Volume 32 — North Carolina Reports

This was an action of debt upon a former judgment commenced by a warrant, issued by, and returnable before, a single justice out of Court.

The case is : McNeel}', the defendant, executed a note-to the plaintiff and signed it, “McNeely & Rumple.'-’ Rumple died, and McNeely and Joseph Rumple administered on his estate. The action is brought on the note against McNeely in his own right, and against him and Joseph Rumple as administrators of Eli Rumple, the deceased.

This was an action of assumpsit for the price of a parcel of salted hides, sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant — Plea, von assumpsit; and upon the issue thereon joined, the case was tried at Henderson on the Fall Circuit of 1847. The plaintiff first, offered in evidence an order, written and signed hy one James J. Bates, in the following words*: ‘■Charleston, 20th January, 1814.

The case is as follows: The defendant and one BeucLni entered into a partnership, to run a line of Stages between the City of Raleigh and Salisbury. Afterwards, and before the company commenced operations, Bencini purchased, for the use of the firm, from the plaintiff, a carryall wagon at the price of $100 — for which he gave his note. This carryall was subsequently put by Bencini into the stock, at the price he was to give, and it was used by the firm a short time throafter.

This was an action of debt upon a promissory note under seal, to which the defendant pleaded a certificate of bankruptcy. The suit was commenced in the County Court of Cherokee, and the pleas wrre entered at the June Term 1844, of that Court.

<p>At the common law no trespass on chattels was an indictable offence with, out a breach of the peace ; that is, either the peace must be actually broken, or the act complained of must directly and manifestly tend to it, as being done in the presence of the owner, to his terror or against his will.</p> <p>The case of the State v Flowers, 2 Mur 225, cited and approved.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Ashe County, at the Spring Term 1848, his Honor Judge Manly presiding.</p> <p>This was an action of ejectment, in which the plaintiff’s lessor claimed under a sale made by the sheriff, by virtue of a writ of venditioni exponas, against one Zachariah Osborne, and, on the trial, he produced a justice’s judgment against the said Osborne, on which an execution W’as issued and returned to the County Court, with the following levy endorsed by the constable: “The above execution levied on the lands whereon George Austin and Jefferson Osborne now live.” He then produced the record of the .County Court, showing that an order had been obtained for the sale of the said lands, and showed the writ of venditioni exponas, issued thereon, and the sheriff’s deed to him as purchaser. He then introduced testimony to prove, that the defendant, George Austin, and Jefferson Osborne lived upon the land sued for, at the time, when the aforesaid levy was made, and that the defendant was in possesston when the declaration was served upon him, it being admitted that he claimed under Zachariah Osborne.</p> <p>The defendant contended, that the levy on the justice’s execution was void, because it contained an insufficient description of the land, upon which it was made, and that the County Court had no power to make an order for the sale of the land, because the constable’s levy did not state, that there were no goods or chattels to be found ; and that for these defects the purchaser under the venditioni exponas had acquired no title. The Court instructed the jury upon the first point, that if they could collect from the testimony, that the description of the land in the levy as fully identified it, as if the words of the Act of Assembly had been literally followed, then the levy would be good; and, upon the second point, the Court charged, that, as the Court made the order for the sale of the land levied upon, and a writ of venditioni ex-ponas issued thereon, the sale made by the sheriff under it was valid, and the purchaser acquired a good title. Under these instructions the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment, and the defendant appealed.</p>

This is an action of assumpsit for work and labor done. The case is; the plaintiff, in the Spring of 1842, agreed with the defendant to work on his farm for six months, and the defendant agreed to pay him eight dollars a month for his work, one half in trade and the other half in cash —and the plaintiff was to find himself.

<p>The statement of the case by the presiding 3 udge is, in our practice, a substitute for a bill of exceptions, which sets forth the errors cotfiplained of. If no such statement accompanies the appeal, and no error appears on the record, the judgment will be affirmed.</p>

The action was brought to recover certains tolls, alleged to-be due from the defendant, for passing on the plaintiffs’ road, and through a toll gate erected thereon. The Company was incorporated in 1834, for the purpose of making a turnpike road from the Saluda Gap, then in Buncombe County, and on tbe South Carolina line, by Asheville, and other designated points to the Tennessee line.

On the trial of this ejectment, the lessor of the plaintiff offered in evidence a judgment of a justice of the peace, at the instance of one Poor against the'defendant, an execution thereon and a levy on land indorsed, then a memorandum on the docket of the County Court, in these words, “ Order of condemnation,” then a venditioni exponas and a sheriff’s deed, and proved the defendant in possession.

The defendant was indicted for a forcible trespass in seizing, and, with a strong hand, taking out of the possession of one David Byrd a certain promissory note, then in the lawful possession of the said David Byrd.

This was a scire facias against a defaulting witness, to which he pleaded that he had not been summoned. Upon the trial, the case appeared to be this. The plaintiff had brought an action against one Dillard, and the defendant was duly summoned as a witness In his behalf.

In this action, the plaintiff declared in trover for a rifle gun. The defendant pleaded the general issue. The evidence was that the gun was the property of the plaintiff, and kept by him, as arms for muster.

This was an action, brought by the relator upon the bond of the defendant, Ira D. Farmer, given upon his ap. pointment to the office of constable in March 1847, with the other defendants as sureties. The breaches of the bond, assigned by the plaintiff, were, 1st: want of diligence ; 2nd, failure to pay over; 3rd, failure to return papers. Pleas — Conditions performed and not broken. .

This is a proceeding under the Act of 1836, commonly called the bastardy act, instituted to subject the defendant to the maintenance of the bastard child of Rebecca Moody, as the father of it. On the trial of the issue, the State read to the jury the examination of Rebecca Moody and rested its case.

This is a sci. fa, against the defendant, as special bail of one McEIrath. The following is the case agreed. In 1840, the plaintiff sued out his writ against J. J. McEIrath and A. II. Erwin, and declared against them in assumpsit, as copartners. The writ was executed by the defendant, w’ho was the sheriff of the County, and he became the bail of the defendants.

This was an action of debt, brought against the defendant, King, as constable, on his official bond, dated 1st January, 1840, and the other defendants as his sureties, for his failing to collect claims put in his hands as constable.

At the Fall Term, 1848, of Wilkes Superior Court of Law, a rule was taken upon the defendant in this case, to show cause why he should not produce at the trial a certain bill of sale. At the Spring Term 1849, the rule coming on to be heard upon argument of counsel, “it was ordered by the Court that the rule be discharged,” from which interlocutory order the plaintiff appealed.

This was an action of trover, brought to recover damages for the conversion of a parcel of oats and corn, alleged to be the property of the plaintiff. Held: that this interest is assignable, and that an action for taking it away must be brought by the assignees, and not by the assignor to the use of the assignees. Carter v. James, 9 Johns, 143.

This was an action of slander. It was in proof, that there was an action of ejectment, pending in the Superior Court of Henderson County/between the present plaintiff, Gilreath, and one George 'Allen, the father of the present defendant: that Gilreath, in support of his title in that suit, relied upon a grant from the State of North Carolina for the land in controversy, appended to which grant was a certificated of survey, signed by Thomas D. Clayton, the County surveyor;…

This is a scire facias to subject bail. At the return. term the defendant pleaded specially, that Marcus S. Alexander, his principal, was arrested on a ca. sa. at the instance of and was duly discharged as an insolvent debtor, having previously given the plaintiff in this action proper notice. To this plea there was a demurrer, which, upon argument, was sustained, and the plea overruled. The defendant ap« pealed.

This was an action on the case. The defendant, in March 1846, had a crib of corn, containing twelve hundred bushels. The sheriff, by virtue of certain executions, levied upon the corn and sold six hundred bushels to different purchasers, in lots of one hundred bushels. The plaintiff bought three lots.

This was an appeal from the County to the Superior Court of Rowan. In the County Court a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, against both the defendants, who appealed to the Superior Court, and filed an appeal bond, signed by each of them and their sureties. The plaintiff read in evidence a promissory note, signed Conner and Long, which was admitted to have been signed by R. W. Long, one of the defendants.

This was an action of debt, originally brought by a warrant before a justice of the peace. It was brought to recover the penalty of fifty dollars, which the plaintiff alleged had been forfeited by the defendant, under the 70th chap.

This was an action of slander. The defendant charged the plaintiff with committing perjury-in this: that, upon a certain trial, he swore “that, from the general character of one Brady, he would believe him on oath, and that he was well acquainted with his general character.” To sustain the plea of justification, the defendant proved, that, a short time before the trial referred to, the plaintiff said, that Brady’s character was so bad, that nobody would believe him; and the…

This was an action of slander for words spoken of the female plaintiff, wife of the other plaintiff. The proof was, that the defendant spoke the words of the female plaintiff, as charged, on many occasions, public and private, sometimes when he was sober, most frequently when ho was excited by spirituous liquors.

presiding. This was an action of assumpsit, commenced before a Justice of the Peace, in March, 1848, and brought by appeal to Gaston Superior Court of Law. On the trial the plaintiff introduced a witness, and shewed him the account, for the recovery of which this suit was brought.

This is an action in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered to the defendant, by the firm of C. T. Alexander and Company, of which the plaintiff is the surviving partner. The defendant admitted the plaintiff’s account, and the only question on the trial was, whether, upon jion assumpsit, the plaintiff’s demand was not to be considered as paid, or whether the defendant had not a counter-demand, which was available upon her plea of set off.

This was an action of slander and the case was as follows. Held: that the action could not be maintained, and gave judgment of non-suit, from which the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Buncombe County, at the Special Term in July 1849, his Honor Judge Caldwell presiding.</p> <p>This was an action on the case, and the declaration contained two counts. Upon the pleadings and evidence the ease appears to have been as follows: One Drury Burnet unlawfully set fire to the woods, whereby he became liable to pay fifty dollars, to the use of any person suing for the same, by the Rev. Stat. Ch. 16, and the defendant, by concert with Frederic Burnet, the father of Drury, warranted Drury Burnet for the penalty, and got judgment therefor, with the intent of favoring the said Drury and barring an action for the penalty by the plaintiff or any other person. There were the like allegations and evidence, as to another penalty incurred by one John Hyatt, and a recovery therefor by the defendant with the same intent. The declaration laid the injury to the plaintiff, in his being thereby hindered and barred from recovering those penalties from the said Drury Bur-net and John Hyatt. It was not alleged or proved, that the plaintiff had instituted any suit for either penalty. Upon not guilty pleaded, the Court instructed the jury, that the plaintiff could not recover, and, after a verdict and judgment accordingly, the plaintiff appealed.</p>

This action was against four for a joint battery and false imprisonment; and, after the jury retired, it was •agreed by the counsel on each side, that the Court might be adjourned till the next day, and that, when the jury should be agreed, the Clerk might enter the verdict in the absence of the Judge and the counsel The jury accordingly informed the Clerk, that they found for the plaintiff and assessed his damages to thirty-five dollars against each of the defendants, and…

This was an action on the case for overflowing the plaintiff’s land, by the erection by the defendant of a dam fora public grist mill in Henderson County. It was brought in the Superior Court of that County ; and the question was, whether it would lie, inasmuch as the plaintiff had not first filed a petition to have the annual damage assessed. The presiding judge held that it would not, and gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

This suit was commenced by petition, in March 1847, in the County Court of Henderson, to recover damages for overflowing the plaintiff’s land.jb'y the erection of a grist mill.

The plaintiff claimed the land in dispute under a grant from the State, issued to him in May, 1842.

This was an action of assumpsit for money had and received, and non-assumpsit pleaded. The case was, that Philip H. Benick was seised in fee of a tract of land, and, in October 1843, entered into articles with the plaintiff for the sale of it, and covenanted to convey it to (he plaintiff on or-before the 1st of March 1S44.

<p>Generally speaking, in an action oi ejectment, one, who comes in as land-! lord, is tobe taken as admitting the possession of all the land, described in the declaration, to have been in the tenant and to be in himself.</p> <p>But when a declaration embraced several tracts, held separately by different tenants, the admission of possession by the landlord should be referred only to the tract occupied by the tenant, on whom the process was served. The cates oi McDowell v. Love, 8 Ired. 502, and Carson v. Burnet, 1 Dev. 4* Bat. 546, cited and approved.</p>

This .case originated in the County of Catawba, where the parties lived, and was removed by the plaintiff to the Superior Court of Lincoln. On the trial, the defendant’s counsel stated to the jury, that the plaintiff was not willing to try his case in the County of Catawba, where he lived and was known, but had it removed to the County of Lincoln. The plaintiff’s counsel objected, that there wras no evidence before the Court, how the case got to that Court.

The plaintiff filed her petition in Iredell County Court, setting forth, that she was the widow of John Thomas, Jun’r, who died intestate in 1845, leaving an infant daughter his only heir at law ; that the said John died, seized in fee of a tract of land described in the petition, and prayed that a writ of dower should issue to the sheriff of the said County, commanding him to summon a jury to set apart to her dower in the said land.

The plaintiff brought an action of debt on a bond, and the only question on the trial was a set off, claimed by the defendant.

The question on the trial in this case was upon the defendant’s plea of plene admiaistravit. The facts were agreed to be these: The defendants administered the 11th day of December, 1843, and, on the same day, the plaintiff served a warrant on them in debt on a bond for 083 51, and the Justice, at the instance of the defendants, postponed the trial to September 11th, 1S44.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Catawba County, at the Fall Term 1847, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding.</p> <p>This is a proceeding in bastardy, in which the defendant was charged as the father of a child of Mary Huffman, At his instance an issue was made up, whether the defendant w’as the father of the said bastard child, or not.</p> <p>On the trial, the examination of the mother was given in evidence on the part of the State, and therein she charged the defendantto.be the father.</p> <p>On the other side, evidence was then given* that the said Mary and one Lawson Huffman intermarried in 1840., and lived together in Catawba County for some months* and that, then, the husband left his wife and went to one of the western States ■, that about the 1st of October 1S4S he returned to Catawba and resided there in the vicinity of his wife, and frequently slept in the same house with her, until March 18 H ; but not in the same bed, except that, on one occasion, the particular period not mentioned, he rose in the night from the bed in which he was lying and went to that in which his wife was : That in March 1844, the said Lawson again left the State, and had not been since heard of; and the said Mary remained in Catawba and had the child there on the 19th of July, 1S44.</p> <p>The counsel for the defendant moved the Court to instruct the jury, that upon this evidence, if believed, the child was deemed in law the husband’s ; and, therefore, that the defendant could not be found to be the father.</p> <p>But the Court refused the instruction ; and then informed the jury, that, although there was such a legal presumption as that mentioned, when the husband and wife had opportunity of intercourse, yet it could not determine the issue — which was, whether the defendant was or was not in fact the father — because, as to that, the law raised also a contrary presumption from the examination of the mother; and that, therefore, the question was to be determined on those opposing presumptions and any other evidence, upon the matter of fact; and that they ought to find against the defendant, if upon the whole evidence they believed, that he was the father of the child.</p> <p>The issue was found against the defendant, and he appealed.</p>

<p>Where a testator, being sick In bed, called for Ills will, apd directed his-so» to burn it, and, instead of doing so, he retained the'-will and burnt another paper for the purpose oí deceiving his father, and. the father was thus deceived Into the belief that his will was burnt; Held, that this did not amount to a revocation, the will not having been actually burnt.</p>

<p>Under the act of 1848, ch. 53, on the trial of an ejectment, brought by a ' purchaser at an execution sale against the defendant in the execution or one bound by its teste, no judgment need be shewn; at all events unless the purchaser be the plaintiff in the execution.</p> <p>In cases, where it is necessary to produce the judgment, as where ttie opposite party claims under a prior conveyance, a variance between the judgment and the execution will not avoid the proceedings under the execution ; provided enough appears to enable the Court to see, with reasonable certainty, that in fact the execution was issued and intended to enforce the particular judgment.</p> <p>In this case, the note, on which the judgment was obtained, was payable to the firm of “Lester, Kilgore Bates,” the judgment was in the names of ‘‘Philip Lester, Josiah Kilgore and William Bates,” and the execution was in the names of “P. Lester, Kilgore ¿r Bates,” and for the same amount as the judgment; Held, that the variance in the names came within the mischief, intended to be remedied by the Act of 1848, and did not vitiate the execution.</p> <p>Although land alone is mentioned in the Act of 184$, it seems to be the unavoidable interpretation of it, that the sales of personalty, under execution, must, in like manner, be upheld, as being within the mischief.</p> <p>The cases of Hamilton v. Adams, 2 Murph. 161, Dobson v. Murphey, 1 Dev, Bat. 591, and Collais v.McLeod, 8 Ire. 221, cited and commented on. The cases of Weaver v. Cryer, 1 Dev. 337, and Farley v. Lea, 4 Dev. §- Bat. 169, cited and approved.</p>

This was an indictment against the defendant for selling spirituous liquors without a licence. The offence was laid to be against “the Act of Assembly” — and upon this ground the defendant moved in arrest of judgment. The motion was sustained by the Court, and the Solicitor .for the State appealed.

This was an indictment for an affray. After the'-Count had charged the jury, they retired, and, remaining out for some considerable time, at the request of the Solicitor, they were sent for by the Court. After the jury returned, tlie Court charged them, that, although Jones (the other' defendant)' had first commenced a battery upon Shule, yet that, if the jury believed the evidence, the defendant Shule .was also guilty.

The following is the case, sent up by the Judge : This is a suit on the single bill of the defendant for one hundred dollars, executed in October 1316, and payable the 1st of November in the said year, to avoid which, he pleaded that it was executed on an usurious consideration.

On the trial of this action of ejectment, the following case appeared. One Lockenore, in May 1845, conveyed in fee the premises in dispute to one E Hetrick, in trust to sell and to pay a debt, to which one Philip Hetrick and one Sigthan were his sureties. On the 22nd of October, 1845.E* Hetrick, Philip H-etrick, and the defendant, came to an agreement, by which the defendant was to pay the trust debt, and to pay Lockenore $147 besides for his in* terest.

This was an action of debt ou the bond of the defendant, as sheriff, for the default of his deputy,' in not collecting certain debts for the relators, and in collecting them and not paying over the money', and a special verdict was found, on which a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs, jointly with four other persons, were the owners of the slaves sued for, by gift from their grand father Robert Webb, the testator of the defendants. At the time of the gift, all the donees were infants. The action is in trover for an alleged conversion by the testator.

This was an action of debt, upon the administration bond of the defendant and his sureties, to recover the distributive share of the intestate’s estate. The wife of Benjamin Burch, one of the relators of the plaintiff, was a distributee of Mabel Clark, and entitled to one seventh part of the sad estate.

<p>An attachment issued by a Justice out of Court and not made returnable within thirty days* is void.</p> <p>A garnishee has a right to object, that the attachment under which he is summoned is void, and that therefore no judgment should be rendered against him.</p> <p>The cases of Ciarle v. Quinn, 5 Ire. 176, and Washington v. Saunders, 2 Dev. 346, cited and approved.</p>

■ ■ Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Caldwell Count}’, at the Spring Term 1840, his Honor Jadg& Bait.Iíy presiding. This was an action- of trover for the conversion of a sirrel mare.

On the trial of this action it? ejectment, the defendants were proved to be in possession of the premises, set forth in the declaration.

This was an action of ejectment begun in 183S. The lessors of the plaintiff claimed title to the premises in question, as the heirs at law of Ann Donahoe, who according to the proof, died in 1832, unmarried and childless. • The plaintiff exhibited in evidence a grant from the State to the said Donahoe for the land in dispute, dated in' 1780, and countersigned by John Shepherd, with the ad* dition pr. sec. The defendant objected to the reading of the grant, upon the ground,…

This is an action of debt on a covenant. The case is as follows. The intestate, Douglass, contracted by deed to purchase from the plaintiff a tract of land, at the price of 500. The covenant is executed by both parites, and ill is bound to the other in the penal sum of $3000, le vendor is bound to make title, when the purchase ■rey is paid, • and the vendee to pay the money in the j-ear 1S4S, if put into possession in that 3'ear.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintifts, as partners, under the style of Neil, Brown & Williams, against the defendants, as partners, under the style of L. D. Childs & Co. The contract, on the part of the defendants, was to make and deliver certain machinery for a cotton factory, and the breaches alleged were, that the machinery was not of proper materials and workmanship, nor delivered according to the contract.

The action was tried in November 1848, and the lessor of the plaintiff claimed under a sale by the sheriff on a fieri facias, against the lands of Squire Simmons, purporting to be issued for the sum of $8227 00, which Benjamin Logan recovered from Simmons by a decree of the Supreme Court in a suit in Equity, lately pending therein between those parties and others.

Appeal, from the Superior Court of Law of Catáwbá County, at the Fall Term 184S, his Honor Judge Moore presiding. Tito action is brought in debt on fhe defendant’s official bond, as Sheri ft’of Catawba County. The breach assigned is, in not using clue diligence to collect a note pat. into his hands.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of McDowell County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge Bailey presiding.</p> <p>Both parties claim under sales by executions against John Allen, under the following circumstances. One John McEntire had a judgment against John Allen, on which a balance of $400 was due in August 1840, and the premises were then sold by the sheriff, under a fierifacias on that judgment, and purchased at the price of $405 by the defendants, who are the sons of John Allen and took a deed from the sheriff. On the 16th of September 1S37, John Allen, as the surety of another person, gave a bond to Morris, the lessor of the plaintiff for $1000. payable two days after dato ; and a suit was commenced thereon in March 1841 in the Superior Court o( Burke, and judgment obtained in October 1843 for $ 1223 05. On the 10th of December 1843, a fieri facias was sued out thereon, directed and delivered to the sheriff of Burke, returnable to the spring term 1843, which was levied on the premises on the 6th of March 1843 by the Sheriff of Burke, who sold them at Morganton, on the 19th of April 1843, at $500, to the lessor of the plaintiff and made him a deed. The premises are situated in that portion of McDowell County, which was taken from Burke County, and the levy of the execution was made before the first County Court held for McDowell, but the sale afterwards. The plaintiff then gave evidence that the premises were, at the time of the purchase by the defendants, of the value of $1500, and that John Allen was much indebted to another person and was totally insolvent. And the plaintiff further gave evidence, tending to shew, that the money, which the defendants paid for the premises, belonged to their father; and also that there was an agreement between John Allen and his sons, the defendants, that the defendants should bid off the land and take the title to themselves, for the purpose of securing the enjoyment to the father, and with the intent to defraud the plaintiff’ and other creditors of the father of their debts.</p> <p>Thereupon the defendants moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the Sheriff' of. Burke had no authority to sell the land at Morganton, and therefore that no title passed.by his deed to the lessor of the plaintiff But the Court refused to give the instruction. And his Honor then stated his opinion to the jury, that, if John Allen furnished the purchase money, paid by the defendants to the sheriff, to the intent that the sons should take the title to themselves and thereby defeat the other creditors of the father, the purchase of the defendants was fraudulent and void, although the plaintiff in the execution, McEntire', and the sheriff were parties to such agreement. And furthermore, if there was an agreement between John Allen and the defendants, that they should buy the land at the sheriff’s sale and take the deed to themselves, but so that the father might possess and enjoy it, and with the intention to defeat the lessor of the plaintiff and his other creditors of their just debts, that then the purchase of the defendants would likewise be fraudulent and void, although the defendants paid their own money. There was a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendants appealed from the judgment.</p>

This was an action of slander. The plaintiff had been a constable in the year 1S43 and was again appointed in 1846. The defendant, speaking of a return made by the plaintiff on an execution, which had been in his hands as constable in 1843, said that he had made a false return. The words were spoken, while the plaintiff was acting as constable in 1846. Much testimony was given on the trial on both sides, but it is unnecessary to repeat it here.

This is an indictment for a battery on Jemima Somers ; and, on not guilty pleaded, she was sworn as a wdtness, and stated, that she was in her .field at the fence, and that the defendant rode by and she asked him why he had been, talking about her, and a .quarrel ensued ; and she then threw a stone at him, as he sat on his horse a few yards off and missed him: and that she then threw a stick at him, which might have brushed against the side of his arm ; and that then he got…

This is an issue, devisavit vel non, made up under the statute to try the validity of a paper writing, propounded as the will of John Graham, deceased. The evidence was, that the supposed testator executed the will in the presence of two witnesses, and desired them to attest the instrument.

By the Act of 1824, incorporating the Buncombe Turnpike Company, all hands liable to work on roads in Buncombe, residing within two miles on either side of the turnpike road, are made liable to do six days work on it annually, and those who do not, when warned.^are made liable to the penalties, which could then be collected from persons failing to work on public roads in the State.

burg County, at the Fall Term 1847, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding. The plaintiffs’ declaration contains two counts; the first on a warranty; the second, for money had and received. The defendant possessed a lease in a gold mine, which had an unexpired term of three years to run, and which the plaintiff purchased from him at the price of $100, and paid it before the beginning of this action.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Rowan County, at the Fall Term 1848, his Honor Judge-Moore presiding.</p> <p>This is an action of debt on a general bond, given by the sheriff of Rowan, in the sum of ¡$10,000, for the discharge of the duties of his office, for the year 1847, of which the condition is in the form prescribed in the Statute. Rev. St. C. 109, S. 13. The breaches assigned are, that the sheriff failed to collect the Town Taxes of Salisbury for the year 1847, and secondly, that he collected the taxes and failed to pay them to the relator, the treasurer of.the town. After oyer of the bond and condition, the defendants pleaded, conditions performed, and no breach, fyo.</p> <p>A verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court, whether the sureties were liable on the bond for this demand, upon the following statement. By a private Statute, passed in the year 1794, to amend the laws regulating the town of Salisbury, it was enacted, that the commissioners of the town should anually appoint a person to collect the taxes assessed for the town, ■ and that such person should enter into bond with sufficient sureties in a sum not less than $100, to the commissioners, for the faithful discharge of his duty ; and it makes it the duty of the person so appointed to give such bond and to collect the taxes, and pay the same to the treasurer of the town on or before the 1st Monday in August in each year. By another private act, passed in the year 1825, it was enacted, that the first five working days in March, in every year, shall be the time, in which the tax list for the town shall be given, in ; and that, on the 20th of March, the commissioners shall appoint three assesors to value and assess the real estate in the town for taxes, who shall, within three days, file,their assessment with the commissioners, who shall thereupon proceed to lay the taxes, and that, wdthin ten days after the commissioners shall have laid the taxes, the clerk of the broad of commissioners shall deliver to the town constable or to the person, whom they may appoint to collect the said taxes, an accurate copy of the return &c, and annex the valuation of each person’s property, as made by the assessors, together with the amount of taxes due thereon ; and that the town constable, or person appointed to collect the taxes, shall, within three months after the list is placed in his hands, account for and pay over to the treasurer of the board of commissioners all such sums as he may be made liable and accountable for by virtue of his appointment; and that such constable or collector may, within one year afterwards, collect the same, notwithstanding he may have paid the same to the commissioners ; and that the commissioners shall annually deliver, to the constable or other person appointed to collect the taxes, a warrant under their hands authorising the said person to demand and receive the taxes. By another act, passed in the year 1827, the sheriff of Rowan County is au'horized and required to collect, pay over and account for the taxes, imposed by the commissioners of the town of Salisbury on the citizens and property therein, in like manner and under the same rules and regulations, as were then prescribed for the government of the town constable, or collector, by the aforesaid act of 1825. Under that act of 1827 the sheriff received the list and collected the taxes of 1847, orbecame. liable for the same.</p> <p>Upon the point reserved, the Court was of opinion with the defendants, and set aside the verdict and entered a nonsuit, according to the agreement of the parties; and the relator appealed.</p>

<p>appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Rutherford County, at the Fall Term 1848, his Honor Judge Bailey presiding.</p> <p>The facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Ashe County, at the Spring .Term 1S49, his Honor Judge Ellis presiding.</p> <p>This action was commenced on the 7th of December, 1847. The plaintiff showed a title to the premises by an old grant to his lessor. As to half an acre, the defendant admitted himself to be in possession without color of title, and submitted to a verdict. The residue of the land in the defendant’s possession consisted of two adjoining tracts of 100 acres each, and, in respect thereto, he relied on the statute of limitations. In support of his defence, the defendant gave in evidence two grants to himself for those two tracts, issued twenty years before the trial; and he also offered evidence, that, in the Spring of 1S41, he claimed the land covered by his grants and cleared a small piece of land, about three rods square,on the line between his two tracts, and including a part of each, and enclosed it by felling four trees around it and throwing branches and brushwood on them; and that he planted potatoes therein, cultivated and gathered them in 1840: and further, that, in the Spring of 1841, he again planted the same acre in potatoes and cultivated them, but that pigs got in and rooted them nearly all up, so that there were in autumn but a few vines to be seen, and a few stalks of corn, which seemed to have been worked: that, in 1842, he enlarged the clearing to three acres, embracing about equal parts of both tracts, and fenced it and planted a crop of corn therein that year and every year afterwards to 1847, inclusive, and cultivated and gathered the crops. On the part of the plaintiff, evidence was then given, that the defendant’s field or enclosure, was surrounded by woods and was three quarters of a mile from the defendant’s dwelling, which was nearer than any other ; and that the land was situate in a mountainous region, where there were but few inhabitants. The plaintiff also gave evidence, that, eight or nine years before the bringing of this suit, his lessor surveyed the land claimed by him, and, on that occasion, made blazes on several trees near his lines, and that the defendant defaced those marks on some of the trees, and felled others of the trees ; and that he requested a witness not to give the lessor of the plaintiff information of a certain tree, as it would enable him to identify his land and injure the defendant.</p> <p>The counsel for the plaintiff insisted, that the defendant’s possession was so minute and detached, as not to conform to the usages of agriculture, nor exhibit the requisite notoriety; and that a possession, thus apparently clandestine and contrived for concealment, was fraudulent and ought not to bar the entry of the true owner, and moved the Court so to instruct the jury. His Honor declined giving an instruction in the terms asked, but charged the jury as follows: that if they should find from the evidence, that the defendant had been in the continuous adverse possession of the land, covered by the two grants to him, for seven years before the suit was brought, tbe plaintiff could not recover ; that to constitute such adverse possession, it must be open and not clandestine, such as is consistent with the usages of agriculture in sowing the land and reaping the fruits ; that the failure to gather the crop of potatoes planted in 1841 would not amount to an abandonment of the possession, if they believed the testimony which had accounted for it; that it would not deprive the defendant of the benefit of his possession (if they should find that it had been taken under his grants and continued on that claim for seven years) even should they believe, that the defendant knew, from the beginning, that the land belonged to the lessor of the plaintiff; and that it was sufficient to prevent the defendant’s possession from being considered clandestine and to constitute an open and adverse one, if it was to such an extent and of such a character, that the public generally might have known it and some of his neighbours did know it, although some others of them did not see it.</p> <p>The jury found the defendant guilty as to the half acre, and not guilty as to the 200 acres included in the defendant’s grants. For the plaintiff it was moved, that the verdict should be entered generally, but the Court directed the verdict to be recorded as it had been given in ; and from a judgment accordingly the plaintiff appealed.</p>

<p>The reputation of the-insolvency of a defendant in an execution will not excuse the officer, who has it, from liability for neglect of duly in not endeavoring to ascertain for himself, whether there is property or not, subject to the execution.</p> <p>The case of Partees v. Alexander, 7 Ire. 412 cited and approved.</p>

This is an action of replevin for a slave, named Cato, which was commenced in March 1849, and in which the defendant pleaded, property in one Thomas Byers.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Rowan County, at the Fall Term 1848, his Honor Judge Moore presiding.</p> <p>The following is the case sent up by the Judge below.</p> <p>This was an action of trover, brought to recover damages for the conversion of a negro by the name pf Louisa. The plaintiff proved, that she had had the possession and control of the negro in controversy from the 1st day of March 1843, until she was taken off by the defendants on the 1st day of December 1846. At the time she was taken off by the defendants, she was at the house of a man by the name of Gibbs, to whom the plaintiff had hired her for two or three days to assist him in his business. After night, the defendant, went to the house of Gibbs and enquired for the girl, alleging that the defendant, March, had purchased her from the other defendant, Ellis. The negro was called up, and Gibbs stated that he would send for the plaintiff, and she would permit them to take her or not, as she might think proper. The defendants said they were in a hurry to start. Gibbs, however, sent for the plaintiff, who arrived in the course of an hour or two, but before the defendants had taken possession of the negro. When the plaintiff came, she objected to their taking her, and took the negro by the hand. The defendants took her from the plaintiff’ and carried her off. The plaintiff proved the value of the slave.</p> <p>The defendants offered in evidence a bill of sale from the plaintiff to the defendant, Ellis, dated the 10th of Febuary 1841, by which the negro in controversy was conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant, Ellis. It was proved that the negro went into the possession of Ellis, about the time of the date of the bill of sale, and continued in bis possession until the 1st of March 1843, when she went into the possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, from that time, either kept her working on the plantation, on which she lived, or hired her out. The day after the negro went into the possession of the plaintiff, she sent after her clothes, and Ellis delivered them up. The plaintiff also proved, that, shortly before she made the conveyance to Ellis, she owed debts to the amount of $4Q or $50, the payment of which was about to be enforced by process of law. Ellis proposed to the plaintiff’s son, that he would assume the payment of these debts, and, as a means of re imbursing himself, would hire the negro Louisa at the rate of $5 per month, until her hire amounted to enough to pay him what he should advance for the plaintiff. Shortly after this, the son of the plaintiff, hearing that Ellis had a bill of sale for Louisa, called upon him and enquired if such was the fact. Ellis stated to him, that he had no bill of sale for Louisa, but merely a strip of paper to show that he had hired her. Another witness stated, that, in the fall of 1842, or the spring of 1S43, Ellis informed him that he had not purchased, but had merely hired, Louisa, at $5 per month, and that she had nearly worked out the time — that he should like to purchase her, but could not afford to pay the price. The officers, who had for collection the claims, which the plaintiff owed, stated that in 1840 or 1841, Ellis called upon them and informed them, that he had agreed to befriend the plaintiff, and that he would assume the debts, which he had to collect from the plaintiff, provided they would allow him a little time to raise the money. Ellis promised to pay them at the ensuing County Court, and did then pay them. Another witness stated, that he lived in the family of Ellis, while he had Louisa in his possession, and, on one occasion, Ellis remarked to his wife, that he had hired Louisa and she should do what he wanted her to do.</p> <p>The defendants introduced a witness, who stated, that he had a claim to collect from the plaintiff and he went with an execution, intending to make a levy upon the slave'Louisa ; that he informed the plaintiff'of his business, and enquired of her, if the defendant, Ellis, had a bill of sale for the negro. She answered that he had. This conversation took place on the 5th of December 1843. Another witness was present, who stated the conversation in nearly the same way.</p> <p>It was in evidence, that the plaintiff was so illiterate as not to be able to read or write. Much evidence was offered by the plaintiff to prove, that an imposition was practised upon her, at the time she executed the bill of sale to Ellis, which it is unnecessary to state.</p> <p>A motion was made to non-suit the plaintiff, because, at the time the defendants took the negro, she did not have the right of immediate possession.</p> <p>The jury were instructed, that, as the witness Gibbs hired the negro by parol, it would be for them to find what were the terms of the contract of hiring. If the negro was to work only that portion of the day, that is usually employed in work, and at night return home to the plaintiff, or if they inferred from what took place, when the defendants went there to take the negro, that Gibbs surrendered the possession or the right of possession to the plaintiff', the action could be maintained. If, however, at the time the defendants took possession of the negro, the plaintiff then had not the right of immediate possession, the action could not be maintained. The Court further instructed the jury, that, though the conveyance from the plaintiff-to Ellis was valid, if the plaintiff had more than three years adverse possession of the negro, previously to the conversion by the defendants, she would be entitled to recover; and what was the character of her possession was a fact for the jury to ascertain from the evidence. The Court further instructed the jury, that, if the convey anee of the negro, though absolute on its face, was really intended by the parties to it, as a security for the money which Ellis had advanced for the plaintiff, and, after being repaid that amount, by the hire of the negro or otherwise, he surrendered her again to the plaintiff, according to the terms of their original contract, it would be evidence, from which the the jury might infer a parol sale and delivery of the negro from Ellis to the plaintiff'.</p> <p>There was a verdict for the plaintiff and from the judgment thereon the defendants appealed.</p>

The following case was sent up by the Judge below. On the trial of this action of ejectment, the defendant admitted himself in possession, and it was admitted that the defendant’s title papers covered the land in dispute. It was also admitted, that the lessor of the plaintiff had the oldest title, and the only question was, whether bis title covered the land in dispute.

<p>A person cannot kill a dog in the owner’s house or yard, upon the pretence that he is a nuisance, because he had,' at a former period, chased or bitten seme one else.</p> <p>When a man has been attacked by a dog on the owner’s premises, but the dog is driven off by the family, so that the man is no longer in danger of being bitten, he is not justified in killing the dog, while the latter is running' from him.</p>

Superior Court of Law of McDowell County, at the Fall Term, 1848, his Honor Judge Manly presiding. -v^v-.

This was ejectment. The defendant admitted himself to be in possession. Both parties claimed under one John Kerr. The plaintiff read in evidence a magistrate’s judgment against the said Kerr, dated February 1842, a levy under an execution issued January 1843, an order of sale and venditioni exponas in 1844, and a sheriff’s deed to the lessors dated February 1845.

This was an action of assumpsit. The contract, upon which the plaintiff declared, was the following : The plaintiff purchased, from the defendant a tract of land of 200 acres, at a certain price by the aere, and it was agreed at the time of the purchase, that, if there should not he 200 acres in the tract, the defendant was to refund to him whatever the deficiency might amount to, at the rate at which.the plaintiff was to pay for the laud, and it was further state',1, as a…

The action is debt on an administration bond, suggesting breaches, and upon issues joined there was a verdict for the plaintiff and the damages assessed to $1772 89. The relator, being dissatisfied with the amount of damages, moved for a new trial ; but it was refused and judgment entered for the penalty of the bond to be discharged by the payment of the damages and costs, and thereupon the relator appealed.

The defendant, on the 15th of February, 1847, entered into a written contract with the plaintiff to repair for him, at a stipulated price, a vessel — the work t® be done in a, workmanlike manner, and within all the month of May following. The work was not finished until the 17th of July. On the 5th of July the plaintiff went to Edenton, where the vessel was undergoing the repairs, for the purpose of receiving her.

This was assumpsit for the hire of a negro from November 1840 to March 1843, during which time, and for some years before, the negro had been in the State of Mississippi under the control and management (as the plaintiff alleged) of the defendant. ffhe plaintiff admitted, that he had received the hire of the negro for the time prior to November 1840 ; and, as evidence to charge the defendant, among other things, offered a letter of his, in which he uses these words, “those…

' Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Person County, at the Spring Term .1849, his Honor Judge Dior presiding. This was an action upon the ease for malicious prosecution, with a count for slanderous words. The plaintiff produced in evidence a State’s warrant, sued out against him at the instance of the defendant, charging him with having stolen money from him.

The action is in debt, upon a sealed instrument, which is as follows: “On or before the first day of January 1843, we promise to pay James Watters, or order, the sum of sixty dollars for the rent of a house and lot, and the said Watters is to put the house in order and put up the fences,” &c. The defendant, Smaw, went into pos> session of the premises and enjoyed the use of them during the term of his lease.

This was an action of trover brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of a negro man, by the name of Harper. The parties agreed upon the following statement of facts, and submitted them to the Court. Prior to the month of December 1841, one Stafford Weatherly lived in the County of Guilford in this State, and owned the slave in controversjh with other property.

This was an action of trespass for an assault and battery, committed by the defendant on the plaintiff, to which the defendant pleaded the general issue. The plaintiff proved, that the defendant and his son and a number of other persons were assembled at a sale. The son of the defendant became intoxicated, and made an attack on several persons, and behaved so badly, that a justice of the peace, present, ordered a constable to take the defendant’s son into custody.

<p>Under the Act of 1840, ch. 28, the possession by a fraudulent donee cannot operate as notice of the conveyance to him of any land, but such tract or parcels of tracts, as may be occupied by him at the time of the second purchase; and especially it cannot so operate, as to any parcels, continuing in the possession of the donor;</p>

The case is : a writ issued from the office of the Clerk of Chatham Superior Court, at the instance of the plaintiff, against James A. McNeil and Daniel McNiel, in covenant upon a sealed instrument. It was duly executed and a bail bond taken, with John McNiel and Henry Arnold, the defendants, as bail. One bond only was executed.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Pasquotank County, at the Fall Term 1849, his Honor Judge Bailey presiding.</p> <p>One Lamb, by deed, dated 22nd of March, 1846, conveyed to the plaintiff a tract of land, “together with the horses, cattle,” &c., and all crops on the ground” in trust, to sell and pay the debts enumerated, unless otherwise paid, before the 2nd of January, 1847.</p> <p>At the date of the deed there was a corn crop in the ground, but on the 10th of April a severe frost destroyed the crop then growing — Lamb was permitted by the plaintiff to remain on the land, plough the ground, plant the crop a second time and cultivate it. The crop amounted to forty barrels, which were converted by the defendant, and this action is brought for the value.</p> <p>His Honor was of opinion, that the plaintiff w’as not entitled to recover, and a non-suit having been entered, the plaintiff appealed.</p>

This was a petition filed in the Superior Court of Law of Pasquotank County, at the Fall Term 1849.

This was an action of debt for the recovery of the sum of two hundred dollars, incurred by the defendant under the statute against usury.

■ On the 22nd of April, 1846, the plaintiff, for the purpose of securing and paying certain debts, executed fo one Black a deed, conveying several tracts of land, stock, farming utensils, &o., also all his stock in trade at New-by’s bridge, and Pine Grove, consisting of dry goods, groceries, &c., “likewise all the books, accounts, notes, bonds, judgments, and other evidences of debts, due the said Willis Lamb ; in trust, to sell the lands and other property, herein conveyed,…

d-' well presiding. This is a suit on a justice’s judgment for about thirty-five dollars j and the controversy turned on the question, whether it had been paid by one Wright, a deputy sheriff, or by him purchased ?

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Pasquotank County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge Man-j.y presiding.</p> <p>This is an action upon the bond of Wilroy and the other defendants, taken in pursuance of the statute, for the performance by the former of the duties of constable for one year. It is dated the 9th day of March 1844, which appears to have been Saturday, the last day of the Term of Pasquotank County Court. The breach assigned is, that the constable collected’ various claims put into his hands, as constable, for collection, and refused to pay upon demand. The facts are, that previous to the Court, at which the bond was given, the claims in question were confided to the officer for collection; judgments were obtained in due time» and on the 9th day of March 1844, the day on which the bond in suit was given, the constable col. lected the several demands — one for $42 65, another of $40, and interest from the 1st of January 1840, and another of $17, and in April following another demand of $24 94.</p> <p>These several amounts were demanded of the constable soon after the collection of the last mentioned debt, and he failed to pay.</p> <p>It is also in evidence, that the defendant, Wilroy, had been appointed constable at June Term 1843, to fill a vacancy, and that the term of his office under that appointment, viz : the residue of one year, expired in the early part of the week of March Term, at which the bond declared on was given. The claims in question were put into the hands of the constable in the summer of 1843, and, it was admitted, might have been collected, with the exertion of proper diligence, before the term of office, then current, had expired.</p> <p>The counsel for the defendants was then going on to examine testimony as to the time of the day on Saturday, when the bond was given and the moneys collected, with a view to show, that the collections were made before the bond was entered into.</p> <p>But the Court arrested the examination, and instructed the jury, that, however that might be, if the moneys were collected on the same day and were in his hands at the time, of the demand in April, the refusal then to pay them over, would be a breach of the bond entered into in March of that year. •</p> <p>There was a verdiet in pursuance of the instructions.</p> <p>Rule for a new trial for misdirection was discharged. Judgment, and appeal.</p>

This was an action of debt brought ffy the plaintiff on a paper writing, purporting to be a bond, given by Perkins, as Chairman of the Board of Superintendants of Common Schools for the County of Pasquotank, to which William H. Davis was surety.

The defendant was indicted for voting, knowingly and fraudulently, at a constable’s election, held for one of the ■captain’s districts in… Held: that the testimony was inadmissible, and that it would have been so, even if the gentleman, whose advice was taken by the defendant, had been a member of the bar: that the defendant was bound to know the constitution and laws of his country ; and that ignorance of them in him and his advisers would not excuse, though it might be…

The action is in debt to recover the sum of one hundred dollars. The facts are as follows : The plaintiff’s intestate was the owner of a justice’s judgment, obtained against the defendant for the above named sum. An execution was issued, and by him put for collection into the hands of one Landis, a constable. Landis, in discharge of the execution, received from A. L. Walker, one of the defendants in the execution, a number of promissory notes upon other persons.

This is a proceeding under the bastardy Act, to subject the defendant, as the alleged father of the illegitimate child of one Zilpha Robbins, to its maintenance. The defendant and Zilpha Robbins, both lived in the County of Brunswick — the latter being a native of it — and while in that Count}', she proved to be with child. During her pregnancy, she went into the County of New Hanover, where the child was born.

This was an action of replevin, brought to recover a negro boy by the name of Peyton. The plaintiff claimed under a bill of sale from her fa* ther, John T. Peace, dated the 4th day of May, 1844.

This was ejectment. The lessor claimed under a deed from one Gittens, dated in 1822, under which possession had been held for more than twenty-one years. The deed described the land as lying on both sides of Loven’s creek — beginning at a white oak on the East side of Loven’s creek, thence South 55 chains to a post oak— thence East 100 chains to a white oak, thence North 55 chains to a white oak, thence to the beginning, containing 559 acres.

The petitioner alleges, that he is the owner of one-half of certain slaves, a tenant in common with the defendants, and prays for a decree of sale in order to. effect a division. The defendants deny the title of the petitioner, and allege, that one- of the defendants is the owner of the slaves in severalty and has the exclusive possession,.

This was a case of recordari to the Superior Court of Beaufort County. The affidavit of the plaintiff set forth, that the deceased, his testator, married Sally Anu Rispess, the sister of the defendant, to whom she was indebted, and died in a few days thereafter, she surviving him, and that the plaintiff is the executor.

The indictment is for marrying one Mary Williams, she being a female infant under the age of fifteen years, and her father not then living. It was found in May 1849, and contains two counts ; both of which state the marriage to have been in Person County, on the 18th day of February 1832. The first count states further, that, on the said day of the marriage, the defendant absconded from that County and had not since returned to it up to the finding of the bill.

By a private Act passed in 1826, ch. 104, it was enacted, that when the office of Clerk and Master in Bladen should thereafter become vacant by resignation or otherwise, it should be united to the office of Clerk of the Superior Court of law; and that, upon such vacancy, the Judge of the Superior Court should take from the Clerk the official bonds and administer to him the oaths required of Clerks and Masters; and that, thereupon, the Clerk should perform the duties, receive…

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Pasquotank County, at the Fall Term 1849, his Honor Judge Bailey presiding.</p> <p>This is a motion to vacate a judgment. , The case is as follows: A writ was issued on the 2nd day of March 1841, at the instance of Banks against Benjamin F. Keaton, who was an infant, returnable to the March Term 1541, of the County Court of Pasquotank. This writ was filed, endorsed, “service accepted William F. Keaton.” At the same term the cause was referred to the Clerk, who at September term 1841, made a report, after which, upon the record was found the following entry: “Jury impannelled and find that the defendant did assume,” &c. Judgment was rendered, and on an execution issued thereon negroes belonging to the plaintiff were sold. The sale took place in the Spring of 1S43. In August 1849, a notice was issued to the defendant by the plaintiff, that, at the ensuing term of the County Court of Pasquotank, a motion would be made to vacate the judgment so obtained, and at the succeeding Term in September, all parties being in Court, “it was adjudged by tbe Court, that the said judgment be set aside and declared void.” From this judgment, Banks appealed to the Superior Court. In the Superior Court, the plaintiff offered evidence to show, that, by the judgment originally given against him in the County Court, while he was an infant, he was greatly injured, by reason of the want of a proper defence to the action. Ho further offered to show by William F. Keaton, that he never was appointed guardian ad litem to Benjamin F. Keaton to bis knowledge, nor everconsented to be appointed, and that he did not defend the said action. This parol evidence the Court refused to hear and reversed the order of the County Court.</p>

The action is assumpsit by the payee of a bill of exchange for $500, purporting to be drawn at Edenton in this State by George Price & Co., on Thomas McAdam & Co , of New York, on the 11th of November 1844, and payable at sight, and it was tried on non-assumpsit, and satisfaction pleaded. The firm of George Price & Co,, was composed of George Price, the defendant, and one Daniel Messmore, and, at and before the drawing of the bill, did business in Edenton.

The plaintiff took out an attachment against the defendant’s estate for $450, directed to any constable, and returnable before,a justice of the peace, and it was levied and returned to the next County Court.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Greene County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>• This is an appeal from an order dismissing a writ of certiorari. The facts are these. The plaintiff Martha A. Lassiter was the wife of oneUzzell Lassiter, and, during'their coverture, they executed their joint bond to Harper for $94 SO, on which a warrant was brought and judgment rendered against both in March 1847. Afterwards the husband died and Harper sued out execution against the husband and wife, which the constable levied on the land of Mrs. Lassiter and returned the levy to the County Court, on the 2nd Monday of August 1847,. when, without taking any notice of the husband’s death, the Justice’s judgment was affirmed, and a venditioni ex-ponas was awarded, and, in October following, the plaintiff obtained this- writ. Her affidavit stated her coverture, at the time the bond was given and'the judgment rendered, and that it was rendered in her absence and without her knowledge. The counter affidavits of the creditors and the constable were put in, and stated that Uzzell Lassiter was insolvent, and that the debt was contracted for necessaries for his family, and that the articles were sold on the credit o.f the feme and her land; and that she made no objection to the judgment being given, on account of her coverture, nor prayed an appeal, but she acknowledged the justice-of the debt, and promised, at the time and also after the death of her husband, to- pay or secure it by a new bond; and that she so continued to promise, until she was advised by counsel at August Court, that she might avoid the payment by reason of her coverture, when she refused to give her bond ; but that she did not, even then, oppose the affirmance of the judgment and order of sale. In reply the plaintiff offered the affidavit of the magistrate, that Mrs. Lassiter was not present when the judgment was given, though it purports to have been rendered by confession ; and her own affidavit, that the debt was chiefly for spirituous liquors sold to her husband, who was very intemperate.</p> <p>His Honor was of opinion, that the case was a proper one for a writ of error coram nobis, and not for a certiorari; and he dismissed the latter writ.</p>

The prisoner was indicted for rape. In forming the jury, a person tendered was challenged by him for favor, and the counsel for the state admitted the cause assigned to be true, and the Court thereupon allowed it.

This is an action of debt, to,recover a penalty given by Statute for trading with a slave ; commenced before a Justice of the Peace, and brought to this Court by successive appeals. Plea, not guilty.

<p>Appeal from Sampson Superior Court of Law at a Special Term in December 1849, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>This was an action of the case, brought by the plaintiff to recover damages of the defendants for negligent management of their cars, whereby one of the plaintiff’s slaves was killed and another badly wounded. On the trial it was proved, fhat, on a certain Sunday in the month of August 1845, about two o’clock in the afternoon, a train of cars, belonging to the defendants, was passing along their road at the usual rate of 15 or 20 miles an hour, when the wheels of the cars passed over one of the plaintiff’s slaves and killed him instantly, and badly injured the hand of another.</p> <p>It was admitted, that the slaves were asleep at the time, but it was disputed, upon the evidence, whether they were lying on the bed of the road or just outside of it, or whether the one who was killed was not sitting' asleep on one of the rails, no witness having seen them until after the injury, when the body of the deceased was’’ found on the bed of the road with his thigh and arm both" crushed. The day was clear, and the part of the road, where the slaves were, was straight for more than a mile, but the slaves were under the shadow of a bridge, which connected the two sides of a deep cnt, sixty feet wide at' top at that place. The witnesses differed as to the distance, at which the slaves might have been seen by the engineer, who had the management of the cars, had he been looking out for them : some stating it to be half a mile, and others at two hundred yards. It was proved, that the train of cars was the regular mail train, and that' it was passing at the usual hour, and that the plaintiff owned the plantation at the bridge on both sides of the road. The defendants, for the purpose of showing that the injury was not occasioned by any fault of their agent, offered to introduce, as a witness, the captain of the train, but it was objected, that he was interested, because of his being responsible to the defendants, if a recovery was had against them. It appearing, however, upon his examination to that point, that he had nothing to do with the running of the cars, that being under the exclusive direction of the engineer, who was appointed by, and responsible to,, the company, and not to the captain, he was admitted. From the testimony of him and other witnesses it appeared, that when the cars were very near the slaves, just before it passed over the one who was killed, the engineer attempted to stop the cars by letting-off the steam and reversing the wheels, but the impetus, which they had received, carried them on about seventy yards before they stopped. It was proved to bo the duty of the engineer, whose station is on the right side of the engine, to keep a look out for obstructions on the road-It was further proved, that, when the train was moving at the rate of 15 or 20 miles an hour, it could not be stopped suddenly in a shorter space than seventy-five or a hundred yards. The engineer was proved to be ordinarily skilful. The plaintiff contended, that it was only necessary to prove, that the injury was done to his slave by the defendants or their agent, and the law would imply that it was done negligently, until the contrary was shown. The plaintiff contended further, that he was in no default; for, that, admitting it to have been wrong in his slaves to have gone to sleep on the defendants’ road, at the time when their train of cars usually passed, he was not to be affected by their wrongful act. But that, if the fault of his slaves could be imputed to him, he was still entitled to recover, if the defendants were, as he contended they were, guilty of neglect on account of their agent, the engineer, not keeping a proper lookout, and by such default not having seen his slaves in time to prevent running over them. In other words, that notvvith • standing his, the plaintiff’s default, the defendants’ misconduct was the proximate cause of the injury, and they were therefore responsible for it. The defendants contended, that, as the plaintiff was guilty of the first negligence by his slaves going to sleep on their road at such an -unseasonable hour, he brought the injury on himself and could not recover, even supposing their agent was, though they contended lie was not, guilty of some negligence.</p> <p>The Court charged (he jury, that to entitle the plaintiff to recover he must show, that he had sustained an injury by the negligent conduct of the defendants’ agent: that the plaintiff’s slaves were guilty of neglect in going to sleep upon the defendants’ road at the time and under the circumstance stated by the witnesses, and that the fault of his slaves was imputable to the plaintiff: this circumstance, though it would not in all cases excuse neglect on the part of the defendants, yet would diminish the amount of prudence and care required of them : that, if the plaintiff’s slaves had been crossing the rail road along an ordinary public high way, where they had a right to be, the defendants would be responsible for any neglect of their agent, the engineer, in keeping a proper look out, if such neglect were the cause of injury to the slaves; but that, under the circumstances of this case, such precautions in keeping a look out could not be expected or required from the engineer, and the defendants were not responsible, unless their engineer, after seeing the slaves, failed to use all the means in his power to prevent injuring them, and that they were responsible, if he did fail to use such means after seeing the slaves.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. And the plaintiff, after an ineffectual motion for a new trial, appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>liuggett v. Montgomery, 5 Bos. & Pull. 446. Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, (25 E. C. L. R. 50 )j 1 Petersdorf’s Abridgement 112. JValman v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213. Dean v. Clayton, 7 Taun. 489, (2 E. C. L. R. 183.) Peg-gilt v. Eastern Co. R. R. Co., 54 E. C. L. R, 229. Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Adol. & Ellis N. S. 20, (41 E. C. L. R. 422.) Davies v. Mann, 10 Mus & Welsby 54G.</p> <p>There is nothing in the charge, of which the plaintiff can justly complain. The plaintiff’s slaves were unlaw fully upon the road of the defendants, and, having substantially contributed to the injury, were the authors of their own wrong.</p> <p>Yanderplank v. Miller, 1 Moody & Malk. 169. (22 E. C. L 280.)</p> <p>Pluckwell v. Wilson, 5 Car. & Payne 375. (24 E. C. L. 368.)</p> <p>Lunsford v. Large. Ibid 375.</p> <p>Wolfe v. Beard, 8 Car. & Payne 373. Hawkins v. Cooper, ib, 473. (34 E. C. L. 435, 485.)</p> <p>Sills y. Brown, 9 Car. & Payne 601.</p> <p>Raisin v. Mitchell, ib. 613. (38 E. C. L. 245, 252.)</p> <p>Williams v. Holland, 6 Car. & Payne 23. (25 E. C. L. 260)</p> <p>Greenleaf, 473, and cases there cited.</p> <p>Ilarifield v. Roper, 21 Wendell 615.</p> <p>Raihburn v. Payne, 19 “ 399.</p> <p>Hotty. Wilkes, 3 B. & Alderson 304, (5 E. C. L.)</p> <p>No negligence has been shewn on the part of the defendants, and, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, he must shew carelessness by the defendants, or prove facts from which it can be inferred. Per Tindall C. L in Aldridge v. Great Western R. R. Co., 42 E. C. L. 27 6.</p>

This is an action of detinue to recover certain slaves, mentioned in the plaintiff’s declaration. The facts are as follows: John Gamble died in 1836, intestate, possessed of the slaves in controversy and others. He left, as his next of kin, a sister, Mrs. Gamble, the testatrix of the defendant,-and four -children of another sister, who died before him ; of these children, Thomas Read, the testator of the .plaintiff, was one.

• Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Anson County, at the Fall Term 1849, his Honor Judge Dick presiding.

The action is detinue for a slave, which was brought against one Dickson, and revived against his administrator. The plaintiff had demanded the slave from the intestate, and, upon refusal, sued out a writ of replevin to the Superior Court of Jones, and Dickson gave bond with sureties for the performance of the judgment, according to the statute.

This is an action of ejectment, to recover the possession of the tract of land set forth in the plaintiff’s declaration : both parties claimed under Thomas Thompson. The defendant claimed under a deed of trust, duly executed and registered in the register’s office of Rockingham County. The plaintiff claimed under a sheriff’s deed, founded on judgments and execulions, levies and sale duly made by the sheriff.

weu. presiding. The respective parties claim under the will of Abram Stowe, in which he devised as follows : “I give to my wife the plantation on which Í now live, during her life, one horse.” &c. Then after several gifts of chattels to others, follows this clause : “Fourthly, I give to the lawful heirs ol my son, Abram, deceased, the plantation whereon I now live.” “Seventliljr, I give unto my sons John and Joel, and their children, the residue of my estate, both land and…

This was a sci. fa. to Phillip Pipkin,' administrator of John B. Dawson deceased, to revive a judgment recovered by the commissioners of the town of Newbern, at the February Term A. D. 1843, of Craven County Court against his intestate, John B. Dawson.

This is an ejectment for a lot in Wilmington, which Abraham Golden purchased in 1813 in fee, and of which he died seized, in 1815. and without issue. The action Was commenced in April 1845, and the demise is laid on the 1st of January, 1S40, for ten years and is for the whole lot. The lessor of the plaintiff claimed by descent from Golden, as the daughter, and only surviving child of Sarah Fleming, who was a daughter of a sister of Golden.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Edgecombe County, at the Fall Term 1849, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>After the decision of this case at December term 1848^ (see 9th Ired. 288,) it came on for trial a second time, when the following facts were agreed : That Louis D. Wilson, then of the town o£ Tarborough, made his will in these words: ‘Tn the name of God : Amen. I, Louis D. Wilson do, this 26th day of May 1833, make this my last will and testament. First: I give to my sister Mary, the sum of five hundred dollars. Secondly : I lend to my sister Nancy, the land and plantation inherited from my father and all my negroes ; and after the death of my sister Nancy, to her surviving children equally. Thirdly: I give to the Chairman of the County Court of Edgecombe and his successors in office the residue of my estate, both real and personal, for the use and benefit of the poor, (the paupers.) of said County, to be appropriated and managed under the supervision of the Justices of the County: Fourthly : I give my town lots, Nos. 27 and 28, to Eliza Cotten, now Eliza Thompson:” And that the paper was written and signed by the testator; and, after his death, was duly proved in November 1S47, as his will, passing both personal and real estate : that the testator’s sisters,Mary and Nancy, and Eliza Thompson, died several years before 1847, and that the testator knew, that they were dead : that the testator, having become an officer in the army of the United States destined for Mexico, was, in the month of July 1847, making arrangements preparatory to his departure on the next day, and was at his own house in Tarborough, looking over a large collection of miscellaneous papers, spread out before him ; and that, whilst he was so engaged, a gentleman called on him, but the testator continued his examination of the papers, and in the midst of it, on taking up one of the papers, the testator made a slight exclamation, which attracted the attention of the visitor, and then the testator read the paper silently, and threw it to the visitor without offering a word, but proceeded in the examination of his papers : that the visitor silently read the paper (which was the will above set forth) and said to the testator, ‘■Is this the only will you have?”and the testator replied, “That’s all, sir whereupon the visitor handed back the paper and said to the testator, “All the persons to whom you have given property are dead,” and the testator rejoined, *'yes;” and nothing more was then said on the subject: that, on the morning of the next day, the testator said to several persons, that he had been so busy that he had not had time to write his will, and asked one of them, whether a will made in Mexico would be valid, and it was concluded that it would be : that, in the evening of that day, the testator departed and went to Rocky Mount, in order to take the Rail Road for Wilmington on his way to Mexico; and that, upon getting to Rocky Mount, the testator remarked to a friend that he had been writing almost incessantly during the week past, and yet had not written the most important document; and, on the succeeding morning, the testator mentioned to the same friend, that he had not written the document, but he would do so as soon as he should get to Mexico — not saying at either time, what kind of document it was, to which he alluded : that on that day the testator proceeded on his journey, and soon sailed for Vera Cruz, and that he was taken very sick on the voyage and died within a few days after he landed.</p> <p>The premises mentioned in the declaration are the lots in Tarborough devised to Eliza Thompson, and a tract of land, which the testator bought, between the years 1833 and 1847 ; and the lessors of the plaintiff are the testator’s heirs at. law.</p> <p>It was agreed, that, if, in the opinion of the Court, the foregoing facts and conversations did not amount in law to a second republication of the said will in the year 1847, there should be a judgment for the plaintiff for all the premises ; and if the Court should be of opinion that they did amount to such republication, then there should be a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant, for such parts of the premises, as the Court should think them respectively entitled to.</p> <p>The Court held, that there had been no republication of the will and gave judgment on the case agreed for the plaintiff for all the premises ; and the defendant appealed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Surry County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge Ellis presiding-</p> <p>This is replevin for a slave, who was delivered to the plaintiff. The defendant avowed the taking, as sheriff by virtue of a writ of fieri facias on a judgment in favor of one Bi ooks against one Stuart. On the trial, the plaintiff offered to show the title in himself, as trustee in a settled ment to the separate use of Stuart’s wife for life, and then for her children, and that the defendant knew it, when he seized the slave. But the Court rejected the evidence as irrelevant; because, if true, it would not enable the plaintiff to maintain replevin against the sheriff; and the plaintiff was non-suited. Thereupon the Court directed the jury to ascertain the damages, sustained by the defendant. by being deprived of the slave. The defendant gave evidence, that the plaintiff carried the slave to Virginia as soon as he got the possession, and yet kept hirfi there The Court then instructed the jury to assess th'd damages to the value oí the slave, and a reasonable''hiffef from the time he had been replevied: and the jury' assessed the damages accordingly to $535,- and jud^m'effi was rendered for the penalty of the 'reptevih borid,1 gifre'M by the plaintiff and his sureties, to be ‘ tliséharge'd by'tffé payment of those bonds and the costs ; and the plaintiff appealed.</p>

<p>Under all execution to sell the lands descended from A. to B., the sheriffhas no authority to sell lands devised by A. to B. and such sale will be void. Where A. having several tracts of land, devises one tract in fee to B. who is one of his heirs, and another tract in fee to C. another heir, each takes by devise and not by descent.</p>

L presiding. The prisoner was indicted for murder. The case stated in the record is as follows: “In forming the jury, two persons wore offered as jurors' and challenged for cause : On being asked, whether they had formed and expressed the opinion, that the prisoner was guilty, they answered, they had — whereupon they were asked by the Court, upon what ground they had formed that opinion, and they answered, that it was formed from report.

This was an action of assumpsit. The plaintiff declared specially, and for work and labor done, and materials furnished, goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered : and for money paid to the use of the defendant. The plaintiff proved, that, in the Spring- of 1844, he contracted to construct and put into operation a saw mill, in a mill house of the defendant. The plaintiff was to do the work and find all the irons.

This was an action of detinue brought by the plaintiff as administrator de bonis non of Hezekiah Mizell, to rccover a number of slaves. The slaves in question were, by one Judith Britton, given to Ann Mizell after her intermarriage with the said Hezekiah Mizell. The slaves went into the possession of Hezekiah Mizell, and so remained for several years until his death.

This is debt for the escape of one Smith, who had been committed, as in execution, to the custody of the sheriff of Rockingham. It was brought in the Superior Court of Stokes on the 36th of February, 1846.

This was trover for a quantity of corn, fodder, peas and beans. The defendant admitted the conversion, and proved, that, in-the Fall of IS 10, he recovered, in ejectment of the plaintiff the land on which the articles Were grown, and was put in possession by the sheriff; at which time, the corn and some part of the peas and beans were growing ; the fodder had been pulled and stacked, and the balance of the peas and beans had been gathered and put into a crib on the premises.

<p>Before the passage of the Act of 1840, ch. 28, no voluntary conveyance of property, even to a child, could be upheld to defeat an existing creditor, if the creditor could find no other property of his debtor, out of which to obtain satisfaction.</p> <p>The Act of 1840, ch. 28, applies only to voluntary conveyances made after that Act went into force. Its application to prior voluntary conveyances would be unconstitutional, as it is not the province of the Legislature but of the Judiciary, to declare what the law was before the passage of any act. The Legislature cannot divest vested rights.</p> <p>The ease of Arnett v. Wanet, 6 Ire. 41, cited and commented on.</p> <p>The cases of Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev 15, O’ Daniel v. Crawford, 4 Dev. 197, Jones v. Young, 1 Dev. & Bat. 352, and Smith v. Reavis, 7 Ire. 341, cited and approved.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of New-Hanover County, at the Spring Term 1848, his Honor Judge Caldwell presiding.</p> <p>This is a suit instituted by Ruth A. Hansley against her husband Samuel G. Hansley, for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, and for alimony. The parties were married in 1836 and lived together until August 1844 ; when the wife left her husband and went to reside with her brother in the same neighborhood and has lived there ever since,</p> <p>The petition was filed on the 25th day of March 1845. It states, that the “petitioner lived for many years the wife of the said Samuel, enjoying much happiness, and fondly hoped to do so for many years yet to come, as she cheerfully fulfilled all the duties of an affectionate wife, until the conduct of her husband became so intolerable that it could no longer be endured: that, without any cause known to her, her husband took to drink, and, while in that state, would commit so many outrages against the modesty and decency of the petitioner, that she refrains from repeating them : that the influence of his intoxication would last sometimes for a month ; all of which time the conduct of the said Samuel G. towards the petitioner would be intolerable ; and the petitioner was often cruelly beaten by him, and his whole course of conduct towards her would be so entirely different from what she might have reasonably anticipated, that he rendered her life burdensome and too intolerable to be borne, from a habit so well calculated to destroy the reason, the affections and all the social relations of life, and to which the petitioner must attribute this brutal conduct of her said husband : that for weeks the said Samuel G. would absent himself from the petitioner during the whole-night, although during the day time residing on the same farm, while so absenting himself; that it has come to the knowledge of the petitioner, that her husband did habitually, while so absenting himself from the petitioner, bed and co habit with a negro woman named Lucy, belonging to him : that for some time previous to this fact coming to her knowledge with that degree of certainty, upon which she could rely, her suspicions were aroused, that such must be the fact; but that, not being able to prove the charge, and not being satisfied to abandon her husband until the proof could be clearly satisfactory to her own mind, the petitioner tried to endure, as long as it was reasonable for any wife to endure, the conduct of her husband ; and that, during all the said time, her husband not only abandoned her bed entirely, and bedded with the said negro Lucy, but he deprived the petitioner of the control of all those domestic duties and privileges-connected with the house, which belong to a wife, and placed the said Lucy in the full possession and enjoyment of those privileges and duties, and insulted the petitioner by openly and repeatedly ordering her to give place to the said negro, and saying that the petitioner was an incumbrance, and encouraged the said Lucy to treat her also : that, when the petitioner would no longer endure these things, and became entirely satisfied of the cause of such treatment, and of the truth of her previous suspicions, the petitioner abandoned her said husband : that, besides all this, her said husband, not satisfied with the treatment as above set forth, would go from home and take with him the keys of the house, and deprive the petitioner of food for two or three days at a time, and of every comfort, to which, as a wife, she was entitled: that often he would, at night, compel the petitioner to sleep in bed with said negro Lucy, when he would treat the said Lucy as his wife, he occupying the same bed with the petitioner and the negro Lucy : that from the cruel and severe treatment of her husband towards the petitioner, she was afraid to resist or to decline so occupying the same bed with her husband and the said negro woman : that, when it was not agreeable to her husband to permit the petitioner to occupy the house, he would often lock her out of doors and there compel her to remain, during the whole night) unprotected and exposed to all the trials incident to such a situation: that she, at length, abandoned the residence of her husband in August 1844, and has made her home with one of her brothers ever since : and that, since her knowledge of the adulterous conduct of her said husband with the said negro Lucy, the petitioner has not admitted him to conjugal embraces, and is resolved never again so to do.”</p> <p>The petition then sets out the husband’s estate, with a view to alimony, and it prays for a divorce from the bonds of matrimony and for a suitable provision.</p> <p>The answer admits, that, at one period the defendant was intemperate and in the habit of intoxication ; but it states, that, for several years before his wife left him, he had been perfectly sober. The defendant also admits that he chastised his wife once: but he denies that he ever did so but at that time, or that that was a violent or severe beating: and he says, that he immediately regretted having done so, and acknowledged that he was wrong and made the most humble apologies to her therefor, which he thought reconciled her: but that on the same night she abandoned his house. The answer then denies all the other allegations of the libel specially.</p> <p>Upon issues submitted to a jury, it was found, that the parties had been inhabitants of this State for three years immediately before the filing of the petition : that the defendant, by habits of adultery with his slave Lucy, by degrading his wife, the petitioner, by beating her,by insulting her, and by abandoning her bed for that of the slave Lucy, rendered the petitioner’s life burthensome, and her condition intolerable, so as to compel her to leave his house, and seek an asylum elsewhere: that the defendant did separate himself from the petitioner and live in adultery with the slave Lucy : and that was known to the petitioner for six months previous to filing the petition : that the petitioner always conducted herself properly as a wife and a chaste woman: and that the petitioner had not admitted the defendant to conjugal embraces since her knowledge of his adulterous intercourse with the said slave Lucy.</p> <p>Upon the trial, in order to prove that the defendant was living in adultery with his own slave named Lucy, the plaintiff offered evidence, that the defendant had a female slave, named Lucy, and that she had a child ; and also of acts of familiarity on the part of the defendant with the said Lucy, and that she acted as a sort of manager of his house : and furthermore, that, in conversations respecting this suit, the defendant said, that he would spend every thing he had in defending it, except the said Lucy and his child; and that, in a conversation between a brother of the petitioner and the defendant about a reconciliation between the parties, the former said to the latter, if he would sell Lucy he did not know what the petitioner might do as to living with him again, and that the defendant replied thereto, that he would part with all the property he had before he would with the said Lucy and his child, and that the petitioner might stay where she was. Objection was made to the admissibility of the defendant’s declarations, but, as it was not suggested, that those declarations were made by collusion, the Court allowed them to go to the jury. There was a decree for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, and for the costs against the defendant : and an enquiry was directed as to the settlement it would be proper to make on the petitioner ; from all which the husband was allowed an appeal.</p> <p>Greenleaf’s Ev., Sec. 108, 2 Phil. Ev., Hill & Cowan’s notes 29, note 298 to page 156. Loveden v. Loveden, 2 Hagg. Con. Rep. 1.</p>

This was an appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Rowan County, at the Fall term 1847, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding, transferred from the Supreme Court at Morganton to this Court, by order of the Court. A grant to the lessor of the plaintiffiskued in June 1845. The defendant relied upon color of title, land seven years possession, and the presumption from lon¿ possession, that the title was out of the state.

This was an action on the case to recover damages for enticing the wife of the paintifF to leave him and detaining her, whereby he lost her services and the comfort of her society. It appeared on his behalf, that his wife left him in August 1841, by the enticement of the female defendant, who lived with the defendant, Armstead, and is the mother of the plaintiff’s wife.

The indictment charges, that the defendant, on the 1st day of September 1847, and on divers other days before the taking of the inquisition, did keep and maintain a certain common, ill governed, and disorderly house, and in said house, for his own lucre and gain, certain persons, both men and women, and white and black, of evil name and fame and of dishonest and lewd conversation, to frequent and come together at unlawful times, as well in the night as the day, and on…

<p>Where a judgment is against several and the sheriff had not taken bail from one, it was not necessary before the Aet of 1844, ch. 31, it was not necessary to issue a ca. sa. against all, to subject the defendant as bail for that one.</p> <p>Under the Act of 1844, cb. 31, it is not necessary to issue a ca. sa. at all, !b order to subject the bail. That Act applies to the remedy only, and not to the contract of the bail.</p> <p>Where there has been a defective or immaterial pleading, so that the finding of the jury does not determine the right, the Court ought to award a re-pleader, uulessit appear upon the whole record, that no manner of pleading the matter could have availed.</p> <p>The cases of Arrenton v. Jourdan, 4 Hawks 98, and Gray v. Hoover, 4 Dev 475, cited and approved.</p> <p>The former cuse of Trice v. Turreniine, 5 Ire. 236, overruled.</p>

This was an action of trespass on the case. The defendant, wishing to have a house moved from the lot, on which it stood in the town of Newbern, to a lot of his own across the street, about 200 yards distant, agreed to give one Gaskill $81 to move it, Gaskill to be at the expense of providing hands, &c. After the house was rolled into the street, Gaskill dug a hole in the ground, about the middle of the street, eighteen inches deep, to fix an anchor, for the purpose of…

This is an action against the sheriff, as bail for one Forkner, in a suit against him and one Walker — Plea, no ca. sa. against the principal.