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320 Or. App. 778

Edwards and Edwards

Court of Appeals of Oregon

Decided July 13, 2022

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Court of Appeals of Oregon · decided 2022-07-13

Applies OR 107 § 107.102 · OR 107 § 107.137

Affirmed · Decided 2022-07-13

                                778

  This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
   pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
        except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
              Submitted on May 6, affirmed July 13, 2022


              In the Matter of the Marriage of
                    Julie E. EDWARDS,
                   nka Julie E. Allaway,
                    Petitioner-Appellant,
                             and
                  Jeremy Lee EDWARDS,
                  Respondent-Respondent.
                 Lane County Circuit Court
                    20DR17479; A176599


  Kamala H. Shugar, Judge.
  George W. Kelly filed the brief for appellant.
  Jeremy Edwards filed the brief pro se.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 
320 Or App 778
 (2022)                              779

           ORTEGA, P. J.
         Mother appeals a judgment granting legal custody
and primary physical custody of her three children to father,
asserting four assignments of error. In her third and fourth
assignments of error, mother argues that the trial court
abused its discretion as to various aspects of its custody and
parenting time decisions. Having reviewed the record, we
conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion and,
accordingly, do not further address those assignments. In
her first and second assignments of error, mother asserts
legal errors by the trial court, which were not preserved
below. We write to briefly address those assignments of
error and affirm the trial court’s ruling.
          A detailed presentation of the facts would not benefit the bench, the bar, or the public. We view the facts in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition, upholding its factual findings if there is any evidence in the record
to support them and accepting reasonable inferences and
reasonable credibility choices that the trial court could have
made. Botofan-Miller and Miller, 
365 Or 504, 505-06
, 
446 P3d 1280
 (2019), cert den, 
141 S Ct 134
 (2020). If the trial
court failed to articulate its factual findings on a particular
issue, we assume that it decided the facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusions, as long as there is evidence in the record, and inferences that reasonably may be
drawn from that evidence, that would support its conclusion.
Id. at 506.1
         We begin with the pertinent procedural history.
Following their divorce in 2017, the parties originally shared
custody of their three minor children. Mother moved for a
modification of the judgment of dissolution and sought “sole
legal and physical custody” of the children and a modification
of father’s parenting time. After mediation was unsuccessful, each parent sought sole legal custody; ultimately father
withdrew his request for legal custody,2 but he expressed

    1
      We note that mother’s brief presents the facts in a manner that was apparently rejected by the trial court and is inconsistent with our standard of review.
    2
      When asked why he withdrew his request for sole legal custody, father indicated that he thought that he would lose and that he did not have the resources
to continue to pursue legal custody.
780                                   Edwards and Edwards

concerns at trial about the children’s safety around mother’s
new husband and told the court that he wanted the children
to reside with him.
         During the course of the hearing, the trial court
indicated that it had safety concerns about mother’s husband (who has a history of serious violence), that mother
was not addressing those concerns to the court’s satisfaction, that the court was not inclined to grant sole custody to
mother, and that, given mother’s insistence on sole custody,
it did not consider joint custody to be an option. Throughout
the trial, mother maintained her position that she was seeking sole legal custody of the children and never expressed a
willingness to continue joint custody. Ultimately, based on
the safety concerns, the court awarded sole legal custody to
father and limited parenting time to mother.
         Mother first argues that the trial court violated
ORCP 67 C by awarding legal custody to father after “he
had withdrawn his request for custody.” ORCP 67 C provides that “[a] judgment for relief different in kind from or
exceeding the amount prayed for in the pleadings may not
be rendered unless reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard are given to any party against whom the judgment is
to be entered.” (Emphasis added.) Mother argues that, when
father withdrew his request for custody, “it had the same
effect as if he had never plead[ed] it at all,” and suggests
that she had no notice that an award of custody to father
was at issue. In all events, mother never argued below that
the court was foreclosed from awarding custody to father
under ORCP 67 C.
         “Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court
will not be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 
331 Or 335, 341
, 
15 P3d 22
 (2000). To adequately preserve an issue, “a
party must provide the trial court with an explanation of
his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that
the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity
to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately,
if correction is warranted.” 
Id. at 343
. Mother failed to raise
below the legal argument she raises now, and she does not
request plain error review. Additionally, mother’s lack-ofnotice argument is belied by the record, which indicates that
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 
320 Or App 778
 (2022)             781

the trial court gave her ample notice, that it was not inclined
to grant her sole custody, and that it did not consider joint
custody an option given mother’s position. The court’s
approach is supported by case law. See Stevens and Stevens,
234 Or App 692, 696
, 
229 P3d 625, 627
 (2010) (“Where, as
here, either party is unwilling to continue a joint custody
arrangement, a change of circumstances has occurred as
a matter of law, and we determine the custody issue based
on the children’s best interests, considering the factors set
out in ORS 107.137.”). Accordingly, we reject mother’s first
assignment of error.
          Mother’s second assignment likewise was not raised
below. She asserts that, in veering from the parenting plans
that each of the parties submitted, the trial court violated
“the spirit, if not the letter, of ORS 107.102,” which provides,
in part, that the court will develop a parenting plan “when
 [s]o requested by either parent” or when “the parent
or parents are unable to develop a parenting plan.” Mother
takes the view that, consistent with the statute, the court
could not award “father parenting time substantially more
than either party requested and  mother parenting time
substantially less than either party requested.” As mother
did not argue below that the statute foreclosed the custody
and parenting time awards that the court suggested, and
does not request plain error review, we do not consider the
merits of her second assignment.
        Affirmed.

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