Volume 32 — Oregon Reports

<p>Negligence of Street Railways — Duty to Passengers.— A street car company is not under obligation to provide for its patrons crossways from its stopping places in the street to the sidewalk (Smith v. City Railway Company, 29 Or. 539, approved); but if for any reason it does erect such passage-ways it must, at its peril, construct and maintain them in a reasonably safe condition.</p> <p>Idem.— Where a street-railway company erects a temporary sidewalk over a flooded street, for the use of its passengers in going from one car to another, it is not bound to construct the passage-way in a manner as reasonably safe “as possible,” it is enough if the way is reasonably safe.</p> <p>Duty to Passengers — Province of Jury.— In an action against a street-railway company for damages sustained while crossing a temporary sidewalk erected by the company over a flooded street, for the use of its passengers in going from one car to another, an instruction that, if the walk was so constructed as to be dangerous for passengers to cross it at night without a light, then it was the company’s duty to have provided a light, was erroneous, as the means indicated by the court as a protection against the danger was too limited, it being for the jury, and not the court, to say what means should have been adopted.</p>

From Linn: Henry H. Hewitt, Judge. Suit by James Laurent and others against E, J. Lanning, Virginia Lanning, and D. H. James to reform a mortgage, and to have the same foreclosed.

From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. Suit by J. Couch Flanders against Lyle N. Au-mack, as administrator of the estate of E. S. Bash, ■deceased, and the sheriff, to restrain an execution sale of certain lots. It appears that on September 24, 1894, W. Gr.

From Linn: Henry H. Hewitt,.Judge. Suit by the Standard Shoe Company and R. L. Sabin against R. N. Thompson and others, to set aside a certain assignment.

From Marion: George H. Burnett, Judge. Andrew Robinson having been convicted of the crime of rape on a child under the age of consent, appeals.

<p>„ , „ „ m , , „ Referee’s Report not Part of the Transcript. — A report of a referee is not part of the transcript on appeal, and cannot be considered unless properly included in the bill of exceptions: Osborn v. Graves, 11 Or. 526, and Van ribber v. Fields, 25 Or. 527, applied.</p> <p>Compudsory Reference — Triad by Jury. * — The constitutional right to a trial by jury is not infringed by section 222, Hill’s Annotated Laws, authorizing the trial court to direct a reference when the ' issue of fact to be tried involves the examination of a long account: Tribou v. Strowbridge, 7 Or. 156, and McDonald v. American Mortgage Company, 17 Or. 626, followed.</p> <p>Presumptions. — In the absence of a showing to the contrary, it will always be presumed that the proceedings of a trial court were lawful and regular, as, for example, that a law action was properly referred to a referee, and that the amount allowed as an attorney’s fee on a note was reasonable.</p> <p>Idem. — It will be presumed on appeal, in the absence of any legal evidence to the contrary, that a judgment was supported by the findings of fact, where only the judgment is in the record and the action was tried before a jury.</p> <p>Judgment. — A judgment on a referee’s report is not premature where the judgment was not rendered until nine days after filing a motion to modify certain findings of the referee.</p>

From Clatsop: Thomas A. McBride, Judge. This action was brought on the twenty-second of September, 1894, to recover the sum of $698.48 for goods alleged to have been sold and money-loaned by the plaintiff’s assignor to the defendant in the month o'f October, 1876, and the complaint avers, for the purpose of taking the case out of the statute of limitations, that the defendant was and had been a non-resident of the state since August, 15, 1877.

<p>1. Criminal Daw — Misconduct of Counsel. — The statement by a prosecuting attorney, in his opening to the jury, of a fact which he was not entitled to prove is not ground for reversal, where the remark was promptly withdrawn from the jury by the court, and they were told to disregard it throughout the trial: Tenny v. Muhaney, 8 Or, 513; State v. Hawkins, 18 Or. 476;. State v. Brown, 28 Or. 148; State v. Hatcher, 29 Or. 309, approved and applied.</p> <p>2. Evidence of Acts of Conspirators. — Under Hill’s Annotated Laws, § 706, subdivision 6, providing that “after proof of a conspiracy the declaration or act of a conspirator against his co-conspirator, and relating to the conspiracy,” may be given in evidence, the sufficiency of the proof of the conspiracy to render such evidence ad- ■ missible is largely discretionary with the trial court; and its action in admitting such evidence will not be disturbed on appeal, where there was evidence prima facie tending to prove the existence of a conspiracy, or from which it might be reasonably inferred.</p> <p>3. Harmless Error. — The admission of evidence of acts and declarations of an alleged co-conspirator, without a sufficient preliminary showing of a conspiracy, is not prejudicial where they were insufficient to connect such alleged co-conspirator with the crime.</p> <p>4. Idem. — Evidence that after the arrest of a defendant for the larceny of money his Toom was searched, and several suits of clothes and a large number of other articles of wearing apparel were found, while immaterial, was not prejudicial to defendant.</p> <p>6. Cross-Examination. — While, under Hill’s Annotated Laws, ? 1365, defendant can be cross-examined as a witness only as to matters to which he has testified in his examination in chief, permitting the asking of a question outside of such limit is not ground for reversal, where both question and answer were immaterial, and could not have prejudiced the defendant.</p> <p>6. Improper Remarks of Counsel. — A prosecuting attorney, in argument, has the right to draw such inferences or conclusions from the evidence as his reason may dictate, if warranted by the facts shown; and, unless an instruction is requested correcting any unwarranted deduction, it will be presumed that no prejudice resulted.</p>

From Linn: George EL Burnett, Judge. This is an appeal from a decree disallowing certain items of credit claimed by the assignee of an insolvent debtor, and charging him with the value of certain property which the court finds came into his possession as assets of the estate. The record shows that on.

<p>Transcript — Title—Rules of Court. — Iu preparing a transcript for an appeal to the supreme court it is sufficient to set out the title of the court and cause in connection with the first paper, though it is better to use the word “title” at the head of each paper. Rule 2 of the supreme court (24 Or. 591, 37 Pac. 6), is sufficiently-complied with, however, by using the title once.</p> <p>Appeal — Sufficiency of Notice. — A notice of appeal, which states the nature of the action, the parties, the title of the court, and the sentence pronounced, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, though it fails to designate the time when said judgment was rendered: Crawford v. West, 26 Or. 596, applied.</p> <p>“Shop” Defined — Larceny.— A building wherein a workman pursues his business and keeps his tools, or the products of his labor, though no article is sold or offered for sale therein, is'a “shop,” within the meaning of Section 1764 of Hill’s Annotated Laws, punishing larceny “in any * * ® store, shop, or warehouse.”</p> <p>Indictment — Decree of Larceny.— Defendant may be convicted of petty larceny under an indictment for larceny from a store, where the value of the stolen property is alleged: State v. Taylor, 3 Or. 10, followed.</p> <p>Idem.— A boiler and engine house where nothing is sold or manufactured and where only the machinery and the tools used in caring for it are kept is not a “shop” under a statute punishing larceny in such a place.</p>

This is a petition to be relieved from an order of this court, directing the restitution of money collected on a judgment notwithstanding an appeal and stay of proceedings.

<p>From Morrow: Stephen A. Lowell, Judge.</p> <p>Chet Sargent appeals from a conviction of an assault with intent to commit a rape.</p>

From Polk: George H. Burnett, Judge. Action by I. A. Allen against Leroy Byerly, commenced in justice’s court. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of defendant, and the appeal was dismissed by the circuit court, from whose judgment plaintiff appeals.

From Multnomah: Thomas A. Stephens, Judge. Ben. Childers was convicted of forging the signature of A. Hallock on the back of a road fund warrant, and appeals.

<p>Lease — Sufficiency of Description. — A lease of real property, to be enforcible if there has not been a part performance, must with reasonable certainty describe the .land demised, either by express words or by reference to something by which its location can be ascertained: Noyes v. Stauff, 5 Or. 456; House v. Jackson, 24 Or. 89, cited.</p> <p>Idem.— A description of land in a lease as a strip of land commencing at the north line of a specified person’s claim, running thence in a specified direction to the south line of another specified claim, thence a specified distance from “low tide, the full length of the said claim back from said low-water mark,” without specifying any township, range, county, or state, is insufficient to render the lessee liable for rent where there has been no entry by him.</p> <p>Estoppel by Verdict.— A question in issue cannot be considered settled by the verdict where the jury were instructed that such issue was immaterial.</p> <p>Evidence — Description in Lease.— While admissions in the pleadings as to the location of leased premises make the written lease competent evidence in an action for rent reserved, its sufficiency as to description must be determined by its provisions, and not by oral proof or admissions.</p> <p>Landlobd and Tenant — Lease.— An action for rent reserved cannot be maintained where the lease does not describe the premises with reasonable certainty.</p>

<p>Criminal Latv — Confessions.— Statements or declarations of the accused, voluntarily made, of such facts as necessarily involve the commission of a crime, or in themselves constitute a crime, are admissions of guilt, and may be properly demominated “confessions”; nor will they be reduced to the grade of admissions only by exculpatory statements made in the same connection: State v. Eeidenreich, 29 Or. 381, distinguished.</p> <p>Evidence — Identification of Exhibits.— Clothing alleged to have been worn by a deceased person at the time he was killed is sufficiently identified at the trial of the slayer when it is shown that deceased was buried in the clothing he wore when killed, and that it was subsequently removed when the body was exhumed by the eoronor for the purpose of examination, and thereafter disposed of under the direction of the coroner and other officers.</p> <p>Clothing as Evidence. — The clothing worn by two deceased persons at the time they were killed may be offered in evidence in a trial for the murder of a third person who was killed with them at the same time by the defendant, for the purpose of showing the direc" üoxl of the gunshot wounds upon their persons, and thereby fix the direction from which the accused fired when such third person was shot.</p> <p>Threats as Evidence.— Threats made against the accused by one who was not present at a homicide, and who is not shown to have been acting in concert with the deceased, cannot be proved to show that the defendant acted in self-defense.</p> <p>Right of Defendant to Testify.— An instruction to the juiy in a criminal case, that the defendant is “permitted” to be a witness in his own behalf, does not express an idea antagonistic to the absolute right which the statute guarantees him in this respect, and is not erroneous.</p> <p>Instruction on Self-Defense.— An instruction by the court upon the plea of self-defense, that the danger must have been “absolute, imminent, and unavoidable,” is not erroneous when coupled with other instructions that the defendant might also have acted upon appearances, if they were such, under the circumstances and surroundings, as to reasonably imbue his mind with the belief that it was necessary to act as he did to avert the impending assault upon him, whether actual or apparent.</p> <p>Good Character — Reasonable Doubt. — A request by a defendant in a criminal cause to charge “ that proof of good character may be sufficient of itself to create a reasonable doubt of guilt, although no such doubt would have existed but for such good character,” although correct as an abstract proposition of law, is properly refused, since the form is vicious unless confined to a given case.</p> <p>"Value of Evidence of Good Character.— Evidence of good character is always admissible in favor of the defendant in a criminal action, and should be weighed and considered in connection with all the other evidence in the cause in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused; and, when so considered, if there exists in the mind of the jury a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, he should be acquitted.</p> <p>Idem. — The court instructed the jury: “Defendant has a right to show his previous good character as a circumstance tending to show the improbability of his guilt. If, however, you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime in question as charged in the indictment, then it would be your duty to find the defendant guilty, even though the evidence satisfied your mind that defendant, previous to the commission of the alleged crime, had isustained a good reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen.” This instruction does not limit or confine the consideration of reputation to the case where the jury are still in doubt after the consideration of all other testimony, but is a fair statement of the law in this state on the subject of good character as a defense: Stale v. Garrand, 5 Or. 216, applied.</p> <p>Haemless Eeroe. — A defendant in a criminal case cannot complain of an erroneous instruction which is in strict accord with his line of defense.</p>

From Lincoln: J. C. Fullerton, Judge. Action at law by H. F. Fischer against several persons to compel contribution. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and this appeal ensued.

From Columbia: Thomas A. McBride, Judge. John W. Isenhart was indicted, tried, and convicted of having committed the crime of adultery with one Mary E. Severn, the wife of Walter Severn.

<p>From Multnomah: Thos. A. Stephens, Judge.</p> <p>Cesaro Marco was convicted of embezzlement and appeals.</p>

From Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck, Judge. Habeas corpus proceeding by Jonathan Tice to 6e delivered from the custody of William .Frazier, sheriff. The writ was denied and petitioner appeals. .

From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. This is a suit for the purpose of reforming a certain deed and instrument in writing, executed by A. H. Johnson to W. M. Ladd, by correcting a mistake in the description of the property intended to be included therein, and of restraining the sale of attached property in an action by the defendant White against Johnson.

Original proceeding by Gus Wachline to obtain from one of the judges of the supreme court a certificate of probable .cause for appeal in a prosecution wherein he had been convicted of murder in the first degree.

From Multnomah: Thos. A. Stephens, Judge. Daniel Magone was convicted of grave robbery-in exhuming and stealing the body of W. S. Ladd. Being without means he was defended by counsel appointed by the court to serve without compensation.

<p>Ruins as to EataIi Vabiance.— The court will not instruct the jury that there is a fatal variance between the proof and descriptive matter contained in the indictment, unless there is no competent evidence at all bearing upon the subject, or unless it is so weak that a verdict against the defendant would be attributable to passion, prejudice, or partiality.</p> <p>Sufficiency op Evidence — Instbuction to Acquit. — The testimony submitted to establish a crime charged is sufficient to take the case ' to the jury, if enough be shown to require the defendant to enter upon his defence and introduce evidence: State v. Jones, 18 Or. 260, and State v. Pomeroy, 30 Or. 16, applied.</p>

From Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge. This is a suit by James Dickson against Seid Back and others to enjoin an execution sale of certain real property, and to foreclose the lien of a mortgage thereon.

From Multnomah: Thos. A. Stephens, Judge. Con Kelliher was convicted of larceny and appeals. At defendant’s request the court appointed counsel to defend him, and they served without compensation.

From Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck,. Judge. This action was instituted by John Landigan against F. J. Alex.

<p>1. Indictment — Conjunctive Change.— An indictment for murder may properly charge in the conjunctive the different acts by which the killing was accomplished, notwithstanding Hill’s Ann. Laws, 1 1273, providing that an indictment shall charge but one crime, and in one form only, except that where the crime may be committed by use of different means, the indictment may allege the means in the alternative.</p> <p>2. Postponement of Trial — Discretion.— An application to postpone the trial of a cause is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action thereon will not be disturbed except for clear abuse of such discretion, which was evidently not the case here: State v. Hawkins, 18 Or. 476, applied.</p> <p>3. Evidence.— Testimony as to a threat made hy an unknown person, though incompetent by itself, is rendered admissible by a showing that no one but defendant and his victim were at the place whence the voice proceeded.</p> <p>4. Evidence op Nonexpert Witness as to Insanity. * — An officer who had the custody of defendant for four months prior to the trial, though he had no previous acquaintance with him, was competent to testify that he had observed no indication of insanity, and that defendant seemed to be perfectly rational during his incarceration.</p> <p>5. Charging Effect of Oral Admissions — Triad.— Hill’s Ann. Laws, § 845, making it the duty of the court on all proper occasions to instruct that oral admissions of a party should be viewed with caution, does not require such instruction to be given in a murder trial, in respect to oral admissions of defendant, where the killing is admitted. In such a ease it is manifest that the admission could not have affected the result.</p> <p>Practice — Motion to Acquit.— The proper practice upon a partial failure in the state’s proof in a criminal trial, is to ask the court to direct the acquittal (State v. Jones, 18 Or. 256, approved), and, unless there is a total failure of proof, the motion must specify the particulars in which it is claimed the evidence is insufficient: State v. Tamler, 19 Or. 528, applied.</p> <p>7. Nunc Pro Tunc Entry — Courts.— At any time during the term at which an order, judgment, or decree has been entered, the court may, without 'notice, direct the correction or enlargement of the .record so that it will show the facts; but if this is attempted in ..criminal cases after the term has closed, it must be on notice.</p>

From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. Suit by ¥m. M. Ladd and others against the City of Portland to enjoin the collection of an assessment for improving a certain street. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and from a decree against them plaintiffs appeal.

<p>1. Offer to Mabry as a Defense to Seduction. — Under 1 Hill’s Ann. Laws, § 1863, making a subsequent marriage of tbe parties a defense to a prosecution for seduction, an unaccepted offer to marry, made by defendant after his indictment, is insufficient.</p> <p>2. Considering Another Charge in Aggravation of Sentence.— A sentence which is within the statutory limits is not invalid because the court, in passing the same, took into consideration another indictment then pending against defendant, in aggravation of the punishment.</p>

From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. Suit by Susan M. Wallace against Jonathan Tice and F. J. Alex Mayer, administrator oí the estate of George Herrall, deceased. From a decree for plaintiff, the administrator appeals.

From Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck,. Judge. This is an action by Gr. L. Eastman against David Monastes to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecution.

From Polk: Geo. H. Burnett, Judge. Suit by Benjamin Windsor against Thomas Collin-son and Israel Booth to rescind a contract and reobtain certain real property. There was a decree for defendant which caused this appeal.

<p>Wills — Construction or Description. — Under the rule that an erroneous statement of the location of property intended to be devised will not affect an otherwise definite description, an irregular shaped tract of unplatted, wild, unimproved and uninclosed forest land, containing 160 acres in one body in the northeast part of a particular land claim, bounded on the north and east by the claim line, and on the other sides by the platted portion of the claim, passes under a will devising all that part of the land claim “not laid off into lots and blocks and lying in the northeasterly portion of said claim, containing 85 acres, more or less.” It is not a reasonable construction to hold that only 85 acres was devised; it is evident that the entire unplatted portion was referred to.</p>

From Multnomah.: E. D. Shattuck, Judge. Plaintiff, a corporation, sued defendants, a copartnership, under the name of Balfour, Guthrie ,& Company, to recover the contract price of a certain carload of wheat, consisting of 600 bushels, which it is alleged, plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendants.

From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. Suit to foreclose a mortgage. Jurisdiction over the mortgagors was obtained by publication, and a decree entered as prayed for, after a defense by Annie Petrain, who appeals. The facts are fully stated in the two opinions.

From Multnomab: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. Suit by Jobn C. Mattbiesen and others to enforce a mechanic’s lien against the leasehold interest of S. A. Arata in a room called the Hoffman Bar, situated in the Sherlock Block in Portland. The facts are set out in the opinion. Arata appeals from a decree against his leasehold interest.

From Lane: J. O. Fullerton, Judge. Action by Laura A. Harris against Sherwood Burr and others, judges of election, for damages for having been denied the privilege of voting at an election for school director.

From Multnomah: Thos. A. Stephens, Judge. H. Meyer was convicted of violating an ordinance of tbe City of Portland prohibiting the maintenance of any slaughter houses within the corporate limits.

From Marion: Henry H. Hewitt, Judge. This is a suit, commenced by the district attorney of the third judicial district, in the name of and on behalf of the state, to enjoin Phil.

<p>From Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge.</p>

From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. This is a suit by Fitch & Bryson to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for materials furnished defendant J. F. McHenry, to be used in a house he was erecting upon the land of the defendant Joseph Howitt, under a contract with the latter.

From Klamath: W. C. Hale, Judge. Writ by L. F. Willits against E. L. Walter to review the proceedings of a justice’s court. The proceeding was dismissed by the circuit judge and plaintiff appeals.

From Douglas: J. O. Fullerton, Judge. Suit by T. B. Lovelady against Ruby Burgess to determine an adverse claim to real property, or, as it is usually styled, a suit to quiet title, under section 504 of Hill’s Code. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

From Jackson: Hiero K. Hanna, Judge. Suit by M. W. Wheeler and others to quiet title against H. H. Taylor and others, resulting in a decree for plaintiffs, from which the defendants appeal.

From Klamath: Hiero K. Hanna, Judge. Action by Klamath County to recover from A. L. Leavitt the face value of certain warrants issued to him and which were unpaid. There was a judgment for defendant on demurrer, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Power of Legislature to Prescribe Qualification of Voters at School Elections.— The power given the legislature by the constitution to provide for the establishment of a uniform and general system of common schools carries with it the power to prescribe the qualifications of voters at school meetings and at elections for district officers: Morris v. Burr, 32 Or. 348, followed.</p> <p>2. School Meeting an Election. — A meeting of school electors held for the purpose of choosing district officers is a ‘ ‘legally authorized election” within the meaning of section 1846, Hill’s Ann. Laws.</p>

From Douglas: J. C. Fullerton, Judge. Suit by John Hunter against Caroline and Jake, Cordon to foreclose ah alleged lien for materials sold to be used in repairing a building belonging to the defendant Caroline. Plaintiff appeals from a decree against him.

From Josephine: Hiero K. Hanna, Judge. Suit by Anton Rose against Joseph R. Oliver and -others to compel the specific performance of a contract alleged to have been made by the ancestor of defendants. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

From Josephine: Hiero K. Hanna, Judge. Suit by B. F. Scott against J. D. Walton and wife ■to compel defendants to rescind a sale, and to cancel the deed made by plaintiff to defendants. From a decree against him plaintiff appeals.

<p>Estoppel to Deny Corporate Organization.— One who conveys property to, or makes a contract with, a corporation which is exercising corporate functions and powers in pursuance of articles of incorporation regularly filed, under a law authorizing its organization, cannot question its corporate capacity upon the ground that no formal stock hooks were ever opened or stock subscribed, or because of other defects of organization.</p> <p>Mortgage to Director. — A corporation, while solvent, may borrow money of an officer or director and give a mortgage on its property to secure the payment thereof, and the transaction, though viewed with-suspicion by a court of equity, will be upheld, if it is fair and free from, fraud.</p>

Proceeding for disbarment by the State of Oregon,, on relation of the grievance committee of the State-Bar Association, against Charles E. Kindt, for unprofessional conduct. License revoked, and defendant-disbarred.

From Clackamas: Thos. A. McBride, Judge. Proceedings by Oregon City against Clackamas ■County, its judge and commissioners, to review the action of the county court while exercising the powers pertaining to county commissioners in disallowing a claim by the city for the amount of certain road taxes. Prom a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal.

From Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action by the North British and Mercantile Insurance Company against respondents, its agents, to compel reimbursement by them of a loss which the company was compelled to pay under one of its policies, on the ground that the agents disobeyed instructions in writing that policy, and negligently failed to cancel it, when directed so to do by their principal. There was judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>"Disbarment of Attorney — Resignation.—The resignation of an attorney without consent of the court is ineffectual to preclude his disbarment, when proceedings therefor were pending at the time of his resignation.</p> <p>Resignation of Attorneys. — "While an attorney may voluntarily resign his office, as provided by section 1045 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, such action does not remove his name from the rolls, unless the court approves such action, and he remains amenable to the orders of the court by which he was admitted for conduct prior to the resignation.</p> <p>Disbarment for Eelony. * — If an attorney be convicted of a felony, the-nature of winch is calculated to injure his reputation for the performance of his duties, he should be removed.</p>

From Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck, Judge. Action by Balfour, Guthrie & Company against J. G. and I. N. Day to recover for certain goods sold. The case was tried before ¥m. T. Muir, Esq., as referee, aud his report modified. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment for less than they claimed.

From Multnomah: Hartwell Hurley, Judge. Suit by D. P. Thompson, one of the sureties on a bond of Puf us Ingalls, as executor, against the executors of the estate of Frank Dekum, deceased, and other-sureties on the same and other like bonds, for contribution, and against C. B. Bellinger, guardian of the minor heirs of the deceased, and others, for 'a credit for an overpayment by the executor to the estate..

<p>Suspension op Attorney foe Willful Misconduct. * — An attorney is guilty of “willful misconduct” in his profession in affixing his official jurat as notary public to purported affidavits which were not in fact sworn to before him, and causing them to be filed for use in an action in which he was attorney for one of the parties.</p> <p>Idem.— In such a case it is immaterial that the statements contained in the affidavits were true, nor is his action excused by the fact that the affidavits were not of use because the case was decided on other grounds; such conduct was a reckless and willful disregard of professional ethics.</p> <p>Idem.— An attorney cannot palliate willful misconduct in‘his profession on the ground that such conduct was customary in the community where he resided.</p> <p>Reasons foe Suspension of Attorneys.— Proceedings for the disbarment of attorneys for misconduct are not for the purpose of punishment», but are entertained for the protection of the court, the proper administration of justice, the dignity and purity of the profession, the public good and the protection of clients. '»</p>

<p>Coepoeations — Pabol Evidence to Show Agency.— The authority of the president and general manager of a corporation to enter into a charter contract for a boat owiied by the corporation may be shown by parol evidence, and it is not essential to such authority that it be evidenced by a resolution of the board of directors: Calvert v. Idaho Stage Company, 25 Or. 412, and Finnegan v. Pacific Vinegar Company, 26 Or. 152, cited; Be St. Helen Mill Company, 3 Sawy. 88, distinguished.</p> <p>Coepoeations — Evidence of Ratification.— It is error to exclude evidence as to the ratification by a corporation of the unauthorized act of its president in chartering a boat owned by it, upon the assumption that the boat had been seized in the interval between such act (tnd the ratification, under an attachment in favor of the objecting party, where such attachment was denied in the pleadings, and no proof thereof had been introduced at the time of the objection.</p>

<p>Unprofessional Conduct by an Attorney. * — An attorney who undertook to procure a necessary undertaking for his client, and himself subscribed the names of purported sureties to such an undertaking, and delivered it to a notary public to obtain from the purported sureties- the necessary affidavits as to their qualifications, and the latter, with the knowledge of the attorney, made no attempt to carry out such instructions, but attached his seal and subscribed his name to the jurat as if he had sworn them, by means of which a fraud was practiced upon the court, is guilty of such unprofessional conduct as to require discipline at the hands of the court.</p>

From Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge. Suit by Anna M. Maffett against E. H. Thompson. The cause was tried before M. L. Pipes, Esq., as referee, who filed a report dismissing both the complaint and the counterclaim of defendant. The referee’s report was affirmed, and defendant appeals.

From Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck, Judge. Mandamus proceeding by James J. Kadderly and others to compel the county court of Multnomah County to operate a certain ferry. Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment for defendants.

<p>1. Writ of Review — County Coubt.— Under section 585 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, as amended (Laws, 1889, 135), the proceedings of a county court ' sitting as a law court may be reviewed by the circuit court on a writ, since that is now concurrent with the right of appeal: Broback v. Huff, 11 Or. 395, distinguished, and Hill v. State, 23 Or. 446, followed.</p> <p>2. “ Inferior Courts ” — Statutes.— The expression “ inferior court or tribunal” used in section 585 of Hill’s Ann. Laws, as amended in 1889, means all courts and tribunals over which the circuit courts are given appellate jurisdiction and supervisory control by the state constitution.</p> <p>3. Collection of Taxes — Supplementary Proceedings.— The purpose of section 2815 of Hill’s Ann. Laws was simply to declare the effect of a tax warrant, and to provide the manner of its execution and return; it does not make a tax warrant an execution in the sense that supplemental proceedings may be based thereon under sections 308, 309 and 310.</p>

From Marion: Geo. H. Burnett, Judge. Mandamus by H. P. McNary, as receiver of the Williams & England Banking Company, to compel F. T. Wrightman, as sheriff and tax collector, to accept the amount of a tax levied on certain real property which was part only of the holding of Geo. Williams, and on which McNary had a lien. A demurrer to the alternative writ having been sustained, petitioner appeals.

From Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge. The Apex Transportation Company attempted to condemn a right of way for a skidroad through the lands of T. A. Garbade, and he appealed from a judgment of $350 for the property seized. After a motion for a rehearing had been denied, the company presented an application for a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.

From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. Per Curiam. This is a suit by A. G. Spalding & Brothers, a corporation, against Sherman D. Brown and John F. King and wife, to set aside two bills of sale and a chattel mortgage of certain personal property, and to enjoin King and wife from maintaining an action to recover the possession of the same or damages for its detention.

<p>From Multnomah: T. A. Stephens, Judge.</p>

<p>From Linn: Geo. H. Burnett, Judge.</p>

<p>From Clackamas: Thos. A. McBride, Judge.</p>

<p>From Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck, Judge.</p>

<p>From Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge.</p>