¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: March 4, 2025
¶4 S24A1182. DILLARD v. THE STATE.
¶5 BOGGS, Chief Justice.
¶6 Appellant Savion Nathaniel Dillard challenges his 2021
¶7convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with
¶8the armed robbery of two 15-year-olds, Branden Gerena and Denzel
¶9Idris, during which Gerena was fatally shot. Appellant contends
¶10that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions.
¶11However, the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s
¶12convictions as a matter of both due process and Georgia statutory
¶13law, and we therefore affirm.1
¶14 1 The crimes occurred shortly after midnight on the morning of July 1,
¶152019. On October 23, 2019, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Appellant and Denzel Wilburn for malice murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Wilburn later pled guilty to a reduced charge and was subpoenaed to testify against 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
¶16evidence at trial showed as follows. On June 24, 2019, Appellant
¶17bought an extended magazine for a 9mm handgun. On June 30,
¶182019, Appellant, using the name “Murksumbilly,” contacted Gerena
¶19through a social media app, ostensibly to buy a half-ounce of
¶20marijuana. Appellant and Gerena agreed to meet at a convenience
¶21store in Gerena and Idris’s neighborhood at around 11:45 p.m.
¶22 Appellant called his friend Denzel Wilburn to get a ride to the
¶23convenience store. Wilburn agreed to give Appellant a ride after
¶24Appellant said that he would get some marijuana for Wilburn’s
¶25girlfriend. Wilburn then picked up Appellant at Appellant’s mother’s
¶26house.
¶27Appellant. At a trial from December 6 to 13, 2021, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, concurrent terms of life in prison for armed robbery against Gerena and Idris, 20 years consecutive for the aggravated assault against Idris, and five years consecutive for the firearm conviction; the felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law, and the remaining aggravated assault count merged. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial. Through new counsel, Appellant elected not to present evidence on the motion and instead submitted a brief in support of the motion on February 19, 2024. On March 19, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying the motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the August 2024 term and submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 Shortly before midnight, Wilburn parked his red 2005 Ford
¶28Mustang on Pebblebrook Court, a street off of Arden Drive that ends
¶29in a cul-de-sac that backs up to the convenience store property.
¶30Appellant got out of Wilburn’s car and walked down a path to the
¶31area behind the store. At about 12:01 a.m. on July 1, 2019,
¶32“Murksumbilly” sent a message to Gerena saying that he had
¶33arrived. In another message, “Murksumbilly” said that he was
¶34coming from Fred Wells’s house, which Idris knew was on Arden
¶35Drive.
¶36 Gerena and Idris walked behind the store. Gerena had half the
¶37marijuana in the pocket of his hoodie, and the other half was in
¶38Idris’s backpack. Gerena also had a BB gun in his shorts pocket.
¶39Appellant approached Gerena and Idris with “money visible in his
¶40pocket” and a black and silver handgun with an extended magazine
¶41in his waistband.
¶42 Gerena handed his half of the marijuana to Appellant to
¶43inspect. Appellant inspected the marijuana, asked if that was all of
¶44it, and handed the marijuana back to Gerena. Then, instead of
¶45 3 pulling money out of his pocket to pay for the marijuana, Appellant
¶46drew his gun from his waistband and pointed it at Gerena and Idris,
¶47saying, “Give me all that s**t.” Idris immediately handed Appellant
¶48his backpack.
¶49 Appellant then turned to Gerena. Appellant snatched the
¶50marijuana that he had handed back to Gerena from Gerena’s hoodie
¶51pocket, told Gerena to give up whatever he had, began searching his
¶52pockets, and took his BB gun. Gerena physically resisted and told
¶53Appellant, “I’m not giving you s**t.” Appellant then shot Gerena in
¶54the side of the head. Gerena died from the gunshot wound within
¶55the hour.
¶56 After shooting Gerena, Appellant ran back up the path to
¶57Wilburn’s car. A neighborhood security camera showed a man
¶58running on Pebblebrook Court with something in his hands, and
¶59Wilburn noticed that Appellant was carrying a backpack that he did
¶60not have when he left to meet Gerena and Idris. Appellant got into
¶61Wilburn’s car, and Wilburn sped away from the scene. When
¶62Wilburn asked Appellant what happened, all Appellant said was
¶63 4 that he “got it.” Appellant then made a phone call and stayed on the
¶64call until they arrived at Appellant’s mother’s house.
¶65 Before getting out of the car at his mother’s house, Appellant
¶66gave Wilburn two grams of marijuana for Wilburn’s girlfriend, and
¶67Wilburn drove home. Appellant left Idris’s backpack in a wooded
¶68area about 100 yards from Appellant’s mother’s house. At 1:21 a.m.,
¶69Appellant’s phone texted Wilburn to ask if he was “straight,” and
¶70Wilburn responded that he was. That afternoon, Appellant’s
¶71younger brother saw him with a handgun with an extended
¶72magazine. Appellant later gathered his belongings and fled to
¶73Wisconsin.
¶74 When responding officers spoke to Idris at the scene of the
¶75shooting, he told them that Gerena was shot during a fight with “a
¶76random dude” who walked up to Gerena and insulted him. Later
¶77that morning, detectives interviewed Idris at the police station. At
¶78first, Idris repeated what he said at the crime scene. However, when
¶79Idris learned that Gerena was dead, he told them what really
¶80happened.
¶81 5 After leaving the police station, Idris asked around on social
¶82media for information about the man who shot Gerena. Idris knew
¶83the shooter only by his social media name, “Murksumbilly.” On the
¶84afternoon of July 2, 2019, someone sent Idris a picture of Appellant
¶85as “a person who might be Murksumbilly,” and Idris recognized
¶86Appellant as the man who had pointed a gun at him and shot and
¶87killed Gerena.
¶88 On July 3, 2019, detectives interviewed Wilburn. The interview
¶89was audio and video recorded, and excerpts from the interview were
¶90later played for the jury. That same day, a detective went to Idris’s
¶91house and showed him a six-man photographic lineup. Idris selected
¶92the picture of Appellant and said that he was “[l]ike 80 percent sure”
¶93that the man in the picture was the person who shot and killed
¶94Gerena.
¶95 On July 16, 2019, Appellant was spotted in Green Bay,
¶96Wisconsin. When law enforcement officers approached, Appellant
¶97fled on foot but was ultimately apprehended. On July 19, 2019, law
¶98enforcement obtained cell-site location information for Appellant’s
¶99 6 cell phone showing that it was located in the area of the shooting
¶100during the relevant timeframe. On August 2, 2019, Appellant was
¶101sent back to Georgia.
¶102 In December 2019, Appellant briefly shared a cell with Antonio
¶103English, a family friend. Appellant admitted to English that he shot
¶104Gerena during a drug transaction but claimed that he did so in self-
¶105defense. Appellant also told English where he hid Idris’s backpack.
¶106Based on information provided by English, an investigator recovered
¶107Idris’s backpack, which had Gerena’s BB gun inside. Until then, the
¶108location of these items was unknown to law enforcement.
¶109 Idris identified Appellant at trial as the shooter. At an
¶110overnight break during the trial, Appellant made a telephone call
¶111from jail to one of his brothers. The call was recorded, and an excerpt
¶112from the call was played for the jury. In the excerpt, Appellant and
¶113his brother were talking about Wilburn when Appellant said, “I
¶114would never have even got caught if bro – if bro didn’t tell them folks
¶115on my ass.”
¶116 7 2. (a) Appellant contends that the evidence was not
¶117sufficient to support his convictions as a matter of constitutional due
¶118process. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter
¶119of due process, we view the evidence presented at trial in the light
¶120most favorable to the verdicts and consider whether it was sufficient
¶121to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty
¶122beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.
¶123See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d
¶124560) (1979). This “limited review leaves to the jury the resolution of
¶125conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the evidence, the credibility
¶126of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made from basic facts
¶127to ultimate facts.” Wilkerson v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 245 (892 SE2d
¶128737) (2023) (cleaned up).
¶129 When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the
¶130verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above
¶131showed the following. Appellant contacted Gerena through a social
¶132media app and arranged to meet him at a convenience store,
¶133ostensibly to buy a half-ounce of marijuana. Appellant arrived at the
¶134 8 meeting with a 9mm handgun with an extended magazine tucked in
¶135his waistband. After Gerena showed Appellant some of the
¶136marijuana, Appellant drew his gun and pointed it at Gerena and
¶137Idris. Appellant demanded their possessions, and Idris handed over
¶138his backpack containing half the marijuana. Appellant then took the
¶139other half of the marijuana from Gerena, along with Gerena’s BB
¶140gun. When Gerena resisted, Appellant shot him in the side of the
¶141head. Gerena died from the gunshot wound within the hour. The
¶142evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a matter of
¶143constitutional due process to support Appellant’s convictions for
¶144malice murder, two counts of armed robbery, aggravated assault
¶145against Idris, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
¶146a crime.
¶147 (b) Appellant also contends that the evidence was not
¶148sufficient to support his convictions under Georgia statutory law.
¶149OCGA § 24-14-6 says that “[t]o warrant a conviction on
¶150circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
¶151with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
¶152 9 hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” But this statute
¶153“only applies when the State’s case against the defendant was
¶154wholly circumstantial.” Torres v. State, 314 Ga. 838, 841 (878 SE2d
¶155453) (2022) (cleaned up). “If there is any direct evidence presented
¶156by the State, the circumstantial evidence statute does not apply.”
¶157Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 492 (910 SE2d 173) (2024) (cleaned
¶158up). Here, the State presented direct evidence of Appellant’s guilt in
¶159the form of Idris’s testimony about Appellant’s commission of the
¶160crimes and English’s testimony that Appellant admitted to shooting
¶161Gerena. As a result, OCGA § 24-14-6 does not apply, and Appellant’s
¶162claim fails.
¶163 3. Appellant next claims that the testimony of a single
¶164witness is not sufficient to support a conviction where the witness –
¶165like Idris here – has changed his statements over time and
¶166expressed uncertainty in his observations. Appellant cites no
¶167authority for this proposition, which is contrary to Georgia law.
¶168OCGA § 24-14-8 expressly states that “[t]he testimony of a single
¶169witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.” And it is well
¶170 10 established that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
¶171support a conviction, this Court “leave[s] to the jury the resolution
¶172of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of
¶173witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.”
¶174Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 72 (891 SE2d 884) (2023) (cleaned
¶175up). See also Handley v. State, 289 Ga. 786, 786 (716 SE2d 176)
¶176(2011) (“[T]he credibility of eyewitness testimony is within the
¶177exclusive province of the jury . . . .”). Accordingly, this claim fails.
¶178 4. Finally, Appellant argues that Idris’s testimony was not
¶179sufficient to support his convictions, because Idris was his
¶180accomplice in a drug transaction, and Idris’s testimony therefore
¶181required corroboration under OCGA § 24-14-8. As noted above,
¶182OCGA § 24-14-8 says that “[t]he testimony of a single witness is
¶183generally sufficient to establish a fact.” But the statute goes on to
¶184say that “in certain cases, including . . . felony cases where the only
¶185witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not
¶186be sufficient” to establish a fact. OCGA § 24-14-8. Thus, in a felony
¶187case, a fact necessary to conviction may not be supported solely by
¶188 11 the testimony of an accomplice. See Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 803,
¶189805 (708 SE2d 331) (2011) (construing materially identical
¶190predecessor to OCGA § 24-14-8). The accomplice’s testimony must
¶191be corroborated by the testimony of another witness or by other
¶192“corroborating circumstances.” Id. (quoting predecessor to OCGA
¶193§ 24-14-8). 2
¶194 If there is even slight evidence that a witness was the
¶195defendant’s accomplice in any of the crimes charged, it is up to the
¶196jury to decide, under proper instructions, whether the witness was
¶197in fact an accomplice such that the witness’s testimony must be
¶198corroborated under OCGA § 24-14-8. See Thornton v. State, 307 Ga.
¶199121, 125 (834 SE2d 814) (2019); Hamm v. State, 294 Ga. 791, 794-
¶200795 (756 SE2d 507) (2014). However, where a defendant argues that
¶201 2 OCGA § 24-14-8 says in full:
¶202 The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including prosecutions for treason, prosecutions for perjury, and felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness, except in prosecutions for treason. 12 a witness was his accomplice only in an uncharged crime, and there
¶203is no evidence that the witness was the defendant’s accomplice in
¶204any of the charged crimes, an accomplice corroboration instruction
¶205is unwarranted, and OCGA § 24-14-8 does not require that the
¶206witness’s testimony be corroborated. See Taylor v. State, 306 Ga.
¶207277, 285 & n.22 (830 SE2d 90) (2019) (rejecting murder defendant’s
¶208argument that a witness’s admission that he “drove the victim to the
¶209crime scene in order to engage in a drug transaction” made the
¶210witness an accomplice and thus entitled the defendant to an
¶211accomplice corroboration instruction where the witness’s “conduct
¶212before, during, and after the incident did not indicate an intent to
¶213aid or abet [the defendant] in any of the crimes charged,” i.e., “malice
¶214murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery,
¶215possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a
¶216weapon during the commission of a crime”); Gee v. State, 261 Ga.
¶217178, 179 (402 SE2d 719) (1991) (affirming denial of motion for
¶218directed verdict based on the predecessor to OCGA § 24-14-8,
¶219because the eyewitness “was in no sense an accomplice to the
¶220 13 [charged] crimes [of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault,
¶221and robbery],” even though it was “clear that [the eyewitness] was
¶222in the taxicab with the defendants because she believed they were
¶223going to get the cocaine for which she had previously paid them”).
¶224That is the situation here.
¶225 Appellant contends that Idris was his accomplice in a drug
¶226transaction, pointing to evidence that Gerena and Idris agreed to
¶227sell Appellant marijuana and that Idris accompanied Gerena to the
¶228convenience store to complete the sale. But even if Idris (the seller)
¶229could be considered to be an accomplice to Appellant (the buyer) in
¶230a drug crime – which we doubt – Appellant was not charged with
¶231any drug crime, nor was a drug crime the predicate for either of the
¶232felony murder counts. As for the charged crimes, Idris obviously did
¶233not share a common criminal intent with Appellant to commit armed
¶234robbery or aggravated assault against himself. See Stripling v.
¶235State, 304 Ga. 131, 136 (816 SE2d 663) (2018) (“An accomplice is
¶236someone who shares a common criminal intent with the actual
¶237perpetrator of a crime.”). And there was no evidence that Idris
¶238 14 shared a common criminal intent with Appellant to murder Gerena,
¶239to commit armed robbery or aggravated assault against Gerena, or
¶240to possess a firearm during the commission of a crime. See id. Idris
¶241was one of Appellant’s victims, not his accomplice. Thus, OCGA § 24-
¶24214-8 did not require that Idris’s testimony be corroborated.
¶243 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶244 15