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32 La. Ann. 896

Duson v. Dupré

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Decided July 15, 1880

Supreme Court of Louisiana · decided 1880-07-15

Landry. John JJ. Ogden, Judge ad hoc. A joinder of issue by default or general denial does not, in a petitory-action, admit the authority of plaintiff to sue. The probate court' of the parish where the deceased resided and had his-, domicile has exclusive jurisdiction of the opening and administration of his estate; and the opening of the succession in another-parish is an absolute nullity.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The case was tried on those exceptions, and the district court held them sufficient, and thereupon dismissed the actions. Upon appeal, th'e Supreme Court [of Louisiana] reversed the judgment and held: ‘In our opinion the district judge erred in allowing this collateral attack on the judgment of the probate court. The late parish court of St. Landry had probate jurisdiction, and was exclusively competent to grant and issue letters of administration in all successions properly opened in that court. Defendants contend that this succession was not properly opened in that court, for the reasons urged in their exceptions. This denial presents a question of fact, that the deceased was not a resident of this parish, and that, having left heirs who were residents of .this state, his succession was not vacant, so as to necessitate or justify the appointment of a curator. These questions can be looked into and adjudicated upon only in a direct action before the same court, or before the tribunal now vested with original probate jurisdiction in the parish of St. Landry. No principle of our jurisprudence is more firmly established than the following: “Letters of administration make full proof of the party’s capacity until they be revoked. They must have their effect, and the regularity of the proceedings on which they issue cannot be examined collaterally.” .This rule was laid, down in early days, * * * and has been sanctioned, confirmed, and consecrated by an unbroken line of decisions ”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Simmons v. Saul, Smith v. Jennings

““The parish court of St. Landry had probate jurisdiction, and was exclusively coinpetent to grant and issue letters of administration in all successions properly opened in that court. Defendants contend that this succession was not properly opened in that court, for the reasons urged in their exceptions. This denial presents a question of fact; that the deceased was not a resident of this parish; and that, having left heirs who were residents of this state, his succession was not vacant so as to necessitate or justify the appointment of a curator. * * * These questions can he looked into and adjudicated upon only in a direct action before the same court, or before the tribunal now vested with original probate jurisdiction in the parish of St. Landry. No principle of our jurisprudence is more firmly established titan the following: ‘I.otters of administration make full proof of the party’s capacity until they be revoked. They must have their effect, and the regularity of the proceedings on which they issued cannot he examined collaterally.’ This rule was laid down in the early days of our jurisprudence, and has been sanctioned, confirmed, and consecrated by an unbroken lino of decisions of this court down to the present day.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Garrett v. Boeing

Relies on Long Island Brick Co. v. Arnold · Mechesney v. Unity Township

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1880-07-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 1936

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

30188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Poché, J.

¶2C. C. Duson, alleging that he is the curator of the succession of Louis Blanc, and E. E. Perrodin, as the attorney of the absent heirs of the same succession, instituted a petitory action against Lastie-Dupré and others, for the recovery of a tract of land situated on Bayo®.. Plaquemine Brusle, in this parish, as the alleged property of the succession which they claim to represent.

¶3After filing an answer and call in warranty, Lastie Dupré, joined', by all his co-defendants, excepted to plaintiffs’ action for want of capacity-in them to sue, on the ground of the nullity of their appointment by the parish court of St. Landry, for the following reasons :

¶4Eirst. That Louis Blanc, having died in the parish of Orleans,, where he resided, the probate court of St. Landry had no jurisdiction over his succession.

¶5Second. That Louis Blanc having left heirs residing in the State;. *897•Í&.8 probate court could not treat and administer his succession as a "•vacant estate.

¶6The case was tried on these exceptions, which were maintained by dlie district court, and the cause was dismissed, from which judgment jplaintiffs appeal.

¶7After filing their letters of appointment, plaintiffs objected to the Introduction of any evidence tending to show the nullity of the proceedings had in the probate court, in the succession of Louis Blanc, on the following grounds:

¶81. Because defendants’ exceptions came too late, after issue joined, •and were not urged in limine litis.

¶92. Because the proceedings of the probate court in the succession •of Louis Blanc could not be attacked collaterally, and the letters of ad-ministration issued by a competent court make full proof until revoked or annulled in a direct action. The objections were overruled, and the proffered evidence admitted by the judge a quo, and plaintiffs reserved their bill of exceptions.

¶10In our opinion the district judge erred in allowing this collateral •attack on the judgment of the probate court.

¶11Defendants’ counsel in their brief admit the correctness of the .principle that the validity of letters of administration issued by a competent court cannot be tested collaterally ; but they contend that the .rule is subject to exceptions, one of which is in a petitory action, wherein the capacity of a curator or administrator to sue can be assailed by the defendant.

¶12Defendants’ position could be maintained if the appointment of the -curator was absolutely void, and the nullity apparent on the face of the ..papers and of the pleadings. But such is not the case here, as evidenced ••by the course of defendants themselves, who not only rely upon volumi- . .nous testimony in support of their attack, but even obtain a continuance -of the cause for-the avowed purpose of procuring such evidence.

¶13The late parish court of St. Landry had probate jurisdiction, and was exclusively competent to grant and issue letters of administration -la all successions properly opened in that court. Defendants contend ■that this succession was not properly opened in that court, for the rea..sons urged in their exceptions. This denial presents a question of fact: •that the deceased was not a resident of this parish, and that having left heirs who were residents of this State, his succession was not vacant -so as to 'necessitate or justify the appointment of a curator.

¶14But the investigation of these facts requires a re-opening of the ■-case and an examination into the motives and reasons which prompted ..the course of the probate judge in the premises.

¶15These questions can be looked into and adj udicated upon only in a *898direct action before the same court, or before the tribunal now vested with original probate jurisdiction in the parish of St. Landry. No principle of our jurisprudence is more firmly established than the following : " Letters of administration make full proof of the party’s capacity until they be revoked. They must have their effect, and the regularity of the proceedings on which they issued cannot be examined collaterally.”

¶16This rule was laid down in the early days of our jurisprudence, and has been sanctioned, confirmed, and consecrated by an unbroken line of decisions of this Court down to the present day. 2 L. 249 ; 2 A. 538 ; 8 A. 35 ; 10 A. 496 ; 26 A. 330 ; 28 A. 807 ; 30 A. 263.

¶17The case reported in 3 A. 261, and mainly relied upon by defendants, is not applicable to the case at bar ; in that case the right of appointment of a party applying for the administration of a succession was the point involved in the issue.

¶18The view which we take of this case obviates the necessity of reviewing the other points raised in the pleadings.

¶19It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment appealed from be annulled, avoided, and reversed; and it is ordered that defendants’ exceptions be overruled, and that this case be remanded to the lower court to be proceeded with in accordance with the views herein expressed, and according to law, and that the defendants pay costs thus far incurred in both courts.

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