Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad’s Empirical Analysis
320 U.S. 508 · 1944
Citation profile
55 federal appellate · 32 district · 54 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 203 later decisions (10 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2024 · most notably Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen (1944), Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Commercial Metals Co. (1982)
55 federal appellate · 32 district · 54 state decisions — followed in 16 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Georgia Florida Alabama Railway Company v. Blish Milling Company · Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co. · Chesapeake Ry Co v. Martin · Louisville Co v. Central Iron & Coal Co · Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 203 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Section 7 of the conditions of the uniform bill of lading provides that the owner or consignee shall pay the freight and all other lawful charges upon the transported property, and except in those instances where it may be lawfully authorized to do so, that no railroad carrier shall deliver or relinquish, at destination, possession of the property covered by the bill of lading until all tariff rates and charges have been paid. Cf. § 3(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 3 (2), 49 U.S.C.A. § 3 (2). But it further provides that ‘The consignor shall be liable for the freight and all other lawful charges, except that if the consignor stipulates, by signature, in the space provided for that purpose on the face of this bill of lading that the carrier shall not make delivery without requiring payment of such charges and the carrier, contrary to such stipulation, shall make delivery without requiring such payment, the consignor (except as hereinafter provided) shall not be liable for such charges. * * * Nothing herein shall limit the right of the carrier to require at time of shipment the prepayment or guarantee of the charges. * * * ’ “Under these provisions, if the nonrecourse clause is not signed by the consignor, he remains liable to the carrier for all lawful charges. The carrier is free to demand payment in advance by the consignor, or it may decline to make delivery to the consignee until the freight charges are paid or guaranteed, or if delivery is mad”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“As the shipment was interstate, the bill of lading was issued pursuant to the Federal Act, the question whether the contract thus set forth had been discharged was necessarily a Federal question. The construction of the clauses of the bill of lading, adopted by the Commission and prescribed by Congress for interstate shipments presents a federal question. Such has been the consistent ruling of this Court ... Since the clauses of Uniform Bill of Lading govern the rights of the parties to an interstate shipment and are prescribed by Congress and the Commission in exercise of commerce power, thy have the force of federal law and question as to their meaning arise under the laws and Constitution of the United States.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“It is familiar experience, as in this case, that undercharges may occur which could not be subject to prepayment either because they are not lawful charges on the shipment as tendered and billed, or because they depend upon events occurring after the transportation has been completed. In either case we conclude that the reasonable construction of the prepayment clause is that, with respect to these charges, it did not, either by its design or by the intention of the parties, curtail the operation of the non-recourse clause, so as to deprive petitioner, the consignor, of the immunity from liability for which it was entitled to stipulate by the non-recourse clause.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.