¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: February 18, 2025
¶4 S24A1184. WASHINGTON v. THE STATE.
¶5 COLVIN, Justice.
¶6 Appellant Jamie Alexander Washington appeals his
¶7convictions for felony murder and related crimes in connection with
¶8the aggravated assault of Desmond Carter at a motel in Dougherty
¶9County and the shooting death of James Hawkins near the motel.1
¶10 1 The crimes occurred on July 5, 2015. On October 1, 2015, a Dougherty
¶11County grand jury returned an indictment against Appellant, Mylan Mahoney, and Malcolm Bernard Offord, Jr. The co-defendants were reindicted on February 8, 2017, and Appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit armed robbery (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 5), and aggravated assault of Hawkins and Carter (Counts 6 and 7, respectively). Before trial, Mahoney and Offord pled guilty pursuant to negotiated plea deals in exchange for their testimony against Appellant. Appellant was tried before a jury from February 17 through 21, 2020, and the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder (Count 5) and imposed concurrent tenyear and consecutive 20-year prison terms for conspiracy to commit armed robbery (Count 1) and aggravated assault (Count 7), respectively. The court merged for sentencing purposes the remaining aggravated-assault count (Count 6) with the felony-murder conviction (Count 5). Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial through new counsel on August 4, 2020, and amended Appellant raises numerous claims of trial-court error and ineffective
¶12assistance of counsel. But as explained below, we conclude that his
¶13claims are unpersuasive and therefore affirm his convictions.
¶14 1. The trial evidence showed the following. Malcolm Bernard
¶15Offord, Jr. (“Offord”) testified that, early in the morning on July 5,
¶162015, he drove Appellant and Mylan Mahoney to a motel. According
¶17to Offord and Mahoney, they were interested in getting some drugs,
¶18and the purpose of their motel visit was to meet with Offord’s father,
¶19Malcolm Bernard Offord, Sr. (“Senior”), who admitted in his own
¶20trial testimony that he was a drug dealer at the time. According to
¶21Offord, when they arrived at the motel, Senior got into Offord’s
¶22parked truck with the other men. Senior testified that he talked to
¶23Appellant about drugs, but when Appellant asked to buy a
¶24substantial amount of “crack cocaine,” Senior “backed off.”
¶25 Offord testified that “the conversation got switched from
¶26the motion on February 28, 2022. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial on March 11, 2024. Appellant then timely filed a notice of appeal directed to this Court. The case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 buying drugs to robbing a drug dealer,” and Mahoney confirmed that
¶27a conversation about committing a robbery occurred. Offord said
¶28that Appellant asked Senior about who was selling drugs, and, after
¶29Senior gave Appellant some information about different drug
¶30dealers, Appellant and Senior got out of the truck, looked at a motel
¶31room, and then returned to the vehicle. Offord testified that he,
¶32Appellant, and Mahoney then left the motel together and “chill[ed]”
¶33elsewhere for the day.
¶34 That night, according to Offord, Appellant brought up the idea
¶35of committing a robbery again, saying, “We could go on ahead and
¶36do it now,” and, “We’re going to do it now,” to which Offord
¶37responded, “Okay.” Offord testified that, before Offord drove
¶38Appellant and Mahoney back to the motel, they picked up some
¶39black bandanas from a store, Appellant and Mahoney changed into
¶40black clothing, and Appellant got a .357-caliber handgun from
¶41someone. Mahoney said that the pistol Appellant had was a
¶42“revolver.” According to Offord, Offord gave Mahoney a .380-caliber
¶43pistol, which Offord confirmed was an “automatic” pistol that ejected
¶44 3 shell casings when fired, rather than a revolver, and which Mahoney
¶45described as a .380-caliber High Point. Offord said that he then
¶46dropped off Appellant and Mahoney in an alley behind a fast-food
¶47restaurant, which the record shows was near the motel.
¶48 Mahoney testified that they planned to rob someone at the
¶49motel, but “Carter got in the way of everything.” Carter, who was
¶50renting a room at the motel on July 5, 2015, testified that two men,
¶51one of whom he identified in the courtroom as Appellant, were in the
¶52motel’s breezeway that night. Mahoney, who testified that he was
¶53the other man Carter encountered, said that only Mahoney’s face
¶54was masked at the time. And Carter testified that Appellant was not
¶55wearing a bandana or anything covering his face.
¶56 According to Carter, Appellant asked Carter for a cigarette
¶57lighter. And Mahoney similarly testified that Appellant asked
¶58Carter for a cigarette. But before Carter could give Appellant “a
¶59light,” Carter said, he saw Appellant “grabbing for his pants[,] . . .
¶60like he was pulling a weapon out,” and Carter saw “something
¶61chrome” that he recognized as a “revolver.” Mahoney testified that
¶62 4 Appellant pulled out a revolver, and according to both Carter and
¶63Mahoney, Carter “took off running.” Carter testified that the two
¶64men chased him, but he got away. And Mahoney testified that, while
¶65he and Appellant were chasing Carter, Carter “dropped something
¶66on the ground,” and Appellant stopped to pick up what Carter had
¶67dropped. Then, according to Mahoney, Appellant and Mahoney left
¶68the motel.
¶69 The chase was witnessed by a motel patron, who testified that,
¶70after hearing some noise, she saw two men with masks chase Carter
¶71and then run in the opposite direction. And the chase was also
¶72captured by motel surveillance cameras. Specifically, the motel’s
¶73surveillance video showed that a man, whom Carter identified as
¶74himself, ran alongside the motel and then across the parking lot.
¶75The video further showed that the man identified as Carter was
¶76being chased by two other men, whom Mahoney identified as himself
¶77and Appellant. And the video showed that the men identified as
¶78Appellant and Mahoney stopped their pursuit at the corner of the
¶79building, where the man identified as Appellant appeared to pick up
¶80 5 something from the ground before both men ran in the opposite
¶81direction.
¶82 Mahoney testified that, following the chase, he and Appellant
¶83“ran through the alley” near the motel to get back to Offord’s vehicle.
¶84Mahoney said that, while wearing a mask and having his gun out,
¶85he ran “full speed” around a corner from the alley onto the sidewalk,
¶86and he encountered Hawkins standing there by a bus stop.
¶87According to Mahoney, Hawkins “confronted” Mahoney, tackling
¶88him to the ground. Mahoney testified that he and Hawkins “wrestled
¶89around” on the ground, but Mahoney eventually managed to get free
¶90of Hawkins and stand up. According to Mahoney, after Mahoney got
¶91to his feet, Appellant “shot [Hawkins].”
¶92 Two cousins, who happened to be driving by at the time,
¶93testified that they witnessed the shooting. One cousin testified that
¶94three men came out of an alley, that he heard “two or three”
¶95gunshots and saw the associated “fire go off,” and that two of the
¶96men then ran away from the scene. He further testified that he
¶97called 911 and told dispatch that a man had been shot and was lying
¶98 6 face down on the ground. Similarly, the other cousin testified that
¶99he saw two men walking behind a third man, that one of the two
¶100men shot the third man, who fell to the ground, and that the two
¶101men then “took off running.” 2
¶102 Offord said that he heard the gunshots, and Mahoney testified
¶103that, following the shooting, he and Appellant ran back to Offord’s
¶104vehicle. According to Offord and Mahoney, Appellant and Mahoney
¶105got into Offord’s truck, and Offord drove them away from the scene.
¶106Offord testified that, as they drove, everyone was “quiet” and there
¶107was a “tens[e]” atmosphere in the truck. According to Offord, after
¶108the shooting, he retrieved his gun from Mahoney, dropped off
¶109Appellant and Mahoney, “got rid of [his] gun,” and then “report[ed]
¶110[his] gun stolen” to avoid blame for “anything that had occurred over
¶111there.”
¶112 Officers who responded to the scene of the shooting found
¶113Hawkins lying dead on the ground. Although Hawkins had multiple
¶114 2 Because it was dark, neither cousin could identify the men involved in
¶115the shooting. 7 gunshot wounds, officers did not find any shell casings. And a crime
¶116scene investigator with firearms training testified that, in contrast
¶117with an “automatic” pistol that “automatically eject[s]” a shell casing
¶118when fired, a “shell casing stays inside” a “revolver” when fired and
¶119must be “manually take[n] . . . out” of the gun.
¶120 Offord said that, sometime during the night of the shooting,
¶121Offord returned to the crime scene to check on his father, Senior,
¶122who had told Offord over the phone that someone had been shot.
¶123Offord testified that Senior was concerned that the victim might be
¶124Hawkins, who, as it turned out, was a member of their extended
¶125family. According to Senior, Offord told Senior that Offord had
¶126something to do with the shooting, saying that he was “sorry,” that
¶127he had brought the men he had been with that morning back to the
¶128motel, and that “[t]hey did that.” Senior testified that he told Offord,
¶129“Man, turn yourself in.” And when Offord failed to do so, Senior
¶130testified, he contacted the police to report Offord’s involvement in
¶131the crime. According to Senior, he called Offord and allowed police
¶132officers to listen to their conversation. When asked if “anyone
¶133 8 identif[ied] [Appellant] at that point to the police,” Senior responded,
¶134“[Offord] did.”
¶135 The medical examiner who later performed Hawkins’s autopsy
¶136testified that Hawkins was shot three times in his left side from a
¶137distance of at least two-and-a-half feet away, resulting in injuries to
¶138his chest, hip, and knee that were fatal, potentially fatal, and
¶139nonfatal, respectively. According to the medical examiner, Hawkins
¶140also had blunt force injuries to his right side that were consistent
¶141with “a fall-type injury.”
¶142 Appellant, who took the stand in his own defense, denied
¶143meeting with Senior on the morning of the shooting, participating in
¶144any conspiracy with Offord or Mahony, planning to rob drug dealers,
¶145being present at the motel on the night of the shooting, being present
¶146for the shooting itself, or knowing anything about the shooting.
¶147Appellant testified that, on the night of the shooting, he was in
¶148another neighborhood that he frequented. According to Appellant,
¶149that night he “smok[ed] weed” and “kick[ed] it” with some “guys” and
¶150“might” have also gone to the house of “[a] girl name[d] Tree,” with
¶151 9 whom he had a sexual relationship, and either “kick[ed] it [there]
¶152for the rest of the night” or “ha[d] sex with her” and then “peel[ed]
¶153out [to] go to another homie[’s] house” to “kick it.”
¶154 Appellant claimed that Offord and Mahoney were lying about
¶155him because they were angry that he had beaten them up. Appellant
¶156explained that he, Offord, and Mahoney were members of “a Blood
¶157gang” called the “Georgia Denver Lanes,” and that Appellant was
¶158the “enforcer” of the gang tasked with punishing gang members for
¶159violations of gang protocol. Appellant described himself as “a
¶160fighter” who trained to box, “like[d] to fight,” and was known as “Jaw
¶161Jacker” because “Jaw” is an acronym for his first, middle, and last
¶162name, and because he “fight[s] very well.” He further said that “a
¶163lot” of his fights had been “videotaped” and that he was “well-known”
¶164in the community “because one of [his] videos went viral and had
¶165over a million views.” According to Appellant, he beat up Offord and
¶166Mahoney two days before Hawkins’s shooting because Offord and
¶167Mahoney had violated gang protocol when they committed a “drive-
¶168by” shooting and used a “registered gun” that “leaves a trail.”
¶169 10 Appellant said that Offord and Mahoney got “extremely mad” when
¶170Appellant told them they needed to be punished for violations, and
¶171that Offord and Mahoney “very much” felt like Appellant had
¶172stepped out of line by beating them up.
¶173 2. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
¶174motion for a directed verdict as to the felony-murder charge because
¶175the trial evidence was insufficient under Georgia’s accomplice-
¶176corroboration statute, which provides that, in “felony cases where
¶177the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness
¶178shall not be sufficient.” OCGA § 24-14-8. Specifically, Appellant
¶179argues that the only evidence that Appellant shot Hawkins came
¶180from Mahoney, who was an accomplice to the crime. And although
¶181Appellant concedes that both Mahoney and Offord testified that
¶182Mahoney and Appellant were present and armed when the shooting
¶183occurred, he argues that no evidence showed “which handgun fired
¶184the fatal rounds.” This claim fails.
¶185 “The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed
¶186verdict of acquittal is the same as for determining the sufficiency of
¶187 11 the evidence to support a conviction.” Clements v. State, 317 Ga. 772,
¶188783 (1) (896 SE2d 549) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). In
¶189assessing the sufficiency of the evidence,
¶190 we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.
¶191Id. at 789 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted). It is well
¶192established that, “in order to sustain a [felony] conviction under
¶193Georgia law, testimony by an accomplice to a crime must be
¶194corroborated by other evidence implicating the defendant.”
¶195Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 471 (2) (837 SE2d 362) (2019) (citing
¶196OCGA § 24-14-8). “[T]he testimony of one accomplice,” however, “can
¶197be corroborated by the testimony of another accomplice.” Id. (citation
¶198and punctuation omitted). And “corroborating evidence may be
¶199slight,” “may be entirely circumstantial,” and “need not be sufficient
¶200in and of itself to warrant a conviction, so long as it is independent
¶201of the accomplice’s testimony and directly connects the defendant to
¶202the crime or leads to the inference of guilt.” McGarity v. State, 308
¶203 12 Ga. 417, 420 (841 SE2d 718) (2020) (citation and punctuation
¶204omitted). “Once the State has introduced independent evidence
¶205implicating the defendant, it is for the jury to decide whether the
¶206accomplice’s testimony has been sufficiently corroborated.” Id.
¶207(citation and punctuation omitted).
¶208 Contrary to Appellant’s argument, he was not convicted of
¶209felony murder based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of
¶210Mahoney. Offord and Mahoney both testified that, on the morning
¶211of the shooting, they were present with Appellant for a conversation
¶212about committing an armed robbery at the motel. Mahoney testified
¶213that the men went back to the motel that evening planning to
¶214commit a robbery there. And Offord corroborated that testimony,
¶215saying that, in the evening, Appellant expressed a desire to commit
¶216the robbery “now,” after which Offord drove Appellant and Mahoney
¶217to the motel. Further, both Mahoney and Carter identified Appellant
¶218as the man who, along with Mahoney, attempted to rob Carter
¶219shortly before Hawkins’s shooting. Mahoney’s testimony that he and
¶220Appellant ran down an alley near the motel after attempting to rob
¶221 13 Carter was corroborated by the motel patron who saw two men chase
¶222Carter and then run in the opposite direction, and by video
¶223surveillance footage from the motel showing that, after Carter got
¶224away, the two men chasing him turned around and ran in the
¶225direction of the alley that led to the location where Hawkins was
¶226ultimately shot. And Mahoney’s testimony that he encountered
¶227Hawkins at the end of the alley, that Appellant shot Hawkins, and
¶228that Mahoney and Appellant then ran back to Offord’s vehicle was
¶229corroborated by the two cousins who witnessed two men run away
¶230after shooting the victim and by Offord’s testimony that, following
¶231the gunshots, Appellant and Mahoney got into Offord’s truck.
¶232 Although Appellant contends that the trial evidence was
¶233insufficient to convict him of felony murder because no evidence
¶234corroborated Mahoney’s testimony that Appellant personally shot
¶235Hawkins, proof that Appellant, rather than Mahoney, shot Hawkins
¶236was not essential to establish Appellant’s guilt as a party to
¶237Hawkins’s murder. See Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 72-73 (2)
¶238(891 SE2d 884) (2023) (noting that the jury could have found the
¶239 14 defendant guilty of murder as a party to the crime “even if [the
¶240defendant] was merely the driver and did not personally shoot either
¶241victim”). In any event, the record belies Appellant’s argument that
¶242no trial evidence corroborated Mahoney’s testimony that Appellant
¶243was the shooter. Specifically, when asked, Offord agreed that
¶244Mahoney was armed with an “automatic” pistol that ejected shell
¶245casings when fired, Carter testified that Appellant was armed with
¶246a “revolver,” and a crime scene investigator with firearms training
¶247testified that a difference between “automatic” pistols and
¶248“revolver[s]” was that only the former type of firearm would
¶249automatically eject shell casings when fired. Because no shell
¶250casings were found at the scene, where Hawkins suffered multiple
¶251gunshot wounds, the jury would have been authorized to find that
¶252the person carrying the revolver (Appellant), rather than the person
¶253carrying an “automatic” pistol (Mahoney), shot Hawkins. And that
¶254evidence therefore corroborated Mahoney’s testimony that
¶255Appellant was the shooter.
¶256 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient
¶257 15 under Georgia’s accomplice-corroboration statute to support
¶258Appellant’s conviction for felony murder.
¶259 3. Appellant argues that, during an exchange with Carter, the
¶260trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1), which prohibits a judge
¶261presiding over a criminal case from “express[ing] or intimat[ing] to
¶262the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has
¶263not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.” We disagree.
¶264 By way of background, following the robbery incident, a
¶265detective presented Carter with a photo lineup that included
¶266Appellant’s photo, and Carter identified Appellant’s photo, noting
¶267that Appellant’s nickname was “Jaw Jacker.” At trial, Carter was
¶268unclear about what role statements from people in his community,
¶269as opposed to his own memory, played in his identification of
¶270Appellant and Appellant’s nickname during the photo lineup. Carter
¶271testified that Appellant’s name did not come up immediately in his
¶272interview with the detectives because “it wasn’t clear to [him] until
¶273after,” and Appellant’s “face didn’t too much hit [him] until [he]
¶274started realizing who [Appellant] was and people [in the community]
¶275 16 went to talking,” after which he knew “[t]hat’s who that was.”
¶276Seeking clarification about Carter’s testimony, the court asked,
¶277“Now, did you have the benefit of th[ese] people in the community
¶278talking before . . . or after . . . you went downtown and spoke with
¶279officers?” Carter responded that “the people went to talk
¶280afterwards.” The court then asked, “I guess the question is[,] did
¶281whatever you heard in the community . . . play any role in your
¶282determination of the person?” And Carter responded, “Yes, ma’am.”
¶283 Shortly after this exchange, the court said to counsel, “I was
¶284just trying to get an understanding. It seemed unclear as to what he
¶285was saying. And I wanted to make sure that it was clear. That I
¶286understood it.” But a discussion between the court and defense
¶287counsel about what Carter was “stating” led defense counsel to
¶288conclude that matters were still “very unclear,” so the court directed
¶289further questions to Carter. And as specifically relevant on appeal,
¶290the following exchange occurred:
¶291 The Court: But now, this is key now. I want to make sure that this is the truth. That when did – when this incident happened with you and when you went downtown to
¶292 17 speak with law enforcement, I heard you say that – or you testified that there was some talk in the community about this incident. Mr. Carter: Yes, ma’am. The Court: My question is[,] did the talk in the community play a role in your identification of the people [sic] [i]n this photograph? Mr. Carter: I still can’t get this down. The Court: You don’t understand what I’m asking? Mr. Carter: Yes, ma’am. The Court: All right. So what I’m trying to say, did you rely on what the people said in the community to make the identification, or did you rely on your own senses to make the identification? Mr. Carter: I relied on the people in the community. ... The Court: You only made the identity of the person in the photograph based on what people in the community said? Mr. Carter: Right. That’s what brought my memory of who this guy – who he was. The Court: I guess I[ ] confused you. Are you saying a name versus who you saw on that evening? Well, let me just ask it like this, because I want to make sure. And it’s not my job to do that, but I was confused. . . .
¶293(Emphasis supplied.) At this point, defense counsel objected that the
¶294question had been “asked and answered,” and the court responded:
¶295 Well, I want to make sure that it’s clear. . . . I interposed a question, because I was confused about what he said. And if I was confused, I presupposed that the jury was likewise confused. And so I asked questions only for purposes of clarity.
¶296 18 The court did not ask any further questions of Carter, and on
¶297redirect examination, Carter testified that he had identified
¶298Appellant in the photo lineup based on his memory. But he also
¶299expressed that he was “kind of confused” about when he heard talk
¶300in the community in relation to when he identified Appellant in the
¶301photo lineup. And he gave conflicting testimony about whether he
¶302knew Appellant’s nickname, “Jaw Jacker,” when he made the photo
¶303identification.
¶304 Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court violated OCGA
¶305§ 17-8-57 (a) (1) by telling Carter that “I want to make sure that this
¶306is the truth.” According to Appellant, this statement improperly
¶307expressed an opinion that a fact at issue in the case had been proved,
¶308namely, that community discussions did not play a role in Carter’s
¶309identification of Appellant. And as a result, Appellant argues, the
¶310comment also implied that Appellant was guilty.
¶311 Because Appellant did not object at trial that the court’s
¶312statement violated OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1), we review this claim
¶313“only for plain error.” Thompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146, 155-156 (11)
¶314 19 (816 SE2d 646) (2018). See also OCGA § 17-8-57 (b) (providing that
¶315an unpreserved argument that a statement violated OCGA § 17-8-
¶31657 (a) (1) is reviewed for plain error on appeal). To establish plain
¶317error under OCGA § 17-8-57, an appellant
¶318 must point to a legal error that was not affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious beyond reasonable dispute, affected his substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
¶319Tedder v. State, 320 Ga. 29, 38 (3) (a) (907 SE2d 623) (2024) (citation
¶320and punctuation omitted).
¶321 Here, Appellant has not shown any error, much less plain
¶322error. Carter’s testimony was confusing, and the judge’s statement
¶323that she “want[ed] to make sure that this is the truth” expressed
¶324only a desire to clarify what Carter was trying to convey to the jury.
¶325Further, the judge’s line of questioning focused narrowly on trying
¶326to clarify a specific aspect of what Carter was saying — whether he
¶327was saying he identified Appellant in the photo lineup and gave the
¶328detective Appellant’s nickname based on his personal recollection of
¶329the incident or based on comments made by people in Carter’s
¶330 20 community. See Sturkey v. State, 319 Ga. 156, 158-159 (2) (902 SE2d
¶331607 (2024) (“Beyond the narrow prohibition contained in OCGA
¶332§ 17-8-57 (a), it is well settled that a trial judge has discretion to
¶333propound questions to a witness to develop the truth of the case or
¶334to clarify testimony,” and “[t]he extent of such examination likewise
¶335is a matter of the judge’s discretion.” (citation and punctuation
¶336omitted)). The judge did not “indicate, either impliedly or expressly,”
¶337that Carter was telling the truth, that the judge had an opinion
¶338about which of Carter’s seemingly inconsistent statements were the
¶339truth, or that “the judge viewed [Carter’s testimony] as conclusive
¶340evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt.” Id. at 159 (2) (holding that a judge’s
¶341statements and questions “focused narrowly” on obtaining clarity
¶342about a witness’s methodology did not express an opinion about the
¶343evidence or the defendant’s guilt). Accordingly, this claim fails.
¶344 4. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
¶345permitting the State to ask Appellant questions about his criminal
¶346history during cross-examination. We conclude, however, that any
¶347error was harmless.
¶348 21 At trial, Appellant volunteered on direct examination that he,
¶349Offord, and Mahoney were gang members, that, as the enforcer of
¶350the gang, Appellant beat up other gang members for violations of
¶351gang protocol, and that he had beat up Offord and Mahoney for
¶352gang-protocol violations two days prior to Hawkins’s shooting. On
¶353cross-examination, Appellant testified that he had authority to
¶354discipline gang members in the Albany area, but that he was not
¶355always in Albany and sometimes went to Atlanta. When asked about
¶356what he did in Atlanta, Appellant explained that he went to Atlanta
¶357to “be with [his] family” because, while he “was incarcerated [for] 10
¶358months,” his family had “relocated from Albany to Atlanta.” The
¶359prosecutor then asked why Appellant had been incarcerated for ten
¶360months, and Appellant said that he had “[m]isdemeanor charges.”
¶361 Later in cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Appellant for
¶362his explanation for why Carter had identified him, and Appellant
¶363responded that the community knew him due to a viral video of him
¶364fighting. The prosecutor followed up by asking if Appellant’s
¶365“argument” was that Carter had identified him because Carter had
¶366 22 seen Appellant on social media. In response, Appellant said that he
¶367had “been locked up a lot of times for misdemeanors” and “locked up
¶368[for] a couple of felonies” and that “interrogation . . . can be hell.”
¶369Following this response, defense counsel lodged an unspecified
¶370objection to the prosecutor’s question, which the court sustained.3
¶371 Following the court’s ruling, the prosecutor asked the court for
¶372permission to ask Appellant “about his misdemeanors and felonies,
¶373because he’s opened the door to that” with “his non-responsive
¶374answer.” Defense counsel objected on relevancy grounds, but the
¶375court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then asked which prior
¶376misdemeanors and felonies Appellant had, and Appellant responded
¶377that he could not recall the misdemeanors, that he had “caught”
¶378charges in 2010 for “burglary,” “aggravated assault,” and
¶379“hijacking,” and that only the aggravated assault was “on [his]
¶380record]” because the other charges were “dropped.” Appellant
¶381claimed that the State kept “put[ting]” charges on him when he was
¶382 3 In its preliminary instructions, the court instructed the jury that, if it
¶383sustained an objection to evidence, the jury should disregard that evidence. 23 in jail. The prosecutor then inquired about what weapon the State
¶384charged him with using in connection with the aggravated assault,
¶385and Appellant responded that he was not charged with using a
¶386weapon, and that he pled guilty to the charge because it was pending
¶387for seven years, “hinder[ing] [him] from getting jobs,” and he wanted
¶388to resolve the case. When asked if the “hijacking” charge involved
¶389guns and stealing cars, and Appellant confirmed that “[t]hat’s what
¶390the detective said.” Following this testimony, the prosecutor asked
¶391if Appellant’s “testimony today [was] that [he] ha[d] been plagued
¶392by people lying about [him] and [that was what was] happening in
¶393this case as well,” and Appellant responded, “Yes.”
¶394 Assuming without deciding that this claim of error is preserved
¶395for ordinary appellate review, any evidentiary error in permitting
¶396the State to ask questions of Appellant about his criminal history
¶397was harmless. See Smith v. State, 313 Ga. 584, 587-588 (872 SE2d
¶398262) (2022) (noting that, where an alleged evidentiary error was
¶399harmless under the standard for reviewing preserved non-
¶400constitutional errors, which “is more favorable” to an appellant than
¶401 24 the test for assessing prejudice under the plain-error standard, we
¶402need not determine whether challenges to each piece of testimony
¶403were preserved “before assessing the aggregate harm of the
¶404testimony that we have assumed to be inadmissible”). “A
¶405nonconstitutional error is harmless if the State shows that it is
¶406highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict, an
¶407inquiry that involves consideration of the other evidence heard by
¶408the jury.” Id. at 587 (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶409 Here, throughout his testimony, Appellant described himself
¶410as a person with a violent character who committed violent acts.
¶411Specifically, he said that he was a gang member and “a fighter,” who
¶412trained to fight, “like[d] to fight,” beat up fellow gang members in
¶413his role as the gang’s “enforcer,” earned a nickname based in part on
¶414the fact that he “fight[s] very well,” and had a reputation in the
¶415community based on a video recording of one of his fights that went
¶416“viral.” And Appellant further volunteered information about his
¶417criminal history without being prompted to do so, testifying that he
¶418had previously been “incarcerated [for] 10 months” for
¶419 25 “[m]isdemeanor charges.” Appellant argues that his answers to the
¶420prosecutor’s questions about his criminal history — which informed
¶421the jury that he had previously been charged with several crimes
¶422but had only been convicted of aggravated assault — reflected badly
¶423on his general character. But given Appellant’s repeated
¶424descriptions of himself as a violent person, it is highly probable that
¶425this additional information about Appellant’s criminal history did
¶426not contribute to the verdict. Cf. Hancock v. State, 277 Ga. 835, 839
¶427(5) (596 SE2d 127) (2004) (holding that testimony from the State’s
¶428expert witness about “prior incidents of violence reportedly
¶429committed by [the] appellant” was harmless “in light of the
¶430extensive testimony by defense experts discussing [the] appellant’s
¶431past violent acts”).
¶432 5. On appeal, Appellant contends that his trial counsel was
¶433constitutionally ineffective in multiple respects. To prevail on an
¶434ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show
¶435deficient performance and prejudice. See Monroe v. State, 315 Ga.
¶436767, 781 (6) (884 SE2d 906) (2023) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
¶437 26 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).
¶438Establishing deficient performance requires a defendant to
¶439“demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively
¶440unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light
¶441of prevailing professional norms.” Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 865
¶442(11) (907 SE2d 281) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶443“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was
¶444within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.
¶445(citation and punctuation omitted). “Overcoming that presumption
¶446requires an appellant to show that no reasonable lawyer would have
¶447done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer
¶448did not.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish
¶449prejudice, “a defendant must show that there is a reasonable
¶450probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial
¶451would have been different.” Zayas v. State, 319 Ga. 402, 409 (3) (902
¶452SE2d 583) (2024) (citation and punctuation omitted). If the
¶453defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or
¶454prejudice, this Court need not examine the other requirement. See
¶455 27 Pierce, 319 Ga. at 865 (11).
¶456 (a) Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
¶457failing to interview and obtain trial testimony from Ramona Hodge,
¶458who testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that she was in the
¶459general vicinity of the shooting, that she saw two men running, and
¶460that, although she was unable to provide a good description of the
¶461men “because it was dark” and she “could only see their silhouette,”
¶462one of the men had “medium length hair” that “seemed like it had
¶463dreads.” According to Appellant, this testimony was important
¶464because it was undisputed at trial that Appellant did not have
¶465dreadlocks.
¶466 This claim fails because Appellant has not shown deficient
¶467performance. At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Hodge testified
¶468that she had moved to another state in 2018 (two years before
¶469Appellant’s trial), and that she had not provided updated contact
¶470information to the police when she did so. Trial counsel testified
¶471that, before trial, he attempted to track down Hodge, visiting two
¶472residences associated with Hodge and using Lexis Nexis, People
¶473 28 Finder, and “another program,” but that he was unable to find her.
¶474And Appellant’s mother corroborated trial counsel’s testimony,
¶475testifying that Appellant’s trial counsel told her before trial that he
¶476had visited two addresses looking for Hodge, but that he was unable
¶477to get in contact with her. Because trial counsel made reasonable
¶478efforts to locate Hodge but was unable to do so, counsel was not
¶479deficient. See Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 397, 400 (2) (d) (603 SE2d 228)
¶480(2004) (“Trial counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to track
¶481down a witness whose whereabouts are unknown.” (citation and
¶482punctuation omitted)).
¶483 (b) Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
¶484failing to raise a hearsay objection when Detective Jameel Gulley,
¶485who investigated the crimes, testified about what Senior and Carter
¶486had told him, and when Senior testified about statements made by
¶487Offord. We conclude, however, that trial counsel’s failure to object
¶488was not deficient performance.
¶489 During Detective Gulley’s trial testimony, the prosecutor asked
¶490him what Senior had told him, and Detective Gulley responded,
¶491 29 “Well, he basically just said his son had something to do with it.”
¶492Later, the prosecutor asked Detective Gulley whether Carter gave
¶493the detective “any details about [the robbery] incident.” The
¶494detective responded that Carter said “James Hawkins[ ] had been
¶495telling people to look out” because there were “two guys out [t]here
¶496posted up with masks over their face,” and that Carter did not “think
¶497that was strange . . . [b]ecause all kind[s] of people [were] out [t]here
¶498doing whatever.” Detective Gulley then recounted Carter’s story
¶499about being approached by two men, asked for a cigarette, and
¶500running away when one of the men pulled a gun out. Further, when
¶501Senior was on the stand, the prosecutor asked him what he had
¶502talked to an officer about, and Senior responded, “So I told him, my
¶503son say that he brought them guys back over here, you know,
¶504without me knowing.” Trial counsel did not object on hearsay
¶505grounds to any of this testimony.
¶506 Here, Appellant has not shown that trial counsel was deficient
¶507for failing to raise hearsay objections to the above testimony because
¶508the hearsay testimony “was cumulative of earlier unchallenged
¶509 30 testimony.” Pierce, 319 Ga. at 867 (11) (b). Specifically, when
¶510Detective Gulley testified that Senior told him Offord had something
¶511to do with the shooting, Offord had already testified about his own
¶512involvement in the shooting. The relevant aspects of Detective
¶513Gulley’s description of Carter’s police statement simply recounted
¶514details from Carter’s prior testimony about how the robbery
¶515unfolded. And Senior testified that Offord told him Offord had
¶516brought the guys back to the motel only after both Offord and
¶517Mahoney had taken the stand and testified that Offord had driven
¶518Appellant and Mahoney back to the motel on the night of the
¶519shooting. Accordingly, this claim fails.
¶520 (c) Although Appellant contends that trial counsel was
¶521deficient for failing to request an alibi instruction, we disagree that
¶522counsel’s performance was deficient. As noted above Appellant
¶523testified at trial that, on the night of the shooting, he was in another
¶524neighborhood that he frequented, where he “smok[ed] weed” and
¶525“kick[ed] it” with some “guys” and “might” have also gone to the
¶526house of “[a] girl name[d] Tree” for part or all of the night. At the
¶527 31 motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel did not provide a
¶528strategic reason for why he failed to request an alibi instruction after
¶529Appellant, who had initially chosen not to testify, changed his mind,
¶530took the stand, and testified about a woman named “Tree.” But trial
¶531counsel testified that, when preparing for trial, he had considered
¶532presenting an alibi defense and decided against doing so because he
¶533had “no . . . identifying information other than a nickname,”
¶534 While Appellant’s trial testimony provided slight evidence
¶535supporting an alibi charge, failure to pursue an alibi defense was
¶536not “objectively unreasonable” trial strategy. Pierce, 319 Ga. at 865
¶537(11) (citation and punctuation omitted). Appellant’s testimony —
¶538that, when the crimes occurred, he was in another neighborhood
¶539where he spent time with some unidentified men and “might” have
¶540also spent time with a woman identified only by a nickname — was
¶541self-serving, vague, and equivocal. There was no evidence
¶542substantiating his testimony. And as outlined above, the State
¶543introduced substantial evidence detailing Appellant’s participation
¶544in the crimes. As a result — and as trial counsel correctly predicted
¶545 32 when preparing for trial — it would have been difficult for trial
¶546counsel to credibly argue to the jury that Appellant could not have
¶547committed the crimes because he was with someone else in another
¶548neighborhood when the crimes occurred. Because an alibi defense
¶549would have been weak, we cannot say that “no reasonable lawyer”
¶550would have forgone an alibi defense. Id. (citation and punctuation
¶551omitted). See Moore, 278 Ga. at 400 (2) (c) (holding that “failure to
¶552request a jury charge on alibi” was not deficient performance where
¶553“the only evidence of alibi was a statement attributed to [the
¶554defendant]” that trial counsel did not view as “sufficient to support
¶555an alibi defense”); Harris v. State, 280 Ga. 372, 375 (3) (627 SE2d
¶556562) (2006) (no deficient performance in failing to present an alibi
¶557defense where counsel did not believe there was credible alibi
¶558evidence). Accordingly, this claim fails.
¶559 (d) Appellant argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing
¶560to object when, in response to Appellant’s testimony about possibly
¶561being with a girl named “Tree” at the time of the shooting, the
¶562prosecutor asked Appellant if “Tree [was] in the courtroom” and
¶563 33 “[w]here is she at?” According to Appellant, these questions were
¶564objectionable because they impermissibly shifted the burden to
¶565Appellant to produce evidence to disprove his guilt.
¶566 Assuming without deciding that trial counsel’s failure to object
¶567to these questions constituted deficient performance, we conclude
¶568that Appellant has not shown prejudice. At worst, the prosecutor’s
¶569questions shifted the burden to Appellant to prove a defense of alibi
¶570that, as discussed above, had no reasonable chance of success and
¶571was not pursued by defense counsel at trial. And the trial court
¶572mitigated any potential harm from the prosecutor’s questions by
¶573properly instructing the jury on the burden of proof. See Davis v.
¶574State, 294 Ga. 486, 488 (3) (b) (754 SE2d 67) (2014) (“Qualified jurors
¶575under oath are presumed to follow the instructions of the trial
¶576court.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Further, the trial
¶577evidence — which included not only detailed testimony about
¶578Appellant’s participation in the crimes from two coconspirators, but
¶579also testimony from several eyewitnesses to the crimes, surveillance
¶580footage, and damaging testimony from Appellant himself — strongly
¶581 34 supported the jury’s guilty verdicts. Accordingly, Appellant has not
¶582shown “a reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s failure to
¶583object to the prosecutor’s two questions about the purported alibi’s
¶584whereabouts, “the result of the trial would have been different.”
¶585Zayas, 319 Ga. at 409 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶586 (e) Appellant argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing
¶587to object when the medical examiner, who was not a ballistics expert,
¶588testified about the size of bullets recovered from Hawkins’s body. We
¶589disagree.
¶590 At trial, the medical examiner testified that she recovered
¶591three “deformed” bullets from Hawkins’s body, two of which were
¶592“jacketed” and the third of which was “just a core.” When asked how
¶593she would describe the bullets, the medical examiner responded that
¶594she was “not a ballistic[s] expert,” but that she categorized bullets
¶595as “small, medium, [or] large” in size. She further testified that the
¶596jacketed bullets were “medium caliber projectiles . . . , which could
¶597range from .32 to .38, 9 mil, somewhere in that range,” and that the
¶598core she recovered “was consistent with being the same as the
¶599 35 [other] ones . . . , but [she] couldn’t say 100 percent.” In addition, the
¶600medical examiner testified about the trajectory of the bullets, saying
¶601that they traveled “slightly back to front,” “coming in . . . more
¶602towards the back and . . . ending up more towards the front.” And
¶603she testified about the distance from which Hawkins was shot,
¶604saying that, based on the absence of “soot,” “searing,” and
¶605“stippling,” he was shot from at least two-and-a-half feet away.
¶606 Appellant has not shown deficient performance on this basis.
¶607Although the medical examiner said that she was not a ballistics
¶608expert, she demonstrated that she had experience dealing with
¶609certain ballistics issues, including range of fire, bullet trajectories
¶610through the body, and rough classifications of bullet size. And she
¶611was careful not to exceed the bounds of her expertise, saying only
¶612that the bullets appeared to fall within the medium size range
¶613without specifically identifying the calibers of the bullets she
¶614recovered. Thus, a reasonable attorney could have concluded that
¶615the medical examiner’s careful and limited testimony about the size
¶616of the bullets fell within the scope of her expertise, and therefore
¶617 36 that an objection to her testimony would not have succeeded. See
¶618Johnson v. State, 296 Ga. 504, 506 (2) (769 SE2d 87) (2015) (medical
¶619examiner’s opinion testimony about “why the autopsy did not reveal
¶620any bullet fragments in the wound” did not go beyond her expertise
¶621because she “demonstrated that she was experienced in dealing with
¶622certain ballistics issues related to, among other things, range of fire,
¶623soot, stippling, and the trajectory of a bullet through a body”). And
¶624as a result, Appellant has not shown that “no reasonable lawyer”
¶625would have forgone an objection to the medical examiner’s
¶626testimony. See Pierce, 319 Ga. at 865 (11) (citation and punctuation
¶627omitted).
¶628 (f) Appellant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
¶629failing to object to certain statements made by the prosecutor during
¶630closing arguments, which Appellant argues shifted the burden of
¶631proof, mischaracterized the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
¶632standard, and improperly advised the jury about which witnesses
¶633the prosecutor found credible. As explained below, these claims fail.
¶634 i. As relevant to Appellant’s contention that the
¶635 37 prosecutor shifted the burden of proof and mischaracterized the
¶636burden of proof, the prosecutor began his closing argument by
¶637explaining that the State had “the burden of proof,” whereas a
¶638defendant “doesn’t have a burden” and does not “have to prove
¶639anything.” The prosecutor continued:
¶640 Now, that’s important, because essentially, that means that the [d]efense can say whatever they want to, because they don’t have to prove anything. They can throw anything they want at you, make any kind of bogus assertions and things like that, and they don’t actually have to prove that, which is kind of nice. And, you know, I’m kind of jealous sometimes that they don’t have to prove what they say. But, you know, that’s the way the system works.
¶641(Emphasis supplied.) The prosecutor then stated that “what the
¶642[d]efense argues and what they give you in the closing argument
¶643isn’t actually evidence, . . . it’s just argument,” so the jurors had to
¶644“listen to the evidence” and apply their “common sense.” And the
¶645prosecutor further told the jury,
¶646 [W]hen we tell you . . . that we have to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt, what that really means is do you believe it or not; right? Because if you have reasonable doubt, you don’t believe it. Does that make sense? . . . Reasonable doubt is your common sense saying, I believe this
¶647 38 happened. . . . [A]nd you don’t want to look for doubt. If you’re sitting there saying, “Well, I think he did it, but I don’t think they proved it enough[,]” . . . that’s looking for doubt. Because if you think someone did something, you don’t have reasonable doubt. If you have reasonable doubt, you don’t think somebody did something. It’s that simple.
¶648(Emphasis supplied.)
¶649 Then, in rebuttal closing, the prosecutor addressed the burden
¶650of proof again, saying:
¶651 Now, the Judge is going to tell you what reasonable doubt is. . . . Again, it’s a doubt for which you can give a real reason based on evidence or lack of evidence. It’s the doubt of an honest impartial juror seeking the truth. It is a doubt which should be based on common sense and a reason.
¶652 At the conclusion of the case, the trial court instructed the jury
¶653on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, reasonable
¶654doubt, and grave suspicion. The court also charged the jury that it
¶655was the court’s duty to determine the law, that the jury was bound
¶656by the court’s instructions, and that attorney arguments were not
¶657evidence.
¶658 On appeal, Appellant contends that trial counsel was deficient
¶659for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statement that the “[d]efense
¶660 39 can say whatever they want to, because they don’t have to prove
¶661anything.” According to Appellant, this comment shifted the burden
¶662to Appellant to prove his innocence. We conclude, however, that the
¶663comment did no such thing, as the prosecutor specifically told the
¶664jury that the defendants “don’t have to prove anything,” not that the
¶665defendant had to prove his innocence. Moreover, reading the
¶666comment in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was saying that
¶667Appellant did not have to prove his innocence because the prosecutor
¶668made comments shortly before and after this comment that
¶669emphasized the same point. Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury
¶670that the State had “the burden of proof,” that the defendant “doesn’t
¶671have a burden,” that the defendant does not “have to prove
¶672anything,” and that, although the burden being on the State
¶673disadvantaged the State, that was just “the way the system works.”
¶674“[T]rial counsel’s failure to make a meritless objection” was not
¶675deficient performance. Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 640 (2) (b) (837
¶676SE2d 808) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶677 Appellant also argues that trial counsel should have objected
¶678 40 when the prosecution mischaracterized the burden of proof,
¶679equating proof beyond a reasonable doubt with a “belief” that
¶680Appellant committed the crimes. We agree that the State improperly
¶681equated proof beyond a reasonable doubt with mere belief in this one
¶682instance by stating that the standard was whether jurors
¶683“believe[d]” or “th[ought] someone did something.” See, e.g., Ward v.
¶684State, 271 Ga. 62, 64 (2) (515 SE2d 392) (1999) (the trial court
¶685improperly lowered the standard of proof by stating that proof
¶686beyond a reasonable doubt was equivalent to an “honest belief” in
¶687the defendant’s guilt). But even assuming that trial counsel
¶688provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to object to
¶689the State brief mischaracterization of the proof-beyond-a-
¶690reasonable-doubt standard, we conclude that Appellant has not
¶691shown prejudice. Although the prosecutor’s remark misstated the
¶692law, the prosecutor later gave a correct description of reasonable
¶693doubt that mirrored the pattern jury charge. And the court also
¶694charged the jury on the burden of proof, the court’s duty to instruct
¶695the jury on the law, the jury’s duty to follow the court’s instructions,
¶696 41 and the fact that closing arguments were not evidence. Moreover, as
¶697discussed above, the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong. See,
¶698e.g., Jackson v. State, 319 Ga. 51, 54-55 (2) (901 SE2d 552) (2024)
¶699(no prejudice from the prosecutor’s statement that the jurors could
¶700find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if they
¶701“believed” the defendant was guilty in their “hearts” and “minds”
¶702because there was “significant proof” of the defendant’s guilt, the
¶703prosecutor “accurately explained” the burden of proof elsewhere in
¶704closing arguments, and the trial court later corrected the
¶705prosecutor’s mischaracterization by properly instructing the jury on
¶706the burden of proof and clarifying that the jury was bound by the
¶707court’s instructions on the law and that closing arguments were not
¶708evidence (punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, Appellant has not
¶709shown “a reasonable probability” that, but for trial counsel’s failure
¶710to object to the prosecutor’s brief-but-erroneous description of the
¶711law on reasonable doubt, “the result of the trial would have been
¶712different.” Zayas, 319 Ga. at 409 (3) (citation and punctuation
¶713omitted).
¶714 42 ii. Appellant argues that trial counsel should have
¶715objected when, according to Appellant, the prosecutor told the jury
¶716during closing arguments that he believed several witnesses were
¶717telling the truth. As relevant here, the prosecutor made several
¶718comments in closing arguments about which witnesses were
¶719credible, saying:
¶720 Carter’s testimony was credible. You can believe him. Because . . . [h]e has no reason to lie [about Appellant]. He has nothing to gain from this. . . . And you see the video . . . corroborate [his testimony]. ... [Offord] wasn’t there, but he testified – oh, he was the best – he was one of the most credible ones; wasn’t he? . . . There’s no “ums[,”] there’s no thinking about it, nothing like that. He responds instantly. Looks us in the eye. He was telling the truth. ... “Offord, I think, was one of the most credible people – they’re all [referring to Offord and Mahoney] credible, I think, because they have nothing to lose. They’re not going home or anything. They came in here in jumpsuits and shackles and said, “After this, I’m going back to prison.” They’re not going to walk out after this . . . because of what they said. They testified that they were told to tell the truth. They weren’t told what to say. They were told to tell the truth and they did. ... [I]f you have two possible solutions, one being there’s a conspiracy [between several witnesses] . . . to frame
¶721 43 [Appellant] . . . [o]r they’re all telling the truth that he shot James Hawkins[,] . . . [w]hich one makes more sense?
¶722(Emphasis supplied.)
¶723 Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to most of
¶724the prosecutor’s remarks about witnesses’ credibility because they
¶725were not comments about the prosecutor’s personal beliefs but
¶726rather arguments about “reasonable inferences” the jury could draw
¶727about “the credibility of witnesses” “from the evidence,” including
¶728from the witnesses’ demeanor while testifying. Jackson v. State, 301
¶729Ga. 774, 775-776 (3) (804 SE2d 73) (2017) (citation and punctuation
¶730omitted); Mason v. State, 274 Ga. 79, 79-80 (2) (b) & n.2 (548 SE2d
¶731298) (2001) (holding that the prosecutor’s statement about a
¶732witness’s credibility in closing argument — “[h]e’s telling you the
¶733truth[,] [h]e’s telling you the honest truth” — was “the conclusion
¶734the prosecutor wished the jury to draw from the evidence, and not a
¶735statement of the prosecutor’s personal belief as to the veracity of a
¶736witness”). See also Stephens v. State, 307 Ga. 731, 736-737 (2) (838
¶737SE2d 275) (2020) (holding that counsel was not deficient for failing
¶738 44 to object to a prosecutor’s comments about witnesses’ credibility
¶739because the “comments were based on inferences from the evidence,”
¶740and were not expressions of her “personal beliefs”). Cf. Cook v. State,
¶741255 Ga. 565, 575 (12) (b) (340 SE2d 843) (1986) (holding that a
¶742prosecutor may argue in closing argument that “the jury [should]
¶743draw [particular] inferences from its observation of the demeanor of
¶744the witnesses,” and that doing so does not “ask[ ] the jury to consider
¶745facts not in evidence”).
¶746 We conclude, however, that trial counsel had reasonable
¶747grounds for objecting to one of the prosecutor’s comments about
¶748witness credibility, namely, the prosecutor’s comment that “I think”
¶749Mahoney and Offord were credible witnesses. See Bell v. State, 294
¶750Ga. 443, 445 (2) (754 SE2d 327) (2014) (“It is well-settled that a
¶751prosecutor may not express to [the] jury his or her personal belief
¶752about the veracity of a witness.”). But even assuming trial counsel’s
¶753failure to object to that comment was objectively unreasonable and
¶754therefore constituted deficient performance, Appellant has not
¶755shown prejudice. Not only was the evidence against Appellant
¶756 45 strong, as noted above, but the court also mitigated any potential
¶757prejudice from the prosecutor’s brief remark by properly instructing
¶758the jury after closing arguments that credibility issues were for the
¶759jury to decide and that attorney arguments were not evidence. See
¶760id. at 445-446 (2) (no prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to object
¶761to a prosecutor’s question that had the effect of “vouching” for a
¶762witness’s credibility because there was “substantial evidence” of the
¶763defendant’s guilt, and the court properly instructed the jury “that
¶764the credibility of the witnesses was for them to determine . . . , and
¶765that the evidence in the case does not include the opening
¶766statements or closing arguments by the attorneys or the questions
¶767asked by the attorneys”). See also Lane v. State, 312 Ga. 619, 624-
¶768625 (2) (b) (864 SE2d 34) (2021) (no prejudice from trial counsel’s
¶769failure to object when the prosecutor improperly bolstered a
¶770witness’s credibility in closing argument because “the State
¶771present[ed] substantial evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt, [and] the
¶772trial court also instructed the jury that closing arguments were not
¶773evidence”).
¶774 46 (g) Appellant argues that “at no point in time did defense
¶775counsel move for a directed verdict on” the count charging Appellant
¶776with conspiracy to commit armed robbery. And he argues that trial
¶777counsel was ineffective for failing to argue, in support of a motion
¶778for a directed verdict on the conspiracy count, that there was no trial
¶779evidence showing that any of the alleged coconspirators shot
¶780Hawkins with the intent to rob him.
¶781 By way of background, Count 1 of the indictment charged
¶782Appellant, Mahoney, and Offord with conspiracy to commit armed
¶783robbery and alleged that they committed several “overt acts to effect
¶784the object of the conspiracy.” These alleged overt acts included
¶785Appellant, Mahoney, and Offord meeting at the motel to plan an
¶786armed robbery, Offord giving Mahoney a gun, Offord providing
¶787transportation to Appellant and Mahoney, Appellant and Mahoney
¶788thereafter traveling on foot to the motel, Appellant and Mahoney
¶789“assault[ing] and shoot[ing] James Hawkins[ ] with the intent to rob
¶790him,” and Appellant, Mahoney, and Offord fleeing the scene in
¶791Offord’s vehicle.
¶792 47 Here, Appellant has failed to show deficient performance.
¶793Contrary to Appellant’s argument, trial counsel did move for a
¶794directed verdict on Count 1, and he made several arguments in
¶795support of that motion. And even assuming that the scope of trial
¶796counsel’s motion for a directed verdict on Count 1 did not encompass
¶797the specific argument that there was insufficient evidence showing
¶798that Appellant and Mahoney shot Hawkins with the intent to rob
¶799him, failure to raise such an argument was not ineffective
¶800assistance. This is because, to prove the conspiracy charge, the State
¶801needed to show only that Appellant conspired with at least one other
¶802person to commit an armed robbery and that at least one member of
¶803the conspiracy engaged in an overt act to effect the object of the
¶804conspiracy. See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 731 (2) (883 SE2d 802)
¶805(2023) (citing OCGA § 16-4-8). And the evidence described above was
¶806more than sufficient to show both that Appellant planned with
¶807Mahoney and Offord to commit an armed robbery at the motel, and
¶808that they engaged in several overt acts, including obtaining guns
¶809and traveling to the motel. Thus, a motion for a directed verdict on
¶810 48 this ground would have been meritless. See Williams v. State, 315
¶811Ga. 797, 806 (2) (884 SE2d 877) (2023) (holding that failure to file a
¶812“meritless” motion for a directed verdict was not deficient
¶813performance).
¶814 6. Finally, Appellant argues that he suffered cumulative
¶815prejudice from the enumerated trial-court errors and instances of
¶816ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
¶817 “[W]e must consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of
¶818trial court errors, along with the prejudice caused by any deficient
¶819performance of counsel.” Blocker v. State, 316 Ga. 568, 583 (5) (889
¶820SE2d 824) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Establishing
¶821cumulative error requires a defendant to show that
¶822 (1) at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial; and (2) considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the defendant a fundamentally fair trial.
¶823Beard v. State, 317 Ga. 842, 852 (5) (896 SE2d 497) (2023) (citation
¶824and punctuation omitted).
¶825 Here, we assumed one trial-court error (the trial court’s abuse
¶826 49 of discretion in allowing the State to cross-examine Appellant about
¶827his criminal history) and three instances of deficient performance
¶828(trial counsel’s failure to object when the prosecutor asked Appellant
¶829about the whereabouts of his purported alibi, when the prosecutor
¶830equated proof beyond a reasonable doubt with mere belief in closing
¶831argument, and when the prosecutor said in closing argument that
¶832he thought two witnesses were credible). “[A]ssuming without
¶833deciding that [these types of] error c[an] be aggregated for
¶834cumulative-error review,” we conclude that these errors were
¶835harmless, even when considered together. Jackson v. State, 317 Ga.
¶83695, 107 (4) (891 SE2d 866) (2023). As explained above, Appellant’s
¶837cross-examination about his criminal history had little, if any,
¶838prejudicial effect when considered in the context of his testimony as
¶839a whole. The prosecutor’s questions about Appellant’s purported
¶840alibi were relevant only to a weak alibi defense that defense counsel
¶841did not even pursue at trial. And the trial court’s jury instructions
¶842mitigated any potential prejudice that might have otherwise
¶843resulted from the prosecutor’s improper closing remarks about the
¶844 50 burden of proof and witnesses’ credibility. Given that the assumed
¶845trial-court error and assumed instances of deficient performance
¶846resulted in, at most, minor prejudice to Appellant, and given that
¶847the trial evidence strongly supported the jury’s guilty verdicts,
¶848Appellant has not established cumulative prejudice warranting a
¶849new trial.
¶850 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶851 51