¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: February 18, 2025
¶4 S24G0855. CLARK v. THE STATE.
¶5 LAGRUA, Justice.
¶6 We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the
¶7notice requirement articulated in OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B)1 is
¶8 ————————————————————— 1 This statute provides in relevant part:
¶9 When a defendant with no prior felony conviction is convicted of felony offenses or is charged with felony offenses . . . , and the court imposes a sentence of probation or not more than 12 months of imprisonment followed by a term of probation, the court shall include a behavioral incentive date in its sentencing order that does not exceed three years from the date such sentence is imposed. Within 60 days of the expiration of such incentive date, if the defendant has paid all restitution owed; not had his or her probation revoked in the immediately preceding 24 months, or when the court includes a behavioral incentive date less than two years from the date a sentence was imposed, not had his or her probation revoked during such period; and not been arrested for anything other than a nonserious traffic offense as defined in [OCGA § 35-3-7], the Department of Community Supervision shall notify the prosecuting attorney and the court of such facts. The Department of Community Supervision shall provide the court with an order to terminate such defendant’s probation which the court shall execute unless the court or the prosecuting attorney requests a hearing on such matter within 30 days of the receipt of such order. The court shall set the matter for a hearing as soon as mandatory, and if so, what remedy exists when the Department of
¶10Community Supervision (“DCS”) fails to provide notice in
¶11compliance with this statute. For the reasons that follow, we
¶12conclude that, although the Court of Appeals erred in determining
¶13that the notice requirement in OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) is directory
¶14rather than mandatory, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded
¶15that, even when DCS fails to comply with this notice requirement,
¶16termination of the defendant’s sentence is not automatic, and the
¶17trial court maintains the discretion to decide whether to terminate
¶18the defendant’s probation. Therefore, we affirm.
¶19 1. Pertinent Facts and Procedural History
¶20 On May 18, 2017, Marvante Clark was indicted by a Henry
¶21County grand jury for burglary, theft by receiving stolen property,
¶22two counts of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act,
¶23OCGA § 16-13-20, et seq., obstruction of an officer, and possession
¶24 ————————————————————— possible but not more than 90 days after receiving the order to terminate. The court shall take whatever action it determines would be for the best interest of justice and the welfare of society. OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i). 2 of marijuana, less than an ounce. On February 12, 2018, Clark
¶25entered a guilty plea to all counts except one count of violation of the
¶26Georgia Controlled Substances Act, which was nolle prossed by the
¶27trial court. The trial court sentenced Clark as a first offender to a
¶28total of ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the
¶29remainder to be served on probation.
¶30 On January 25, 2023, the State requested, and the trial court
¶31issued, a warrant for Clark’s arrest, alleging that Clark violated his
¶32probation on January 7, 2023, by committing a new offense of theft
¶33by receiving stolen property. Clark was arrested shortly thereafter,
¶34and in March 2023, Clark filed a motion to terminate his probation,
¶35contending that his “probation should have terminated as a matter
¶36of law” on February 12, 2021, under the retroactive application of
¶37OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B).2
¶38 ————————————————————— 2 When the trial court sentenced Clark as a first offender on February
¶3912, 2018, the early termination provisions of OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i) were not yet in effect. However, the statute was amended to include those provisions in May 2021 and given retroactive effect. See Ga. L. 2021, p. 223, § 1. See also OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (providing that subparagraph (a) (1) (B) (i) of the statute “is intended to be retroactive”). 3 In support of Clark’s motion, he asserted that his February
¶402018 sentencing order, which imposed “no more than twelve months
¶41of imprisonment followed by probation,” did not include a behavioral
¶42incentive date, and pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (ii), where
¶43a behavioral incentive date has not been included in an original
¶44sentencing order, the “behavioral incentive date shall be three years
¶45from the date such sentence was imposed.” OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1)
¶46(B) (ii). Clark further argued that, under OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B)
¶47(i), if—within 60 days of the expiration of the behavioral incentive
¶48date—the defendant has (1) paid all restitution owed; (2) not had his
¶49or her probation revoked in the immediately preceding 24 months;
¶50and (3) not been arrested for anything other than a nonserious
¶51traffic offense, DCS is required by the statute to “provide the Court
¶52with an order to terminate probation.” Clark claimed that, as of
¶53February 12, 2021—three years from the date he was sentenced—
¶54he “did not owe restitution, did not have his probation revoked in
¶55the immediately preceding 24 months, and did not have any new
¶56arrests,” but DCS did not provide the trial court with notice of
¶57 4 Clark’s compliance and a proposed3 order to terminate his probation
¶58as required by law. Clark contended that, because DCS failed to
¶59provide the requisite notice to the trial court, his probation should
¶60have “automatically terminated” under OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B)
¶61(i).
¶62 The trial court heard Clark’s motion on April 4, 2023.
¶63Following the hearing, the trial court issued a written order on April
¶6428, 2023. In the trial court’s April 28 order, the trial court confirmed
¶65that “no behavioral incentive date was included in [Clark’s]
¶66sentencing order” and that OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (ii) provides
¶67that “a behavioral incentive date is retroactively applied to
¶68situations such as this,” which date “shall not exceed three years
¶69 ————————————————————— 3 DCS does not have the authority to issue an order terminating a defendant’s probation, as such authority lies strictly with the trial court. See OCGA § 15-1-3. See also OCGA § 42-8-37 (b). Accordingly, any order presented by DCS to the trial court in this context would be a “proposed” order unless and until it is executed and entered by the trial court. See OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i) (“[DCS] shall provide the court with an order to terminate such defendant’s probation which the court shall execute unless the court or the prosecuting attorney requests a hearing on such matter . . . .” (emphasis supplied)); OCGA § 42-8-37 (d) (2) (“When the court is presented with such order, it shall execute the order to terminate unless the court or the prosecuting attorney requests a hearing on such matter . . . .” (emphasis supplied)).
¶70 5 from the date the sentence is imposed.” As to Clark’s argument that,
¶71as of February 12, 2021, he had “met all three factors” provided in
¶72OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i) and so “his probation should have
¶73terminated as a matter of law,” the trial court explained that, “even
¶74if a defendant meets all three statutory factors to be eligible for a
¶75termination of his probation, the statute provides additional
¶76procedural requirements for the defendant’s probation to
¶77terminate.”
¶78 Relevant here, the trial court found that “the statute gives an
¶79opportunity for the State to request a hearing in the matter of the
¶80defendant’s termination within 30 days of the receipt of a [proposed]
¶81order to terminate the defendant’s probation.” See OCGA § 17-10-1
¶82(a) (1) (B) (i). The trial court also found that the State did not have
¶83“an opportunity to request a hearing in the matter” because DCS
¶84never provided the trial court with a proposed order to terminate
¶85Clark’s probation. See id. The trial court thus held that, after
¶86“interpreting the statute as a whole,” Clark’s probation “did not
¶87terminate as a matter of law on his behavioral incentive date.”
¶88 6 Additionally, while not reflected in its written order, the trial court
¶89also ruled during the April 4 hearing that, “based upon the
¶90circumstances of this case,” terminating Clark’s probation would not
¶91be “in the best interest of justice and the welfare of society.” OCGA
¶92§ 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i). For these reasons, the trial court denied
¶93Clark’s motion.
¶94 Clark timely appealed the denial of his motion to the Court of
¶95Appeals, contending that
¶96 the trial court erred in denying his motion to terminate probation where DCS failed to present an order to terminate his probation following the retroactive application of the behavioral incentive date under OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B). Stated differently, Clark asserts that the DCS was required to notify the State and the trial court of Clark’s successful completion of three years’ probation and that, in the absence of such notice, his probation terminated as a matter of law.
¶97Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 38. On March 12, 2024, the Court of Appeals
¶98issued a decision affirming the trial court. Id. at 37.
¶99 The Court of Appeals first addressed the retroactivity of OCGA
¶100§ 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) and noted that, “at the time the trial court
¶101sentenced Clark as a first offender on February 12, 2018, the early
¶102 7 termination provisions of OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) were not
¶103available to him.” Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 39 (a) (citing Mays v. State,
¶104345 Ga. App. 562, 564-565 (814 SE2d 418) (2018)). However, “the
¶105most recent amendment, effective May 3, 2021, gave the statute
¶106retroactive effect.” Id. (citing Ga. L. 2021, p. 223, § 1). See also
¶107OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (ii) (providing that the statute “is
¶108intended to be retroactive”). The Court of Appeals thus concluded
¶109that the provisions of OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) as amended “are
¶110now generally available to Clark.” Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 39-40 (a)
¶111(emphasis in original).
¶112 Turning to the applicability of OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) in
¶113Clark’s case, the Court of Appeals noted that, when a defendant has
¶114met the conditions specified in the statute—i.e., paid all restitution
¶115owed, not had his probation revoked in the immediately preceding
¶11624 months, and not been arrested for anything other than a
¶117nonserious traffic offense—the statute provides that DCS “shall
¶118notify the prosecuting attorney and the court of such facts” within
¶11960 days of the expiration of the defendant’s behavioral incentive
¶120 8 date, and DCS “shall provide the court with an order to terminate
¶121such defendant’s probation which the court shall execute unless the
¶122court or the prosecuting attorney requests a hearing on such matter
¶123within 30 days.” Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 40 (b) (quoting OCGA § 17-
¶12410-1 (a) (1) (B) (i); emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals then
¶125explained that “the manner in which Clark may benefit” from this
¶126statute “initially turns upon the use of the word ‘shall’” because this
¶127term can be construed either as a “mandatory directive” or as
¶128“merely directory”—which would be the proper construction when it
¶129“was not accompanied by any negative words restraining the doing
¶130of the thing afterward.” Id. at 41 (b) (citation and punctuation
¶131omitted; emphasis in original).
¶132 The Court of Appeals concluded that, as used in OCGA § 17-
¶13310-1 (a) (1) (B), the term “shall” is meant to be “directory rather than
¶134mandatory.” Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 42 (b). The Court of Appeals
¶135reached this conclusion based on the following determinations: (1)
¶136the statute “does not contain any negative words which would
¶137prevent DCS from sending notice of a probationer’s status outside
¶138 9 the 60-day window prescribed in the statute”; (2) the statute does
¶139not “in any other manner declare that a designated result will follow
¶140noncompliance or that the agency will cease to have authority to
¶141take specified action after 60 days”; (3) “even assuming a lack of
¶142performance by DCS, i.e., that it did not provide the prescribed
¶143notice within the 60-day window, probation is viewed generally as a
¶144matter of judicial grace since there is no substantial right to receive
¶145a probated sentence”; and (4) “a failure by DCS to provide notice
¶146within the 60-day window will result in no injury or prejudice to the
¶147substantial rights of interested persons.” Id. (citing Sanchez v.
¶148Walker County Dept. of Family and Children Svcs., 237 Ga. 406, 410
¶149(229 SE2d 66) (1976)).
¶150 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that, in this case, DCS “did
¶151not provide notice, at this time or at any other time, to the State and
¶152the trial court of the status of Clark’s probation as required by
¶153OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i).” Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 42 (b). But
¶154the Court of Appeals disagreed with Clark’s contention that, based
¶155upon DCS’s failure to provide notice, “his probation stands
¶156 10 terminated as a matter of law.” Agreeing with the trial court’s
¶157analysis, the Court of Appeals observed that “DCS’s notice to the
¶158State and the trial court during the 60-day window merely triggers
¶159a procedure that, in part, requires DCS to submit an order
¶160terminating probation,” which the trial court “shall execute unless
¶161the court or the prosecuting attorney requests a hearing on such
¶162matter within 30 days of the receipt if such order.” Id. at 43 (c)
¶163(emphasis in original).
¶164 To that end, the Court of Appeals explained that OCGA § 17-
¶16510-1 (a) (1) (B) (i) “grants the trial court the overarching discretion
¶166to ‘take whatever action it determines would be for the best interest
¶167of justice and the welfare of society’ once notice and an order of
¶168termination have been presented by DCS, regardless of whether the
¶169State requests a hearing.” Id. And the Court of Appeals determined
¶170that, based upon this clear language, “termination of probation is
¶171not automatic even if DCS complied with its initial duty to provide
¶172notice to the State and the trial court.” Id. Concluding that “the
¶173trial court correctly applied these principles when it denied Clark’s
¶174 11 motion to terminate probation” in this case, the Court of Appeals
¶175affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 44.
¶176 We granted Clark’s petition for certiorari and asked the parties
¶177to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
¶178the notice requirement of OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) is directory, as
¶179opposed to mandatory, and if the statute is mandatory, what (if
¶180anything) is the remedy for DCS’s failure to satisfy that
¶181requirement.
¶182 2. Analysis
¶183 (a) On appeal, Clark argues that the term “shall,” as used in
¶184OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B), is mandatory, and the Court of Appeals
¶185erred in concluding otherwise. We agree.
¶186 In statutory interpretation cases such as this, it is well settled that a statute draws its meaning from its text. When interpreting a statute, we must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it in the context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural and reasonable way. For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law – constitutional, statutory, and common law alike – that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question. When
¶187 12 we construe such statutory authority on appeal, our review is de novo.
¶188State v. Coleman, 306 Ga. 529, 530 (832 SE2d 389) (2019) (citations
¶189and punctuation omitted). “Moreover, ‘we assume that the General
¶190Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant when it comes
¶191to the meaning of statutes.’” Stubbs v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354, 363 (4)
¶192(840 SE2d 407) (2020) (citation omitted).
¶193 With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutory text in
¶194question, OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B). This statute provides:
¶195 (i) When a defendant with no prior felony conviction is convicted of felony offenses or is charged with felony offenses and is sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of [OCGA § 16-13-2] or Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, and the court imposes a sentence of probation or not more than 12 months of imprisonment followed by a term of probation, the court shall include a behavioral incentive date in its sentencing order that does not exceed three years from the date such sentence is imposed. Within 60 days of the expiration of such incentive date, if the defendant has paid all restitution owed; not had his or her probation revoked in the immediately preceding 24 months, or when the court includes a behavioral incentive date less than two years from the date a sentence was imposed, not had his or her probation revoked during such period; and not been arrested for anything other than a nonserious traffic offense as defined in [OCGA § 35-3-37], the Department of Community Supervision
¶196 13 shall notify the prosecuting attorney and the court of such facts. The Department of Community Supervision shall provide the court with an order to terminate such defendant’s probation which the court shall execute unless the court or the prosecuting attorney requests a hearing on such matter within 30 days of the receipt of such order. The court shall set the matter for a hearing as soon as possible but not more than 90 days after receiving the order to terminate. The court shall take whatever action it determines would be for the best interest of justice and the welfare of society.
¶197 (ii) This subparagraph is intended to be retroactive and shall be applied to any case in which a person with no prior felony conviction was convicted of felony offenses or was charged with felony offenses and was sentenced pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of [OCGA § 16-13-2] or Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, and the court imposed a sentence of probation or a sentence of not more than 12 months of imprisonment followed by a term of probation. A behavioral incentive date shall as a matter of law be included in the sentencing order, but in a case where it was not, the behavioral incentive date shall be three years from the date such sentence was imposed.
¶198OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i) and (ii) (emphasis supplied).
¶199 At issue here is whether the term “shall”—as used throughout
¶200the pertinent provisions of the statute—demonstrates that these
¶201procedures are meant to be mandatory or are merely directory. The
¶202 14 Court of Appeals relied on the following rule of statutory
¶203construction to conclude that OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) is directory:
¶204 Language contained in a statute which commands the doing of a thing within a certain time, when not accompanied by any negative words restraining the doing of the thing afterward, will generally be construed as merely directory and not as a limitation of authority, and this is especially so where no injury appeared to have resulted from the fact that the thing was done after the time limited by the plain wording of the Act. . . . A statutory provision is generally regarded as directory where a failure of performance will result in no injury or prejudice to the substantial rights of interested persons, and as mandatory where such injury or prejudice will result.
¶205Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family and Children Svcs., 237
¶206Ga. 406, 410 (229 SE2d 66) (1976) (emphasis supplied). See also
¶207Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 42 (b) (holding that a failure by the DCS to
¶208provide notice within the 60-day window “will result in no injury or
¶209prejudice to the substantial rights of interested persons”) (citing
¶210Sanchez, 237 Ga. at 410).
¶211 We disagree with the Court of Appeals that the statute is
¶212merely directory. First, the term “shall” is generally construed as
¶213mandatory unless there is a contextual reason to think it is merely
¶214 15 permissive. See Bell v. Hargrove, 313 Ga. 30, 33-34 (2) (867 SE2d
¶215101) (2021). See also Carr v. State, 303 Ga. 853, 856-857 (2), 865 (5)
¶216(a) n.15 (815 SE2d 903) (2018) (“Although the word ‘shall’ is
¶217generally construed as a mandatory directive, this Court has
¶218explained that it need not always be construed in that fashion, if the
¶219context in which it is used indicates a permissive instruction.”)
¶220(citation and punctuation omitted). There is no such contextual
¶221reason here; to the contrary, the context suggests that “shall” is
¶222mandatory. Among other things, the statute prescribes hard
¶223deadlines for both DCS and the trial court to carry out their tasks.
¶224See OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B).
¶225 Second, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that DCS’s
¶226failure to comply with the notice requirement of OCGA § 17-10-1 (a)
¶227(1) (B) in this context results in “no injury or prejudice to the
¶228substantial rights of interested persons,” like Clark. Clark, 371 Ga.
¶229App. at 42 (b). The test the Court of Appeals applied from Sanchez,
¶230237 Ga. at 410, is somewhat out of step with our more recent
¶231precedent. See Nelson v. Strickland, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (2) (___ SE2d
¶232 16 ___) (Case No. S24A1386, decided on January 28, 2025) (citation
¶233omitted). But, even under Sanchez, the statute is mandatory here
¶234because Clark’s substantial rights may be affected. In circumstances
¶235where DCS notifies the prosecuting attorney and the trial court of a
¶236defendant’s compliance with the terms of OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B)
¶237(i)—i.e., that restitution has been paid, probation has not been
¶238revoked in the immediately preceding 24 months, and there have
¶239been no arrests for anything other than nonserious traffic offenses—
¶240such notice is of benefit to that defendant as it could potentially
¶241result in the termination of his or her probation. And, without such
¶242notification from DCS, the trial court may not otherwise review the
¶243terms of this defendant’s probation, which could result in prejudice
¶244to the defendant’s “substantial rights.” Sanchez, 237 Ga. at 410. We
¶245therefore conclude that the notice requirement imposed by OCGA §
¶24617-10-1 (a) (1) (B) on DCS is mandatory.
¶247 (b) Although we have concluded that OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B)
¶248is mandatory, our analysis does not end there—because determining
¶249that the statutory provision is mandatory does not answer what
¶250 17 happens if DCS does not comply with the statute. To that end, Clark
¶251argues on appeal that, because the notice requirement of OCGA §
¶25217-10-1 (a) (1) (B) is mandatory, DCS’s failure to comply with this
¶253mandatory language results in the automatic termination of Clark’s
¶254probation. In support of this argument, Clark asserts that the
¶255statute “creates a system in which there is a presumption that
¶256probation will be terminated early when the behavioral incentive
¶257date is reached as long as the enumerated conditions have been
¶258met,” and in such circumstances, DCS “‘shall provide the court with
¶259an order to terminate,’” which “‘the court shall execute’ unless the
¶260prosecution or the court intervene to request a hearing on the matter
¶261within 30 days.” OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i). According to Clark,
¶262if DCS had provided a proposed order to the trial court in this case
¶263but a hearing had not been requested or scheduled within 30 days,
¶264the terms of the statute “would clearly require termination.” On this
¶265basis, Clark contends that the “the only sensible remedy . . . in the
¶266absence of a timely hearing [is that] a qualifying petitioner’s
¶267probation must be terminated as a matter of law.”
¶268 18 We disagree. Reading OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) “in its most
¶269natural and reasonable way,” Stubbs, 308 Ga. at 363 (4), we
¶270recognize that the statute provides that DCS “shall”—i.e., is
¶271required to—notify the prosecuting attorney and the trial court
¶272when a defendant has complied with and met the conditions of
¶273OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i). However, the statute does not provide
¶274that, if DCS fails to provide such notice, the trial court “shall” then
¶275execute an order terminating the defendant’s probation. OCGA § 17-
¶27610-1 (a) (1) (B) (i).
¶277 As explained by the Court of Appeals, “DCS’s notice to the
¶278State and the trial court during the 60-day window merely triggers
¶279a procedure that, in part, requires DCS to submit an order
¶280terminating probation” to the trial court. Clark, 371 Ga. App. at 43
¶281(c). But, even in instances where DCS properly provides notice and
¶282a proposed order terminating probation to the trial court, the statute
¶283provides that the trial court or the prosecuting attorney may still
¶284request “a hearing on such matter,” and following such hearing,
¶285“[t]he court shall take whatever action it determines would be for
¶286 19 the best interest of justice and the welfare of society.” OCGA § 17-
¶28710-1 (a) (1) (B) (i). In other words, the trial court maintains the
¶288discretion to decide whether to terminate a defendant’s probation in
¶289this context—termination is not automatic. See id. In the same
¶290way, when DCS fails to submit a proposed order terminating
¶291probation to the trial court in order to trigger this statutory
¶292procedure, automatic termination of a defendant’s probation is not
¶293the remedy for any such failure on DCS’s part. See id.
¶294 As it stands, nothing in the text of OCGA § 17-10-1 or the
¶295remaining provisions of Chapter 10 of Title 17—the chapter
¶296governing sentences and punishment—“provides a remedy, let alone
¶297an express remedy,” Stubbs, 308 Ga. 365 (4), for DCS’s failure to
¶298notify the prosecuting attorney and the trial court of a defendant’s
¶299compliance with the provisions necessary to have his or her
¶300probation terminated.4 See OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) (i). And the
¶301 ————————————————————— 4 We note that, in instances where DCS has not provided notice in compliance with OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B), a defendant could file a mandamus action against DCS to initiate the process. See OCGA § 9-6-20 et seq. Additionally, a defendant always has the right to move for early termination of his or her probation. See OCGA § 42-8-37 (b). 20 content of the statute does not reflect that the General Assembly
¶302meant for a defendant to be automatically released from probation
¶303as a result of DCS’s noncompliance with the notice requirement. See
¶304id. What the statute does reflect is that the parties are permitted to
¶305be heard in these matters and that the General Assembly vested the
¶306trial court with the absolute discretion to make determinations that
¶307are in “the best interest of justice and the welfare of society.” Id.
¶308 We therefore hold that DCS’s failure to provide notice under
¶309OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (B) does not result in the automatic
¶310termination of a defendant’s probated sentence, and we affirm the
¶311judgment of the Court of Appeals, albeit for a different reason. See
¶312Martinez-Arias v. State, 313 Ga. 276, 293 (4) (869 SE2d 501) (2022)
¶313(“Because the Court of Appeals’s ultimate judgment affirming
¶314Martinez-Arias’s convictions was correct, we affirm.”); Nordahl v.
¶315State, 306 Ga. 15, 27 (829 SE2d 99) (2019) (affirming the judgment
¶316of the Court of Appeals under the “right for any reason” doctrine).
¶317 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶318 21