¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: December 10, 2024
¶4 S24A1069. WESTON v. THE STATE.
¶5 BETHEL, Justice.
¶6 Adrian Darnyell Weston was convicted of malice murder in
¶7connection with the shooting death of Alex Tolbert.1 On appeal,
¶8Weston challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
¶9conviction under OCGA § 24-14-6 and the trial court’s denial of his
¶10motion for new trial on the “general grounds” under OCGA §§ 5-5-
¶1120 and 5-5-21. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶12 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
¶13 1 The crimes occurred on January 23, 2021. In March 2021, a Morgan
¶14County grand jury indicted Weston for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At a November 2022 jury trial, Weston was found guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced Weston to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; the remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Weston filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, as amended, on April 19, 2024. Weston filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. evidence presented at trial showed as follows. On January 23, 2021,
¶15Tolbert was shot and killed at a Madison hotel. Police found
¶16Tolbert’s body partially blocking the entrance to the hotel room
¶17where he was living at the time; he had been shot 11 times.
¶18Investigators collected fourteen .22-caliber shell casings and three
¶19bullets from the scene. During the investigation of Tolbert’s murder,
¶20Weston was identified as a person of interest due to a history of
¶21conflict between the men. Specifically, in May 2019, Tolbert stabbed
¶22Weston in an altercation. Tolbert was arrested, indicted for
¶23aggravated assault, and reincarcerated for a probation violation
¶24related to a prior conviction. Tolbert was released from prison after
¶25serving the balance of his sentence, and in July 2020, shortly after
¶26his release, Tolbert visited the home of Jimmy Zanders, the uncle of
¶27Weston’s then-girlfriend, where Weston frequently stayed. When
¶28Tolbert knocked on the door, Weston answered and chased Tolbert
¶29off the property. Weston called police about the incident and,
¶30according to the responding officer, was “fixated on the fact that he
¶31had been stabbed previously.” Weston’s then-girlfriend testified that
¶32 2 Weston spoke to her multiple times over a long period of time
¶33regarding the stabbing incident and his “aggravat[ion]” that Tolbert
¶34had not served any jail time in connection with the assault.
¶35 Subsequent investigation revealed that, on the day of the
¶36crimes, Weston was at the Zanders’ home and was overheard on the
¶37phone telling his sister that he was going to kill Tolbert that night.
¶38Weston was observed later that evening leaving the Zanders’ home
¶39with his gun inside a bookbag and walking down a trail. The trail
¶40connected the Zanders’ home and the hotel at which Tolbert was
¶41shot, which are located approximately 400 yards apart. Weston
¶42spoke to his then-girlfriend on the night of the crimes and told her
¶43that “he did something, but he . . . didn’t want to tell details about
¶44it” and that he “f**ked up.” Officers learned that Weston had
¶45previously fired his gun near an outdoor firepit at the Zanders’
¶46home. Testimony at trial established that Weston was the only
¶47person who stayed at the Zanders’ home who possessed a firearm.
¶48Four .22-caliber shell casings collected from the Zanders’ yard were
¶49determined to have been fired from the same gun as the shell casings
¶50 3 recovered at the crime scene.
¶51 Weston fled the state shortly after the crimes. He was arrested
¶52in November 2021 while hiding in the attic of his sister’s residence
¶53in Kansas. Weston phoned his sister from jail, telling her, “When I
¶54was caught, I really wish you hadn’t talked to Mom. She knows it’s
¶55over and done with now.” He also told his mother to “[k]eep [her]
¶56f**king mouth shut.”
¶57 On appeal, Weston first asserts that the evidence recounted
¶58above was insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of
¶59Georgia statutory law. Specifically, he complains that the evidence
¶60was circumstantial and did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses
¶61other than his guilt. See OCGA § 24-14-6. “The fact that the evidence
¶62of guilt was circumstantial does not render it insufficient.” Taylor v.
¶63State, 313 Ga. 5, 8 (867 SE2d 88) (2021) (citation and punctuation
¶64omitted). Instead, as we have explained, “[w]hen a conviction is
¶65based on circumstantial evidence, the State must present sufficient
¶66evidence to ‘exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of
¶67the guilt of the accused.’” Hooks v. State, 318 Ga. 850, 853 (2) (b) (901
¶68 4 SE2d 166) (2024) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6). Of course, “not every
¶69hypothesis is reasonable,” and there is no requirement that the
¶70evidence “exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis — only
¶71those that are reasonable.” Clark v. State, 309 Ga. 473, 477 (847
¶72SE2d 364) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in
¶73original). It is for the jury to decide “[w]hether any alternative
¶74hypotheses are reasonable and whether the circumstantial evidence
¶75excludes any such hypotheses,” and “we will not disturb the jury’s
¶76findings on those questions unless they are insupportable as a
¶77matter of law.” Wilson v. State, 319 Ga. 550, 553 (1) (905 SE2d 557)
¶78(2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶79 At the outset, we note that Weston has failed to identify any
¶80specific alternative hypothesis that, in his estimation, the State
¶81failed to disprove. Instead, Weston centers his argument on the
¶82assertion that the State failed to present enough persuasive or direct
¶83evidence to establish his guilt and vaguely implies that some
¶84unidentified person was responsible for Tolbert’s murder. To that
¶85end, Weston makes much of inconsistencies in the testimony of
¶86 5 various witnesses, but “it is axiomatic that resolving evidentiary
¶87conflicts and assessing witness credibility are within the exclusive
¶88province of the jury.” McCoy v. State, 315 Ga. 536, 543 (a) (883 SE2d
¶89740) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Weston’s complaints
¶90about the State’s failure to present certain types of evidence,
¶91including fingerprint or DNA evidence connecting him to the crime
¶92scene, eyewitness testimony identifying him as the shooter, or a
¶93confession, are equally unavailing because “there is no requirement
¶94that [the State] prove its case with any particular sort of evidence,”
¶95so long as the evidence presented is “competent.” Rodriguez v. State,
¶96309 Ga. 542, 546 (1) (847 SE2d 303) (2020) (citation and punctuation
¶97omitted). Deferring to the jury on these issues of evidentiary weight
¶98and credibility, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was
¶99sufficient as a matter of Georgia statutory law concerning
¶100circumstantial evidence to support Weston’s conviction for malice
¶101murder.
¶102 At trial, the jury heard testimony that Weston, who was armed
¶103with a gun, was observed shortly before the crimes walking toward
¶104 6 the hotel at which Tolbert was shot and killed. Shell casings
¶105recovered at the crime scene were fired from the same gun as shell
¶106casings recovered at the Zanders’ residence where Weston
¶107frequently stayed, and testimony at trial reflected that Weston was
¶108the only person to have possessed and fired a gun at the Zanders’
¶109residence. Weston made incriminating statements to several people
¶110both before and after the crimes. Additionally, Weston fled the state
¶111after Tolbert’s killing and concealed himself in his sister’s attic in an
¶112attempt to avoid arrest, and there was a history of animosity
¶113between Weston and Tolbert. This evidence was legally sufficient to
¶114exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than Weston’s guilt. 2 See
¶115OCGA § 24-14-6; Rodriguez, 309 Ga. at 546 (1) (circumstantial
¶116evidence supporting a murder conviction included appellant’s
¶117statements to multiple people that he would kill the victim, evidence
¶118 2 Weston also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
¶119felony murder and aggravated assault counts. That argument is moot, however, because Weston was not sentenced on those counts; the felony murder count was vacated by operation of law and the aggravated assault count merged into the malice murder conviction for sentencing. See Frazier v. State, 309 Ga. 219, 224 (1) n.7 (845 SE2d 579) (2020). 7 placing appellant at or near the crime scene within walking distance
¶120of his apartment, and evidence of a prior altercation between
¶121appellant and the victim); Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 88-89 (3) (868
¶122SE2d 205) (2022) (flight from scene of crime, resistance to arrest,
¶123and concealment generally is circumstantial evidence of guilt).
¶124Accordingly, this claim fails.
¶125 2. Weston also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
¶126by denying his motion for new trial on the general grounds, again
¶127focusing on the circumstantial evidence of his guilt. See OCGA §§ 5-
¶1285-20 (authorizing grant of new trial if the trial judge concludes that
¶129the jury’s verdict is “contrary to evidence and the principles of justice
¶130and equity”) and 5-5-21 (authorizing grant of new trial if the trial
¶131judge concludes that the jury’s verdict is “decidedly and strongly
¶132against the weight of the evidence”). When a defendant raises the
¶133general grounds in his motion for new trial, the trial court must
¶134“exercise a broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’” and
¶135“consider some of the things that he cannot when assessing the legal
¶136sufficiency of the evidence, including any conflicts in the evidence,
¶137 8 the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.” Hinton
¶138v. State, 312 Ga. 258, 262 (1) (c) (862 SE2d 320) (2021) (citation and
¶139punctuation omitted). On appeal from the denial of such a motion,
¶140this Court reviews “whether the trial court exercised its discretion
¶141as the thirteenth juror, but the decision to grant a new trial on the
¶142general grounds is vested solely in the trial court and is not subject
¶143to our review.” Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 102-103 (3) (897 SE2d
¶144368) (2024).
¶145 Here, in its order denying Weston’s motion for new trial, the
¶146trial court recognized its duty to sit as the thirteenth juror and
¶147expressly indicated that it had considered all the evidence presented
¶148at trial, including any conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the
¶149evidence, and the credibility of the testifying witnesses. Based on
¶150that review, the trial court concluded that the State proved Weston’s
¶151guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crimes of
¶152which he was convicted. “The court therefore ruled on the motion
¶153based on its own independent review of the trial record and found
¶154no discrepancy between the jury’s conclusions regarding the weight
¶155 9 of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and the court’s
¶156own views of those matters.” Williams v. State, 307 Ga. 689, 691 (1)
¶157(b) (838 SE2d 314) (2020). And because the trial court properly
¶158exercised its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, Weston’s
¶159argument “is otherwise not subject to review by this Court.”3 Weems,
¶160 3 Weston does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support his
¶161conviction as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In the past, we often reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process when considering an appellant’s general-grounds claim. See King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2) n.8 (889 SE2d 851) (2023). But see, e.g., Caviston v. State, 315 Ga. 279, 282-284 (1) (882 SE2d 221) (2022) (limiting general-grounds analysis to evaluating whether trial court exercised its discretion); Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 772 (3) (778 SE2d 205) (2015) (same). But more recently, many of us have begun to question the propriety of including a Jackson sufficiency analysis within a general-grounds analysis and have expressed interest in reexamining it in a case where the issue is properly presented. See King, 316 Ga. at 616 (2) n.8 (“[M]any of us question whether it is proper for this Court to import Jackson into an appellate review of the general grounds (or to otherwise rely on Jackson as part of that analysis).”). See also, e.g., White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 374 (2) n.8 (903 SE2d 891) (2024). Because Weston’s argument in this regard is confined to the nature and weight of the evidence of his guilt but does not concern the constitutional sufficiency thereof, we have conducted our analysis to address the argument raised, without delving into unargued issues. Compare generally Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 392-399 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (announcing this Court’s discontinuation of deciding federal constitutional sufficiency issues sua sponte in non-death penalty cases and noting that “it is almost always a better course to decide the appeal the parties bring us”); Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832, 837 (1) (a) n.6 (896 SE2d 476) (2023) (noting that, post-Davenport, “instead of considering all conceivable sufficiency-related issues, we limit our consideration to only the argument that [the appellant] actually makes”). 10 318 Ga. at 103 (3). See also Brock v. State, 319 Ga. 765, 772 (2) (b)
¶162(906 SE2d 739) (2024) (“[T]he merits of a trial court’s discretion on
¶163the general grounds are not subject to our review — that decision is
¶164vested solely in the trial court.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
¶165 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶166 11