¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: January 28, 2025
¶4 S24A1386. NELSON v. STRICKLAND et al.
¶5 PINSON, Justice.
¶6 Henry Strickland lost a close election for city commissioner in
¶7Waycross, Georgia, and he filed a petition to contest the election.
¶8The trial court granted the petition, concluding that the election had
¶9used an outdated map of voting districts from 2005 and that, based
¶10on the districts as set by the “right” map, 32 voters voted in the
¶11wrong districts, which was enough to have potentially affected the
¶12outcome of Strickland’s election. On that basis, the court vacated the
¶13election and ordered that a new election take place in November
¶142024 using the most recent election map, which was adopted in
¶152011. Alvin Nelson, Strickland’s opponent and winner of the elec-
¶16tion, appealed, and we granted his motion to stay pending the appeal
¶17of the trial court’s order vacating the election and ordering a new one.
¶18 We now reverse the trial court’s judgment. Strickland’s chal-
¶19lenge is based on the assumption that the 2011 map was in effect for
¶20the 2023 election, and that because the 2005 map was used instead,
¶21enough votes were cast in the wrong districts to call the election re-
¶22sults into doubt. But as Nelson contends, the 2011 map never be-
¶23came effective, because none of the filings with the Secretary of
¶24State and clerk of the superior court required by OCGA § 36-35-5 to
¶25make the charter amendment effective have been made. Because the
¶262011 map was not effective at the time of the election, there is now
¶27no basis in the record for the trial court’s conclusion that enough
¶28illegal or irregular votes were counted to change or cast doubt on the
¶29outcome of the election, which leaves no ground for vacating the elec-
¶30tion. Strickland’s petition must therefore be rejected.
¶31 1. In 2011, the City of Waycross amended its charter to bring
¶32its voting districts up to date after the 2010 national census. As ex-
¶33plained further below, the City’s power to do that came from the
¶34Home Rule Act of 1965, which imposes conditions and prescribes
¶35 2 procedures for home-rule charter amendments. Among other things,
¶36amendments to a city charter made pursuant to a city’s home rule
¶37powers do not become effective “until a copy of the amendment or
¶38revision . . . has been filed with the Secretary of State and in the
¶39office of the clerk of the superior court of the county of the legal situs
¶40of the municipal corporation.” OCGA § 36-35-5. The City did not file
¶41its 2011 charter amendment with either the Secretary of State or
¶42the clerk of superior court. But the City used the 2011 voting dis-
¶43tricts and the associated maps in city elections from 2011 until
¶442022.1
¶45 In 2022, the City transitioned from paper maps to digital maps.
¶46At some point, the county election supervisor asked that the most
¶47updated version of the digital map be sent to him by email. Some-
¶48how, the map that was sent to the election supervisor was not the
¶49updated 2011 map, but a map from 2005 that had been prepared in
¶50response to the 2000 census. As a result, the 2005 map was used in
¶51 1 The City did not update its districts or maps after the 2020 Census
¶52because it determined that the population had not changed enough to justify an update. 3 city elections from 2022 forward.
¶53 In November 2023, Nelson, the appellant here, was elected as
¶54Waycross City Commissioner for District 5, in an election that used
¶55the 2005 map. Nelson’s opponent in that election was Strickland,
¶56one of the appellees here.
¶57 After the election was certified, Strickland filed a pro se elec-
¶58tion contest under OCGA § 21-2-521. In his filings, Strickland al-
¶59leged that the Board of Elections incorrectly used the 2005 map for
¶60the election, and that using that map instead of the 2011 map had
¶61resulted in 32 voters casting ballots in the “wrong” districts. Twenty-
¶62three voters who lived in District 1 according to the 2011 map had
¶63instead voted in District 5, and nine voters who resided in District 5
¶64according to the 2011 map had instead voted in District 4 (and thus
¶65did not vote in the election for District 5’s commissioner). The Ware
¶66County Board of Elections — the other appellee here — stated in its
¶67verified answer that 32 voters had voted “in an incorrect district.”
¶68Strickland pointed out that Nelson won the District 5 election by
¶69 4 only 18 votes, and the Board expressed its belief that the discrep-
¶70ancy “would warrant a re-vote.”
¶71 After a hearing, the court granted relief to Strickland. The
¶72court denied Nelson’s motion to dismiss Strickland’s petition for in-
¶73sufficient process and insufficient service of process, and it rejected
¶74Nelson’s argument that the petition should have been dismissed be-
¶75cause Strickland did not pursue it expeditiously. On the merits, the
¶76court found that there were irregularities in the 2023 election based
¶77on the use of the 2005 map rather than the 2011 map. The court
¶78reasoned that the use of the older map had resulted in some voters
¶79voting in the “wrong” district, by which it meant a district other than
¶80the one established by the “right” 2011 map. The court therefore va-
¶81cated that election and ordered a new election to take place “as soon
¶82as practicable and in accordance with Georgia law.” The new elec-
¶83tion was later set for November 5, 2024.
¶84 Nelson appealed both orders, and we granted his request for a
¶85stay of the trial court’s orders pending appeal.
¶86 2. Under our Election Code, a candidate for office may contest
¶87 5 an election on the ground that “illegal votes have been received or
¶88legal votes rejected at the polls sufficient to change or place in doubt
¶89the result.” OCGA §§ 21-5-521, 21-5-522 (3). If a petitioner is able to
¶90prove that enough illegal or irregular votes were counted to change
¶91or place in doubt the result of the contested election, a court has the
¶92power to vacate that election. See Martin v. Fulton County Board of
¶93Registration and Elections, 307 Ga. 193, 222 (3) (a) (835 SE2d 245)
¶94(2019). In making that showing, the petitioner “need not establish
¶95for whom the disputed electors cast their ballots,” only that enough
¶96disputed ballots were counted that the result of the election could
¶97have been affected. See Smith v. Long County Bd. of Elections and
¶98Registration, 312 Ga. 306, 311-312 (1) (862 SE2d 517) (2021). That
¶99was the nature of Strickland’s election contest here. He alleged that
¶100the 2011 map reflected the election districts in effect at the time and
¶101should have been used for this election, and that because the 2005
¶102map was used instead, 32 voters voted in the “wrong” districts, in an
¶103election decided by only 18 votes. The trial court agreed and vacated
¶104the election on that basis.
¶105 6 On appeal, Nelson disputes the premise that the 2011 map was
¶106the map in effect at the time of the election here. He contends that
¶107a step required by statute to make the 2011 map effective — making
¶108certain filings with the Secretary of State and the superior court
¶109clerk — has not happened. If Nelson is right, then Strickland’s claim
¶110that 32 voters voted in the “wrong” districts — which is based en-
¶111tirely on the assumption that those voters were supposed to vote in
¶112the districts set by the 2011 map — would lack any basis in the rec-
¶113ord. All of which is to say that the merits of this election contest turn
¶114on whether the 2011 map was effective at the time of the election.
¶115So that question is our focus here, and we review de novo the trial
¶116court’s legal conclusion that the 2011 map was the effective map at
¶117the time of the election. See Parham v. Stewart, 308 Ga. 170, 176 (4)
¶118(839 SE2d 605) (2020) (applying de novo review to legal question of
¶119whether summary judgment was proper in a post-election contest).
¶120 The City’s authority to enact new election district maps comes
¶121from the Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965. See OCGA § 36-35-1 et
¶122 7 seq. The Home Rule Act generally gives municipalities the legisla-
¶123tive power to adopt “clearly reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or
¶124regulations relating to its property, affairs, and local government”
¶125that are not inconsistent with the Constitution or preempted by
¶126state law. OCGA § 36-35-3 (a). The Act also authorizes certain spe-
¶127cific local laws. Relevant here, the Act allows a municipality, after a
¶128national census, to “reapportion the election districts from which
¶129members of the municipal governing authority are elected.” OCGA
¶130§ 36-35-4.1 (a). And the Act lays out the procedural steps through
¶131which a municipality can exercise that power: A city that wants to
¶132reapportion its electoral districts “shall by ordinance amend its char-
¶133ter.” OCGA § 36-35-4.1 (b). That ordinance must be “duly adopted at
¶134two regular consecutive meetings of the municipal governing au-
¶135thority,” OCGA § 36-35-3 (b) (1), and the city must publish notice of
¶136the proposed amendment beforehand, see id. And finally, at issue
¶137here, OCGA § 36-35-5 requires certain filings to be made to make
¶138the amendment effective. That provision says that
¶139 [n]o amendment or revision of any charter made pursuant
¶140 8 to this chapter shall become effective until a copy of the amendment or revision, a copy of the required notice of publication, and an affidavit of a duly authorized representative of the newspaper in which the notice was published, to the effect that the notice has been published as provided in this chapter, has been filed with the Secretary of State and in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county of the legal situs of the municipal corporation.
¶141OCGA § 36-35-5.
¶142 Under the plain language of OCGA § 36-35-5, an amendment
¶143or revision of a charter made pursuant to a city’s home rule powers
¶144is not effective until a copy of the charter amendment or revision
¶145(among other things) has been filed with the Secretary of State and
¶146the superior court clerk. That language provides that “[n]o” such
¶147amendment or revision “shall become effective” until those steps are
¶148taken. When the word “shall” is accompanied by a negative word
¶149(like “not” or “no”) in this way, the phrase including the “shall” is
¶150ordinarily read as denying permission to do a thing or, as here, not
¶151permitting a thing to happen. Put another way, the use of “shall” in
¶152that kind of phrase is generally mandatory — “shall not” means
¶153 9 “may not” rather than “should not.” See, e.g., Premier Pediatric Pro-
¶154viders, LLC v. Kennesaw Pediatrics, P.C., 318 Ga. 350, 360 (4) (898
¶155SE2d 481) (2024) (explaining that the statutory language “[n]o ap-
¶156peal shall be dismissed by the appellate court” in OCGA § 5-6-48 (c)
¶157means that “an appellate court may not dismiss an appeal” under
¶158that statute); Collington v. Clayton County, 318 Ga. 29, 31 (1) & n.4
¶159(897 SE2d 361) (2024) (statutory language in OCGA § 36-92-3,
¶160providing that a person suing a local government entity under the
¶161statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for motor vehicle claims
¶162“shall not name the local government officer or employee individu-
¶163ally,” means that claims against a government employee in his indi-
¶164vidual capacity were improper and foreclosed); Ford Motor Co. v. Co-
¶165sper, 317 Ga. 356, 358 (2) (893 SE2d 106) (2023) (statutory language
¶166in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2), which provides that “[n]o action shall be
¶167commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury af-
¶168ter ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption
¶169or the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the in-
¶170jury,” means that claims filed under that subsection more than ten
¶171 10 years after the first sale for use or consumption of the product are
¶172“completely barred”). Accord Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thurais-
¶173sigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 112 (I) (B) (140 SCt 1959, 207 LE2d 427) (2020)
¶174(statutory language of 28 USC § 1252 (a) (2) (A) (i) providing that
¶175“no court shall have jurisdiction to review” executive determinations
¶176about expedited removal means that courts “may not” review those
¶177determinations); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638-639 (II) (A) (136
¶178SCt 1850, 195 LE2d 117) (2016) (statutory language of 42 USC
¶179§ 1997e (a) providing that “[n]o action shall be brought” until admin-
¶180istrative remedies are exhausted is “mandatory” and means, when
¶181“said more conversationally,” that prisoners “may not bring any ac-
¶182tion” until they have exhausted administrative remedies). And that
¶183is the best reading of the language here, too. We see no “contextual
¶184basis” for a different reading, Bell v. Hargrove, 313 Ga. 30, 34 (2) n.5
¶185(867 SE2d 101) (2021), like a qualification of or exception to the stat-
¶186ute’s clear declaration that “[n]o amendment or revision . . . shall
¶187become effective until” the required filings happen. So we conclude
¶188that an amendment or revision of a charter made pursuant to a city’s
¶189 11 home rule powers is not effective until a copy of the amendment or
¶190revision has been filed with the Secretary of State and the superior
¶191court clerk.
¶192 The trial court erred by treating OCGA § 36-35-5 as “directory”
¶193rather than mandatory because failing to file a copy of the amend-
¶194ment did not “prejudice . . . the substantial rights of interested per-
¶195sons,” citing Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733 (187 SE2d 835) (1972).
¶196In that case, we said that
¶197 this court has held that language contained in a statute which, given its ordinary meaning, commands the doing of a thing within a certain time, when not accompanied by any negative words restraining the doing of the thing afterward, will generally be construed as merely directory and not as a limitation of authority, and this is especially so where no injury appeared to have resulted from the fact that the thing was done after the time limited by the plain wording of the Act.
¶198Barton, 228 Ga. at 739 (1). Putting aside whether that statement
¶199from Barton remains an accurate statement of law,2 it does not apply
¶200 2 This statement from Barton is out of step with how we have assessed
¶201the “mandatory or directory” question in our more recent decisions, which focus on context to determine the meaning of the word “shall” rather than assessing prejudice. Compare, e.g., Bell, 313 Ga. at 34 (2) n.5 (explaining that “‘shall’ is
¶202 12 here, where the language at issue does not “command[ ] the doing of
¶203a thing within a certain time” but instead sets conditions that must
¶204be satisfied before a particular kind of legal act becomes effective. 3
¶205 For its part, the Board contends that the 2011 map should still
¶206be considered effective because the City “substantially complied”
¶207with the requirements for amending its charter. The Board points
¶208out that the City complied with most of the statutory requirements
¶209for amending its charter and it has been using the 2011 map for
¶210‘generally construed as a mandatory directive’” unless “the context in which it is used indicates a permissive instruction” (quoting Carr v. State, 303 Ga. 853, 865 (5) (a) n.15 (815 SE2d 903) (2018))). 3 The trial court also concluded that applying OCGA § 36-35-5 to “inval-
¶211idate” the 2011 map would “violat[e]” the constitutional mandate of “one person, one vote.” The trial court’s order offers no basis for that statement in the law or the record of this case, and it is not clear what role, if any, it played in the trial court’s analysis. To the extent the trial court was suggesting that the statute should be interpreted differently under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, that doctrine applies only when the statute in question is ambiguous, see Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (1) (829 SE2d 99) (2019) (“[T]he canon of constitutional avoidance is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that [the legislature] did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.”) (citation and punctuation omitted), which OCGA § 36-35-5 is not, so any such argument would fail. As for any underlying question under the United States Constitution, Strickland did not challenge the constitutionality of the 2005 map that was used in the 2023 election, under a “one person, one vote” theory or otherwise, so no freestanding constitutional claim was properly before the trial court in this case. 13 more than a decade. This is good enough, the Board says, and in
¶212support, it relies on Jackson v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No.
¶2138, 234 Ga. 906 (218 SE2d 633) (1975). In Jackson, we upheld a city’s
¶214charter amendment where the city had already operated under the
¶215amendment for months and had shown “substantial compliance”
¶216with the Home Rule Act by following all the statutory requirements
¶217— including filing the amendment with the Secretary of State — but
¶218did not file the amendment with the clerk of superior court. See id.
¶219at 913 (1). Under those circumstances, we said we were “unwilling
¶220to hold that the mere failure to also file the completed ordinance in
¶221the office of the clerk of court made it an ineffective charter amend-
¶223 Jackson’s implicit holding that “substantial compliance” with
¶224the law is all that is required to effectively amend a city charter un-
¶225der the Home Rule Act is subject to question. Substantial compli-
¶226ance is a concept that has ordinarily applied to excuse relatively mi-
¶227nor or immaterial failures of public officers to comply with duties or
¶228 14 requirements imposed on them by law, or similarly minor “discrep-
¶229ancies in format or phraseology” between what a statute requires
¶230and what a person does. See, e.g., OCGA § 1-3-1 (c) (“A substantial
¶231compliance with any statutory requirement, especially on the part
¶232of public officers, shall be deemed and held sufficient[.]”); Martina v.
¶233Elrod, 293 Ga. 538, 539 (1) (748 SE2d 412) (2013) (explaining that
¶234“[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance, though tolerant of varia-
¶235tions in the mode of expression utilized to satisfy statutory requi-
¶236sites, nonetheless requires actual compliance as to all matters of
¶237substance,” and that “minor discrepancies in format or phraseology
¶238are acceptable, but the omission of substantive elements is not”) (ci-
¶239tations and punctuation omitted). But as we just discussed, OCGA
¶240§ 36-35-5 does not impose a duty or command the doing of anything;
¶241it simply identifies conditions that must be satisfied before a charter
¶242amendment becomes effective, and it denies permission to treat such
¶243an amendment as effective in the absence of those conditions. It is
¶244not at all clear that the concept of “substantial compliance” maps
¶245onto this kind of statute.
¶246 15 Despite these concerns, we need not disturb Jackson here.
¶247Even assuming substantial compliance is enough to allow a charter
¶248amendment to go into effect, the City here did not even substantially
¶249comply. As the trial court found, although the redistricting charter
¶250amendment was published and adopted by the City, none of the re-
¶251quired filings was made, with anyone. That makes this case differ-
¶252ent than Jackson, where the City filed a copy of its amendment with
¶253the Secretary of State but not with the superior court clerk. And that
¶254difference matters, because filing with the Secretary of State is how
¶255a municipal charter amendment is recorded in the published laws of
¶256the State. 4 In any event, making no filings of any kind could hardly
¶257be considered “substantial compliance” with a statutory require-
¶258ment that consists entirely of making filings, see OCGA § 36-35-5.
¶259 Because the conditions set by OCGA § 36-35-5 for making the
¶260 4 The statute requires the Secretary to “provide for the publication and
¶261distribution of all such amendments and revisions at least annually,” see OCGA § 36-35-5, and an affidavit from a member of the Secretary’s office confirms that municipal charter amendments are published in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, under Local and Special Laws, once they are filed with that office. 16 charter amendment here effective were not satisfied, the 2011 elec-
¶262tion map for the City of Waycross was not effective at the time of the
¶2632023 election at issue. 5 And with that premise gone, Strickland’s
¶264challenge fails. The challenge relied on the assumption that the 2011
¶265map was in effect and thus should have been used for the 2023 elec-
¶266tion. That assumption about the map was the sole basis for Strick-
¶267land’s contention, and the trial court’s conclusion, that enough votes
¶268were cast in the wrong districts to call the election results into doubt.
¶269Because the 2011 map was not effective at the time of the election,
¶270there is now no basis in the record for that conclusion, so this elec-
¶271tion challenge fails. See Martin, 307 Ga. at 222-223 (3) (a).
¶272 Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Boggs, C.J., not participating.
¶273 5 Nothing in this decision should be read to preclude the City from mak-
¶274ing the filings required by OCGA § 36-35-5 to make the 2011 map effective. 17