Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 32 F.1d 273 - Wall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.

Wall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.’s Empirical Analysis

32 F. 273 · 1887

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
June 1947
most recently cited

3 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 1947

3 federal appellate ·

701887189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Paul v. Virginia · Randall v. Baltimore O R · New York Life Insurance v. Fletcher · Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Peavey · In re Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The manifest object of this statute, as of many statutes, regulating the form of insurance policies on lives or against fires, is to prevent insurance companies from inserting in their policies conditions of forfeiture or restriction, except so far as the statute permits. The statute is not directory only, or subject to be set aside by the company, with toe assent of the insured; but it is mandatory, and controls too nature and terms of the contract into which toeA company may induce the assured to enter. * ⅜ * It follows that the insertion ⅛ the policy oí a provision for a different rale of commutation from that prescribed by the statute in case of default of payment of premium after three premiums have been paid, as well as the insertion in the application of a clause by which the beneficiary purports to ‘waive’ and relinquish all right and claim to any other surrender value than that so provided, whether required by a statute of any state or not, is an ineffectual attempt to evade and nullify the clear words of the statute.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““It was evidently intended by- its [the state’s! legislation to provide a fixed and absolute rule, applicable to all cases, — absolute and universal — because, if It applied only in cases in which the policies were silent, or if it could be waived or changed, a child can see that it would protect only so far as the insurance companies wero willing. So, although no words of penalty are attached, no express denial of the right to waive, in fact no words of negation in any direction, yet ii seems to me fair to say that the affirmative language of this statute discloses a public policy, which no court ought to question or refuse to enforce. The legislature has by this language declared a rule in respect to forfeitures In ilfe insurance policies. It has thus established the policy which it believes should obtain in this state, and it is roy duty to administer the law's of this state In the spirit in which they were enacted, and to uphold both their spirit and their letter.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““Now, in the policy sued on, there is a nonforfeiture clause, but containing a different provision; and it is alleged that in the application the insured waived and relinquished all right or claim to any other surrender value than that provided in the policy, whether required by the statute of the state or not. This is the doubtful question. It is strenuously insisted by the defendant that the statute of Missouri neither forbids nor declares null, nor makes anywise illegal, such a waiver as the one in question; that it merely gives a right or privilege to the insured, which, like any other personal right or privilege, he may, for sufficient consideration, waive; and that such waiver, not being .forbidden by the statute, is not contrary to public policy, in any such sense as that the courts should refuse to enforce it. Back of this argument, and strongly supporting it, is that liberty of contract which courts are strenuous to uphold.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.