¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: March 4, 2025
¶4 S24G0816. THE STATE v. GREEN.
¶5 LAGRUA, Justice.
¶6 Appellee Billy Ray Green was convicted of attempt to entice a
¶7child for indecent purposes and other crimes arising from his March
¶812, 2021 interaction with a 15-year-old female, A.H. 1 The Court of
¶9Appeals reversed this conviction as unsupported by sufficient
¶10evidence pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (III) (B)
¶11(99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), and its progeny. See Green v.
¶12 1 Green was also convicted of criminal attempt to commit kidnapping,
¶13criminal attempt to commit false imprisonment, and simple assault, but only the conviction for attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes (“attempted enticement”) is at issue here. This crime is committed “when, with intent to commit [enticement],” a defendant “performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of [enticement].” OCGA § 16-4-1. See OCGA § 16-6-5 (a) (“A person commits the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes when he or she solicits, entices, or takes any child under the age of 16 years to any place whatsoever for the purpose of child molestation or indecent acts.”). The indictment alleged that Green “attempt[ed] to commit the crime of [enticement], in violation of [OCGA § 16-6-5], in that said accused did attempt to entice [A.H.], a child less than 16 years of age, to enter his vehicle for the purpose of committing indecent acts . . .” State, 371 Ga. App. 259, 262-264 (2) (899 SE2d 493) (2024). The
¶14State sought certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals
¶15misapplied sufficiency standards with respect to this conviction by
¶16treating certain evidence (referred to herein as the “CVS evidence”)
¶17as not relevant to the issue of Green’s intent. We granted review to
¶18consider whether evidence that a defendant made unwanted,
¶19sexually suggestive comments to an adult is evidence relevant to
¶20whether the defendant’s later solicitation, enticement, or taking of
¶21a minor was done “for the purpose of child molestation or indecent
¶22acts.” OCGA § 16-6-5 (a). In this case, we answer our certiorari
¶23question affirmatively and agree with the State that the CVS
¶24evidence is relevant to Green’s intent to entice A.H. Thus, we
¶25conclude that it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold otherwise,
¶26and that, when properly considered in the context of a sufficiency
¶27challenge, the CVS evidence is sufficient on the issue of Green’s
¶28intent to uphold the attempted enticement conviction. Therefore, we
¶29reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and affirm
¶30Green’s conviction.
¶31 2 1. Background
¶32 (a) The evidence presented at trial showed the following. Around
¶335:30 p.m. on March 12, 2021, A.H. was walking her dog in her
¶34neighborhood when a car driven by Green pulled up beside her.
¶35Green told A.H. that her father, Jamie – whom Green referred to by
¶36name – had called and asked for Green to bring A.H. to him. A.H.
¶37testified that she did not know or recognize Green, and Jamie
¶38testified to the same. Green then opened the passenger side door of
¶39his car, reached his arm out toward A.H., and gestured for her to get
¶40in. A.H. testified that Green became mad when she declined his
¶41request, but that Green did not threaten her, touch her, or say
¶42anything to her that was sexual in nature. About this same time,
¶43one of A.H.’s neighbors pulled into the neighborhood, and Green
¶44“sped off.” A.H. called her father, and then 911. During the 911 call,
¶45which was played at Green’s trial, A.H. told the operator that “a guy
¶46just tried to kidnap [her],” and she described the perpetrator as a
¶47white male in his 50’s or 60’s with long hair driving a small red car.
¶48 Officers with the Barrow County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”),
¶49 3 including Sgt. William Meeler, responded to A.H.’s location within
¶50minutes. 2 BCSO Sgt. Garrett Guest also responded to the 911 call
¶51and was a few minutes from A.H.’s location when he spotted a car in
¶52a nearby CVS parking lot that matched the description given by
¶53A.H. Sgt. Guest pulled into the CVS parking lot and made contact
¶54with the driver, who identified himself as Green.3 In their
¶55conversation, Green repeatedly said he had been at the CVS “all
¶56day,” but also gave Sgt. Guest conflicting versions of his activities
¶57that day. A few minutes later, Sgt. Guest entered the CVS to obtain
¶58security camera footage and learned from an employee that Green
¶59had tried to “lure” female CVS employees into his car earlier that
¶60day. When Sgt. Guest walked back outside, he asked Green whether
¶61he had talked to any CVS employees that day, and Green affirmed
¶62he had asked two “young girls” if they wanted to “hang out.” BCSO
¶63officers decided to conduct a showup, and Sgt. Meeler drove A.H. to
¶64 2 Sgt. Meeler’s bodycam footage was admitted into evidence, which depicts A.H. describing the perpetrator, his car, and their encounter. 3 Sgt. Guest’s bodycam footage was admitted into evidence, which depicts
¶65his interactions with Green in the CVS parking lot. 4 the CVS, where she positively identified Green. 4 Green was
¶66subsequently arrested.5
¶67 Evidence specific to Green’s interactions with two CVS
¶68employees (the “CVS evidence”) was presented at trial through the
¶69testimony of those employees, both of whom were female, aged 39
¶70and 27, respectively. 6 Their testimony collectively showed that
¶71around lunchtime on March 12, Green entered the CVS, feigned
¶72injury, and asked the two employees if they could help him get to his
¶73car. Both declined, offering instead to get their manager or call 911.
¶74Green insisted that he did not want them to call their manager or
¶75 4 A “showup” is “[a] police procedure in which a suspect is shown singly
¶76to a witness for identification, rather than as part of a lineup.” Showup, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 5 In a later search of Green’s car, two softball bats and a stuffed unicorn
¶77were found inside. 6 The trial court held in a pre-trial order that the CVS evidence was
¶78“admissible as intrinsic evidence because it was necessary to complete the story of the crimes charged in the indictment[,]” and that “the probative value of the [CVS] evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” such that the balance was struck in favor of admissibility under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”). This pre-trial order also held the CVS evidence was admissible as extrinsic other acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”), but “at trial, the State stated that it was simply offering the [CVS] evidence as intrinsic evidence and withdrew its request for a jury instruction on other acts evidence.” Green, 371 Ga. App. at 264 (4), n.7. 5 911, and when they went to do so, Green “bolted” out the door to his
¶79car. One of the employees recalled the other suggesting: “I don’t
¶80think that man was hurt . . . I think he was just trying to get us out
¶81there.”
¶82 The 27-year-old employee testified that she left for lunch
¶83shortly after this incident and asked her manager to watch her leave
¶84because she was “90 percent sure [Green] was still out there.” When
¶85she returned around 45 minutes later, Green’s car was still in the
¶86CVS parking lot but had been moved into the spot where the
¶87employee’s car had previously been. While this employee “thought
¶88that was very strange,” she did not interact with Green again, but
¶89still asked her manager to watch her leave at the end of her shift
¶90that day.
¶91 The 39-year-old employee testified to additional interactions
¶92with Green on March 12. She testified that, when she walked
¶93outside for a smoke break in the afternoon, Green asked her “are you
¶94ready for a good time?” Not wanting to “egg him on,” she ignored
¶95Green, continued to her car, took her smoke break, and went back
¶96 6 inside the CVS without incident. Then, at the end of her shift,
¶97around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., the employee walked outside to discover
¶98Green’s car parked next to hers. She told the jury that, “[b]ased on
¶99the little comment [Green] made already, it scared the hell out of
¶100me,” so she got her manager and asked him to watch her leave. As
¶101she reached her car, Green told her that he could “show her a few
¶102tricks” or “show her a few things.” The employee interpreted Green’s
¶103comments as an attempt “to coax [her] to get in [Green’s car] and go
¶104do things with him.”
¶105 At the close of the State’s case, Green moved for a directed
¶106verdict on the attempted enticement charge. The transcript reflects
¶107the following:
¶108 COUNSEL: . . . I’ll make a motion for directed verdict on Count Three. Specifically, the victim in the case said that there was -- in any contact between her and Mr. Green, that there was no mention of any kind of sexual advance. And based on her statement, I believe that -- that as a matter of law, that Count Three has to be -- a directed verdict would be appropriate as to Count Three.
¶109 ....
¶110 THE COURT: All right. State’s response, please?
¶111 7 THE STATE: Yes, Your Honor. Looking at Count Three, it charges Mr. Green with criminal attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes. It talks about the substantial steps that he took to do that. And whether those constituted substantial steps, that would be a question for the jury, but certainly there’s some evidence that he took steps to do that.
¶112In terms of what his intent was, obviously that’s something the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s alleged that he did this with the purpose of committing indecent acts. And [defense counsel] is correct, there was no testimony about any kind of explicit sexual advance towards the victim from Mr. Green, no sexual comment, but the State would argue that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence on his intent based on how he was acting that day towards others. And that gets into the -- the intrinsic evidence with other witnesses from CVS. And what constitutes an indecent act, that’s also a question for the jury, but the State would argue there is sufficient evidence to get past the directed verdict.
¶113THE COURT: You get the final word on that motion with respect to that count. Anything else you want to say?
¶114....
¶115COUNSEL: Yeah, and the child themself said that there was no indication of any sexual advance, and I think that’s clear, that based on that as to that count, there’s no substantial step toward doing something that she said didn’t occur. So we feel like, as a matter of law, that we should have a directed verdict as to Count Three.
¶116 8 THE COURT: . . . The Court is inclined to deny the motion and finds that there may be some -- some evidence, albeit circumstantial, that could put a jury in a position to conclude that -- that the Defendant committed this act. So I’m just going to -- I’m going to deny your motion with respect to that count.
¶117 Green then testified in his own defense and gave the jury his
¶118version of events from March 12. He did not deny interacting with
¶119A.H., but characterized their encounter in much different terms.
¶120Green testified that he was on his way to the CVS from his home7
¶121when he saw who he thought was a 40-year-old female friend of his
¶122named Dana Hayne walking in front of the house where a different
¶123friend, George Baker, used to live, so he turned down the road to
¶124talk to her. Though it was not his friend Dana, Green testified that
¶125he pulled over anyway to “ask[] her did she know George Baker,”
¶126and when A.H. said she did not, Green “said thank you and drove
¶127off.” Green denied opening the door to his car or gesturing for A.H.
¶128to get in, testified that he did not know A.H.’s father and denied
¶129 7 The evidence showed that Green lived in the same neighborhood as
¶130A.H. 9 using his name, said the softball bats were for his “little great
¶131grandson,” and opined that the stuffed unicorn was not his, but
¶132might belong to his niece who would occasionally use his car. At
¶133various points, Green told the jury that harming A.H. “never crossed
¶134[his] mind” and that “[he] had no intentions of nothing” in speaking
¶135with her, adding that he “would never hurt a child” and had “never
¶136harmed a kid.”
¶137 Green also told the jury that, on March 12, like most days, he
¶138spent a large portion of his time in the CVS parking lot “just sit[ting]
¶139there and play[ing] [his] radio” because it was “something to do.”
¶140Asked about the day in question, Green repeatedly testified that he
¶141did not recall speaking with any CVS employees and denied entering
¶142the CVS. But after being impeached with Sgt. Guest’s bodycam
¶143footage, Green admitted he “might have talked to the two [CVS
¶144employees] at the store.” When confronted about his changing story,
¶145Green admitted that he lied to Sgt. Guest but said he did so because
¶146he consumed “half a pint” of vodka on the morning of March 12, had
¶147recently received a DUI, and “didn’t want to go to jail.”
¶148 10 After Green’s testimony concluded, he renewed his motion for
¶149directed verdict on the attempted enticement charge. The trial court
¶150denied the renewed motion without elaboration, stating only that it
¶151“decline[d] to alter its [previous] ruling,” but noted renewal of the
¶152motion for the record. At the end of trial, the jury returned guilty
¶153verdicts on each of the four counts charged. Green was sentenced
¶154immediately thereafter.
¶155 (b) Green appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals,
¶156where he argued in relevant part that the trial court erred in
¶157denying his motion for directed verdict on the attempted enticement
¶158charge, asserting that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to
¶159sustain it. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at 262-264 (2). The Court of
¶160Appeals agreed and reversed this conviction in Division 2 of its
¶162 The Court of Appeals’ discussion on this enumeration of error
¶163began with a recitation of OCGA § 16-6-5 (a)’s statutory language
¶164and citation to its precedent for the proposition that a conviction for
¶165enticement “must be based upon some evidence that an act of
¶166 11 indecency or child molestation was the intended motivation for the
¶167enticement.” Green, 371 Ga. App. at 263 (2) (citing Lasseter v. State,
¶168197 Ga. App. 498, 499-500 (1) (339 SE2d 85) (1990)). The Court of
¶169Appeals then reasoned that, while the evidence presented at trial
¶170was sufficient to prove “that Green attempted to entice the minor
¶171victim into his vehicle,” that same evidence was not sufficient to
¶172establish “that an act of indecency or child molestation was the
¶173intended motivation for Green’s attempted enticement of the minor
¶174victim.” Green, 371 Ga. App. at 263-264 (2) (cleaned up). With
¶175respect to Green’s “intended motivation,” the Court of Appeals held
¶176that the evidence was not just insufficient, but “lacking” altogether,
¶177as was the case in Phillips v. State. Id. (citing 354 Ga. App. 88, 92
¶178(1) (840 SE2d 165) (2020)).8 To support that conclusion, the Court of
¶179 8 In Phillips, a defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted
¶180enticement and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 354 Ga. App. at 90-92 (1). There, the evidence at trial showed that the defendant attempted to entice three different children at three different times and locations: first, by gesturing at a minor victim for her to come get in his car; second, by telling a minor victim that he “like[d] her hair” before asking “if she wanted to put her bike in the back of his car and go[;]” and third, by making a “money gesture” from his car toward a minor victim. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed each conviction due to an “absence of evidence showing that an act of
¶181 12 Appeals observed that A.H. “denied that Green said anything about
¶182wanting to take her somewhere else to ‘try and have relations with
¶183[her]’ or anything similar[,]” and rejected the State’s position – the
¶184same position maintained on appeal to this Court – “that Green’s
¶185arguably suggestive prior comments to one of the CVS employees
¶186constituted evidence of Green’s motivation for enticing the minor
¶187victim.” Id. (citation omitted). Instead, it reasoned the CVS evidence
¶188was “not evidence of the motivation required” and suggested, as
¶189Green argues before this Court on appeal, that because the
¶190unwanted, sexually suggestive comments comprising the CVS
¶191evidence were directed at adults, those comments had no relevant
¶192evidentiary value with respect to Green’s intent to entice A.H., a
¶193minor, for indecent purposes. See id. at 263 (2) (“Green’s comments
¶194to the CVS employee, while upsetting, were directed to another
¶195adult and were not evidence of the motivation required here.”).
¶196 In sum, despite the CVS evidence having been admitted at trial
¶197indecency or child molestation behind [the defendant’s] apparent attempts to entice the victims into his vehicle[.]” Id. at 92 (1). 13 as evidence intrinsic to the charged crimes, see Green, 371 Ga. App.
¶198at 264-266 (4) (citation omitted), the Court of Appeals concluded that
¶199the CVS evidence was categorically “not evidence” of the type needed
¶200to sustain an attempted enticement conviction. Id. at 262-264 (2).9
¶201Thus, absent any relevant evidence to establish the intent
¶202component for an attempted enticement, the Court of Appeals
¶203analogized the present case to Phillips, where “the State failed to
¶204present any evidence” to establish the defendant’s intent, such that
¶205the evidence presented at trial was necessarily insufficient. Id.
¶206(citing 354 Ga. App. at 92 (1)). Applying that same logic here, the
¶207Court of Appeals reversed Green’s conviction as unsupported by
¶208sufficient evidence.
¶209 2. Analysis
¶210 (a) The enticement statute provides that: “[a] person commits
¶211 9 To the extent that the Court of Appeals’ discussion of the CVS evidence
¶212in Division 4 was limited to the attempted kidnapping charge, we attribute the siloed context of its analysis to the fact that this enumeration was chronologically the last one to be addressed. The record reflects that the CVS evidence was generally admitted by the trial court for any purpose, rather than on a limited basis, see OCGA §§ 24-1-104 and 24-1-105, and that the only request to limit the admissibility of the CVS evidence was from the State and later withdrawn. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at 264 (4), n.7. See n.6, supra. 14 the offense of enticing a child for indecent purposes when he or she
¶213solicits, entices, or takes any child under the age of 16 years to any
¶214place whatsoever for the purpose of child molestation or indecent
¶215acts.” OCGA § 16-6-5 (a). Enticement, like all other crimes, requires
¶216a “joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or
¶217criminal negligence.” OCGA § 16-2-1 (a). See In the Interest of T.B.,
¶218313 Ga. 846, 854 (3) (874 SE2d 101) (2022) (“[C]onduct cannot be
¶219characterized as a ‘crime’ unless, at a minimum, the conduct
¶220satisfies both the ‘act’ element and the ‘intention’ element of the
¶221statutory offense.”) (citing OCGA § 16-2-1 (a)). In the present case,
¶222Green concedes that he satisfied the act requirement for this crime
¶223when he “reached out to A.H. and [tried] to grab at her[,]”and the
¶224Court of Appeals concluded the same. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at
¶225263 (2) (“Here, there was evidence that Green attempted to entice
¶226the minor victim into his vehicle.”). See OCGA §§ 16-6-5 (a) and 16-
¶2272-1 (a). Thus, it is only the intent requirement for this crime’s joint
¶228operation that is at issue here. OCGA § 16-2-1 (a).
¶229 To obtain a conviction under OCGA § 16-6-5 (a), the State must
¶230 15 establish that the defendant acted with the requisite intent – that
¶231is, the State must offer evidence from which a rational trier of fact
¶232could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
¶233enticed10 a minor victim “for the purpose of child molestation or
¶234indecent acts.”11 That a defendant possessed such an intent must be
¶235proven whether the crime is charged as a completed offense or as an
¶236attempted offense. See OCGA § 16-4-1 (“A person commits the
¶237offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific
¶238crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step
¶239toward the commission of the crime.”).
¶240 In the decision below, the Court of Appeals discounted the CVS
¶241evidence on a categorical basis as not relevant to Green’s intent
¶242because the comments comprising the CVS evidence were directed
¶243at adults, rather than children. See Green, 371 Ga. App. at 263 (2).
¶244 10 While we refer to enticement throughout this opinion given the facts
¶245of this case, a defendant’s soliciting or taking of a child can also satisfy the act requirement. See OCGA § 16-6-5 (a). 11 The code does not define the “indecent acts” referred to in OCGA § 16-
¶2466-5 (a), and we need not do so today. That said, the State’s theory at trial was that Green sought to entice A.H. for the purpose of committing acts that were sexual in nature, and Green’s briefing accepts that acts sexual in nature would be included among those contemplated by the statute. 16 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of
¶247any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
¶248more probable or less probable that it would be without the
¶249evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401 (“Rule 401”). We have said that
¶250“[r]elevance is a binary concept – evidence is relevant or it is not.”
¶251Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544, 546 (1) (802 SE2d 234) (2017) (citation
¶252omitted). Moreover, relevance under Rule 401 is distinct from
¶253probative value. See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 75 (2) (786 SE2d 633)
¶254(2016) (“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency’ to prove or
¶255disprove a fact, whereas the probative value of evidence derives in
¶256large part from the extent to which the evidence tends to make the
¶257existence of a fact more or less probable.”) (emphasis in original).
¶258 Here, Green’s intent was a fact of consequence to the
¶259determination of the attempted enticement charge because he
¶260pleaded not guilty to that charge. See Olds, 299 Ga. at 72 (2)
¶261(“[I]ntent was put at issue by the defendant entering a plea of not
¶262guilty. That such a plea puts the State to its burden of proving each
¶263and every element of the crimes charges id beyond dispute.”)
¶264 17 (citations omitted)). Accordingly, if the CVS evidence has any
¶265tendency to make it more or less probable that Green acted with the
¶266requisite intent – that is, more or less probable that Green’s act of
¶267enticing A.H. was for the purpose of committing child molestation or
¶268an indecent act – then the evidence is relevant.
¶269 We conclude that the CVS evidence is relevant to Green’s
¶270intent in this case, as it has some tendency to make it more probable
¶271that Green’s enticement of A.H. was done for the purpose of
¶272committing child molestation or an indecent act. In Olds, we
¶273explained “that evidence that an accused committed an intentional
¶274act generally is relevant to show – the evidence, in other words, has
¶275some tendency to make more or less probable – that the same
¶276defendant committed a similar act with the same sort of intent,
¶277especially when the acts were committed close in time and in similar
¶278circumstances.” Olds, 299 Ga. at 72 (2) (citations omitted; emphasis
¶279in original). Such is the case here.
¶280 The record establishes that, in the span of approximately six
¶281hours, Green interacted with three members of the opposite sex: 15-
¶282 18 year old A.H. and the two CVS employees. Green attempted to get
¶283each of these women into his car under false pretenses and through
¶284the use of deception – first, by feigning injury at the CVS and later,
¶285by telling A.H. that her father, who Green referred to by name, had
¶286requested Green pick her up. Less than an hour before Green
¶287encountered A.H., he made unwanted, sexually suggestive
¶288comments to one of those CVS employees, telling her that he could
¶289“show her a few tricks” or “show her a few things,” which that
¶290employee interpreted as an attempt by Green “to coax [her] to get in
¶291[Green’s car] and go do things with him” that were sexual in
¶292nature.12 Because Green’s interactions with the CVS employees, and
¶293in particular, his interaction with the employee that he offered to
¶294“show a few tricks,” were “committed close in time and under similar
¶295circumstances” to his interaction with A.H., that evidence has some
¶296tendency to make it more probable that Green acted with a similar,
¶297 12 These facts distinguish the present case from Phillips, where the defendant’s words and conduct toward minors were not supported by any facts to suggest that a defendant’s intent was sexual in nature. See 354 Ga. App. at 91-92 (1). 19 sexually-related intent with respect to his attempted enticement of
¶298A.H. Olds, 299 Ga. at 72 (2). As such, the CVS evidence is relevant
¶299to Green’s intent for the attempted enticement conviction.
¶300 (b) Having concluded that the CVS evidence is relevant to
¶301Green’s intent and that the Court of Appeals erred by categorically
¶302disregarding it, we turn to whether the evidence presented at trial
¶303on the issue of Green’s intent was sufficient. We conclude that it
¶304was.
¶305 In a sufficiency review, “we view the evidence presented at trial
¶306in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider whether it
¶307was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the
¶308defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which
¶309he was convicted.” Wilkerson v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 245 (1) (892 SE2d
¶310737) (2023) (citations omitted). In so doing, we “leave[] to the jury
¶311the resolution of conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the evidence,
¶312the credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made
¶313from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. (citation omitted). Among
¶314those matters left for a jury’s consideration is whether a defendant
¶315 20 acted with the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged. See
¶316Poole v. State, 312 Ga. 515, 518-519 (863 SE2d 93) (2021)
¶317(“[C]riminal intent is a question for the jury, and it may be inferred
¶318from that person’s conduct before, during, and after the commission
¶319of the crime.”) (citation omitted)); OCGA § 16-2-6 (“A person will not
¶320be presumed to act with criminal intention but the trier of facts may
¶321find such intention upon consideration of the words, conduct,
¶322demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the
¶323act for which the accused in prosecuted.”). See also Bryan v. State,
¶324371 Ga. App. 769, 776 (1) (b) (903 SE2d 160) (2024) (“Intent, which
¶325is a mental attitude, is commonly detectible only inferentially, and
¶326the law accommodates this.”) (citation omitted)); OCGA § 24-14-9
¶327(“In arriving at a verdict, the jury, from the facts proved, and
¶328sometimes from the absence of counter evidence, may infer the
¶329existence of facts reasonably and logically consequent to those
¶330proved.”).
¶331 While Green testified that “[he] had no intentions of nothing,”
¶332when interacting with A.H., a jury is permitted to draw reasonable
¶333 21 inferences, including on the issue of intent, from his denial and other
¶334evidence presented at trial. Here, we think the jury could reasonably
¶335infer Green’s intent with respect to his enticement of A.H. from the
¶336relevant and intrinsic CVS evidence, as that evidence demonstrated
¶337that Green’s prior actions, “which took place on the same day, and
¶338in one instance, shortly before the incident with the victim[,]” Green,
¶339371 Ga. App. at 265 (4), were motivated by a purpose that was sexual
¶340in nature. The fact that Green’s sexually-related overtures toward
¶341the employee that he offered to “show a few tricks” were frustrated
¶342by the employee’s rejection of his efforts also increases the probative
¶343value of that evidence with respect to Green’s intent when he
¶344encountered A.H. less than an hour after being rejected.
¶345 Additionally, “jurors [are] authorized to consider their disbelief
¶346in [a defendant’s] testimony – and the inconsistencies between it and
¶347the eyewitness accounts of others – as substantive evidence of his
¶348guilt” where “some corroborative evidence exists for the charged
¶349offense[.]” Maynor v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 498 (2) (a) (893 SE2d 724)
¶350(2023) (citation omitted); Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 263-264 (2)
¶351 22 (773 SE2d 263) (2015) (citations omitted). Green himself offered
¶352corroborative evidence for the attempted enticement conviction by
¶353admitting that he approached A.H. on March 12. Moreover, Green’s
¶354testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of both A.H. and the
¶355CVS employees in several material respects. For example, Green
¶356denied opening the door to his car, gesturing for A.H. to get in, or
¶357using the name of A.H.’s father, despite A.H. testifying to those
¶358facts, and he denied entering the CVS on March 12, but the CVS
¶359employees testified that he did so twice. When confronted about
¶360those inconsistencies on cross-examination, Green told the jury that
¶361he “d[id]n’t have a clue” why his story was different from theirs. In
¶362the face of these inconsistencies, the jury was authorized to reject
¶363Green’s version of events and treat his inconsistent testimony as
¶364substantive evidence of his guilt. See Maynor, 317 Ga. at 497-498 (2)
¶365(a) (concluding that jury was authorized to reject defendant’s
¶366testimony that he acted in self-defense where the only evidence
¶367offered in support of that defense was the defendant’s self-serving
¶368 23 statements).13
¶369 3. Conclusion
¶370 Based on the foregoing, we hold that the CVS evidence
¶371presented at trial was relevant under Rule 401 and sufficient as a
¶372matter of constitutional due process to establish Green’s intent for
¶373the attempted enticement conviction. Accordingly, the decision of
¶374the Court of Appeals is reversed in part.
¶375 Judgment reversed in part. All the Justices concur.
¶376 13 We also note that the jury could infer consciousness of guilt from Green’s flight from the scene of his encounter with A.H. See Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 88-89 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022). 24