Herget v. Herget’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 district · 52 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed. In these circumstances, the true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. Consequently, the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away [sic] to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean. Consequently, the clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give away to what the parties thought that the agreement meant or intended it to mean.... As a result, when the contractual language is clear and unambiguous, and in the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to show the intention of the parties or to vary, alter, or contradict the terms of that contract.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 156 Md. App. 387 - Cannon v. Cannon · Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook

2. “[w]e also reject the argument that general language cannot effect a full release of a specific right, even a right that is unknown at the time the agreement is drawn.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. McGeehan v. McGeehan · McGeehan v. McGeehan

3. ““The monetary award that the wife seeks is authorized by Maryland Code (1984, 1989 Cum.Supp.) Family Law Article § 8-201 et seq. The concept of a monetary award is relatively new in Maryland, having been first adopted in 1978. Chapter 794, Laws of Maryland 1978. Its function is to provide a means for the adjustment of inequities that may result from distribution of certain property in accordance with the dictates of title. With one exception, a divorce court in Maryland is not empowered to alter title to real or personal property held by the parties, or to directly divide or distribute that property in a way that is inconsistent with title. The court may, however, after giving con sideration to factors enumerated by the legislature, enter a monetary award against one party and in favor of the other when that action is appropriate to adjust an inequity that would otherwise result from distribution, strictly in accordance with title, of property qualifying as ‘martial property.’ To the extent a monetary award is immediately due and owing, the court may enter a judgment reflecting it, thereby subjecting the property of the indebted party to lien and execution.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lohman v. Lohman