¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: March 19, 2024
¶4 S24A0105. HOWARD v. THE STATE.
¶5 PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
¶6 Marquavious Howard appeals his felony murder conviction for
¶7the 2017 shooting death of Jacorbin King. 1 Howard argues that (1)
¶8 1 The victim’s first name was spelled “Jakorbin” in the indictment but
¶9“Jacorbin” in the trial transcript and the District Attorney’s brief on appeal. King was shot and killed on the morning of April 30, 2017. On January 30, 2018, a Muscogee County grand jury returned an indictment charging Howard with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). Four others — Jylonda Jones, Samuel Jones, Tyler Teal, and Tramal Williams — were also charged with Counts 1-3, and Samuel Jones, Tyler Teal, and Tramal Williams were charged with other crimes, as well. Tramal Williams testified at Howard’s trial that he expected his case to be transferred to juvenile court, while Howard’s other three codefendants pleaded guilty to charges less than murder. At a trial held in May 2018, a jury found Howard not guilty of malice murder or the firearm count, but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Howard to life with the possibility of parole for felony murder; the aggravated assault count merged. Howard filed a timely motion for new trial that was amended by appellate counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in an order entered on May 23, 2022. Howard filed a notice of appeal on June 22, 2022. Because the record transmitted to this Court was incomplete, the appeal was stricken from the docket on April 19, 2023. Upon transmission the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) his trial
¶10counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress
¶11evidence of a photo identification, and (3) the trial court erred in
¶12excusing a juror for cause. We conclude that (1) the evidence was
¶13sufficient, (2) Howard has not shown that counsel performed
¶14deficiently in failing to move to suppress evidence of the photo
¶15identification, and (3) Howard’s juror claim fails because he has not
¶16shown that the selected jury was biased or incompetent. We
¶17therefore affirm.
¶18 The evidence at trial showed as follows. On the night of April
¶1929, 2017, a group of teenagers, including Tramal Williams
¶20(“Tramal”), Samuel Jones (“Sam”), and Tyler Teal, went to King’s
¶21Muscogee County apartment, planning to steal marijuana. Teal
¶22carried a BB gun, and Sam carried his father’s firearm. At the
¶23apartment, Tramal grabbed the marijuana and began to run out,
¶24causing a fight that spilled out into the hallway. During the scuffle,
¶25of a more complete record, the case was redocketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2023 and submitted for consideration on the briefs. 2 Sam fell down a stairwell and lost some belongings, including his
¶26father’s gun.
¶27 Agitated about losing the items, Sam began making phone
¶28calls, asking for another gun and threatening to kill someone. Sam
¶29called his older sister, Jylonda Jones (“Jylonda”), who lived in
¶30Hoover, Alabama, and asked for her help; she agreed to come pick
¶31him up and asked her 21-year-old boyfriend, Howard, to accompany
¶32her on the approximately two-and-a-half-hour drive. On the
¶33morning of April 30, 2017, Jylonda and Howard picked up Tramal,
¶34Sam, and Teal in a white Toyota Camry and drove to King’s
¶35apartment. Everyone went inside except for Jylonda. The group
¶36initially came back to the car after being unable to find Sam’s
¶37belongings, but then went back in a few minutes later after Howard
¶38noted a bedroom door had been locked. After the group reentered the
¶39apartment, King emerged from behind the locked bedroom door, a
¶40struggle ensued, and Howard shot King multiple times.
¶41 Tramal testified that he saw Howard with a firearm magazine
¶42on the morning of the shooting. Tramal testified that King “barged
¶43 3 out into” Howard when King came out of the bedroom, then Tramal
¶44heard gunshots as he ran out of the apartment building.
¶45 Sam testified that he saw Howard with a handgun just before
¶46the group entered King’s apartment for the last time. Sam testified
¶47that Teal became entangled with King when King “bust out of the
¶48[bed]room[,]” and King made contact with Howard’s person, with
¶49King “go[ing] for [Howard’s] mouth area.” Sam testified that he
¶50pulled Teal off of King, then heard shots as he and Teal ran out of
¶51the apartment.
¶52 Teal testified that he heard one shot while he was trying to
¶53break up a fight between Howard and King, then ran away. Teal
¶54testified that Howard was the only other member of their group who
¶55was in the apartment when the victim was shot. Teal testified that
¶56he did not see Howard with a gun but saw him clutching his pants
¶57in such a manner that he could have been holding one.
¶58 Jylonda testified that she knew Howard to have a weapon
¶59generally. Sam, Teal, and Tramal all testified that none of the three
¶60of them had a firearm in the apartment on the morning of the
¶61 4 shooting.
¶62 A neighbor who heard the shooting, Rodrell Williams, saw the
¶63group entering and leaving the apartment building. The neighbor
¶64said a person matching Howard’s description was carrying a
¶65weapon, and was accompanied by three others who looked like “little
¶66kids.” Rodrell’s wife called 911 around 7:00 a.m. and testified that
¶67she heard gunshots while she was on that call.
¶68 Surveillance video capturing the area adjacent to King’s
¶69apartment building showed the arrival of a white sedan on the
¶70morning of April 30, 2017, then a group of four young men twice
¶71walking away from, then running back toward, the car. In their trial
¶72testimony, Jylonda, Sam, and Tramal identified Howard on the
¶73surveillance video as being part of the group.
¶74 A jail bunkmate of Howard, Merrick Redding, testified that
¶75Howard confessed to shooting King. According to Redding, Howard
¶76told him that he rode to Columbus with his girlfriend to retrieve her
¶77brother, then went to King’s apartment to retrieve a gun, shoe, and
¶78glasses that had been lost in a botched robbery, and that when King
¶79 5 burst through a locked door, Howard shot him multiple times with
¶80a .40-caliber, FN-brand pistol. Redding reported that Howard told
¶81him that King and Teal had tussled, and King hit Howard in the
¶82mouth. According to Redding, Howard first shot King in the side,
¶83then fired more shots as King was falling, then finally, because
¶84Howard was upset about being hit in the mouth, Howard shot King
¶85in the head, firing a total of four to six shots.
¶86 A firearms expert testified that the shell casings recovered
¶87from the scene were consistent with having been fired by, among
¶88other possible types of guns, a .40-caliber FN handgun and had all
¶89been ejected from the same firearm. The expert also testified that
¶90bullets recovered from the scene, as well as two bullets recovered
¶91from King’s body, were consistent with having been fired by a .40-
¶92caliber FN handgun and had all been fired from the same firearm.
¶93The autopsy of King revealed four gunshot wounds, one in the head
¶94and three in the abdomen or torso, with at least one indicating a
¶95bullet entered the left side of the victim. The medical examiner
¶96testified that the distance between King and the gun when it was
¶97 6 discharged could not be determined.
¶98 1. Howard first argues that the evidence was insufficient to
¶99support his felony murder conviction. We disagree.
¶100 When evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence, we view the
¶101evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts and inquire
¶102whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
¶103beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
¶104319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “Under this review, we must
¶105put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of
¶106witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of
¶107such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.” Mims v. State, 304
¶108Ga. 851, 853 (1) (a) (823 SE2d 325) (2019) (citation and punctuation
¶109omitted).
¶110 To support Howard’s conviction for felony murder, the evidence
¶111presented at trial had to show that he caused King’s death while in
¶112the commission of an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See
¶113OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). The relevant portion of Georgia’s aggravated
¶114assault statute requires the prosecution to show that a defendant
¶115 7 committed assault “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object,
¶116device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person,
¶117is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury[.]” OCGA
¶118§ 16-5-21 (a) (2). The crime of assault in Georgia requires that the
¶119defendant “[a]ttempt[ed] to commit a violent injury to the person of
¶120another; or . . . [c]ommit[ted] an act which place[d] another in
¶121reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.”
¶122OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). A jury may find a defendant guilty beyond a
¶123reasonable doubt if the evidence shows either that he directly
¶124committed the crime or that he was a “party thereto.” OCGA § 16-2-
¶12520 (a). And a jury may infer a defendant’s criminal intent, and
¶126thereby find him guilty as a party to a crime, “from his presence,
¶127companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the offense.”
¶128Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 24 (2) (880 SE2d 158) (2022) (citation and
¶129punctuation omitted).
¶130 Howard appears to argue that the evidence (1) was insufficient
¶131to show that he directly committed felony murder, because the
¶132evidence did not show that he shot King, and (2) was insufficient to
¶133 8 support his conviction on a party-to-the-crime theory, given a lack of
¶134evidence that the group that entered King’s apartment the morning
¶135of the shooting planned anything other than retrieving a weapon.
¶136Howard does not challenge the evidence showing that he was in
¶137King’s apartment when King was shot, instead arguing that the
¶138evidence was “insufficient to prove anything other than Howard was
¶139merely present at the scene[.]”But there was ample evidence
¶140showing that he was the person who shot Howard. Tramal, Sam,
¶141and Teal all testified that none of the three had a firearm, and they
¶142all testified that they either saw Howard with a gun or that he
¶143appeared to have one. This testimony was supported by the
¶144testimony of King’s neighbor that he saw someone matching
¶145Howard’s description carrying a gun. Teal also testified that Howard
¶146was the only other member of their group who was in the apartment
¶147when he heard King being shot. Moreover, Howard admitted to a jail
¶148bunkmate that he shot King in the head and torso with a .40-caliber
¶149FN pistol. And that account by the jail bunkmate was corroborated
¶150by ballistics evidence consistent with King having been shot with a
¶151 9 .40-caliber FN handgun and autopsy findings that King was shot in
¶152the head and torso.
¶153 Howard also appears to suggest that the evidence was
¶154insufficient to show that he shot King because the jury necessarily
¶155found that he was not the shooter when the jury found him not guilty
¶156of the firearm possession count. But an acquittal on one count is not
¶157itself a basis to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to
¶158another count. See Kolokouris v. State, 271 Ga. 597, 598 (2) (523
¶159SE2d 311) (1999); see also McElrath v. State, 308 Ga. 104, 108-109
¶160(2) (a) (839 SE2d 573) (2020) (noting abolition of rule that
¶161inconsistent verdicts warrant reversal).
¶162 Although Howard suggests that the evidence was insufficient
¶163to show that he had the requisite intent to be guilty of the crime of
¶164conviction, “[f]elony murder requires only that the defendant
¶165possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying
¶166felony — in this case, aggravated assault, which also does not
¶167require intent to kill.” Mathews v. State, 314 Ga. 360, 365 (1) (877
¶168SE2d 188) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted)). And the jury
¶169 10 could infer that Howard himself had the intent to injure King
¶170violently when he shot at him multiple times, including in the head.
¶171Howard has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
¶172his conviction.
¶173 2. Howard next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
¶174failing to file a motion to suppress evidence of a photo identification
¶175of him by Tramal that Howard argues was based on an
¶176impermissibly suggestive process. We disagree.
¶177 As memorialized in a video recording that is part of the record,
¶178Tramal was shown a group of individual photos during an interview
¶179by investigators. He indicated, with some uncertainty, that one of
¶180the photos looked like Sam’s sister’s boyfriend, whom he knew as
¶181“Quay” and had not met prior to the morning of the shooting. Later
¶182in the interview, Tramal was shown what appeared to be a one-page
¶183photo array of six headshots, and definitively selected one of the
¶184photos as “Quay,” stating affirmatively that he was sure it was him.
¶185A detective who interviewed Tramal and was present for the photo
¶186array presentations explained in his trial testimony that the initial
¶187 11 group of photos was taken from photos posted on Facebook, whereas
¶188the second array included a driver’s license photo of Howard.
¶189 During Tramal’s trial testimony, both the individual photos
¶190(State’s Exhibit 71) and the one-page photo array (State’s Exhibit
¶19172) were admitted without objection. But when the State attempted
¶192to publish to the jury the individual photos that comprised Exhibit
¶19371 after their admission, Howard’s trial counsel moved for a mistrial
¶194on the basis that, although he thought at the time they were
¶195admitted that the photos had been provided in discovery, counsel in
¶196fact had “never seen these pictures before[,]” and a photo of Howard
¶197placed Howard’s character in question because the photo showed
¶198him making gang signs and holding cash, which counsel said
¶199suggested Howard was a drug dealer. The prosecutor represented
¶200that the photos had been provided in discovery and shown to defense
¶201counsel just prior to Tramal identifying them for admission. The
¶202prosecutor said that although the photo of Howard showed him with
¶203“large amounts of money in his hand[,]” it did not show him making
¶204gang signs, and that the purpose of the photo was to demonstrate
¶205 12 how Howard was identified during the interview. The trial court
¶206denied the motion for a mistrial but indicated “that particular
¶207exhibit” — specifically referencing “71C” — would not go out with
¶208the jury, which defense counsel agreed “satisf[ied his] concern.”
¶209 Tramal later testified without objection that he picked Howard
¶210out of the photo array that was admitted as Exhibit 72. The detective
¶211who interviewed Tramal also testified about Tramal picking
¶212Howard’s photo out of an array as Jylonda’s boyfriend. The detective
¶213acknowledged in his testimony that in viewing the original array,
¶214Tramal said that he was not sure of his identification of Howard; the
¶215detective noted that a hat Howard was wearing in the picture left a
¶216shadow on his face. The State played portions of the video recorded
¶217interview of Tramal for the jury, although the transcript is not
¶218precise as to which portions.
¶219 Tramal also identified Howard in court as Jylonda’s boyfriend,
¶220the person he knew as “Quay.” In his trial testimony, Tramal also
¶221identified Howard on the video surveillance footage from outside of
¶222King’s apartment. Tramal described riding in the car with Howard
¶223 13 both before and after the shooting, saying the ride to King’s
¶224residence took at least 30 minutes. The video appears to show that
¶225the sun had begun to rise before the group arrived at the apartment
¶226building.
¶227 Howard argues that trial counsel was ineffective when counsel
¶228“failed to file a motion to suppress the photo lineup” because the
¶229identification procedure used by the detective when interrogating
¶230Tramal was impermissibly suggestive.2 To prove his claim of
¶231ineffective assistance of counsel, Howard must show that counsel’s
¶232performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance
¶233 2 To the extent that Howard made below separate arguments that counsel was ineffective for failing to review any particular photo prior to trial or failing to object promptly to their admission into evidence, he has abandoned those arguments on appeal. Although he mentions those arguments in his brief to this Court, he enumerates as error on appeal only that counsel was ineffective for failing to “file a motion to suppress the photo lineup.” This is insufficient to raise any such additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for our review. See Mims v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 854 n.2 (854 SE2d 742) (2021) (“An appealing party may not use its brief to expand its enumeration of errors by arguing the incorrectness of a trial court ruling not mentioned in the enumeration of errors.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Moreover, because he makes no substantive argument or citation of authority regarding trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies in this regard, we would not address such claims of ineffectiveness even if they were contained in his enumerations of error. See former Supreme Court Rule 22; Session v. State, 316 Ga. 179, 185 (2) (887 SE2d 317) (2023). 14 prejudiced Howard’s defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
¶234U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). “If [a defendant]
¶235fails to establish one of these two prongs, we need not examine the
¶236other.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 328 (3) (877 SE2d 202) (2022)
¶237(citation and punctuation omitted). “To show deficient performance,
¶238the defendant must demonstrate that counsel performed counsel’s
¶239duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the
¶240circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Id.
¶241at 328-329 (3) (citation omitted). “To establish prejudice, [a
¶242defendant] must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
¶243but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding
¶244would have been different.” Id. at 329 (3) (citation and punctuation
¶245omitted). “In reviewing a ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance
¶246of counsel, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they
¶247are clearly erroneous, but we apply the law to the facts de novo.” Id.
¶248(citation and punctuation omitted).
¶249 When a defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for
¶250failing to file a motion to suppress evidence, he cannot show that his
¶251 15 counsel performed deficiently unless he can show that the motion
¶252would have been granted. See Armour v. State, 290 Ga. 553, 554-555
¶253(2) (a) (722 SE2d 751) (2012) (appellant failed to establish deficient
¶254performance where he failed to show that an objection to certain
¶255eyewitness identifications of him during photo arrays would have
¶256been sustained). A motion to suppress an out-of-court identification
¶257by a witness as impermissibly suggestive in violation of due process
¶258— the motion that Howard contends his counsel should have filed —
¶259requires a showing that the identification was “so impermissibly
¶260suggestive that it could result in a substantial likelihood of
¶261misidentification[.]” Lewis v. State, 314 Ga. 654, 662 (3) (b) (878
¶262SE2d 467) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). We employ a
¶263two-step process to determine whether identification evidence meets
¶264that test. See id. “First, we decide whether the identification
¶265procedure used was impermissibly suggestive.” Id. (citation and
¶266punctuation omitted). “Second, if a trial court properly concludes
¶267that the State employed an impermissibly suggestive pre-trial
¶268identification procedure, the issue becomes whether, considering the
¶269 16 totality of the circumstances, there was a substantial likelihood of
¶270irreparable misidentification.” Id. (citation and punctuation
¶271omitted). “If, however, a trial court properly determines that the
¶272identification procedure is not unduly suggestive, it is not necessary
¶273to consider whether there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable
¶274misidentification.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶275 Here, whether or not the photo identification procedure used
¶276with Tramal was impermissibly suggestive, we conclude that
¶277Howard has not shown that there was a substantial likelihood of
¶278irreparable misidentification, such that a motion to suppress the
¶279photo identification evidence would have succeeded. See Newton v.
¶280State, 308 Ga. 863, 863, 867 (2) (843 SE2d 857) (2020) (concluding
¶281that, even assuming photo array was impermissibly suggestive,
¶282defendant had not shown a substantial likelihood of irreparable
¶283misidentification, and thus trial court did not err in denying motion
¶284to suppress). In evaluating the likelihood of irreparable
¶285misidentification, a court considers whether, under the totality of
¶286the circumstances, the identification is reliable. See id. at 867 (2).
¶287 17 Factors to consider include (1) a witness’s opportunity to view the
¶288accused at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention;
¶289(3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the accused; (4)
¶290the witness’s level of certainty at the confrontation; and (5) the
¶291length of time between the crime and the confrontation. See id.
¶292 Here, Howard argues that because Tramal had not met him
¶293prior to the day of the shooting, the likelihood of misidentification
¶294was higher. But Howard does not grapple with the evidence showing
¶295that Tramal had a significant opportunity to view him before and
¶296after the shooting. As noted above, Howard and Tramal rode
¶297together in a car both before and after the shooting, a journey that
¶298was at least 30 minutes each way. As demonstrated by the
¶299surveillance video, Tramal would have had the opportunity to view
¶300Howard in daylight at least by the time that they arrived at King’s
¶301apartment. Tramal and Howard also went into King’s apartment
¶302twice together. And Tramal expressed certainty in identifying
¶303Howard in the second, one-page photo array. The extensive
¶304opportunities for Tramal to view Howard, as well as the certainty
¶305 18 with which he ultimately identified Howard, greatly lessened the
¶306likelihood that any suggestiveness in the initial photo array
¶307influenced the reliability of Tramal’s subsequent identifications of
¶308Howard. See Curry v. State, 305 Ga. 73, 77 (2) (823 SE2d 758) (2019)
¶309(despite trial court’s conclusion that State employed an
¶310impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure with
¶311bystander witnesses, no abuse of discretion in overruling objection
¶312to identification evidence, given factors such as witnesses’ “adequate
¶313opportunity in full daylight” to view the defendant and high level of
¶314certainty of identifications at the time of trial); Wright v. State, 294
¶315Ga. 798, 800, 802-803 (2) (756 SE2d 513) (2014) (rejecting argument
¶316that in-court identification should have been excluded for
¶317substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, even though
¶318witness had not seen the shooter prior to the night of the shooting
¶319and was unable to select defendant definitively from photo array,
¶320where witness had sufficient opportunity to observe shooter, gave
¶321fairly accurate description of gunman, and testified that he was 95
¶322percent certain of his identification). And although Tramal was
¶323 19 hesitant about identifying Howard in the initial photo array, the
¶324uncontested evidence is that Howard was wearing a hat that cast a
¶325shadow on his face in this photo, both explaining Tramal’s hesitance
¶326about identifying him from that photo and making it less likely that
¶327the viewing of this photo influenced Tramal’s subsequent, more
¶328certain identifications of Howard. Having failed to show that an
¶329objection to Tramal’s identification of Howard would have been
¶330successful, Howard has failed to establish deficient performance by
¶331his trial counsel for not filing a motion to suppress, so Howard’s
¶332claim fails on the first prong of the ineffective assistance test. See
¶333Pearson v. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29-31 (2) (855 SE2d 606) (2021) (no
¶334deficient performance in failing to secure ruling on motion to
¶335suppress identifications where totality of the circumstances did not
¶336show that the trial court would have found a substantial likelihood
¶337of misidentification); see also Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 692-693
¶338(3) (763 SE2d 704) (2014) (equating the admissibility of in-court
¶339identification with whether suggestive out-of-court identification
¶340leads to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification).
¶341 20 3. Finally, Howard argues that the trial court erred in
¶342striking a prospective juror for cause. We conclude that Howard has
¶343not shown reversible error.
¶344 During voir dire, in response to the State’s question of whether
¶345any member of the panel “may have some moral or religious or
¶346philosophical beliefs that would prevent you from sitting in
¶347judgment of another person,” Juror No. 18 said she did not “feel
¶348comfortable judging” and did not “feel comfortable making the
¶349judgment on someone else’s situation.” She added, “I just feel like I
¶350pray that — for everyone and I just think that God is going to make
¶351everybody better. But it doesn’t always happen that way, but I still
¶352pray for them.” During follow up questioning, Juror No. 18 stated
¶353that she would follow the trial court’s instructions, “listen to all the
¶354evidence[,] and follow what the [j]udge told [her] to do[,]” and she
¶355told the prosecutor that if she “fe[lt] “that [the] evidence [was] strong
¶356enough, then it would have to be a guilty verdict.” But she also
¶357expressed concern about “holding the young man’s life in [her]
¶358hands[,]” noting she had five grandsons. And when the prosecutor
¶359 21 pressed her on whether she could “set aside” her “moral belief” and
¶360thoughts about her grandsons and “decide this case without all of
¶361that influencing [her,]” Juror No. 18 responded, “I don’t think I could
¶362do that. I really don’t.” The State moved to strike Juror No. 18 for
¶363cause. Howard’s counsel responded that the prospective juror should
¶364not be struck, noting her statements that she would follow
¶365instructions and vote guilty if the evidence were strong enough. The
¶366State argued in turn that “her initial response and her final response
¶367clearly indicates that she has so much compassion and cannot set
¶368aside her moral convictions[.]”The trial court granted the State’s
¶369motion to strike, saying, “I’m kind of falling back on primacy and
¶370recency on this one.” Howard did not further object to the striking of
¶371the juror.3
¶372 3 The Attorney General argues that this claim is not preserved. But the
¶373cases that the Attorney General cites do not address whether a defendant needs to restate an objection to excusing a juror for cause once the court has ruled. See Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 186-187 (3) (a) (850 SE2d 110) (2020); Passmore v. State, 274 Ga. 200, 202 (5) (552 SE2d 816) (2001). And our precedent indicates that a defendant does not need to restate such an objection. See Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 69 (4) (694 SE2d 316) (2010), disapproved on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 706-707 (11) (a) n.3 (820 SE2d 640) (2018). 22 Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in striking
¶374Juror No. 18, Howard’s claim provides no grounds for reversal. “It is
¶375well settled that a defendant does not have a right in a particular
¶376juror but rather only has a right to a legal and impartial jury[.]”
¶377Saylor v. State, 316 Ga. 225, 232-233 (3) (887 SE2d 329) (2023). The
¶378erroneous dismissal for cause of a prospective juror for a reason that
¶379is not constitutionally impermissible does not require reversal “if
¶380there is no showing that a competent and unbiased jury was not
¶381selected.” Id. at 233 (3). Howard does not argue that the jury that
¶382was selected was biased or incompetent. Accordingly, his claim fails.
¶383 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶384 23