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321 F.3d 790

Docket No. 01-50148.

United States v. Pearson

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 12, 2002.

Filed Dec. 16, 2002.

Amended Feb. 26, 2003.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 2002-12-16

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently August 2012

4 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Relies on Moskal v. United States · United States v. Pearson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2002-12-16

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¶1James H. Locklin, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendant-appellant.

¶2Ronald L. Chen, Assistant United States Attorney, Nancy B. Spiegel, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.

¶3Before NOONAN, WARDLAW and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

¶4*791ORDER

¶5The opinion filed on December 16, 2002 [312 F.3d 1287], is amended as follows:

¶6At 312 F.3d at 1289, before “AFFIRMED”, insert the following paragraph:

Pearson urges us to apply the rule of lenity. Lenity cannot be invoked merely because a different reading of the statute is possible. The rule of lenity may apply only when a statute remains ambiguous after resort to canons of statutory construction. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990). The statute must be read in the light of the principle preventing a criminal profiting from his crime. The principle is not ambiguous, and the principle is controlling. Consequently, the statute is unambiguous, leaving leniency without a place.

¶7With this amendment, the petition for rehearing is DENIED. Judge Berzon would grant the petition for rehearing.

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