¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2 In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: December 10, 2024
¶4 S24A1063. WOOD v. THE STATE.
¶5 PINSON, Justice.
¶6 Tabitha Wood killed her fiancé, Leroy Kramer; his body was
¶7 found two months later in the home he and Wood had shared. At
¶8 trial, Wood claimed self-defense, testified about the long history of
¶9 Kramer’s violence toward her, and presented testimony from an ex-
¶10 pert who concluded that Wood suffered from battered person syn-
¶11 drome. A jury convicted her of malice murder and other crimes.1
¶12 1 Kramer died on or about April 1, 2022. On February 15, 2023, a Hall
¶13 County grand jury returned an indictment charging Wood with malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2, 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), exploitation of an elder person (Count 5), concealing the death of another (Count 6), and financial transaction card theft (Count 7). After a jury trial from March 13 to 24, 2023, the jury found Wood guilty of all counts. On March 24, 2023, the trial court sentenced Wood to life in prison for malice murder (Count 1), a consecutive prison sentence of ten years for concealing the death of another (Count 6), and a concurrent sentence of three years for transaction card theft (Count 7). The trial court purported to merge the remaining counts. Although the felony murder counts were actually vacated by operation of law, and On appeal, Wood contends that the trial court erred by not al-
¶14lowing her to introduce witness testimony about Kramer’s acts of
¶15violence toward other women under OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) (Rule 405),
¶16and that not admitting this evidence violated her constitutional
¶17right to a complete defense. But the trial court did not abuse its dis-
¶18cretion by not admitting this evidence of Kramer’s prior acts of vio-
¶19lence under Rule 405 (b): that rule allows proof of specific instances
¶20of a victim’s conduct to establish the victim’s character or a trait of
¶21character when it is an essential element of a defense, but Wood
¶22sought to support a claim of self-defense with this evidence, and a
¶23victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense.
¶24As for her constitutional claim, which we review only for plain error,
¶25Wood has not shown that the trial court’s application of the standard
¶26the trial court may have committed a merger error with respect to the other counts, we decline to address that issue here because any error benefited the defendant and the State has not challenged the merger of these counts. See Ware v. State, 302 Ga. 792, 794-795 (3) (809 SE2d 762) (2018); Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697-69 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017). Wood timely filed a motion for new trial, which was later amended. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on October 30, 2023. Wood timely filed a notice of appeal on November 29, 2023. The appeal was docketed to the August 2024 term of this Court and was orally argued on September 17, 2024. 2 evidentiary rules at issue here was a clear and obvious violation of
¶27her constitutional rights. So Wood’s convictions are affirmed.
¶28 1. The evidence at trial showed the following. Wood met and
¶29moved in with Kramer sometime in 2020, and they were engaged in
¶30February 2021. They lived in a home that had been owned by Kra-
¶31mer’s late wife, and the homes on either side were occupied by his
¶32late wife’s family members. In early June 2022, the family members
¶33realized that no one had seen or heard from Kramer in months. On
¶34June 4, 2022, Kramer’s stepdaughter, who lived out of state, called
¶35the Hall County police and adult protective services to request a wel-
¶36fare check. When a local sheriff’s deputy went to Kramer’s home on
¶37June 6 for a wellness check, the home appeared “abandoned” and no
¶38one came to the door.
¶39 Kramer’s stepdaughter filed a missing-person report with the
¶40Hall County police. When deputies returned to the home on June 7
¶41in response to the report, Wood came outside after “several
¶42minutes.” She told the deputies that she last saw Kramer in April
¶43and that he had died by suicide.
¶44 3 In the home, investigators found Kramer’s decaying body in the
¶45bedroom. Based on the level of decomposition, the medical examiner
¶46who performed Kramer’s autopsy estimated he had been deceased
¶47for anywhere from “weeks to months,” and the exact amount of time
¶48would depend on environmental factors not known to the medical
¶49examiner. The medical examiner concluded that Kramer died from
¶50traumatic injuries to his neck and that traumatic injuries to his
¶51chest were also a “significant factor” that contributed to his death.
¶52Investigators opined that a three-pound dumbbell found near Kra-
¶53mer’s body was likely used to cause these injuries.
¶54 Wood testified that she and Kramer got into an argument that
¶55escalated to his using physical violence against her on April 1, 2022.
¶56At some point during the fight, Wood “blacked out.” Eventually she
¶57kicked Kramer, got away from him, and ran into the woods near
¶58their home where she stayed until morning. She testified that Kra-
¶59mer was alive when she left their home because he was yelling
¶60“B**ch, I’m going to kill you.” But sometime after she returned to
¶61their home the next day, she “realized he was dead.” Wood said she
¶62 4 did not want to accept his death and did not report it to the police.
¶63 Wood also testified extensively about Kramer’s violence toward
¶64her during their relationship. And she presented expert testimony
¶65from a psychologist who had evaluated her and concluded she suf-
¶66fered from battered person syndrome throughout her relationship
¶67with Kramer, including on the night he was killed.
¶68 2. Wood contends that the trial court erred in not admitting
¶69evidence about Kramer’s prior acts of violence against two other
¶70women through the testimony of other witnesses. She claims that
¶71this evidence should have been admitted under Rule 405 (b), a claim
¶72we review for abuse of discretion, see White v. State, 319 Ga. 367,
¶73376 (3) (903 SE2d 891) (2024), and that the failure to admit that
¶74evidence violated her constitutional right to a complete defense.
¶75Wood raised this constitutional claim for the first time in her motion
¶76for new trial, so we review it for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103
¶77 5 (d); State v. Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259, 263 (2) (b) (818 SE2d
¶78552) (2018).
¶79 (a) Before trial, Wood filed a “Notice of Intent to Present Evi-
¶80dence of Acts of Violence by the Victim” under OCGA §§ 24-4-404
¶81(Rule 404) (a) and (b) and Rule 405. The notice specified acts of vio-
¶82lence Kramer had committed against three women: A.S., J.P., and
¶83S.W. After a pre-trial hearing, the court ruled that if Wood made a
¶84prima facie showing of self-defense, she could then testify to her per-
¶85sonal knowledge of Kramer’s prior violent acts against other women
¶86to show “her reasonableness of fear or justification for self-defense.”
¶87And it ruled that she could introduce testimony from other witnesses
¶88about Kramer’s character for violence in the form of reputation and
¶89opinion testimony. See OCGA § 24-4-405 (a) (“In all proceedings in
¶90which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is ad-
¶91missible, proof shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by
¶92testimony in the form of an opinion.”).
¶93 At trial, the court ruled that Wood made a prima facie showing
¶94of self-defense, so it allowed her to testify to her personal knowledge
¶95 6 of Kramer’s violent acts against other women to show her own state
¶96of mind.2 The trial court maintained its earlier ruling that Wood
¶97could call witnesses to testify about Kramer’s reputation but ruled
¶98that the witnesses could not testify about Kramer’s specific bad acts
¶99toward other women. See OCGA § 24-4-405 (a)-(b).
¶100 Wood testified that Kramer “told [her] about the things he had
¶101done to women and he would laugh about it.” He spoke to her about
¶102his relationships with three women — A.S., S.W., and J.P. According
¶103to Wood, Kramer told her that he and A.S. had lived together, and
¶104Kramer had stalked, raped, and threatened A.S. He would go to
¶105A.S.’s job, follow her, and threaten her. Wood and Kramer once ran
¶106into A.S., and A.S. looked “kind of scared” and “very shocked.” Kra-
¶107mer also told Wood that he had dated S.W. and “pulled a gun on”
¶108her. And he told her that he lived with J.P. at one point and “pulled
¶109a gun on” her too. Wood said that when Kramer spoke to her about
¶110what he had done to these other women, it was “very shocking” and
¶111 2 The trial court did not cite a specific rule of evidence to support its rul-
¶112ing, and we express no opinion on the admissibility of this evidence, which has not been challenged on appeal. 7 felt threatening. She testified that hearing from Kramer about what
¶113he had done to these other women made her even more fearful of
¶114him because he was doing the same types of things to her.
¶115 After Wood testified, she proffered testimony from A.S. and
¶116S.W.’s children (S.W. was deceased).3 The proffer from S.W.’s chil-
¶117dren did not include testimony about Kramer “pulling a gun” on
¶118S.W. or any other specific act by Kramer. During her proffer, A.S.
¶119testified that she had lived with Kramer and he was abusive. She
¶120left Kramer’s home after he raped her and became physically vio-
¶121lent.
¶122 After this proffer, Wood withdrew the request to introduce rep-
¶123utation or opinion testimony through these witnesses but main-
¶124tained that the trial court should allow her to call them to testify
¶125about Kramer’s prior acts of violence against S.W. and A.S. She also
¶126moved to introduce this testimony as prior consistent statements
¶127under OCGA § 24-6-613 (c). The trial court maintained its prior rul-
¶128ing that Wood could not introduce extrinsic evidence of specific acts
¶129 3 Wood did not proffer extrinsic evidence of Kramer’s violence toward J.P.
¶130 8 through these witnesses. And the trial court also rejected Wood’s
¶131new argument that the testimony was admissible under Rule 613,
¶132because it concluded that the witnesses’ testimony would be “im-
¶133proper bolstering” and neither witnesses’ testimony was a “prior
¶134consistent statement.”4
¶135 (b) Under our Evidence Code, the accused may offer evidence
¶136of a “pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim” to prove “ac-
¶137tion in conformity therewith” in limited circumstances. OCGA § 24-
¶1384-404 (a) (2). When such evidence is admissible, it generally may be
¶139introduced only “by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in
¶140the form of an opinion.” OCGA § 24-4-405 (a). See also Copeland v.
¶141State, 316 Ga. 452, 458 (3) (b) (888 SE2d 517) (2023) (explaining that
¶142Rules 404 (a) and 405 are read together). That said, the accused may
¶143 4 On appeal, Wood argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
¶144the other witnesses’ testimony would be “improper bolstering.” But, as noted above, that ruling was in response to Wood’s motion to admit those statements as “prior consistent statements” under OCGA § 24-6-613 (c), and Wood no longer contends on appeal that those statements should have been admitted as prior consistent statements under Rule 613 (and in fact conceded at oral argument before this Court that the statements would not have been properly admitted under that Rule). Thus, the trial court’s “improper bolstering” ruling is not properly before us on appeal. 9 offer proof of “specific instances” of the victim’s conduct if the trait
¶145is “an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense.” See OCGA §
¶14624-4-405 (b).
¶147 The testimony from S.W.’s children and A.S. about specific in-
¶148stances of Kramer’s conduct was not admissible under Rule 405 (b).
¶149We have held before that “[a] victim’s violent character is pertinent
¶150to” a defendant’s claim of self-defense, but it is “not an essential ele-
¶151ment of” that defense. Beck v. State, 310 Ga. 491, 498 (3) (852 SE2d
¶152535) (2020) (emphasis in original). Thus, evidence of a victim’s char-
¶153acter for violence generally may be admitted only in the form of rep-
¶154utation or opinion testimony under Rule 405 (a), and not by proof of
¶155“specific instances” of the victim’s conduct under Rule 405 (b). See
¶156OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (a), 24-4-405 (a)-(b). So the trial court did not
¶157abuse its discretion by not admitting testimony from S.W.’s children
¶158and A.S. about specific instances of Kramer’s conduct. See Beck, 310
¶159Ga. at 498 (3).5
¶160 5 This Court has reserved the question whether prior acts of violence by
¶161a victim could be admitted if they are relevant to a purpose other than to prove
¶162 10 (c) Wood also contends that not allowing her to introduce the
¶163other witnesses’ testimony about Kramer’s prior acts violated her
¶164constitutional rights, “such as her right to a complete defense and to
¶165call witnesses in her own defense,” citing the Sixth Amendment to
¶166the United States Constitution. She points out that the trial court
¶167allowed her to testify about what Kramer told her about his prior
¶168acts of violence against other women, and so she should have been
¶169allowed to call other witnesses to testify about Kramer’s prior acts
¶170of violence to show that she was credible.
¶171 Wood raised this constitutional claim for the first time in a mo-
¶172tion for new trial, so we review it only for plain error. See OCGA §
¶17324-1-103 (d); Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. at 263 (2) (b). To estab-
¶174lish plain error, the trial court must have committed an error that
¶175the victim’s “character . . . in order to show action in conformity therewith.” See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). See, e.g., Ward v. State, 318 Ga. 884, 902 (3) (c) (901 SE2d 189) (2024) (assuming without deciding that Rule 404 (b) applies to evidence regarding the other acts of a victim, a victim’s prior violence may be admissible to “establish the defendant’s state of mind and the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of force”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Copeland v. State, 316 Ga. 452, 459 & n.7 (3) (b) (888 SE2d 517) (2023) (noting, in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, that the admissibility of this evidence was “an open question” in Georgia). That question is not properly before us here, however, because Wood makes no such argument on appeal. 11 was not “affirmatively waived”; was “clear or obvious, rather than
¶176subject to reasonable dispute”; and affected the defendant’s “sub-
¶177stantial rights.” See White v. State, 305 Ga. 111, 119-120 (3) (823
¶178SE2d 794) (2019) (quoting State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718
¶179SE2d 232) (2011)). If the defendant establishes each of those things,
¶180then the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error if it
¶181seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of ju-
¶182dicial proceedings. Id. at 120.
¶183 Wood has failed to establish that the trial court committed a
¶184clear or obvious error by not allowing her to call other witnesses to
¶185testify about Kramer’s prior acts. The Due Process Clause of the
¶186Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution “guaran-
¶187tees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a com-
¶188plete defense,” but a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence
¶189is “subject to reasonable restrictions.” Burns, 306 Ga. at 121-122 (2).
¶190As the United States Supreme Court has explained, state-law rules
¶191excluding evidence from criminal trials “do not abridge an accused’s
¶192 12 right to present a defense so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘dis-
¶193proportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” Id. at 122
¶194(2) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (118 SCt
¶1951261, 140 LE2d 413) (1998)). Wood makes no argument that Rule
¶196405 or the trial court’s application of it is arbitrary or disproportion-
¶197ate to its purposes. Nor does she offer any authority in support of
¶198her specific assertion that not allowing her to call the other wit-
¶199nesses to support her credibility violated her right to a complete de-
¶200fense. She has therefore failed to establish that the trial court com-
¶201mitted a clear or obvious error. See Sconyers v. State, 318 Ga. 855,
¶202859 (1) (901 SE2d 170) (2024) (“For an error to be obvious for pur-
¶203poses of plain error review, it must be plain under controlling prec-
¶204edent or in view of the unequivocally clear words of a statute or
¶205rule.” (quoting Grier v. State, 313 Ga. 236, 242 (3) (b) (869 SE2d 423)
¶206(2022))).
¶207 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶208 13