Brooks v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1990
Citation profile
32 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently December 2010 · most notably Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC (2009), 121 Md. App. 263 - Simpson v. State (1998)
32 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Roviaro v. United States · McCray v. State of Illinois · United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal · Lewis v. United States · Costello v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“We noted that “[t]he cases universally recognize the exception to the nondisclosure privilege where the informer was a participant, accessory or witness to the crime.” Gulick v. State, 252 Md. 348, 354 [ 249 A.2d 702 ] (1969). Judge Orth, in Nutter v. State, 8 Md.App. 635 [ 262 A.2d 80 ] (1970), clarified the disclosure requirement in regard to an informer who witnesses the unlawful transaction: “ ‘[Witness’ as used in Gulick means a material witness, in the sense that his testimony is important to a fair determination of the cause. It is then that his identity becomes necessary and relevant to a fair defense. Thus in this context ‘material’ may be said to have a meaning more restrictive than its usual meaning. So, although an eyewitness to a crime is clearly a ‘material’ witness as that word is ordinarily used, if he is an informer, simply observing an illegal transaction but not participating in it, the fact that he observes the transaction does not necessarily make his possible testimony so important as to compel disclosure of his identity in the face of the rationale of the nondisclosure privilege.” (Emphasis in original). The decision to compel disclosure of an informer is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Gulick, 252 Md. at 354 [ 249 A.2d 702 ].”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[a defendant] must do more than merely speculate that disclosure will prove helpful____ “[W]hile a defendant who has not had an opportunity to interview a witness may face a difficult task in making a showing of materiality, the task is not an impossible one.” Nevertheless, the burden is on the defendant to assert a substantial reason indicating that the identity of the informer is material to his defense or the fair determination of the case.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.