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32 Cal. 36

People v. Shaber

California Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1867

California Supreme Court · decided 1867-07-01

The indictment charged that the defendant, “ on the twelfth day of August, A. D. 1866, at the city, county, and State aforesaid, about the hour of twelve of the clock, m., of the nighttime of the same day, with force and arms, the house, room, apartment, and tenement of one Jacob Gr. Jackson and William E. Wood, doing business under the name and style of J. G-.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The ... entry and the intent being found or given, the crime would be complete even though it should turn out that, contrary to the calculations of the burglar, the building was empty. The sting of the crime is, in short, the guilty purpose, without reference to the possibility of accomplishing it....”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 7 Cal. 4th 1027 - People v. Montoya

Relies on People v. King · People v. Garcia · People v. Murray

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1867-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently June 1994

17 state decisions

4018671870188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

By the Court, Shafter, J.:

¶1The appellant was indicted for feloniously and burglariously breaking and entering in the nighttime a certain house (describing it) “ with intent to commit larceny.” On conviction, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the indictment did not state whose property the defendant intended to steal, nor that he intended to feloniously steal, take and carry away any property then being in the house entered.

¶2The indictment charges the offense in the very terms used in defining it in the fifty-eighth section of the Crimes Act, as amended in 1858, (Acts 1858, p. 206,) and with all the particularity required by the two hundred and thirty-fifth section of the Criminal Practice Act. The case cannot be distinguished from 6 Cal. 487; 7 Cal. 403; 10 Cal. 309; 14 Cal. 30; People v. Garcia, 25 Cal. 533; People v. King, 27 Cal. 510 ; Regina v. Lawes, 1 Car. and Kir. 62 ; Regina v. Clarke, 1 Car. and Kir. 422-3. As a larceny actually committed is not made an element in the offense, it cannot be needful to allege one, either generally or by an averment of the facts entering into and constituting its definition. And as a forcible entry, etc., with a larcenous intent is all that is made essential to the crime, we consider that a conviction would be due even though it should appear that there were no goods in the building at the time the entry was made. The forcible entry and the intent being found or given, the crime would be complete even though it should turn out that, contrary to the calculations of the burglar, the building was empty. The sting of the crime is, in short, the guilty purpose, without reference .to the possibility of accomplishing it, in any given instance.

¶3The judgment is affirmed.

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