Davis v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he procedure which you must follow in arriving at your verdict in this sentencing hearing is set forth in Section 2929.03 of the Revised Code of the State of Ohio ... you must determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the aggravating circumstances, which the defendant, Frank G. Spisak, Jr., has been found guilty of committing in the separate counts are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in this case. If all twelve members of the jury find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances in each separate count outweighs the mitigating factors, then you must return that finding to the Court. I instruct you, as a matter of law, that if you make such a finding, then you must recommend to the Court that a sentence of death be imposed upon the defendant, Frank G. Spisak, Jr. A jury recommendation to the Court that the death penalty be imposed is just that, a recommendation. The final decision is placed by law upon the Court. On the other hand, if after considering all of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence and the testimony received at this hearing and the arguments of counsel, you find that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating cireum- stances which the defendant, Frank G. Spisak, Jr., has been found guilty of committing in the separate counts outweigh the mitigating factors, you will then proceed to determine which of two possible life imprisonment sentences to recommend to the Court”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jackson v. Bradshaw · Spisak v. Mitchell

2. “[Cjombined with the jury verdict form, not only ‘could’ but by its plain language ‘would’ lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the only way to get a life verdict is if the jury unanimously finds that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, an entirely different instruction from one that clearly informs the jurors that a life verdict can be rendered by a jury that has not first unanimously rejected the death penalty.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spisak v. Mitchell · 276 F. Supp. 2d 744 - Madrigal v. Bagley

3. “[S]ilent as to the different unanimity requirements for aggravating and mitigating circumstances, making no mention of the individual juror’s power to prevent the death penalty by giving effect to mitigating circumstances absent the agreement of the other jurors regarding the presence of those mitigating circumstances. Nor do they make clear that the jury need not be unanimous in rejecting death in order to render a verdict for life imprisonment. The inescapable likelihood in this case that the jury understood the instructions to require unanimity in both its ultimate and interim conclusions violates Mills .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 604 F. Supp. 2d 1003 - Sheppard v. Bagley