State v. Devon D.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The standards for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion pertaining to joinder are discussed at length in our [Supreme Court's] decisions in State v. LaFleur , 307 Conn. 115 , 159, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012), and State v. Payne , 303 Conn. 538 , 544-50, 34 A.3d 370 (2012). In those cases, [our Supreme Court] rejected the notion of a blanket presumption in favor of joinder ... and clarified that, when charges are brought in separate informations, and the state seeks to join those informations for trial, the state bears the burden of proving that the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced by joinder pursuant to Practice Book § 41-19. The state may satisfy this burden by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that the evidence in the cases is cross admissible or that the defendant will not be unfairly prejudiced pursuant to the factors set forth in State v. Boscarino, [supra, 204 Conn. at 722 -24 , 529 A.2d 1260 ]. 4 ... Although the state bears the burden of proof in the trial court, [i]t is the defendant's burden on appeal to show that joinder was improper by proving substantial prejudice that could not be cured by the trial court's instructions to the jury .... As [our Supreme Court] emphasized in LaFleur , our appellate standard of review remains intact. Accordingly, [i]n deciding whether to [join informations] for trial, the trial court enjoys broad discretion, which, in the absence of manifest abuse, an appellate court may not disturb.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 Conn. App. 608 - State v. Snowden · 184 Conn. App. 187 - State v. McKethan

2. “We previously have held that the process of balancing probative value and prejudicial effect is critical to the determination of whether other crime[s] evidence is admissible.... At the same time, however, we ... do not ... requir[e] a trial court to use some talismanic phraseology in order to satisfy this balancing process. Rather ... in order for this test to be satisfied, a reviewing court must be able to infer from the entire record that the trial court considered the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative nature before making a ruling.... In conducting this balancing test, the question before the trial court is not whether [the evidence] is damaging to the defendant but whether [the evidence] will improperly arouse the emotions of the jur[ors].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 180 Conn. App. 250 - State v. Angel M.

3. “In Boscarino , [our Supreme Court] identified the factors that a trial court should consider in determining whether separate trials might be necessary to avoid undue prejudice resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for trial. These factors include: (1) whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or concerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant's part; and (3) the duration and complexity of the trial.... If any or all of these factors are present, a reviewing court must decide whether the trial court's jury instructions cured any prejudice that might have occurred.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 171 Conn. App. 608 - State v. Snowden