¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: June 11, 2024
¶4 S24A0158. HARMON v. THE STATE.
¶5 PINSON, Justice.
¶6 Shanadore Harmon and Jermaz Lawson got into an argument
¶7that ended with Harmon shooting into the car that Lawson was driv-
¶8ing. The bullet struck and killed Brittany Trantham, who was sit-
¶9ting in the passenger seat. Harmon was convicted of the malice mur-
¶10der of Trantham, the aggravated assault of Lawson, and three fire-
¶11arms offenses. 1
¶12 1 Trantham was shot on October 24, 2015, and died two days later. On
¶13January 20, 2016, a Richmond County grand jury returned an indictment charging Harmon with malice murder of Trantham (Count 1), felony murder of Trantham predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 3, 5), aggravated assault of Lawson (Count 4), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). At a jury trial from May 7 to 9, 2018, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. On May 10, 2018, the trial court entered a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1), consecutive sentences of five years for each of the firearm convictions (Counts 3, 5, 6), and a On appeal, Harmon contends that the evidence was not consti-
¶14tutionally sufficient to convict him of Trantham’s murder or the re-
¶15lated firearms offenses, the trial court erred by denying his motion
¶16for directed verdict on the aggravated assault and firearm offense
¶17related to Lawson, and he received constitutionally ineffective assis-
¶18tance of counsel because his trial counsel did not raise a hearsay
¶19objection to the admission of Lawson’s recorded statement to police.
¶20Each claim fails. The evidence, recounted below, was sufficient to
¶21support each of Harmon’s convictions related to the murder of Tran-
¶22tham and the denial of his motion for directed verdict on the counts
¶23related to the assault of Lawson. Harmon also failed to establish
¶24that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the admission
¶25of Lawson’s statement to police, because even putting this statement
¶26consecutive sentence of twenty years for aggravated assault (Count 4).The felony murder count (Count 2) was vacated by operation of law. New counsel for Harmon entered an appearance and timely filed a motion for new trial; Harmon changed counsel and filed amendments to that motion several times. After a hearing on June 27, 2022, the trial court denied Harmon’s motion for new trial, as amended, on June 30, 2022.Harmon timely filed a notice of appeal on July 14, 2022.His appeal was docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
¶27 2 aside, the convictions were supported by strong evidence, including
¶28testimony from two witnesses who saw Harmon stand behind Tran-
¶29tham’s car (which Lawson was driving) and then heard gunshots, as
¶30well as evidence that Harmon was found soon after the shooting
¶31with the gun that fired both the fatal bullet and all the bullets col-
¶32lected from the crime scene. So we affirm Harmon’s convictions and
¶33sentence.
¶34 1. The evidence at trial showed the following. 2
¶35 On the night of October 24, 2015, Harmon, Lawson, Trantham,
¶36and others went to the Limelite Café in Richmond County, where
¶37Harmon and Lawson got into an argument. Their argument got so
¶38“heated” that security told their group to leave. Lawson left with
¶39Trantham and drove her car, Harmon left in another car, and their
¶40group eventually met near Lawson’s grandmother’s home on Cun-
¶41ningham Drive.
¶42 2 Because this case involves a question of prejudice under Strickland v.
¶43Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), we recount the trial evidence in some detail, weighing the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done rather than only in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Wood v. State, 316 Ga. 811, 812 (1) n.2 (890 SE2d 716) (2023). 3 Trantham remained in the passenger seat of the parked car the
¶44whole time she and Lawson were at Cunningham Drive that night.
¶45Lawson, however, got out of the car, and he and Harmon resumed
¶46their argument. Harmon pulled out a gun and was “waving it
¶47around” during the argument, and the argument eventually esca-
¶48lated into a fistfight.
¶49 Tammy Lawson, who was related to both Harmon and Lawson,
¶50testified at trial that she was asleep at the Cunningham Drive home
¶51and woke up when she heard arguing. She looked outside and saw
¶52that Lawson and Harmon were arguing, and that Harmon had a
¶53gun. She saw “a couple people” other than Harmon with guns but
¶54did not think Lawson had one. Tammy went outside and told Law-
¶55son to leave. He left, but came back less than five minutes later and
¶56resumed arguing with Harmon.
¶57 Tammy testified at trial that she did not see Harmon fire the
¶58gun, but she said that “[h]e was waving it around then he fired it.”
¶59In interviews recorded with police on the night of the shooting,
¶60Tammy first told police that she woke up to loud music, heard two
¶61 4 gunshots, and went to the door and saw two cars driving by at a fast
¶62speed. But once she and the officer resumed the interview outside
¶63the presence of other family members, she told police the same ver-
¶64sion of events she testified to at trial: that, while Harmon and Law-
¶65son were arguing, she saw Harmon walk to the back of Trantham’s
¶66car (which Lawson was driving) and “heard” him “fire” two shots. In
¶67another interview recorded at the police station later that night,
¶68Tammy told police that Harmon shot at the car twice and appeared
¶69to be aiming for the trunk.
¶70 Lawson testified that he was standing by the driver’s side door
¶71of the car when he heard gunshots from behind him, and he then got
¶72into the car and drove away.
¶73 As Lawson drove toward home, he tried to get Trantham’s at-
¶74tention, nudged her, and discovered that she was bleeding and un-
¶75responsive. He immediately drove her to the hospital, where doctors
¶76determined that Trantham’s wounds were fatal and placed her on
¶77life support until her organs could be donated. She died two days
¶78later.
¶79 5 Lawson spoke to police about the shooting twice: first after
¶80bringing Trantham to the hospital, and again later that morning at
¶81the police station. In the police station interview, Lawson said that
¶82the night before, he and Harmon had been “talking trash” at Lime-
¶83lite. Later, he and Trantham left Limelite and went back to his
¶84grandmother’s home on Cunningham Drive. Harmon was already
¶85there and stood outside Lawson’s front passenger door with a pistol
¶86when Lawson got out of the car. Harmon’s pistol fell, and Harmon
¶87picked it up and put it in his waistband. Harmon then “swung” at
¶88Lawson, and Lawson fought back. During the fight, Harmon pulled
¶89his pistol out more than once. Eventually, someone told Lawson he
¶90needed to leave, and he did. Harmon “started shooting” and Lawson
¶91heard two gunshots while he was still outside of the car and a third
¶92shot as he was driving away. He drove toward home and, when he
¶93tried to get Trantham’s attention, her head fell to the side, and he
¶94saw blood, so he drove her to the hospital.
¶95 Meanwhile, back at Cunningham Drive, Tammy saw Harmon
¶96“walk[ ] up the street” as Lawson drove away. A sheriff’s deputy,
¶97 6 responding to a report of shots fired on Cunningham Drive, saw a
¶98man duck behind a tree, so he stopped, and he found Harmon on his
¶99hands and knees under the tree with a pistol. The officer took a
¶100Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter pistol from Harmon and detained
¶101him.
¶102 After investigators connected the report of shots fired on Cun-
¶103ningham Drive with Trantham’s shooting, Harmon’s hands were
¶104swabbed for gunshot residue and his clothes were collected and
¶105tested for gunshot residue. No gunshot residue was detected on the
¶106swabs from his hands and one particle characteristic of gunshot res-
¶107idue was found on his shirt.
¶108 The autopsy and other forensic evidence showed that a bullet
¶109passed through the back window of the car Trantham had been sit-
¶110ting in, into the headrest of her seat, and through her neck, where
¶111the bullet severed her spinal cord and lodged in her tongue. The
¶112medical examiner testified that this gunshot wound was the sole
¶113cause of Trantham’s death, and the fatal bullet was removed from
¶114her tongue and submitted to the GBI for testing. That bullet, as well
¶115 7 as shell casings found at Cunningham Drive, were matched to the
¶116firearm police found Harmon with when he was detained soon after
¶117the shooting. The firearms expert also concluded that a bullet found
¶118in the spare tire of Trantham’s car was consistent with being fired
¶119from the same type of firearm, but she could not determine if the
¶120bullet was fired from Harmon’s specific gun because the bullet was
¶121damaged.
¶122 2. Harmon contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sup-
¶123port his convictions for malice murder, possession of a firearm dur-
¶124ing that crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon be-
¶125cause the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that
¶126Harmon, and not Lawson or someone else, fired the fatal shot. Har-
¶127mon also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
¶128for a directed verdict as to the aggravated assault against Lawson
¶129and possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime be-
¶130cause there was no evidence that Lawson was ever in fear of being
¶131shot.
¶132 8 (a) We evaluate a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the
¶133evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
¶134verdict. See Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 415 (2) (a) (897 SE2d 856)
¶135(2024) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt
¶1362781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). Viewing the evidence in that light, we
¶137determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found be-
¶138yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crimes
¶139of which he was convicted. See Lee, 318 Ga. at 415 (2) (a). In doing
¶140so, “we leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies
¶141in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences
¶142to be derived from the facts.” Id. at 415-416 (2) (a) (citation and punc-
¶143tuation omitted).
¶144 Applying that standard here, the evidence summarized above
¶145and viewed in the proper light was sufficient for a rational trier of
¶146fact to find Harmon guilty of each of the offenses he was convicted
¶147of. As to malice murder, both Lawson and Tammy saw Harmon with
¶148a gun when he was arguing with Lawson and heard gunshots while
¶149Harmon stood behind Trantham’s car. Tammy also saw Harmon
¶150 9 shoot at the back of the car where Trantham sat.3 And, soon after
¶151the shooting, police found Harmon hiding behind a tree nearby with
¶152the gun that fired the fatal bullet, and forensic testing showed that
¶153all the shell casings and bullets collected during the investigation
¶154were or may have been fired from that same gun. See Morris v. State,
¶155317 Ga. 87, 92-93 (2) (891 SE2d 859) (2023) (affirming malice mur-
¶156der conviction where the evidence authorized the jury to conclude
¶157that the defendant fired the fatal bullet, as the evidence showed he
¶158possessed at least two guns on the night of the shooting, including
¶159one from which the fatal bullet could have been fired, and his act of
¶160shooting at the victim’s van was the proximate cause of the victim’s
¶161 3 Harmon contends that he was not the shooter and does not specifically
¶162address the element of malice. Although there is little evidence that Harmon intended to shoot and kill Trantham, there is ample evidence that he intended to shoot and kill Lawson, including their argument at the café earlier that night, their physical altercation at Cunningham Drive, and evidence that Harmon shot at the car as Lawson entered it. Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a person who intends to, for example, shoot one person and unintentionally strikes another cannot avoid wrongdoing by claiming that he did not intend to shoot that victim; his intent is transferred from the person he intended to shoot to the person whom he actually shot. See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 364-365 (4) (882 SE2d 289) (2022). So the element of malice is supported by the evidence that Harmon intended to shoot and kill Lawson, and that intent was transferred to Trantham, whom Harmon actually shot. Id. 10 death).
¶163 This evidence was also sufficient to support Harmon’s convic-
¶164tion for possession of a firearm during the commission of malice
¶165murder. See Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 221 (3) (576 SE2d 886) (2003)
¶166(“Evidence that the defendant . . . carried or was within arm’s length
¶167of a weapon during the commission of a crime authorizes a finding
¶168of guilt” for possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime).
¶169Combined with the evidence of Harmon’s three earlier felony convic-
¶170tions, 4 this evidence also supported the conviction for possession of
¶171a firearm by a convicted felon. See Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 165
¶172(10) (c) (635 SE2d 740) (2006) (certified copies of prior felony convic-
¶173tion combined with evidence supporting convictions for malice mur-
¶174der and possession of a firearm during commission of a crime were
¶175sufficient to support conviction for possession of a firearm by a con-
¶176victed felon).
¶177 (b) The standard for review of the constitutional sufficiency of
¶178 4 The State introduced certified copies of Harmon’s three prior felony
¶179convictions, which were admitted into evidence during the bifurcated portion of the trial. 11 the evidence also governs our review of the denial of a motion for a
¶180directed verdict. See Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199, 206 (2) (897 SE2d
¶181760) (2024).
¶182 To convict someone of aggravated assault (or deny them a di-
¶183rected verdict on that count), as relevant here, the State must prove
¶184beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a deadly weapon
¶185“to commit an act which places another person in reasonable appre-
¶186hension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” Jackson v. State,
¶187315 Ga. 543, 549 (1) (a) (883 SE2d 815) (2023) (citation omitted). See
¶188OCGA §§ 16-5-20, 16-5-21. Whether the victim was placed “in rea-
¶189sonable apprehension of injury” is a question of fact, and “[t]he pres-
¶190ence of a deadly weapon would normally place a victim in reasonable
¶191apprehension of being injured violently.” Jackson, 315 Ga. at 549 (1)
¶192(a) (quoting Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622, 626 (2) (a) (791 SE2d 61)
¶193(2016)).
¶194 The evidence at trial authorized the jury to conclude beyond a
¶195reasonable doubt that Lawson was placed in reasonable apprehen-
¶196 12 sion of receiving a violent injury when he heard gunshots from be-
¶197hind him after seeing Harmon with a gun. See id. This, combined
¶198with the evidence that Harmon was the shooter, which we discussed
¶199in Division 2 (a), was sufficient to support the denial of a motion for
¶200directed verdict on the aggravated assault count and, ultimately, to
¶201support Harmon’s conviction for that crime. See e.g., Gobert v. State,
¶202311 Ga. 305, 309-310 (1) (b) (857 SE2d 647) (2021) (sufficient evi-
¶203dence to support an aggravated assault conviction where there was
¶204evidence that the defendant fired multiple shots into the car where
¶205the victim was riding); Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 742-743 & n.1,
¶206744-745 (1) (784 SE2d 759) (2016) (sufficient evidence to support ag-
¶207gravated assault convictions where defendant and others shot into
¶208the car where the victims were riding). This evidence was also suffi-
¶209cient to support the denial of a motion for directed verdict on, and a
¶210conviction for, possession of a firearm during the commission of the
¶211aggravated assault. See Hill, 276 Ga. at 221 (3).
¶212 3. Harmon contends that his trial counsel provided constitu-
¶213tionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of
¶214 13 Lawson’s police statement. He asserts that Lawson’s police state-
¶215ment was hearsay that did not fall within any exception, and he was
¶216prejudiced by its admission because the statement served only to
¶217improperly bolster Lawson’s and Tammy’s trial testimony. 5
¶218 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a de-
¶219fendant must show that his counsel’s performance both was defi-
¶220cient (objectively unreasonable under the circumstances) and caused
¶221him prejudice (shown by establishing a reasonable probability that
¶222the result of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s de-
¶223ficient performance). See Lee, 318 Ga. at 420 (6) (citing Strickland
¶224v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
¶225(1984); Scott v. State, 317 Ga. 218, 221 (2) (892 SE2d 744) (2023)).
¶226 5 Harmon also takes issue with the wording of several questions the
¶227State asked Lawson on cross-examination about whether Lawson told police that he saw Harmon fire the gun (which Lawson denied saying). Harmon contends that the State asked these questions to “mislead” the court into admitting the challenged recording of Lawson’s interview with police as a prior inconsistent statement. But Harmon does not appear to claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to these questions. In any event, for the reasons we discuss later in this opinion, Harmon has not shown that he was prejudiced by the admission of Lawson’s police interview, during which Lawson told police he saw Harmon with a gun and later heard gunshots but did not say he saw Harmon fire the gun. 14 When evaluating whether an appellant has established prejudice
¶228under Strickland, “we review the record de novo and weigh the evi-
¶229dence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done” rather
¶230than in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Wood v. State,
¶231316 Ga. 811, 812 (1) n.2 (890 SE2d 716) (2023) (quoting Draughn v.
¶232State, 311 Ga. 378, 382-383 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 8) (2021)).
¶233 Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by fail-
¶234ing to object to the admission of Lawson’s statement to police, Har-
¶235mon has not established that he was prejudiced by that failure. See
¶236Lee, 318 Ga. at 420 (6). Even without Lawson’s statement to the po-
¶237lice, the evidence against Harmon was still very strong. Lawson tes-
¶238tified that he saw Harmon with a gun when they were arguing and,
¶239even though he did not see Harmon fire the gun, he heard gunshots
¶240from behind as he entered the driver’s side of the car. Tammy also
¶241testified that immediately before shots were fired, she saw Harmon
¶242with a gun and saw him walk to the back of Trantham’s car as Law-
¶243son entered the driver’s seat. Although it is unclear whether Tammy
¶244 15 only heard the gunshots or also saw them,6 her testimony—that
¶245Harmon had a gun and was standing behind Trantham’s car when
¶246gunshots rang out—was largely consistent with Lawson’s testimony.
¶247Their testimony about the shooting was further supported by evi-
¶248dence that police found Harmon hiding near the crime scene with a
¶249gun soon after the shooting, and forensic evidence that the fatal bul-
¶250let, and all the bullets and shell casings collected at the crime scene,
¶251matched Harmon’s gun. Given this evidence, Harmon has not estab-
¶252lished a reasonable probability of a different result absent trial coun-
¶253sel’s assumed error of not objecting to the admission of Lawson’s
¶254statement to police.7 See Henderson v. State, 304 Ga. 733, 738 (3) (d)
¶255 6 Tammy testified that she did not see Harmon fire the gun but saw him
¶256“waving it around then he fired it.” But she told police during her third interview on the night of the shooting that Harmon shot at the car twice and appeared to be aiming for the trunk. 7 A word about preserved hearsay objections to the admission of prior
¶257statements to police that were “consistent” with the speaker’s trial testimony but were not “prior consistent statements” within the meaning of the Evidence Code. We have evaluated whether admitting such statements was harmless error by disregarding both the inadmissible hearsay statement and the trial testimony that the improperly admitted hearsay statement repeated, and then applying the standard for non-constitutional harmless error. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 315 Ga. 524, 535 (5) (883 SE2d 746) (2023); McGarity v. State, 311 Ga. 158, 167-168 (3) (856 SE2d 241) (2021); Davis v. State, 307 Ga. 746, 751 (2) (b)
¶258 16 (822 SE2d 228) (2018) (concluding that defendant failed to establish
¶259Strickland prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to hearsay be-
¶260cause, given the strong evidence against him, he failed to show that
¶261there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
¶262would have been different if the jury had not heard the hearsay). See
¶263(838 SE2d 263) (2020) (decided under the old Evidence Code). We have explained that whether admitting the hearsay statement was harmless error depends on whether it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the jury’s guilty verdict,” so we do not “look to [the witness’s] improperly bolstered testimony to show that the bolstering error was harmless.” Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 341-342 (4) (b) (751 SE2d 399) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). In doing so, we may have conflated the improper admission of hearsay statements that repeated the live witness’s testimony with “bolstering”— a term that more precisely describes the scenario of one witness vouching for the credibility of the other. See Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 460-461 (2) (b) (807 SE2d 369) (2017) (“When a witness’s statement does not directly address the credibility of another witness…there is no improper bolstering.”). But we need not decide here whether this approach is correct, because Harmon’s argument about admitting this prior statement is made as part of an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland. Under Strickland’s prejudice standard, we ask if the defendant has established a “reasonable probability” that the result of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (III) (b). Here, had Harmon’s counsel raised a hearsay objection when the State moved to admit Lawson’s police interview and the objection were sustained, the jury would not have heard Lawson’s police interview. But the jury still would have heard Lawson’s and Tammy’s live testimony and the evidence that Harmon was found with the gun that matched all the bullets at the crime scene, all of which, as discussed above, was very strong evidence of his guilt. 17 also Wood, 316 Ga. at 812 (1) n.2; Morris, 317 Ga. at 92-93 (2); Go-
¶264bert, 311 Ga. at 309 (1) (a); Pyatt, 298 Ga. at 742-743 & n.1, 744-745
¶265(1); Walker, 281 Ga. at 165 (10) (c).
¶266 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶267 18