¶1I respectfully dissent.
¶2In return for their services rendered in connection with the equal protection challenge to the school financing system, plaintiffs’ attorneys were awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees. The award was based upon the so-called “private-attorney-general” theory now codified in section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These attorneys now seek an additional award of attorneys’ fees, payable from taxpayers’ funds, for their time and effort spent solely to collect the prior attorneys’ fee award. Such an additional award is beyond the scope of section 1021.5, which limits recovery of attorneys’ fees to actions resulting “in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,” and conferring “a significant benefit” upon the public or a large segment thereof.
¶3In my view, the correct analysis of the issue before us is contained in the thoughtful opinion of Acting Presiding Justice Stephens written for the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, in this case, a pertinent portion of which is as follows:
“Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, is dispositive to the appellate fee award for Serrano III [Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303)]. The statute sets forth the requirements for a ‘private attorney general’ attorney fee award, and codifies the trial court’s traditional equitable discretion. (Woodland Hills Resident Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 938 [154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 *645P.2d 200]; Save El Toro Assn. v. Days (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 544, 554 [159 Cal.Rptr. 577].) The legislative prerequisites clearly demonstrate the trial court’s abuse of discretion in making the award involved herein. Litigating the amount of a fee award on appeal in Serrano III cannot be construed as ‘the enforcement of an important right’ which conferred ‘a significant benefit’ on ‘the general public or a large class of persons.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.)
¶4“It is apparent that the Legislature intended ‘some selectivity, on a qualitative basis,’ in awarding attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., supra,23 Cal.3d 917, 935.) The Supreme Court has instructed that ‘the trial court, utilizing its traditional equitable discretion (now codified in § 1021.5), must realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an important right so as to justify an attorney fee award under a private attorney general theory.’ (Id., p. 938.)
¶5“Respondents’ efforts in obtaining a sizable fee award (Serrano III) do not rise to the level of vindicating ‘an important right affecting the public interest.’ In Save El Toro Assn. v. Days, supra,98 Cal.App.3d 544, 555, the court declared: ‘Whether the litigation was actually necessary in order to vindicate the rights of the public has a strong bearing on the question whether, in the words of section 1021.5, a “significant benefit” has resulted.’ The only right secured on appeal in Serrano III was respondents’ entitlement to a fee award, and the only benefit conferred by that litigation was personal to Public Advocates and Western Center. A realistic assessment of the ‘importance’ of an attorneys’ fee award, together with the limited class of beneficiaries, clearly indicates that the supplemental appellate fees ordered for Serrano III do not comport with the ‘fundamental legislative goals’ underlying section 1021.5. (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., supra, at pp. 936, 939-940.)
¶6“The absence of the ‘private attorney general’ doctrine in Serrano III is explained by the Court of Appeal’s analysis in Mandel v. Lackner (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 747 [155 Cal.Rptr. 269]. Although the Mandeldecision addressed the ‘substantial benefit’ theory, the court’s reasoning has a determinative effect on the attorneys’ fee award for Serrano III.
¶7“The Mandelcourt decided that respondent’s attorneys were not entitled to fees for their services on an appeal which only related to their right to fees as the result of a prior appeal. (Id., at p. 760.) In evaluating the appeal for attorneys’ fees, the court declared: ‘The stake on this one is not the constitutional principle now perpetually established in the public interest, but the amount of the attorneys’ fees earned in the process of establishing it.
¶8*646Respondent’s attorneys are therefore representing essentially their own interests at this time, as distinguished from those of the public to whom the benefits of the antecedent litigation stand secured.’ (Ibid.; cited with approval in Marini v. Municipal Court [1979] 99 Cal.App.3d 829, 838 [160 Cal.Rptr. 465], [a ‘private attorney general’ decision].)
¶9“If for no other reason, the trial court’s attorney-fee order regarding Serrano III must be reversed ‘for want of the pivotal element of predominant public interest. ’ (Marini, supra, at p. 838.) From a ‘practical perspective,’ it is difficult for this, court to perceive any significant benefit derived by the public from the $39,560 award. (See, e.g., Bruno v. Bell (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 776, 787 [154 Cal.Rptr. 435].)
¶10“Respondents argue that defense of the fee award in Serrano III caused them to forego the representation of other ‘public interest’ claims. Public Advocates and Western Center urge this ‘fees for fees’ scenario to purportedly permit the litigation of public interest cases on their merits. Respondents also contend that ordering attorneys’ fees for securing fees will terminate protracted litigation over awards with recalcitrant defendants possessing greater legal resources. Superficially attractive, these arguments fail to satisfy statutory requirements for a ‘private attorney general’ award.
¶11“The use of $39,560 to help finance additional public interest litigation is not at issue before this court. While we recognize respondents’ strong legal efforts, we do not here adjudicate the value thereof. (Marini v. Municipal Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 829, 837-838.) The public benefits allegedly forfeited through respondents’ involvement in the Serrano III appeal are obviously too speculative to satisfy ‘the standard of significance’ dictated by section 1021.5 and the relevant judicial authorities. (Id., at p. 837.) Any public value derived from the Serrano III appeal is ‘wholly coincidental to the attainment of [respondents’] personal goals.’ (Ibid.)
¶12“Respondents seek to highlight their limited ability to bear the expense of extended litigation, and the relative legal resources of the state appellants. ‘Disparity of economic resources has played a role in some counsel fee decisions, but only where the basic requisities of the award were otherwise satisfied. [Citation.]’ (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82, 90 [144 Cal.Rptr. 71].) The economic arguments cannot substitute for failure to qualify for a ‘private attorney general’ award in the Serrano III appeal.
¶13“Public Advocates and Western Center contend that the attorneys’ fee award for the constitutional litigation in Serrano II [Serrano v. Priest *647(1976) 18 Cal.3d 728 (135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929)] should not be diminished by a denial of appellate fees in the Serrano III effort to secure that award. Respondents argue that to exclude fees for Serrano III would substantially reduce their ‘effective recovery of fees for all Serrano appellate work,’ and violate ‘the spirit of the private attorney general doctrine.’ The ‘diminution’ argument fails to recognize the critical distinction between the Serrano II and the Serrano III litigation, and contravenes an express statutory requirement for a ‘private attorney general’ award. Respondents’ limited financial resources do not satisfy the statutory directives, because Public Advocates and Western Center did not incur a ‘disproportionate’ financial burden in securing their personal interests. (Friends of “B” Street v. City of Hayward (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 988, 994 [165 Cal.Rptr. 514]; Marini v. Municipal Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 829, 836.)
¶14“The trial court award of attorney’s fees for the Serrano III appeal contravenes the section 1021.5 requirement relating to ‘the necessity and financial burden of private enforcment.’ ‘An award on the “private attorney general” theory is appropriate when the cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff “out of proportion to his individual stake in the matter.” [Citation.]’ (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 82, 89; Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, supra,23 Cal.3d 917, 941.) The award at issue here does not meet this basic condition.
¶15“The sizable attorneys’ fee award affirmed in Serrano III and the settlement with the county defendants reimbursed respondents for their ‘private enforcement’ effort in Serrano II. But the only benefits conferred in Serrano III were personal to Public Advocates and Western Center, and respondents’ individual interests in attorneys’ fees transcended the cost of their legal victory.
¶16“In summation, the Supreme Court in Serrano III listed three basic factors to be considered in awarding fees on the ‘private attorney general’ theory. (20 Cal.3d 25, 45.) If a trial court ‘determines that the litigation has resulted in the vindication of a strong or societally important public policy, that the necessary costs of securing this result transcend the individual plaintiff’s pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization, and that a substantial number of persons stand to benefit from the decision, the court may exercise its equitable powers to award attorney fees on this theory.’ (Ibid.)
¶17*648“The three-pronged test was applied by the Supreme Court in Serrano III to affirm the ’private attorney general’ fee award for the constitutional litigation climaxed in Serrano II. (Id., at pp. 46-47.) However, all three factors in the equitable doctrine weigh against the propriety of attorneys’ fees for the Serrano III appeal. First, the relevant public policy grounded in the state Constitution was vindicated in Serrano II. This court cannot accept the ‘fees for fees’ award at issue here as ‘the vindication of a strong or societally important public policy.’ Second, respondents’ pursuit of substantial attorneys’ fees should not be subsidized through an additional ‘private attorney general’ award, (see, e.g., Bruno v. Bell, supra,91 Cal.App.3d 776, 786.) Finally, the Serrano III fee litigation will have no widespread public benefit, as only respondents stood to receive an attorneys’ fee award. The circumstances of the case at bar also fall short of meeting the Supreme Court indices for a ‘private attorney general’ award.”
¶18I would reverse the trial court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees for the Serrano III appeal.
¶19The petitions of all parties for a rehearing were denied November 29, 1982. Newman, J., and Kaus, J., did not participate therein. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.