¶1dissenting.
¶2Because Kent has failed to show error on the record, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion reversing the trial court’s grant of the application of Kent’s former client to confirm her fee arbitration award against him.
¶3Because Kent, “as appellant, has the burden to affirmatively show error by the record,” we must consider his contentions in light of the meager, 23-page appellate record. Azordegan v. Ebrahimi, 311 Ga. App. 509 (1) (716 SE2d 528) (2011). Consistent with Kent’s notice of appeal, the record includes only the client’s application for confirmation, Kent’s answer, and the superior court’s final order confirming the award. While Kent argues that the superior court substantively modified the arbitration award by confirming it against him *117individually, rather than against his professional corporation, the record does not affirmatively establish error.
¶4The body of the award includes the arbitrators’ finding that “Petitioner paid for service from the attorney Respondent,... who has not provided evidence of any valuable service performed on behalf of petitioner.” The award was made by a panel of arbitrators pursuant to the State Bar’s Fee Arbitration program, which “is designed to provide a convenient mechanism to resolve disputes between lawyers and clients over fees, and is administered by the State Bar Committee on the Arbitration of Fee Disputes.” Farley v. Bothwell, 306 Ga. App. 801 (703 SE2d 397) (2010), citing State Bar Rules, Part VI, Arbitration of Fee Disputes, Preamble, 247 Ga. A-2. And under State Bar Rules 6-201 (f) and 6-402, Kent would only have been allowed to participate in the arbitration hearing if he had agreed to be bound by the arbitrators’ decision, and he admitted in his answer to the confirmation petition that he presented evidence during the proceeding. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s confirmation of the award against Kent individually.
¶5Kent’s argument that he only appeared at the hearing on behalf of his professional corporation and that the award was only against his corporation is unpersuasive in light of the entire award and his answer to the petition admitting he presented evidence to the arbitration panel. As noted previously, it is the appellant’s burden to show error on the record, and this Kent has not done. See Afraknteh v. Halstead, 259 Ga. App. 645, 646 (578 SE2d 126) (2003).
¶6Considering the context of this arbitration award, along with Kent’s failure to establish error on the record, we should affirm the trial court’s confirmation. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
¶7I am authorized to state that Judge McFadden joins in this dissent.
¶8dissenting.
¶9I respectfully dissent and join fully in Presiding Judge Barnes’s dissenting opinion. I write separately to set out my view that Kent is personally liable under the terms of the rules governing the State Bar’s fee arbitration program, which were promulgated by the Supreme Court of Georgia.
¶10He has since been disbarred, but at the time of the subject proceedings Kent was a lawyer. “Lawyers practicing in a professional corporation still owe a duty to clients and remain personally liable to them for acts of professional negligence.” Henderson v. HSI Financial Svcs., 266 Ga. 844, 845 (1) (471 SE2d 885) (1996).
¶11As a member of the State Bar of Georgia, Kent was subject to its rules governing the practice of law and the conduct of lawyers. Those rules have been promulgated by our Supreme Court after consultation with the State Bar and reflect an intent to bind individual lawyers.
¶12Where the dispute is between a lawyer and client, those rules provide — even if “the respondent lawyer refuses to be bound” — that “the award rendered will be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the award and the burden of proof shall shift to the lawyer to prove otherwise.” State Bar Rule 6-502. Here, Kent agreed to be bound. So, upon a showing that he refused to pay the award, the superior court was authorized and required to enter judgment on it. State Bar Rule 6-501.
¶13That judgment was properly entered against Kent personally. It is true that State Bar Rule 6-501 speaks of the “parties.” But the arbitration rules speak of “parties” when referring to both lawyer and client and of the “lawyer” when speaking of the lawyer. State Bar Rules 6-201 (h) (2), 6-402, 6-501, 6-502. Under the State Bar’s rules, “ ‘Lawyer,’ denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its Rules to practice law in the State of Georgia....” State Bar Rule 1.0 (j). Although now stripped of that authority, Kent remains, under the terms of those rules, bound by his agreement and personally liable.