¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: March 4, 2025
¶4 S24A1101. RYALS v. THE STATE.
¶5 BOGGS, Chief Justice.
¶6 Appellant Charvez Ryals appeals from his convictions for
¶7malice murder and other crimes in connection with the beating and
¶8fatal shooting of Daniel Wise.1 Appellant contends that trial counsel
¶9 1 The crimes occurred on March 10, 2018. On June 7, 2018, a DeKalb
¶10County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder; two counts of felony murder (based on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); two counts of aggravated assault against Wise, one for assaulting him with a deadly weapon and one for striking him with a handgun; one count of aggravated assault against Robbie Johnson; one count of aggravated assault against Ka.W.; one count of aggravated assault against Ke.W.; two counts of cruelty to children in the second degree; four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At a trial from October 24 to October 31, 2019, a jury found Appellant guilty on all counts of the indictment. On November 4, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for malice murder, to 20 concurrent years in prison for the count of aggravated assault against Wise predicated on striking him with a handgun, to concurrent terms of 20 years in prison for the aggravated assaults of Johnson, Ka.W., and Ke.W., to concurrent terms of ten years in prison for both counts of cruelty to children, and to consecutive terms of five years in prison for each of the five firearm offenses. The felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law, and the provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to
¶11subpoena a witness, by failing to investigate and procure phone
¶12records, by failing to introduce the criminal history of Wise and
¶13Robbie Johnson, who was a victim who testified at trial, and by
¶14failing to request a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter. For the
¶15reasons set forth below, we conclude that these claims of ineffective
¶16assistance fail. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶17 At the time of the crimes, which occurred shortly before noon
¶18on March 10, 2018, Regina Welch and Appellant lived in an
¶19apartment on Chupp Road in DeKalb County. They had been dating
¶20about a year and a half and had one child together. Before her
¶21relationship with Appellant, Regina had dated Wise for 13 years.
¶22They had three children together, Ka.W., Ke.W., and D.W. The three
¶23siblings primarily lived with Wise or his mother, and Wise would
¶24trial court merged one of the aggravated assaults of Wise for purposes of sentencing. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel on February 2, 2022. On March 18, 2024, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 drive them to Regina’s apartment for weekend visits, as Regina did
¶25not have a car. Regina described her relationship with Wise as a
¶26“violent” one. In addition to her testimony of Wise’s violence toward
¶27her on the night of the crimes, she testified that, during an earlier
¶28incident at which Appellant was present, Wise had first “smushed
¶29[her] face” and then “grazed [her] face.” Regina added that Wise had
¶30also previously threatened to “shoot [her] house up.” Regina added
¶31that Appellant was aware of the “prior violence.” 2
¶32 On the night before the murder, Regina and Appellant were at
¶33home, while Ka.W. and Ke.W. stayed at the home of Regina’s
¶34mother, Pamela Benton. Wise came by Regina’s home about 3:00
¶35a.m., and Regina and Appellant went outside to ask Wise what he
¶36was doing there. Wise said that he was there because Regina owed
¶37him some money based on tax credits related to their three children.
¶38In response, Regina said that she did not owe Wise any money, and
¶39the confrontation escalated, which led to Wise “punch[ing]” Regina
¶40 2 The trial court limited evidence about Wise’s violence toward Regina to
¶41the time frame in which Regina and Appellant were dating. 3 in the face. Appellant then told Wise not to “put [his] hands” on
¶42Regina, and Appellant and Wise began fighting each other.
¶43Neighbors heard the fight and came outside and broke it up. Wise,
¶44however, refused to leave for about an hour, and after he did, he
¶45called Appellant about 5:00 a.m. that same morning, and Regina
¶46recorded the call.
¶47 Later that morning, Regina drove to a nearby Chevron gas
¶48station where she met her mother, Benton, who was bringing Ka.W.
¶49and Ke.W. back to Regina’s home. From the gas station, Regina,
¶50with Benton following, drove to see Appellant, who was visiting
¶51someone at an apartment complex that was across Chupp Road from
¶52Appellant’s apartment. Regina spoke with Appellant, who told her
¶53that Wise was parked in front of her apartment. According to
¶54Regina, Appellant was angry because Wise “had been threatening
¶55him all morning,” starting with the phone call at 5:00 a.m.
¶56 Regina told Appellant to stay at the neighboring apartment
¶57complex, and she, her mother, and her children, drove to her
¶58apartment, where Wise and his co-worker, Robbie Johnson, were
¶59 4 waiting. Once Regina parked, Wise approached her car and was
¶60“cussing and stuff.” Regina told Wise to leave, but he did not do so
¶61and put both of the children in the back seat of his car. According to
¶62Regina, Wise was “talking all this smack” and said that he was there
¶63“to see that . . . dude of yours dead.” Wise went to talk to Regina’s
¶64mother; Regina got out of her car and began talking to Johnson, who
¶65was sitting in the front passenger seat of Wise’s Suburban and had
¶66a gun in his lap.
¶67 At this point, Appellant arrived on the scene using a path from
¶68the neighboring apartment complex. Regina saw him walk “around
¶69the front of [her] mom’s car.” Appellant, who was holding a black
¶70gun, told Wise that he had told Wise “to stay . . . away from [his]
¶71family.” Wise “lifted up his shirt and showed his gun,” and Appellant
¶72“hit [Wise] with [his] gun” “in the side of the head.” Wise then tried
¶73“to go for [Appellant’s] gun again” and Appellant hit him again.
¶74According to Regina, Wise kept coming at Appellant, and Appellant
¶75stepped back and shot Wise, firing “more than five” shots. Although
¶76Regina testified that Wise “pull[ed] his shirt up,” she added that he
¶77 5 never had his gun in his hands; it was in the waist of his pants.
¶78Johnson then tried to get out of Wise’s Suburban and “shoot at
¶79[Appellant],” but Appellant saw him and shot him in the back. After
¶80the shooting stopped, Appellant went through the path toward the
¶81neighboring apartment complex. Regina reiterated that Wise did not
¶82pull a gun on anyone that morning and did not hit her.
¶83 Several other witnesses also testified about the shooting.
¶84Contrary to Regina’s testimony, Johnson testified that neither he
¶85nor Wise had a gun during the incident. He added that, when
¶86Regina and Benton arrived with the children, Regina began arguing
¶87with Wise, who was calm, about a disagreement that had occurred
¶88the night before between Regina, Appellant, and Wise. Shortly after
¶89the children got out of Regina’s car and sat in the backseat of Wise’s
¶90Suburban, 3 Appellant arrived at the scene and said to Wise, “Didn’t
¶91I tell you not to come back over here.” Appellant, who had a black
¶92handgun, hit Wise with the gun. Appellant and Wise “tussel[ed]
¶93 3 D.W. had spent the night at a friend’s house and was not present at the
¶94time of the crimes. 6 with the gun in the air.” According to Johnson, Appellant, who was
¶95taller than Wise, was shooting down at Wise and fired “a lot” of
¶96shots. At one point, Wise fell to the ground, and Appellant turned
¶97his attention to Johnson, who had stayed in the passenger seat of
¶98Wise’s Suburban. Appellant asked Johnson if he was with Wise and
¶99fired “about three” shots toward the Suburban, which was occupied
¶100by Ka.W. and Ke.W. in addition to Johnson. Johnson was struck in
¶101the back by one of the shots. Johnson looked toward Appellant and
¶102saw him run through the path toward the neighboring apartment
¶103complex. Johnson and the children got out of the Suburban. Despite
¶104being shot during the altercation, Wise was able to get back in his
¶105Suburban and attempt to drive away from the scene. Wise did not
¶106make it far, however, crashing into a street sign a short distance
¶107from where he was shot. Johnson went to check on Wise and saw
¶108that he was bleeding from his chest and head. Johnson added that
¶109Wise did not have a gun during the altercation and did not ever
¶110“raise his arms” like he was getting ready to fire a gun. Johnson
¶111testified that he fled the scene because he had an outstanding
¶112 7 warrant against him, although he could not remember what it was
¶113for. Wise died from his injuries.
¶114 According to Benton, when Appellant arrived at the scene,
¶115Wise and Appellant “exchanged words” and Appellant pulled out a
¶116black gun. Appellant walked toward Wise, hit him with the gun, and
¶117“then . . . shot,” firing “six to eight shots.” Benton got out of her truck
¶118and yelled “there [are] children over here, stop shooting.” Benton
¶119saw Appellant and another man run through “a cut to an apartment”
¶120complex. Benton never saw Wise with a gun.
¶121 Two other witnesses who were in the area saw the shooting
¶122from farther away. One saw the shooting from the back patio of her
¶123apartment, from where she could see the driveway of Regina and
¶124Appellant’s apartment. She heard a gunshot and “looked over” to the
¶125driveway. She added that there “was like about six gunshots” and
¶126that she saw Wise get shot by a man carrying a black gun. She added
¶127that she did not see Wise with a gun. The second witness saw a man
¶128walking fast toward Appellant’s apartment. He was carrying a black
¶129 8 gun and “just went over there and just unloaded, shooting.” From
¶130his position, the witness could not see who was shot.
¶131 Appellant testified in his own defense at trial. He testified that
¶132he had seen Wise pull a gun on Regina before the crimes at issue in
¶133this case. The first time was in September 2017. He explained, that,
¶134during that incident, Regina and Wise had been arguing and that
¶135Wise drove his SUV to Regina and Appellant’s apartment, got out,
¶136pulled “a gun out of his back pocket,” walked up to Regina, and
¶137started “cussing her out,” while “poking her in the face.” Appellant
¶138added that there were “other incidents [of] arguing and fussing
¶139going on.”
¶140 According to Appellant, on the night of March 9 to 10, 2018, he
¶141and Regina were “relax[ing]” about 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. when they saw
¶142Wise park his Suburban near their apartment. Wise began “creeping
¶143around” Appellant and Regina’s car, and Regina screamed, “get
¶144away from my car” and ran out the door. Appellant went outside,
¶145and Wise was “cussing [Regina] out” and was arguing with Regina
¶146“about stupid stuff.” Appellant asked Wise why he was “creeping
¶147 9 around [Appellant’s] house this time of night.” Wise told Appellant
¶148that “this ain’t got nothing to do with you” and that he did not give
¶149an “F about [Appellant’s] house.” Wise, who was intoxicated, kept
¶150“going on” and was talking about how he wanted $3,000. Appellant
¶151testified that “there was a lot of arguing”; that Wise kept “putting
¶152his hand in [Regina’s] face”; and that he eventually “punched her”
¶153and “pushed her head back.” Wise kept demanding money and told
¶154Appellant that he was “going to kill [Appellant]” and that “the police
¶155[would] never find [him].” Wise eventually left but called Appellant
¶156later that night. Regina recorded that call, and it was played for the
¶157jury. During that call, Wise “kept going on” about what had just
¶158happened and how he wanted more money from Regina. Appellant
¶159told Wise that he did not want any trouble, but Wise said that “he
¶160was going to pull up and put one in [Appellant’s] face.” Appellant
¶161testified that Wise called him again about 9:00 a.m. on March 10,
¶162saying he wanted his money and “[d]on’t make me have to pull up
¶163on y’all.” Appellant told Wise to stop calling him, that he did not owe
¶164Wise any money and did not have $3,000.
¶165 10 Later that morning, when Appellant arrived at his apartment
¶166to find Wise there, arguing with Regina, Appellant asked Wise to
¶167leave, and the two men started “getting up on each other.” Wise then
¶168lifted his shirt and “grabbed the handle of his gun.” Appellant, at the
¶169same time, pulled his gun out of his back pocket. The two men were
¶170“in each other’s face,” and Appellant “backed away” and hit Wise in
¶171the head “with the side of [his] weapon.” Appellant knocked Wise
¶172down, but Wise “stared and looked at [him]”; “got back up”; and came
¶173at Appellant. Appellant then “fired in the ground” but Wise “never
¶174stopped, he kept coming at [Appellant].” According to Appellant, as
¶175Wise was coming towards him, he had his gun “in his hand coming
¶176in a forward motion.” Appellant fired two shots into the ground and
¶177then “blanked” and kept firing. Appellant added that he “had no
¶178intention of hurting [Wise], but just trying to prevent him from
¶179hurting me. I was going low, and I was leaning back. And as he kept
¶180coming, you know, it kept going.”
¶181 1. Appellant contends that trial counsel provided
¶182constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena
¶183 11 Regina’s father, Reginald Welch, as a witness; by failing to procure
¶184text messages from Appellant’s cell phone; by failing to introduce
¶185evidence of Wise’s and Johnson’s criminal histories; and by failing
¶186to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. We
¶187conclude that these claims of ineffective assistance fail.
¶188 To establish that his trial counsel was constitutionally
¶189ineffective, Appellant must prove both deficient performance by his
¶190counsel and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
¶191U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To establish
¶192deficient performance, Appellant must show that his attorney’s acts
¶193or omissions were “objectively unreasonable . . . considering all the
¶194circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”
¶195Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (787 SE2d 221) (2016). The law
¶196recognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel performed
¶197reasonably, and the defendant bears the burden of overcoming this
¶198presumption. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To carry this burden,
¶199Appellant must show that “no reasonable lawyer would have done
¶200what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did
¶201 12 not.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (873 SE2d 132) (2022)
¶202(cleaned up). To establish the required prejudice, Appellant must
¶203show that but for his attorney’s deficient performance, there is a
¶204reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
¶205been different. See Davis, 299 Ga. at 183. “A reasonable probability
¶206is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
¶207Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “This burden, though not impossible to
¶208carry, is a heavy one.” Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 283 (736 SE2d 412)
¶209(2013).
¶210 (a) Appellant first claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing
¶211to subpoena Regina’s father, Reginald Welch, as a witness.
¶212Appellant contends that Reginald would have testified at trial, as he
¶213did at the motion for new trial hearing, that on the morning of the
¶214crimes, Wise called him several times and threatened to harm
¶215Appellant and Regina.
¶216 We conclude, however, that, under the circumstances, counsel
¶217reasonably believed that Reginald would testify without a subpoena.
¶218As for not subpoenaing Reginald, trial counsel testified at the motion
¶219 13 for new trial hearing as follows: “He was a friendly witness. He was
¶220my client’s girlfriend’s father. He had always been cooperative with
¶221us. He had always said he would come. We asked him if he needed a
¶222subpoena to get off work. He said he did not, so we did not serve
¶223him.” Moreover, the evidence at the motion for new trial hearing
¶224shows that Reginald voluntarily came to court to testify but left the
¶225courthouse without informing anyone because he had hurt his foot
¶226and was in pain. Here, Reginald was a “friendly,” “cooperative”
¶227witness who assured trial counsel that he would voluntarily come to
¶228testify. Although a subpoena would have guaranteed that Reginald
¶229would have stayed in the courtroom, counsel could reasonably have
¶230decided that the chance of his not showing up was not worth the risk
¶231of antagonizing him by putting him under a court order. That
¶232decision was not so unreasonable that no competent attorney would
¶233have made it. See Jernigan v. State, 357 Ga. App. 415, 431 (848 SE2d
¶234707) (2020) (holding that trial counsel’s decision not to subpoena a
¶235witness “was reasonable because [the witness] willingly agreed to
¶236testify on [the defendant’s] behalf without one and counsel had no
¶237 14 reason to believe otherwise”); Carruth v. Comm’r Alabama Dept. of
¶238Corr., 93 F4th 1338, 1361 (11th Cir. 2024) (ruling that counsel did
¶239not perform deficiently in failing to subpoena witnesses who were
¶240part of the defendant’s family because “there was nothing to indicate
¶241to counsel that subpoenas were needed because they had voluntarily
¶242agreed to attend”). 4
¶243 (b) Appellant contends that trial counsel was constitutionally
¶244ineffective in failing to obtain his cell phone so that text messages
¶245on it from Wise to Appellant on the morning of the crimes could have
¶246been introduced into evidence. 5 We conclude, however, that
¶247Appellant has failed to establish prejudice on this claim.
¶248 At one of the hearings on his motion for new trial, Appellant
¶249testified that, between the 3:00 a.m. altercation and time of the
¶250 4 Appellant does not contend on appeal that trial counsel was deficient
¶251in failing to obtain Reginald’s testimony once he left the courthouse.
¶252 5 Appellant’s contention regarding counsel’s investigation into his cell
¶253phone is confusing. Because Appellant never offered any evidence that the phone calls from Wise to him about which he testified on motion for new trial were recorded on his phone and does not contend on appeal that recordings of those calls exist, we construe his argument to be that counsel was deficient in failing to introduce evidence of the content of text messages from his phone. 15 crimes, Wise sent him threatening text messages. He specified that,
¶254in one of those messages, sent at 11:52 a.m., Wise texted him that
¶255he was “gonna smoke [Appellant]” and “kill [him].” Appellant also
¶256testified that he informed trial counsel of these messages, that his
¶257phone was inside his house, that he told counsel that his phone was
¶258in his house, and that he “kept explaining to her to get [his] phone,
¶259but she never did get [it].”
¶260 At another motion for new trial hearing, appellate counsel
¶261asked trial counsel whether the phone records of Appellant would
¶262have contained any relevant “text messages” between Appellant and
¶263the victim. Trial counsel responded that it would have been
¶264necessary to have Appellant’s cell phone to access the text messages.
¶265Appellate counsel, however, never asked trial counsel whether she
¶266ever had access to Appellant’s phone or whether Appellant
¶267requested that she go to his home and attempt to locate his phone.
¶268 We assume without deciding that trial counsel was deficient
¶269and conclude that Appellant has failed to carry his burden to show
¶270prejudice. As noted above, to satisfy the prejudice prong, Appellant
¶271 16 must establish that but for his attorney’s deficient performance,
¶272there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
¶273would have been different. See Davis, 299 Ga. at 183. “This burden,
¶274though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one.” Ellis, 292 Ga. at 283.
¶275Additionally, when we are assessing “prejudice from counsel’s
¶276deficient performance, we review the record de novo, and we weigh
¶277the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have weighed
¶278the evidence.” Sharkey v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (910 SE2d 216, 223)
¶279(2024) (cleaned up).
¶280 As an initial matter, Appellant did not produce the cell phone
¶281or text messages at the motion for new trial hearings. The burden is
¶282on a defendant to show prejudice on his ineffective assistance claim,
¶283see Davis, 299 Ga. at 183; Ellis, 292 Ga. at 283, and when a
¶284defendant claims that trial counsel was deficient in failing to
¶285introduce evidence, part of his burden in demonstrating prejudice is
¶286to establish what that missing evidence would have shown. See
¶287Pauldo v. State, 317 Ga. 433, 437 (893 SE2d 633) (2023) (“It is well
¶288established that a defendant fails to establish prejudice under
¶289 17 Strickland when he merely contends that trial counsel was deficient
¶290for failing to present an expert, without also presenting evidence at
¶291the motion-for-new-trial hearing about what the potential expert
¶292would have testified to at trial.”); Thorpe v. State, 304 Ga. 266, 268
¶293(818 SE2d 547) (2018) (explaining that “it was [the defendant’s]
¶294burden to show deficient performance and prejudice through
¶295‘competent evidence’” on his ineffective assistance claim).
¶296 Moreover, even assuming that the text messages were just as
¶297Ryals claimed in his testimony, they were largely cumulative of
¶298other testimony. First, Regina, in particular, testified in detail about
¶299the confrontation the night before the murder and that, starting
¶300with the phone call to Appellant about 5:00 a.m. on March 10 and
¶301continuing through the morning, Wise “ha[d] been threatening”
¶302Appellant. The jury also heard the phone call that Wise made to
¶303Appellant at 5:00 a.m. that morning. In addition, Appellant testified
¶304that Wise had threatened to kill him both during the 3:00 a.m.
¶305altercation and during phone calls at 5:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. that
¶306morning. and one neighbor of Appellant’s testified that, about 3:00
¶307 18 a.m. on March 10, he heard Wise threaten Appellant and Regina.
¶308Consistent with the evidence of these threats to Appellant, Regina
¶309testified that Wise told her shortly before the shooting that Wise was
¶310there “to see that . . . dude of yours dead.”
¶311 Finally, to the extent that Appellant argues that the missing
¶312text messages showed even more explicitly that Wise had recently
¶313threatened to kill him, it is unlikely that that extra piece of
¶314information would have made a difference in the trial, given the
¶315testimony of several witnesses that Appellant was the primary
¶316aggressor in the fatal confrontation and the agreement among most
¶317witnesses that Wise was not armed. As recounted above, four
¶318eyewitnesses, Sarah Freeman, Richard Stephens, Robbie Johnson,
¶319and Pamela Benton (Regina’s mother) testified that they did not see
¶320Wise with a gun, significantly undermining Appellant’s testimony
¶321that Wise was carrying a handgun “in his hand coming in a forward
¶322motion” when Appellant shot him. Also contradicting Appellant’s
¶323claim regarding Wise’s use of a gun was that law enforcement
¶324officials did not find a firearm in front of Appellant’s apartment
¶325 19 where the shooting occurred or by Wise’s Suburban. And Regina
¶326testified that Wise did not have a firearm in his hands at the time of
¶327the shooting, contradicting Appellant’s testimony that Wise was
¶328approaching Appellant with his firearm “in his hand” just before
¶329Appellant shot him. In addition, Stephens described Appellant as
¶330walking fast toward Wise and “just unloading” his gun, and Johnson
¶331added that he heard Appellant say to Wise, “Didn’t I tell you not to
¶332come back over here” and that Appellant then hit Wise with his
¶333handgun and shot him multiple times. In this same vein, Benton
¶334described seeing Appellant pull out a black gun, walk toward Wise,
¶335hit him with the gun, and then fire “six to eight shots” into Wise.
¶336 Because Appellant failed to introduce the cell phone or text
¶337messages at the motion for new trial hearings, because the text
¶338messages would have been largely cumulative of other properly
¶339admitted evidence, and because the evidence against Appellant was
¶340strong, we conclude that Appellant has failed to carry his heavy
¶341burden of establishing that there is a reasonable probability that the
¶342result of the proceeding would have been different except for
¶343 20 counsel’s alleged deficiency. See Pauldo, 317 Ga. at 437 (holding that
¶344the defendant failed to show prejudice on his claim that counsel was
¶345ineffective in failing to introduce expert testimony because the
¶346defendant did not present evidence at the hearing on his motion for
¶347new trial regarding what that expert testimony would have been);
¶348Sharkey, ___ Ga. at ___ (910 SE2d at 223) (holding that appellant
¶349failed to establish prejudice on his claim that trial counsel was
¶350ineffective in failing to have certain evidence admitted, in part,
¶351based on the strength of the evidence against appellant); Walker v.
¶352State, 301 Ga. 482, 491 (801 SE2d 804) (2017) (holding that
¶353appellant failed to establish prejudice on his claim that trial counsel
¶354was ineffective in failing to subpoena his brother to testify about
¶355appellant’s fear of the victim in part because appellant and his
¶356father testified on this point); Ivey v. State, 305 Ga. 156, 162-163
¶357(824 SE2d 242) (2019) (concluding that defense counsel’s failure to
¶358present the victim’s toxicology report did not prejudice the
¶359defendant in part because the report “would have been cumulative
¶360of other evidence introduced at trial”).
¶361 21 (c) Appellant next contends that counsel was constitutionally
¶362ineffective by failing to introduce evidence of Wise’s and Johnson’s
¶363criminal histories. We conclude that this claim fails.
¶364 In his amended motion for new trial, Appellant alleged that
¶365Wise had a conviction for domestic violence battery arising from an
¶366assault on Regina and that Johnson had a “prior criminal history”
¶367and admitted that he left the scene of the crime because, at that
¶368time, there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Appellant
¶369alleged that trial counsel was deficient in failing to introduce records
¶370of Wise’s and Johnson’s criminal histories or to cross-examine
¶371Regina about Wise’s conviction and Johnson about his own. At a
¶372motion for new trial hearing, Appellant introduced into evidence a
¶373certified copy of Wise’s misdemeanor conviction for family violence
¶374battery against Regina. 6 Appellant did not introduce evidence of
¶375Johnson’s criminal history at the motion for new trial hearings and
¶376 6 The copy of that conviction is not part of the record on appeal. See
¶377Tedder v. State, 320 Ga. 29, 41 n.12 (907 SE2d 623) (2024) (explaining that “[a]s a general matter, the appellant bears the burden of ensuring that the appellate record is complete”). 22 did not question trial counsel about the warrant against Johnson
¶378that was outstanding at the time of the crimes.
¶379 (1) With regard to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was
¶380ineffective in failing to introduce Wise’s conviction for domestic
¶381violence battery or to cross-examine Regina about it, he has failed to
¶382show that this prior conviction would have been admissible at trial
¶383or that it would have been permissible to cross-examine Regina
¶384about Wise’s conviction. First, to the extent that Appellant is
¶385contending that Wise’s conviction shows that Wise had a violent
¶386character that was relevant to Appellant’s self-defense claim,
¶387Appellant could only prove this character trait “by reputation and
¶388opinion testimony,” and not by use of Wise’s prior conviction. See
¶389Ward v. State, 318 Ga. 884, 902 (901 SE2d 189) (2024) (cleaned up).
¶390 Moreover, although “we have held that specific instances of a
¶391victim’s past conduct may also be admitted, not to show the victim’s
¶392action in conformity therewith, but rather to establish the
¶393defendant’s state of mind and the reasonableness of the defendant’s
¶394use of force,” we have also held that “because such evidence is offered
¶395 23 as proof of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the charged
¶396crime, it is only admissible if there is proof that the defendant
¶397actually knew about the victim’s prior acts at that time.” Id. at 902
¶398(cleaned up). Accord Copeland v. State, 316 Ga. 452, 459 (888 SE2d
¶399517) (2023) (explaining that evidence of a victim’s prior conviction
¶400“would only have been admissible—and even then, only
¶401potentially—to show [the defendant’s] state of mind at the time of
¶402the shooting and the reasonableness of his use of force. And it could
¶403have been admissible for that purpose only upon a showing that [the
¶404defendant] actually knew about the past crimes at the time of the
¶405shooting”).
¶406 Here, Regina described prior violence committed by Wise
¶407against her and added that Appellant was aware of “the prior
¶408violence.” We need not decide whether her testimony was sufficient
¶409to satisfy the admissibility requirements for Wise’s prior conviction,
¶410because even assuming that it was, and even assuming that trial
¶411counsel was deficient in failing to use Wise’s conviction at trial,
¶412Appellant has failed to establish prejudice on this claim. To begin,
¶413 24 we know that Wise’s misdemeanor conviction was for domestic
¶414violence against Regina, but Regina and Appellant testified about
¶415domestic violence committed by Wise against Regina. Regina
¶416testified that on the night of March 9 to 10, Wise “punched [her] in
¶417[her] face,” and that, during earlier incidents, Wise had “smushed
¶418[her] face,” “grazed [her] face,” and threatened to “shoot [her] house
¶419up.” Appellant also testified that he previously had seen Wise “pull[
¶420] a gun out of his back pocket,” walk up to Regina, and start “cussing
¶421her out,” while “poking her in the face.” Because evidence of a
¶422misdemeanor domestic violence conviction would have been
¶423cumulative of other evidence of domestic violence introduced at trial
¶424and because, as explained in Division 1 (b) above, the evidence
¶425against Appellant was strong, we conclude that Appellant has failed
¶426to establish that but for counsel’s assumed deficiency, the result of
¶427the trial would have been different. See Sharkey, ___ Ga. at ___ (910
¶428SE2d at 223); Ivey, 305 Ga. at 162-163.
¶429 (2) As for the warrant that existed against Johnson at the time
¶430of the crimes, Appellant appears to argue that trial counsel was
¶431 25 ineffective in failing to cross-examine Johnson about any bias that
¶432Johnson might have had in testifying for the State arising from that
¶433warrant. However, Appellant failed to introduce any evidence at the
¶434hearings on the motion for new trial about the charges and
¶435circumstances that led to the issuance of the warrant against
¶436Johnson or any evidence regarding whether that warrant was still
¶437outstanding at the time of trial. Appellant therefore offers nothing
¶438more than speculation that cross-examination regarding the
¶439warrant would have shown Johnson’s bias in testifying. See Sauder
¶440v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 812 (901 SE2d 124) (2024) (holding that
¶441counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to cross-examine a
¶442witness about bias in testifying for the State where the evidence
¶443showed that the charge in question was no longer pending at the
¶444time of trial); Monroe v. State, 315 Ga. 767, 783 (884 SE2d 906)
¶445(2023) (rejecting claim that trial counsel was ineffective in not
¶446exploring a witness’s deal with the State where the defendant did
¶447not introduce evidence on motion for new trial to support his claim
¶448that deal existed, explaining that “mere speculation will not support
¶449 26 a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel”). See also Moore v. State,
¶450315 Ga. 263, 269 (882 SE2d 227) (2022) (explaining that “[t]he scope
¶451of an attorney’s cross-examination is grounded in trial tactics and
¶452strategy, and will rarely constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”
¶453(cleaned up)).
¶454 Similarly, Appellant also failed to show that Johnson had any
¶455prior convictions or that, if he did, they would have been admissible
¶456under OCGA § 24-6-609 for impeachment purposes. For these
¶457reasons, Appellant has failed to show that trial counsel performed
¶458deficiently in failing to introduce evidence regarding those alleged
¶459convictions. See Monroe, 315 Ga. at 783-784 (rejecting claim that
¶460counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach a witness with prior
¶461convictions where the defendant failed to put forward any evidence
¶462on motion for new trial that the witness had any prior convictions);
¶463Wofford v. State, 305 Ga. 694, 697 (827 SE2d 652) (2019) (holding
¶464that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to impeach witnesses
¶465with prior convictions where the defendant at the hearing on motion
¶466for new trial failed to offer evidence of any prior convictions as to one
¶467 27 witness and failed to show that certain prior convictions of another
¶468witness would have been admissible under OCGA § 24-6-609).
¶469 (d) Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective by
¶470failing to request a charge on voluntary manslaughter. We conclude
¶471that this claim has no merit.
¶472 At a motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that
¶473she was “certain” that she had discussed whether to request a
¶474voluntary manslaughter charge with Appellant and that it was “an
¶475intentional and strategic decision” not to request the charge because
¶476“[w]e were trying for not guilty.” On cross-examination, counsel
¶477reiterated that she did not request a charge on voluntary
¶478manslaughter “[b]ecause it would have given the jury the option to
¶479compromise and give [Appellant] a significant amount of time in a
¶480case where were we arguing for self-defense.” Appellant, on the
¶481other hand, testified at one of the hearings on the motion for new
¶482trial that trial counsel never discussed the possibility of requesting
¶483a voluntary manslaughter charge with him and that such a charge
¶484should have been one of his defenses. In denying Appellant’s motion
¶485 28 for new trial, the trial court found that trial counsel’s testimony was
¶486more credible than Appellant’s regarding whether counsel had
¶487discussed with Appellant the decision not to request a voluntary
¶488manslaughter charge. The court also concluded that counsel’s
¶489decision was a matter of trial strategy.
¶490 Here, the record shows that counsel and the defendant
¶491discussed the all-or-nothing strategy of pursuing only a claim of self-
¶492defense, with counsel testifying that “we were trying for a not
¶493guilty.” That strategy was reasonable under the circumstances of
¶494this case, as the claim of self-defense was supported by some
¶495evidence at trial. Appellant, for example, testified that, during the
¶496altercation that led to Wise’s death, Wise pulled his gun out of his
¶497back pocket, came at Appellant with his gun “in his hand coming in
¶498a forward motion,” and Appellant shot Wise “to prevent him from
¶499hurting me.” Counsel’s decision not to request a voluntary
¶500manslaughter charge, which would have undermined the all-or-
¶501nothing defense, was not patently unreasonable. See Rosenbaum v.
¶502State, 320 Ga. 5, 12 (907 SE2d 593) (2024) (holding that trial
¶503 29 “counsel’s choice to rely solely on the defense of accident, and not to
¶504request a jury charge on justification, was not so patently
¶505unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that
¶506choice”). Although Appellant contends that trial counsel failed to
¶507consult with him about whether to pursue a voluntary manslaughter
¶508charge, the trial court found that trial counsel did consult with
¶509Appellant about that matter, and that finding is not clearly
¶510erroneous. See Powell v. State, 309 Ga. 523, 526-527 (847 SE2d 338)
¶511(2020) (explaining that we “accept[ ] a trial court’s factual findings
¶512and credibility determinations on an ineffectiveness claim unless
¶513they are clearly erroneous”). For these reasons, Appellant’s claim of
¶514ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
¶515 2. Appellant contends that the cumulative effect of trial
¶516counsel’s four instances of allegedly deficient performance affected
¶517the outcome of the trial. See Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811
¶518n.1, (642 SE2d 56) (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v.
¶519Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 23 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). In Division 1, we
¶520assumed two instances of the deficient performance of counsel and
¶521 30 held that Appellant failed to establish that either assumed instance
¶522of deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Appellant also has
¶523not shown that these two assumed deficiencies, considered together,
¶524created a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding
¶525would have been different in their absence. Accordingly, his claim of
¶526cumulative prejudice fails. See Vendrel v. State, 318 Ga. 233, 244
¶527(897 SE2d 751) (2024).
¶528 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶529 31