Hill v. Hawes’s Empirical Analysis
320 U.S. 520 · 1944
Citation profile
156 federal appellate · 9 district · 74 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 329 later decisions (8 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2021 · most notably Federal Trade Commission v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (1952), United States v. Ohio Power Co. (1957)
156 federal appellate · 9 district · 74 state decisions — followed in 14 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
reviewedHill v. Hawes (from District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals)
Relationships
Relies on Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. · Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp. · Heike v. United States · Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 329 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““It is true that Rule 77(d) does not purport to attach any consequence to the failure of the clerk to give the prescribed notice; but we can think of no reason for requiring the notice if counsel in the cause are not entitled to rely upon the requirement that it be given.” 13”
9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““To say that a district court can rightly extend the prescribed time for taking an appeal by the reentry, pro forma, of a final judgment after the time to appeal from it has expired, is to disregard considerations of certainty and stability which have hitherto been considered of first importance in the appellate practice of the federal courts. It is to sanction the regulation of the time for appeal by courts, contrary to the appeal statute, and without support in law or any rule of court. * * * It is in the public interest, and it is the very purpose of limiting the period for appeal, to set a definite and ascertainable point of time when litigation shall be at an end unless within that time application for appeal has been made; and if it has not, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of the appellant’s demands. [Citing case]. "That purpose is defeated if judges may enlarge the time for appeal beyond the period prescribed by law, whether by an order purporting directly to extend it or by reentry, without change, of a judgment which has already become final. It is for that reason that this Court has consistently ruled that no federal judge or court possesses the power to extend the time for appeal beyond the statutory period by any form of judicial action which falls short of a reconsideration of the provisions of the judgment in point of substance so as to postpone its finality.” 320 U.S. at 524-5 , 64 S.Ct. at 336 , quoted at 73 Ariz. 36 , 236 P.2d 1018 .”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent““Immediately upon the entry of an order made on a written motion subsequent to arraignment the clerk shall mail to each party affected thereby a notice thereof and shall make a note in the docket of the mailing.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.