¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: March 5, 2024
¶4 S23A1091. PALMER v. THE STATE.
¶5 BOGGS, Chief Justice.
¶6 Appellant Willie Williams Palmer challenges his 2023
¶7convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with
¶8the shooting deaths of his estranged wife, Brenda Jenkins Palmer,
¶9and his 15-year-old stepdaughter, Christine Jenkins. He contends
¶10that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; that
¶11the State’s loss or destruction of potential biological evidence from
¶12the crime scene required dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct or
¶13an instruction allowing the jury to draw an inference adverse to the
¶14State; that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present
¶15a defense by excluding evidence of “historical bias against him on
¶16the part of local law enforcement and prosecutors”; that the court
¶17erred in prohibiting him from questioning the lead GBI investigator about a shooting two months after the murders to support his theory
¶18of an alternative suspect and his argument that the investigators
¶19unfairly focused on him as the shooter to the exclusion of other
¶20possible suspects; and that the cumulative effect of the court’s errors
¶21deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. For the reasons that
¶22follow, we affirm.1
¶23 1 The crimes occurred on the night of September 10, 1995. On April 17,
¶241996, a Burke County grand jury indicted Appellant on two counts of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count each of burglary, kidnapping, child cruelty, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Appellant’s first trial in April 1997 ended in a mistrial. At Appellant’s second trial in late October and early November 1997, the jury found him guilty of all charges, and he was sentenced to death. He appealed, and this Court affirmed. See Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234 (517 SE2d 502) (1999). Appellant then filed a petition for habeas corpus, which the habeas court granted, and this Court affirmed the grant of habeas relief. See Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848 (621 SE2d 726) (2005). At Appellant’s third trial in August 2007, he was again found guilty of all charges and sentenced to death. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he amended in 2014, 2015, and 2016. In November 2019, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court granted Appellant’s request for a 30-day extension of time to file a notice of appeal, and in January 2020, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. In August 2020, this Court granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Vacate the Denial of Motion for New Trial and Remand to Enter Consent Judgment Granting a New Trial. On December 14, 2020, the remittitur from this Court was filed in the trial court. On July 7, 2021, the trial court entered a Consent Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for New Trial. At Appellant’s fourth trial from February 2 to 15, 2023, the jury found him guilty of all charges and determined that he is not a person with
¶25 2 1. The evidence at Appellant’s fourth trial showed as
¶26follows. Appellant married Brenda Jenkins Palmer in May 1993,
¶27and they had a daughter, Willshala, in 1994. In May 1995, Brenda
¶28Palmer separated from Appellant and filed for divorce, and the
¶29following day, Appellant was served with a restraining order to stay
¶30away from her. Meanwhile, Brenda Palmer stayed with family and
¶31at some point moved with her daughters, 15-year-old Christine and
¶32one-year-old Willshala, into a two-room house in Vidette. Appellant
¶33owned five acres of land and told numerous people that he would kill
¶34Brenda Palmer if she tried to take it from him.
¶35 On July 31, 1995, Appellant was arrested for violating the
¶36restraining order and put in jail. At the end of August 1995, Brenda
¶37Palmer met with the manager of a small loan company to catch up
¶38intellectual disability. On February 15, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the malice murders, concurrent terms of 20 years each for burglary, kidnapping, and child cruelty, a concurrent term of five years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and a consecutive term of five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; the felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law. On the same day, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed in this Court for the August 2023 term and was orally argued on October 26, 2023. 3 on her payments and update her address. She was very nervous and
¶39upset during the meeting, and the manager promised not to give out
¶40her address to anyone.
¶41 On September 1, 1995, Appellant was released from jail, and
¶42he immediately went to the same small loan company to borrow
¶43money to pay a lawyer. He asked the manager if she had seen
¶44Brenda Palmer, and the manager did not reply. He then asked the
¶45manager if she knew where Brenda Palmer was living, and again
¶46the manager did not reply. Appellant told the manager twice that
¶47she did not have to tell him where Brenda Palmer was, because “I
¶48will find her. And, when I do, I’ll kill that b**ch.” Appellant’s
¶49demeanor was “cold” and “hard,” and he looked different than the
¶50manager had ever seen him before.
¶51 Appellant also was angry with Brenda Smith. Appellant and
¶52Brenda Smith had been in a relationship for 12 to 14 years before
¶53Appellant married Brenda Palmer, and Appellant and Brenda
¶54Smith had three children together. When Brenda Palmer moved out
¶55and filed for divorce, Brenda Smith moved back in with Appellant.
¶56 4 On September 7, 1995, Appellant told Emma Ruth Brown that he
¶57was going to “kill all the Brendas,” that he was going to do it
¶58“execution style,” and that she would “see it on TV.”
¶59 On the afternoon of Sunday, September 10, 1995, Brenda
¶60Smith’s niece, Letrichia Smith, overheard Appellant ask his
¶61nephew, Frederico Palmer, and his son, Wilbur Palmer, where his
¶62gun was. Appellant said that he was “going to kill . . . the two
¶63Brendas.” Appellant then went and spoke with Brenda Smith, who
¶64seemed afraid afterward. Not long after that, Appellant got into his
¶65car and chased Brenda Smith, who was a passenger in her sister’s
¶66car, and Appellant ran into the back of the car. Brenda Smith fled
¶67her sister’s car on foot, and Appellant angrily approached her sister
¶68and told her that she “didn’t know who the f**k [she] was messing
¶69with.”
¶70 That night, Appellant met up with Frederico at a club in Gough
¶71called Soul City and asked Frederico to ride with him to Augusta.
¶72Frederico agreed and got into Appellant’s blue Chevy Caprice, but
¶73Appellant drove towards Vidette instead of Augusta. Appellant
¶74 5 asked Frederico, “Do you think I should kill Brenda and Christine?”
¶75Frederico did not answer.
¶76 When they got to Vidette, Appellant parked his car on the side
¶77of the road near the Vidette Country Store, which was close to
¶78Brenda Palmer’s house. Appellant put on gloves, pulled out his .22-
¶79caliber rifle, and exited the car. At Appellant’s direction, Frederico
¶80parked the car near some dumpsters and caught up to Appellant on
¶81foot outside Brenda Palmer’s house. At Appellant’s request,
¶82Frederico disconnected the telephone line on the side of the house,
¶83making the telephone inside the house inoperable.
¶84 Appellant then went to the front door, knocked twice, and when
¶85there was no answer, he kicked in the door and turned on the light.
¶86Christine, whose nickname was “Bootie,” was sleeping on a bed in
¶87the living room, and Appellant called out, “Bootie, I told y’all I was
¶88coming back.” Appellant shot Christine once in the face with the
¶89rifle, killing her. Appellant then went into the back room, where the
¶90telephone receiver was off the hook and Brenda Palmer was holding
¶91Willshala. Appellant directed Frederico to take the baby, and
¶92 6 Frederico complied, knocking Brenda Palmer to the floor. Frederico
¶93took the baby outside, and Appellant shot Brenda Palmer twice in
¶94the head, killing her. Frederico came back inside and, at Appellant’s
¶95direction, put the baby down and checked to see if Brenda Palmer
¶96had a pulse; she did not. Appellant and Frederico turned out the
¶97light and left, leaving Willshala in the house.
¶98 Frederico went and got the car and picked up Appellant.
¶99Appellant concocted an alibi, telling Frederico to say that they had
¶100driven straight from Gough to Augusta, where they spent the
¶101evening visiting Belle Walker. Appellant and Frederico drove to
¶102Appellant’s house, where Appellant changed clothes, before driving
¶103on towards Augusta. Along the way, they stopped at Brushy Creek
¶104Bridge, where Appellant got out and threw his rifle and the gloves
¶105and shoes that he was wearing at the time of the murders over the
¶106side of the bridge. Later, they stopped at a gas station for cigarettes
¶107before going to Walker’s apartment, where they knocked on the door,
¶108but no one answered. Appellant and Frederico then drove back to
¶109Gough. That night, Frederico told Kelvin Jenkins what had
¶110 7 happened and said that he was scared that Appellant was going to
¶111kill him.
¶112 At around 7:00 a.m. on Monday, September 11, 1995, Brenda
¶113Palmer’s sister, Jellen Jenkins, discovered the bodies of her sister
¶114and Christine and took Willshala out of the house. Within an hour
¶115or so, GBI Special Agent David Leonard began processing the crime
¶116scene. He noticed a small amount of a milky white liquid between
¶117Christine’s legs, but by the time he went to collect it, the substance
¶118had dissipated. Agent Leonard wiped the skin in the area with two
¶119sterile gauze pads, one dry and one moistened with a saline solution,
¶120in an attempt to collect any remnants of the liquid for testing for the
¶121presence of seminal fluid. The gauze pads later tested negative for
¶122seminal fluid.
¶123 At noon on the day the bodies were discovered, the lead GBI
¶124investigator, Special Agent Anthony Williamson, interviewed
¶125Appellant at the Burke County Sheriff’s Office. Appellant said that
¶126the night before, he met up with Frederico a little after 9:00 p.m.
¶127According to Appellant, Frederico then rode with him to Augusta in
¶128 8 Appellant’s blue Chevy Caprice to see a woman, who was not home,
¶129so they drove back to Gough, arriving around 12:55 a.m. At 3:30 p.m.
¶130on September 11, 1995, Agent Williamson interviewed Frederico,
¶131who related essentially the same story as Appellant about riding to
¶132Augusta the prior evening.
¶133 On September 13, 1995, Agent Williamson interviewed
¶134Frederico again. Frederico confessed his involvement with
¶135Appellant in the murders and then led law enforcement officers to
¶136Brushy Creek Bridge, where they recovered a rifle from the creek
¶137below. Two days later, Frederico told Agent Williamson that
¶138Appellant threw the gloves and shoes that he was wearing at the
¶139time of the murders over the side of the bridge along with the rifle,
¶140and the gloves and shoes were then recovered. The shoes from the
¶141creek matched Appellant’s shoe size.
¶142 Ballistics testing showed that two shell casings found at the
¶143crime scene were fired from the rifle recovered from the creek and
¶144that the bullet removed from Christine’s skull during an autopsy,
¶145half of which was missing, “was probably fired from that gun.” The
¶146 9 same rifle had been temporarily confiscated from Appellant during
¶147a traffic stop in 1992.
¶148 Randy Waltower, a paid confidential informant for the GBI in
¶149drug operations, identified Appellant’s car as having been in the
¶150area near Brenda Palmer’s house on the night of the murders.
¶151Appellant’s car was easily recognizable, because it was missing part
¶152of its front grille. Thomas Parrish was with Waltower and also saw
¶153Appellant’s car. Pamela Parker, who worked at the Vidette Country
¶154Store, confirmed that Waltower and Parrish were in the area that
¶155night. Frederico saw Waltower as well. The GBI later paid Waltower
¶156$500 for the information he provided about Appellant and for his
¶157assistance in two other matters.
¶158 On September 19, 1995, GBI Special Agent Robert Ingram,
¶159Agent Williamson’s supervisor, interviewed Appellant, who denied
¶160any involvement in the murders. Near the end of the interview,
¶161Agent Ingram asked Appellant if he had “spoken to the Lord about
¶162what he had done,” and Appellant said that he had. Agent Ingram
¶163asked Appellant, “[D]id you tell the Lord the truth when you talked
¶164 10 to him?” Appellant said that he did. Agent Ingram then asked if that
¶165was different from what Appellant had told the investigators,
¶166including Agent Ingram, and Appellant said, “Yeah, it was
¶167different.” At that point, Appellant said that he wanted to go back
¶168to his jail cell, and Agent Ingram ended the interview.
¶169 The following month, on October 26, 1995, Frederico pled
¶170guilty to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to serve two
¶171consecutive terms of life in prison. In exchange for his plea,
¶172Frederico agreed to cooperate fully and testify truthfully against
¶173Appellant.
¶174 2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting
¶175his claim that the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to a
¶176speedy trial. We disagree.
¶177 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
¶178provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
¶179the right to a speedy . . . trial.” Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims
¶180are analyzed under the two-part framework set out in Barker v.
¶181Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), and Doggett
¶182 11 v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992).
¶183First, the trial court must determine whether the delay at issue was
¶184sufficiently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial. See
¶185Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-531; Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-652 & n.1. If
¶186not, the claim fails at the threshold. See Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52,
¶18755 (663 SE2d 189) (2008) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Doggett,
¶188505 U.S. at 652 n.1). But if the delay has passed the point of
¶189presumptive prejudice, the trial court must proceed to the second
¶190step of the Barker-Doggett analysis. See id.
¶191 The second step of the Barker-Doggett analysis requires the
¶192application of a context-sensitive balancing test to determine
¶193whether the defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy
¶194trial. See id. The four factors that form the core of this balancing test
¶195are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
¶196defendant’s assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant
¶197from the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 56.
¶198See also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651 (describing the four core factors as
¶199“whether [the] delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the
¶200 12 government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that
¶201delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a
¶202speedy trial, and whether [the defendant] suffered prejudice as the
¶203delay’s result”).
¶204 Application of the Barker-Doggett balancing test to particular
¶205cases is committed to the sound discretion of the trial courts. See
¶206Heard v. State, 295 Ga. 559, 563 (761 SE2d 314) (2014). Thus, on
¶207appeal from a ruling on a speedy trial claim, we accept the trial
¶208court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we
¶209review the trial court’s evaluation of each factor and its “balancing
¶210of [the] factors – its ultimate judgment” – “only for abuse of
¶211discretion.” Williams v. State, 314 Ga. 671, 678 (878 SE2d 553)
¶212(2022).
¶213 (a) Length of the Delay and Presumptive Prejudice.
¶214 (i) The Sixth Amendment speedy trial right “does not
¶215attach until . . . a defendant is arrested or formally accused.”
¶216Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 441 (136 SCt 1609, 194 LE2d
¶217723) (2016) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-321
¶218 13 (92 SCt 455, 30 LE2d 468) (1971)). Thus, the length of the delay
¶219ordinarily is measured from the earlier of the date of the defendant’s
¶220arrest or indictment (or other formal accusation) to the date that his
¶221trial started. See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55. See also 5 Wayne R. LaFave
¶222et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.2 (b) (4th ed. Dec. 2023 update) (“In
¶223the usual case, [determining the length of the delay] is simply a
¶224matter of calculating the time which has elapsed from when the
¶225Sixth Amendment right attached until trial (or, until the pretrial
¶226motion to dismiss on this ground is determined).” (footnotes
¶227omitted)). However, the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right
¶228“detaches upon conviction.” Betterman, 578 U.S. at 441. See also id.
¶229at 442 (“As a measure protecting the presumptively innocent, the
¶230speedy trial right . . . loses force upon conviction.”). Like delay prior
¶231to arrest or indictment, the “adverse consequences of postconviction
¶232delay, though subject to other checks [such as due process], are . . .
¶233outside the purview of the Speedy Trial Clause.” Id. at 444 (cleaned
¶234up). See also id. at 448-449 (“The Sixth Amendment speedy trial
¶235right . . . does not extend beyond conviction, which terminates the
¶236 14 presumption of innocence.”). Cf. Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253,
¶237256 (626 SE2d 102) (2006) (“Substantial delays experienced during
¶238the criminal appellate process implicate due process rights.”
¶239(cleaned up)).
¶240 The United States Supreme Court has expressly reserved
¶241decision on whether the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right
¶242“reattaches upon renewed prosecution following a defendant’s
¶243successful appeal, when he again enjoys the presumption of
¶244innocence.” Betterman, 578 U.S. at 441 n.2. We have never directly
¶245addressed whether the speedy trial right reattaches after a
¶246conviction is set aside by the grant of a new trial or reversal on
¶247appeal, but we have assumed without deciding that it does reattach.
¶248See generally Jakupovic v. State, 287 Ga. 205 (695 SE2d 247) (2010)
¶249(new trial); State v. Carr, 278 Ga. 124 (598 SE2d 468) (2004)
¶250(reversal on appeal). When a speedy trial claim is raised following a
¶251retrial, the length of the delay is measured from the date of the order
¶252granting a new trial or the return of the case from the appellate
¶253court to the date that the retrial started. See Jakupovic, 287 Ga. at
¶254 15 206 (new trial); Carr, 278 Ga. at 126 (reversal on appeal). See also 5
¶255Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.1 (c) (4th ed. Dec.
¶2562023 update) (stating that “[i]f, following conviction, defendant’s
¶257motion for a new trial is granted, the length of delay in retrying the
¶258defendant is measured from the date that the trial court ruled on
¶259defendant’s motion,” and that “[u]pon appellate reversal of a
¶260conviction, the speedy trial clock regarding retrial generally starts
¶261as of the time of remand” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 23
¶262CJS Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 798 (Nov. 2023
¶263update) (“The time for speedily bringing a defendant to trial,
¶264pursuant to an order granting a new trial, begins to run anew after
¶265the order is entered.”).
¶266 (ii) At Appellant’s third trial in 2007, he was found
¶267guilty of two counts of malice murder and other crimes and
¶268sentenced to death. He filed a motion for new trial, which he
¶269amended in 2014, 2015, and 2016. In November 2019, the trial court
¶270denied the motion, and he appealed to this Court. On August 7,
¶2712020, the parties filed in this Court a Joint Motion to Vacate the
¶272 16 Denial of Motion for New Trial and Remand to Enter Consent
¶273Judgment Granting a New Trial. On August 24, 2020, this Court
¶274granted the motion, vacated the trial court’s order denying
¶275Appellant’s motion for new trial, and remanded the case to the trial
¶276court for further proceedings. On December 14, 2020, the remittitur
¶277from this Court was filed in the trial court. On July 7, 2021, the trial
¶278court entered a Consent Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for
¶279New Trial.
¶280 The trial court measured the length of the delay from the filing
¶281of the remittitur on December 14, 2020, to the start of Appellant’s
¶282fourth trial on February 2, 2023, a period of approximately two years
¶283and two months, and ruled that this delay was presumptively
¶284prejudicial. However, this Court did not set aside Appellant’s
¶285convictions on appeal following his third trial. Instead, we granted
¶286the parties’ joint motion, vacated the trial court’s order denying
¶287Appellant’s motion for new trial, and remanded the case to the trial
¶288court for further proceedings. On July 7, 2021, the trial court entered
¶289the parties’ consent order granting Appellant a new trial. Only then
¶290 17 did Appellant again enjoy the presumption of innocence. Moreover,
¶291until his convictions were set aside by the grant of a new trial,
¶292double jeopardy barred him from being retried. See Currier v.
¶293Virginia, 585 U.S. 493, 501 (138 SCt 2144, 201 LE2d 650) (2018)
¶294(“As a general rule, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a
¶295second prosecution for the same offense after conviction as well as
¶296against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.”
¶297(cleaned up)). The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment did
¶298not require the State to attempt to retry Appellant at a time when
¶299the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred his
¶300retrial. The trial court therefore should have measured the length of
¶301the delay from the entry of the order granting him a new trial on
¶302July 7, 2021, to the start of his fourth trial on February 2, 2023, a
¶303period of approximately one year and seven months.
¶304 “One year generally marks the point at which expected
¶305deliberateness in the prosecution of a criminal matter turns into
¶306presumptively prejudicial delay.” Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 55 (cleaned up).
¶307Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that the delay at issue was
¶308 18 sufficiently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial. And
¶309because the trial court’s legal error in measuring the length of the
¶310delay favored Appellant, the error does not undermine the
¶311reasonableness of the trial court’s ultimate judgment denying his
¶312speedy trial claim.
¶313 (iii) Appellant agrees that the trial court erred in
¶314measuring the length of the delay but claims that the error was in
¶315the opposite direction. Appellant argues that the trial court should
¶316have measured the length of the delay from his arrest on July 31,
¶3171995, to the start of his fourth trial on February 2, 2023, a period of
¶318more than 27 years. He notes that his first trial in April 1997 ended
¶319in a mistrial when it was discovered that the State had failed to
¶320disclose a statement by Frederico that contradicted his trial
¶321testimony and that his convictions from his second trial in October
¶322and November 1997 were vacated on habeas due to the State’s
¶323failure to disclose the GBI’s $500 payment to Waltower. See Brady
¶324v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963)
¶325(holding that due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the
¶326 19 defense material, exculpatory evidence that is within its possession
¶327or control). Appellant also asserts that there was reversible error in
¶328his third trial in August 2007 due to the State’s failure to disclose
¶329that an expert witness who had previously testified that Appellant
¶330was not intellectually disabled had since revised his opinion and
¶331concluded that Appellant was, in fact, mildly intellectually disabled.
¶332Appellant contends that because his first three trials were tainted
¶333by prosecutorial misconduct in the form of Brady violations, the
¶334length of the delay for purposes of his speedy trial claim should
¶335include the entire period from his arrest in 1995 to the start of his
¶336fourth trial in 2023.
¶337 Appellant’s argument appears to conflict with precedent from
¶338the United States Supreme Court and this Court. See Betterman,
¶339578 U.S. at 439 (“We hold that the [Sixth Amendment speedy trial]
¶340guarantee protects the accused from arrest or indictment through
¶341trial, but does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at
¶342trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.”); Jenkins v. State,
¶343294 Ga. 506, 510 (755 SE2d 138) (2014) (rejecting argument that
¶344 20 because of Brady violations at the defendant’s first trial, the length
¶345of the delay should be measured from the date of the defendant’s
¶346arrest instead of the date of the remittitur from this Court following
¶347affirmance of the habeas court’s judgment setting aside the
¶348defendant’s convictions); Carr, 278 Ga. at 126 (measuring the length
¶349of the delay “from the return of this case to the trial court after this
¶350Court’s 1997 reversal of [the defendant’s] convictions” where this
¶351Court had concluded in the defendant’s direct appeal that the record
¶352supported several of his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, see
¶353Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 711-712 (482 SE2d 314) (1997), overruled
¶354on other grounds by Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 10 (515 SE2d 155)
¶355(1999)). See also Betterman, 578 U.S. at 444 (“Adverse consequences
¶356of postconviction delay, though subject to other checks, are . . .
¶357outside the purview of the Speedy Trial Clause.” (citation omitted)).
¶358However, we need not decide here whether a series of Brady
¶359violations resulting in retrials ever justifies consideration of periods
¶360of time prior to the grant of a new trial or the setting aside of a
¶361defendant’s convictions on appeal in evaluating a speedy trial claim.
¶362 21 See Pelletier v. Warden, 627 A2d 1363, 1372 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)
¶363(suggesting, before Betterman, that where the prosecutorial
¶364misconduct that resulted in the reversal of the defendant’s
¶365convictions was “motivated by a desire to cause additional delay or
¶366otherwise impair the [defendant’s] speedy trial rights,” the time
¶367prior to the reversal may be included in the length of the delay).
¶368 As explained above, after Appellant’s third trial, where the jury
¶369found him guilty of two counts of malice murder and other crimes
¶370and he was again sentenced to death, he appealed to this Court.
¶371While his appeal was pending, the parties filed in this Court a Joint
¶372Motion to Vacate the Denial of Motion for New Trial and Remand to
¶373Enter Consent Judgment Granting a New Trial, which we granted.
¶374The remittitur from this Court was filed in the trial court, and on
¶375July 7, 2021, the trial court entered a consent order granting
¶376Appellant a new trial. Thus, rather than running the risk that at the
¶377end of his appeal, this Court might reject his claims and affirm his
¶378convictions and death sentence, Appellant decided to enter into an
¶379agreement with the State in which the State agreed to the grant of
¶380 22 a new trial and not to seek the death penalty at Appellant’s fourth
¶381trial, and Appellant agreed to be retried and to be eligible for a
¶382sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The
¶383parties explicitly agreed to further proceedings “to entail a jury trial
¶384as to the question of criminal responsibility and a sentencing
¶385determination to be made by the trial court.” The proposed consent
¶386order attached to the parties’ joint motion, which was later entered
¶387by the trial court, explained in the first sentence that the order was
¶388“[b]ased upon agreement and consent of the parties that reversible
¶389error in the trial proceedings of this matter warrant a new trial”
¶390(emphasis added); specifically referred to “trial proceedings to
¶391follow” and a “re-trial”; and referenced a “new trial” three times.
¶392Under these unique circumstances, we conclude that Appellant has
¶393waived any argument that periods prior to the entry of the consent
¶394order should be included in the length of the delay in evaluating his
¶395speedy trial claim raised in connection with his fourth trial,
¶396regardless of the violations of his Brady rights in his previous trials.
¶397See Currier, 585 U.S. at 501-502 (“Retrial is generally allowed when
¶398 23 the defendant consents to a disposition that contemplates
¶399reprosecution.” (cleaned up)).
¶400 (b) Barker-Doggett Balancing Test.
¶401 (i) Length of the Delay Beyond the Point of Presumptive
¶402Prejudice. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in weighing
¶403the length-of-the-delay factor “only slightly against the State.” In
¶404applying the Barker-Doggett balancing test, the trial court was
¶405required to consider, as one factor among several, “the extent to
¶406which the delay stretche[d] beyond the bare minimum needed to
¶407trigger judicial examination of [Appellant’s Sixth Amendment
¶408speedy trial] claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. As explained above,
¶409the trial court should have measured the length of the delay from
¶410the entry of the order granting him a new trial on July 7, 2021, to
¶411the start of his fourth trial on February 2, 2023, a period of
¶412approximately one year and seven months.
¶413 The trial court made no express finding regarding the extent to
¶414which this one-year-and-seven-month delay stretched beyond the
¶415point of presumptive prejudice. However,
¶416 24 a delay approaching one year is sufficient in most cases to raise a presumption of prejudice and to warrant a more searching inquiry, keeping in mind that the delay that can be tolerated in a particular case depends to some extent on the complexity and seriousness of the charges.
¶417Heard, 295 Ga. at 564-565 (cleaned up). Thus, at most, the length of
¶418the delay extended beyond the point of presumptive prejudice by a
¶419span of only seven months. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial
¶420court’s decision to weigh the length-of-the-delay factor only slightly
¶421against the State in the balancing test. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-
¶422656 (“While . . . presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth
¶423Amendment [speedy trial] claim without regard to the other Barker
¶424criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance
¶425increases with the length of delay.” (citation omitted)); United States
¶426v. Otero, No. 23-1266, 2023 WL 8947133, at *1 (8th Cir. Dec. 28,
¶4272023) (weighing a delay of approximately one year and six months
¶428“only slightly” in the defendant’s favor after noting that the delay,
¶429while presumptively prejudicial, “did not stretch far beyond” the
¶430point of presumptive prejudice).
¶431 25 (ii) Reason for the Delay. The trial court weighed the
¶432reason-for-the-delay factor in the State’s favor. Appellant contends
¶433that the trial court erred in doing so, but most of his arguments
¶434relate to periods that preceded the delay at issue. With respect to
¶435the relevant delay – the approximately one year and seven months
¶436from the entry of the order granting him a new trial on July 7, 2021,
¶437to the start of his fourth trial on February 2, 2023 – he does not
¶438allege, and the record does not suggest, any “deliberate delay to
¶439hamper the defense,” which would be weighed heavily against the
¶440State. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (129 SCt 1283, 173 LE2d
¶441231) (2009) (cleaned up). To the contrary, the trial court expressly
¶442found that the prosecutors worked diligently to bring the case to
¶443trial during the relevant period, and the record fully supports that
¶444finding. Instead, Appellant argues merely that the trial court abused
¶445its discretion in failing to weigh the reason-for-the-delay factor
¶446“marginally” against the State. We see no abuse of discretion.
¶447 The trial court pointed to two reasons for the delay from July
¶4487, 2021, to February 2, 2023: (1) the filing of “numerous Defense
¶449 26 motions” by Appellant; and (2) the recusal of two judges to whom the
¶450case was assigned. 2 The trial court found the periods of judicial
¶451reassignment to be “neutral,” essentially concluding that neither
¶452Appellant nor the State was more to blame for them. The trial court
¶453then found that, on balance, the delay was beyond the State’s control
¶454and exercised its discretion to weigh the reason-for-the-delay factor
¶455in the State’s favor.
¶456 The record supports the trial court’s finding that, as between
¶457Appellant and the State, Appellant was more to blame for the
¶458relevant delay. Appellant does not contend that the trial court erred
¶459in weighing the periods of judicial reassignment neutrally. As for the
¶460“numerous Defense motions,” Appellant filed more than three dozen
¶461pretrial motions between July 7, 2021, and February 2, 2023, which
¶462took multiple hearings and months to resolve. See id. (“Delay caused
¶463by the defense weighs against the defendant . . . .” (cleaned up));
¶464 2 The first of the two judges voluntarily recused himself in response to a
¶465motion to recuse filed by Appellant. The second judge explained that she recused herself in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety after Appellant subpoenaed the chief judge of her judicial circuit to testify at a hearing. 27 Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 (explaining that “pretrial delay is often both
¶466inevitable and wholly justifiable,” that “the government may need
¶467time to,” among other things, “oppose [the defendant’s] pretrial
¶468motions,” and that “we attach great weight to such considerations”
¶469(cleaned up)). See also Jenkins, 294 Ga. at 512 (“While defense
¶470counsel felt the responsibility to file and pursue the motions and
¶471pleas, it did not alter the fact that the case would have been brought
¶472to trial but for the need to hear and rule on them.” (cleaned up)). In
¶473light of the numerous pretrial motions filed by Appellant, as well as
¶474the trial court’s express finding of prosecutorial diligence in bringing
¶475the case to trial following the grant of a new trial, we hold that the
¶476trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the reason-for-
¶477the-delay factor in the State’s favor (and thus against Appellant).
¶478 (iii) Assertion of the Right. Appellant filed a Demand for
¶479Speedy Trial on July 15, 2021, eight days after the entry of the order
¶480granting him a new trial. The trial court found that since that time,
¶481Appellant “consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial.” The
¶482trial court therefore exercised its discretion to weigh the assertion-
¶483 28 of-the-right factor in Appellant’s favor (and thus against the State).
¶484Appellant does not argue that the trial court abused its discretion in
¶485weighing this factor in his favor, and we see no abuse of discretion.
¶486 (iv) Prejudice to the Defendant from the Delay. In the
¶487speedy trial context, the United States Supreme Court has identified
¶488three types of prejudice that are relevant: (1) oppressive pretrial
¶489incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern resulting from public
¶490accusation; and (3) impairment of the accused’s ability to defend
¶491against the charges due to dimming memories and loss of
¶492exculpatory evidence. See Betterman, 578 U.S. at 442; Doggett, 505
¶493U.S. at 654. The trial court found that Appellant failed to show that
¶494he suffered any such prejudice in the approximately one year and
¶495seven months from the entry of the order granting him a new trial
¶496on July 7, 2021, to the start of his fourth trial on February 2, 2023,
¶497and therefore exercised its discretion to weigh the prejudice-to-the-
¶498defendant factor against Appellant.
¶499 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that he
¶500failed to show prejudice, but again, most of his arguments relate to
¶501 29 periods of time that preceded the relevant delay. For example, he
¶502points to his years on death row living under the threat of execution
¶503in an attempt to show that he suffered oppressive pretrial
¶504incarceration, circumstances that no longer existed after he was
¶505granted a new trial on July 7, 2021. And as evidence of his anxiety
¶506and concern resulting from public accusation, he points to his pro se
¶507filings during periods of time that preceded the grant of a new trial.
¶508 Appellant’s claims of impairment to his defense likewise relate
¶509primarily to periods of time before July 7, 2021. For example, he
¶510argues that the delay deprived him of the opportunity to elicit
¶511testimony from his niece, Theresa Wilson, about statements that
¶512Brenda Smith allegedly made in 1995, because Wilson had died by
¶513the time of his fourth trial. But Wilson died on August 10, 2020,
¶514approximately 11 months before the grant of a new trial on July 7,
¶5152021, so any prejudice to the defense from her unavailability cannot
¶516properly be attributed to the relevant delay. See Higgenbottom v.
¶517State, 290 Ga. 198, 203 (719 SE2d 482) (2011) (holding that the
¶518death of a witness did not constitute prejudice to the defendant
¶519 30 where the witness died “prior to the attachment of his constitutional
¶520rights to a speedy trial”).
¶521 Appellant also points to memory loss by a number of witnesses
¶522due to the passage of time between the murders in 1995 and his
¶523fourth trial in 2023. However, the trial court found that Appellant
¶524failed to show prejudice from the dimming of memories, because the
¶525witnesses had testified under oath and been subject to cross-
¶526examination at Appellant’s first three trials, and the transcripts
¶527from the prior trials had crystallized their memories and provided a
¶528source of testimony from witnesses who were no longer available.
¶529The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant
¶530failed to show prejudice in this regard. See Jakupovic, 287 Ga. at
¶531207-208 (holding, in the context of a retrial, that the trial court did
¶532not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant failed to show
¶533prejudice from the unavailability of two witnesses where transcripts
¶534of their testimony from his first trial were available).
¶535 Appellant argues as well that his defense was impaired by the
¶536inability of Pam Wilson and Alvin Brown to remember certain
¶537 31 events from 1995 by the time of his fourth trial in 2023. At a hearing
¶538on April 22, 2022, Wilson denied having told Agent Williamson in
¶5391995 that she saw Brenda Smith and her sister take something out
¶540of Appellant’s car on the day of the murders. But the jury at
¶541Appellant’s fourth trial was aware of Wilson’s alleged statement,
¶542because Appellant asked Agent Williamson about it on cross-
¶543examination. Thus, Appellant has not shown prejudice to his
¶544defense from Wilson’s lack of memory.
¶545 As for Brown, according to a Burke County Sheriff’s Office
¶546incident report dated July 18, 1995, Frederico beat Alvin Brown
¶547with a board at a club in Gough, leaving Brown with cuts and
¶548scrapes around his right shoulder. At a hearing on November 17,
¶5492022, Brown testified that he had no recollection of the incident,
¶550although he did not deny that it happened. Appellant argues that
¶551his defense was impaired, because Brown’s memory loss left him
¶552unable to establish acts of violence by Frederico in the same year as
¶553the murders. But the jury at Appellant’s fourth trial knew that
¶554Frederico had pled guilty to two counts of felony murder in
¶555 32 connection with the deaths of Brenda Palmer and Christine.
¶556Appellant therefore failed to show prejudice from Brown’s lack of
¶557memory.
¶558 Finally, Appellant argues that at some point after his third
¶559trial in 2007, the State lost or destroyed potential biological evidence
¶560from the crime scene, which impaired his defense at his fourth trial.
¶561Specifically, he claims that his defense was impaired by his inability
¶562to perform independent testing on the two gauze pads that Agent
¶563Leonard used to wipe the skin between Christine’s legs where a
¶564milky white liquid had pooled and then dissipated. However, the
¶565trial court expressly found that the gauze pads were not exculpatory,
¶566because the GBI performed serological testing on them in 1995, and
¶567the results were negative for the presence of semen. The trial court
¶568also noted that Appellant did not seek to independently test the
¶569gauze pads during his first three trials, when they were still
¶570available for testing. Appellant has not shown that the trial court’s
¶571finding that the potential biological evidence lacked exculpatory
¶572value is clearly erroneous.
¶573 33 In sum, the record supports the trial court’s finding that
¶574Appellant failed to show that he suffered any relevant prejudice
¶575from this delay at issue. The trial court therefore did not abuse its
¶576discretion in weighing this factor against Appellant.
¶577 (v) Conclusion. The trial court weighed the assertion-of-
¶578the-right factor against the State and the length-of-the-delay factor
¶579slightly against the State but weighed the reason-for-the-delay
¶580factor and the prejudice-to-the-defendant factor against Appellant.
¶581The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the weights it assigned
¶582to these factors or in concluding, on balance, that the scales tipped
¶583against Appellant. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
¶584rejecting Appellant’s speedy trial claim.
¶585 3. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his
¶586motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his due process
¶587rights were violated by the State’s loss or destruction of the potential
¶588biological evidence discussed above. Alternatively, he claims that
¶589the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury that
¶590 34 it could draw an adverse inference against the State from the loss or
¶591destruction of the evidence. Both claims fail.
¶592 “When the State suppresses or fails to disclose material
¶593exculpatory evidence, the good or bad faith of the prosecution is
¶594irrelevant: a due process violation occurs whenever such evidence is
¶595withheld.” Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (124 SCt 1200, 157
¶596LE2d 1060) (2004) (cleaned up). However, due process “‘requires a
¶597different result when we deal with the failure of the State to
¶598preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than
¶599that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might
¶600have exonerated the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Arizona v.
¶601Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (109 SCt 333, 102 LE2d 281) (1988)).
¶602The State’s “failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
¶603constitute a denial of due process of law” unless the defendant can
¶604show “bad faith” on the part of the State in the failure to preserve
¶605the evidence. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. The applicability of the
¶606bad-faith requirement does not depend on “the centrality of the
¶607 35 contested evidence to the prosecution’s case or the defendant’s
¶608defense.” Fisher, 540 U.S. at 549.
¶609 The trial court determined that the potential biological
¶610evidence in this case had no apparent exculpatory value at the time
¶611that it was lost or destroyed. To the contrary, serological testing of
¶612the gauze pads was negative for the presence of semen. At best, the
¶613gauze pads were “potentially useful evidence” for the defense.
¶614Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. See also Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-549
¶615(distinguishing “material exculpatory evidence” from mere
¶616“potentially useful evidence” (cleaned up)). The trial court found that
¶617“nothing in the record indicates that the State acted in bad faith in
¶618failing to preserve” the potential biological evidence, and our review
¶619of the record confirms the trial court’s finding in this regard. Thus,
¶620Appellant’s due process rights were not violated, and the trial court
¶621did not err in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on
¶622an alleged due process violation.
¶623 Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in denying his
¶624oral request to instruct the jury that it could infer from the fact that
¶625 36 the State lost or destroyed the potential biological evidence that the
¶626results of laboratory analysis would have been favorable to the
¶627defense. However, there is no legal basis in Georgia law for giving a
¶628spoliation, or adverse inference, jury instruction in a criminal case.
¶629To the contrary, we have held that it is inappropriate to give a
¶630spoliation instruction in a criminal case, see Howard v. State, 307
¶631Ga. 12, 18-19 & n.9 (834 SE2d 11) (2019), disapproved on other
¶632grounds by Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876, 889 n.11 (885 SE2d 725)
¶633(2023), even when the instruction is requested by the defendant, see
¶634Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50, 53 (302 SE2d 555) (1983). Accordingly,
¶635the trial court did not err in refusing to give Appellant’s requested
¶636jury instruction.3
¶637 4. Appellant asserts that the trial court violated his
¶638constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence of
¶639 3 Howard and Radford relied on former OCGA § 24-4-22. However, that
¶640provision was carried forward substantially unchanged into Georgia’s current Evidence Code as OCGA § 24-14-22, and it has no counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, “our case law interpreting that former provision applies.” State v. Almanza, 304 Ga. 553, 557 (820 SE2d 1) (2018). 37 “historical bias against him on the part of local law enforcement and
¶641prosecutors.” This claim fails.
¶642 Appellant’s claim is based on the trial court’s pretrial rulings
¶643precluding him from introducing three categories of evidence:
¶644(1) evidence that the State violated his Brady rights at his first three
¶645trials by failing to disclose evidence favorable to the defense;
¶646(2) evidence that he filed a federal civil rights complaint against a
¶647deputy in the Burke County Sheriff’s Office in 1978; and (3) evidence
¶648that the accusations against him in 1995 were used in a successful
¶649campaign to keep a superior court judge who was appointed shortly
¶650before the murders from being elected to a full term the following
¶651year. 4 Appellant does not contend that the trial court abused its
¶652discretion in excluding this evidence under the Georgia Evidence
¶653Code. See OCGA §§ 24-4-402 (relevant evidence generally is
¶654admissible; irrelevant evidence is inadmissible), 24-4-403 (relevant
¶655 4 Appellant also refers in passing to the trial court’s denial of his request
¶656to instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference against the State from the loss or destruction of the potential biological evidence. Appellant’s jury instruction request is discussed in Division 3 above. 38 evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
¶657outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice,
¶658confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or considerations of
¶659undue delay or waste of time). Instead, he contends that the
¶660exclusion of the evidence pursuant to the Georgia Evidence Code
¶661violated his federal constitutional right to present a defense, citing
¶662State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 121 (829 SE2d 367) (2019) (“The Due
¶663Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment . . . guarantees
¶664criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
¶665defense.” (cleaned up)).
¶666 The United States Constitution guarantees criminal
¶667defendants the “right to present a defense.” United States v.
¶668Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 (118 SCt 1261, 140 LE2d 413) (1998)
¶669(cleaned up). However, “state and federal rulemakers have broad
¶670latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence
¶671from criminal trials.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (133 SCt
¶6721990, 186 LE2d 62) (2013) (cleaned up). The routine application of
¶673well-established rules of evidence like OCGA §§ 24-4-402 and 24-4-
¶674 39 403 to exclude irrelevant evidence, or relevant evidence whose
¶675probative value is substantially outweighed by factors such as the
¶676danger unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or the potential to
¶677mislead the jury, does not violate a defendant’s constitutional right
¶678to present a defense. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,
¶679326-327 (126 SCt 1727, 164 LE2d 503) (2006) (noting that such rules
¶680are “familiar and unquestionably constitutional,” and stating that
¶681“the Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is
¶682repetitive, only marginally relevant[,] or poses an undue risk of
¶683harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues” (cleaned up)). The
¶684constitutional right to present a defense is abridged only “by
¶685evidence rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused
¶686and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
¶687designed to serve.” Id. at 324 (cleaned up). See also id. at 326
¶688(explaining that “the Constitution . . . prohibits the exclusion of
¶689defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or
¶690that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to
¶691promote”). “Only rarely” has the United States Supreme Court held
¶692 40 that the “right to present a complete defense was violated by the
¶693exclusion of defense evidence under a state rule of evidence.”
¶694Jackson, 569 U.S. at 509.
¶695 Appellant does not argue that OCGA §§ 24-4-402 and 24-4-403
¶696are “arbitrary” or “disproportionate to the purposes they are
¶697designed to serve,” and he has made no such showing here.
¶698Moreover, this case bears no resemblance to cases in which the
¶699United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusion of
¶700evidence pursuant to state evidentiary rules violated a defendant’s
¶701constitutional right to present a defense. Cf., e.g., Rock v. Arkansas,
¶702483 U.S. 44, 57-62 (107 SCt 2704, 97 LE2d 37) (1987) (holding that
¶703an evidentiary rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony
¶704violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense
¶705where it prevented the defendant, who was accused of a killing to
¶706which she was the sole eyewitness, from testifying in her own
¶707defense); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-302 (93 SCt
¶7081038, 35 LE2d 297) (1973) (holding that the denial of a murder
¶709defendant’s motion to treat as an adverse witness a man who had
¶710 41 confessed to the charged murder but later retracted the confession,
¶711combined with the exclusion of the testimony of three witnesses to
¶712whom the man had confessed on hearsay grounds, violated the
¶713defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense); Washington v.
¶714Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19-23 (87 SCt 1920, 18 LE2d 1019) (1967)
¶715(holding that a murder defendant’s constitutional right to present a
¶716defense was violated when he was prevented from calling as a
¶717witness a man who had been convicted of the same murder based on
¶718two evidentiary statutes preventing persons charged or convicted as
¶719participants in committing the same crime from testifying for one
¶720another). Furthermore, Appellant does not cite, and we have not
¶721found, a case from any court holding that the exclusion of evidence
¶722alleged to show “historical bias” against a defendant “on the part of
¶723local law enforcement and prosecutors” under standard rules of
¶724evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional right to present a
¶725defense.
¶726 Evidence relating to the State’s prior Brady violations,
¶727Appellant’s civil rights complaint from the late 1970s, and a 1996
¶728 42 judicial election was at best tangential to the issues at Appellant’s
¶729fourth trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
¶730in excluding this evidence, much less violate Appellant’s
¶731constitutional right to present a defense.
¶732 5. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
¶733prohibiting him from questioning Agent Williamson about a drug-
¶734related shooting two months after the murders in which a man
¶735named Ricardo Chandler shot and killed Appellant’s teenage son
¶736Wilbur. Wilbur was arguing with a woman who said that since he
¶737was selling drugs in her front yard, he should be sharing the profits
¶738with her. When Chandler intervened in the argument, Wilbur pulled
¶739out a gun and started shooting at him, and Chandler then shot and
¶740killed Wilbur in self-defense. According to Appellant, the prohibited
¶741questioning would have allowed him to show that Wilbur was the
¶742person who committed the murders with Frederico, not Appellant,
¶743and that the investigators unfairly focused on Appellant to the
¶744exclusion of other possible suspects.
¶745 43 Certainly a defendant is entitled to introduce relevant and admissible testimony tending to show that another person committed the crime for which the defendant is tried. However, the proffered evidence must raise a reasonable inference of the defendant’s innocence, and must directly connect the other person with the corpus delicti, or show that the other person has recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature.
¶746Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 573 (501 SE2d 810) (1998) (citation
¶747omitted). See also OCGA § 24-4-403 (permitting trial courts to
¶748exclude even relevant evidence “if its probative value is
¶749substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
¶750confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury”); Holmes, 547 U.S. at
¶751327 & n.*, 330 (citing Klinect and explaining that rules like the one
¶752adopted in Klinect “are widely accepted” and are “designed . . . to
¶753focus the trial on the central issues by excluding evidence that has
¶754only a very weak logical connection to the central issues”); Moss v.
¶755State, 298 Ga. 613, 616-617 & n.4 (783 SE2d 652) (2016) (applying
¶756Klinect’s rule regarding the admissibility of third-party guilt
¶757evidence in a case decided under Georgia’s current Evidence Code
¶758based on OCGA § 24-4-403). Third-party guilt evidence “that merely
¶759 44 casts a bare suspicion on another or raises a conjectural inference as
¶760to the commission of the crime by another is not admissible.” Roberts
¶761v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 261 (824 SE2d 326) (2019) (cleaned up). See
¶762also Moss, 298 Ga. at 616 (holding that the trial court did not abuse
¶763its discretion in preventing the defendant from questioning two
¶764witnesses about a prior shooting of the victim to show that there
¶765were other potential suspects in the victim’s murder, because the
¶766court was not required to allow the defendant to introduce evidence
¶767“based purely on rumor, speculation, and conjecture” (cleaned up)).
¶768 The testimony that Appellant sought to elicit from Agent
¶769Williamson would not have raised a reasonable inference of
¶770Appellant’s innocence. At most, it would have cast “bare suspicion”
¶771on Wilbur or raised a “conjectural inference” that he was somehow
¶772involved in the murders with Appellant and Frederico. Roberts, 305
¶773Ga. at 261 (cleaned up). It also would not have shown that Agent
¶774Williamson unfairly focused on Appellant to the exclusion of a viable
¶775alternate suspect, as there was no evidence of animus on the part of
¶776Wilbur towards Brenda Palmer or Christine and no evidence that
¶777 45 Wilbur had the opportunity to commit the murders, either alone or
¶778with Appellant and Frederico. Nothing linked Wilbur to the
¶779murders. See Roberts, 305 Ga. at 261 (“Even if opportunity could be
¶780inferred, nothing linked this third party to the murder.” (cleaned
¶781up)). To the extent that Appellant was attempting to show Wilbur’s
¶782participation in the murders based solely on the fact that he had
¶783“recently committed a crime of the same or similar nature,” Klinect,
¶784269 Ga. at 573, the testimony that he sought to elicit was
¶785inadmissible character evidence. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
¶786(“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible
¶787to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
¶788conformity therewith. . . .”). Accordingly, the trial court did not
¶789abuse its discretion in precluding Appellant from questioning Agent
¶790Williamson about the drug-related shooting with no apparent
¶791connection to this case that resulted in Wilbur’s death two months
¶792after the murders.
¶793 6. Finally, Appellant claims that the cumulative effect of the
¶794trial court’s errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. See
¶795 46 State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17-18 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). However, as
¶796explained above, Appellant has not shown any error by the trial
¶797court. Accordingly, cumulative error analysis is inapplicable. See
¶798Wynn v. State, 313 Ga. 827, 840 (874 SE2d 42) (2022) (“Cumulative
¶799error analysis . . . requires an appellant to show that at least two
¶800errors were committed in the course of the trial.” (cleaned up)).
¶801 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶802 47