¶1 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2 SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Case No. S24A0131
¶3 June 27, 2024
¶4 The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.
¶5The following order was passed:
¶6 CHRISTOPHER MASSEY v. THE STATE.
¶7 Upon consideration, the Court has revised the deadline for motions for reconsideration in this matter. It is ordered that a motion for reconsideration, if any, including motions submitted via the Court’s electronic filing system, must be received in the Clerk’s Office by 12:00 p.m. on Friday, July 5, 2024.
¶8 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA Clerk’s Office, Atlanta
¶9 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
¶10 , Clerk SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Case No. S24A0131
¶11 June 27, 2024
¶12 The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.
¶13The following order was passed:
¶14 CHRISTOPHER MASSEY v. THE STATE.
¶15 The trial court’s order is vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in the light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ____ (2024).
¶16 All the Justices concur, except Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, and Colvin, JJ., who dissent.
¶17 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA Clerk’s Office, Atlanta
¶18 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
¶19 , Clerk
¶20 2 LAGRUA, Justice, dissenting.
¶21 While I respect my colleagues’ decision, I must respectfully
¶22dissent. This appeal asks a critical question: whether the Second
¶23Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a State to
¶24prohibit someone who has committed a violent felony from
¶25possessing firearms during the pendency of a first-offender sentence.
¶26See OCGA § 16-11-131 (b). We are remanding this case back to the
¶27trial court to consider the United States Supreme Court’s recent
¶28decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S ___ (___ SCt ____, ___
¶29LE2d ___) (No. 22-915) (June 21, 2024). But I do not believe that
¶30Rahimi gives any better guidance in this case than the Supreme
¶31Court’s previous Second Amendment decisions in New York State
¶32Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (142 SCt 2111,
¶33213 LE2d 387) (2022) and D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (128 SCt 2783,
¶34171 LE2d 637) (2008). The trial court relied on both cases in its order
¶35denying Appellant’s demurrer as well as on this Court’s opinion in
¶36Spencer v. State, 286 Ga. 483, 484 (5) (689 SE2d 823) (2010) (holding
¶37that prohibiting a defendant from possessing a firearm as a
¶38 3 condition of probation does not violate the Second Amendment and
¶39citing Heller’s declaration that “‘longstanding prohibitions on the
¶40possession of firearms by felons’ are not in doubt.” (citing Heller, 554
¶41U.S. at 626 (III)). Looking to the facts of this case, I find that Rahimi
¶42would not undercut the trial court’s order. Rather, Rahimi likely
¶43supports the idea that the legislature may disarm those who have
¶44committed violent crimes like Appellant. See Rahimi 603 U.S. at ___
¶45(II) (B) (3) (“the surety and going armed laws confirm what common
¶46sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physical
¶47violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.”);
¶48id. at ____ (repeating Heller’s declaration that felon-in-possession is
¶49“presumptively lawful”); id. at ___ (“we do not suggest that the
¶50Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of laws banning the
¶51possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature
¶52to present a special danger of misuse”); id. at ___ (Barrett, J.,
¶53concurring) (citing her dissent in Kanter v. Barr, 919 F3d 437, 451
¶54(7th Cir. 2019), where she explained that “[h]istory is consistent
¶55 4 with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the
¶56power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns.”).
¶57 The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that vacating
¶58and remanding a case without issuing an opinion is inappropriate
¶59when the “delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not
¶60justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the
¶61lower court.” Lawrence on Behalf of Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S.
¶62163, 168 (116 SCt 604, 133 LE2d 545) (1996) (per curiam). And I am
¶63concerned that the benefits of remanding this case are far
¶64outweighed by the delay and costs. More guidance from the Supreme
¶65Court may be forthcoming, but the governing law as it stands now
¶66is sufficient to address Appellant’s claim and (in my opinion) affirm
¶67the trial court’s order. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justice Ellington, Justice
¶69McMillian, and Justice Colvin join in this dissent.
¶70 5