¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: May 28, 2025
¶4 S25A0421. FRENCH v. THE STATE.
¶5 BETHEL, Justice.
¶6 A jury found Timothy French guilty of malice murder and
¶7related crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Arthur
¶8James Mosley.1 Following the denial of his motion for new trial,
¶9French appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in four respects.
¶10Because French has failed to show error, we affirm.
¶11 1 The crimes occurred in January 2008. In April 2014, a Lee County
¶12grand jury indicted French for malice murder, felony murder, and armed robbery. «V1. 18-20» An April 2015 jury trial ended in a mistrial. French was tried again in June 2015, and the jury found him guilty of all counts. The trial court sentenced French to serve life in prison for malice murder and a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery. The felony murder count was vacated by operation of law. Thereafter, French filed a timely motion for new trial through new counsel. The transcript for the hearing on the motion for new trial indicates that French amended the motion sometime before the July 2024 hearing, but the amended motion is not part of the appellate record. The trial court entered an order denying French’s motion, as amended, on August 27, 2024. French filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, and the case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. The evidence at trial showed that, in January 2008, Mosley, an
¶13elderly farmer, was found deceased in his home. An autopsy
¶14revealed Mosley’s cause of death to be more than ten sharp-force
¶15injuries to the chest and more than twenty sharp-force injuries to
¶16the head and neck. Mosley’s wallet was not found in his home.
¶17Several days later, a neighbor of French’s discovered Mosley’s
¶18wallet, which had been chewed and partially burned, in her yard.
¶19According to the neighbor, her dogs frequently returned home with
¶20trash from the surrounding area, and the residents of French’s home
¶21had previously complained about her dogs going into their yard and
¶22getting into the trash. From the neighbor’s backyard, there was a
¶23clear line of sight to French’s backyard, where there was an actively
¶24smoking burn pile.
¶25 Following advancements in DNA testing between 2008 and
¶262013, the pants Mosley was wearing at the time of his death were
¶27tested for “contact DNA.” DNA obtained from the back pocket
¶28contained a partial DNA profile consistent with French. The DNA
¶29analyst testified that the partial DNA profile would appear with a
¶30 2 frequency of “approximately 1 in 100,000,000 in the African-
¶31American population.” As a result of the DNA testing, investigators
¶32obtained a warrant for French’s arrest.
¶33 1. French first argues that the trial court erred by rejecting his
¶34Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike of a black
¶35potential juror. 2 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SCt 1712,
¶3690 LE2d 69) (1986). We disagree.
¶37 A Batson challenge involves three steps:
¶38 (1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent’s discriminatory intent.
¶39Thomas v. State, 309 Ga. 488, 490 (2) (847 SE2d 147) (2020) (citation
¶40and punctuation omitted). Because the trial court here went on to
¶41 2 The trial court also found that the Batson challenge was untimely, and
¶42French complains on appeal that this finding was erroneous. However, because the trial court also rejected the Batson challenge on the merits, we do not address the timeliness issue. See Coleman v. State, 256 Ga. 77, 78 (4) (343 SE2d 695) (1986) (“[Appellant] claims the trial court erred in entertaining arguments by the State that the motion was untimely filed and eventually ruling that the motion was untimely. But since the judge also ruled correctly on the merits of the case, we need not reach issues of timeliness.”). 3 the second step of the analysis and the State articulated its reasons
¶43for the peremptory strike, the issue of whether French has
¶44established a prima facie case under step one is moot. See Arrington
¶45v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 339 (9) (687 SE2d 438) (2009) (“[T]he trial
¶46court did require the State to articulate its reasons for the
¶47peremptory strikes, rendering moot the issue of whether [the
¶48appellant] had established a prima facie case.”).
¶49 “At step two, the proponent of the strike need only articulate a
¶50facially race-neutral reason for the strike.” Taylor v. State, 303 Ga.
¶51624, 631 (3) (814 SE2d 353) (2018) (citation and punctuation
¶52omitted). Here, the prosecutor explained that he struck the
¶53prospective juror based on her employment with the Division of
¶54Family and Children Services (DFCS). The prosecutor elaborated
¶55that, during his career, he had experienced three trials ending with
¶56a hung jury, and in two of those instances, the juries “were hung
¶57essentially by DFCS workers who took . . . a hardline stance, as I
¶58understood it from other jurors.” And based on that experience, the
¶59prosecutor decided that he “would never seat another person who
¶60 4 was employed, or had been substantially employed by DFCS in the
¶61history of their employment.” Contrary to French’s argument on
¶62appeal, the prospective juror’s employment is race-neutral on its
¶63face, and we have previously held that such a reason is sufficient to
¶64satisfy the prosecutor’s burden under Batson. See Taylor, 303 Ga. at
¶65632 (3) (noting that a potential juror’s employment is a race-neutral
¶66characteristic); Trice v. State, 266 Ga. 102, 103 (2) (464 SE2d 205)
¶67(1995) (affirming denial of Batson challenge where prosecutor’s
¶68reason for striking prospective juror was based on juror’s
¶69employment and prosecutor’s prior experience with lack of
¶70cooperation by employees of the same company and noting that
¶71“[t]he nature of a prospective juror’s employment is not a
¶72characteristic that is peculiar to any race” (citation and punctuation
¶73omitted)).
¶74 Finally, at step three, “the ultimate burden of persuasion is on
¶75the opponent of a strike to prove discriminatory intent.” Coleman v.
¶76State, 301 Ga. 720, 723, 724 (4) n.7 (804 SE2d 24) (2017). In
¶77assessing whether that burden has been carried, the trial court
¶78 5 “makes credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of
¶79the strike opponent’s prima facie showing and the explanations
¶80given by the strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances
¶81that bear upon the issue of racial animosity.” Johnson v. State, 302
¶82Ga. 774, 779-780 (3) (b) (809 SE2d 769) (2018) (citation and
¶83punctuation omitted). “A trial court’s finding as to whether the
¶84opponent of a strike has proven discriminatory intent is entitled to
¶85great deference and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”
¶86Id. at 780 (3) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). In arguing this
¶87issue below, French broadly implied that the prosecutor had acted
¶88with discriminatory intent in striking the prospective juror, pointing
¶89to the fact that the two jurors who voted “not guilty” at French’s first
¶90trial, which ended in a mistrial, were black. French did not attempt
¶91to refute the prosecutor’s previous factual experience and instead
¶92simply pointed to the prospective juror’s race and argued that he did
¶93not think that working for DFCS was “a reason to strike someone.”
¶94In response, the prosecutor again emphasized that he struck the
¶95prospective juror based on her employment with DFCS, noted that
¶96 6 he did not use a peremptory strike against any black potential jurors
¶97at French’s first trial, and argued that it is not his “modus operandi”
¶98to use peremptory strikes for race-based reasons.
¶99 On this record, we see no clear error in the trial court’s implicit
¶100determination that French failed to meet his burden of persuasion,3
¶101and French advances no argument to the contrary. Indeed, French’s
¶102attempt to refute the prosecutor’s explanation for the strike was far
¶103from compelling. See Thomas, 309 Ga. at 493 (2) (trial court’s finding
¶104of no discriminatory intent not clearly erroneous where appellant
¶105“expressed doubt about the prosecutor’s rationales for using
¶106peremptory strikes” but “failed to make any factual argument in
¶107support of those doubts or in support of his claim that the prosecutor
¶108acted with discriminatory intent”). See also, e.g., Demery v. State,
¶109287 Ga. 805, 808 (700 SE2d 373) (2010) (“The opponent of the strike
¶110 3 The trial court did not make an express finding on the third step of the
¶111Batson inquiry, but it heard French’s argument on the issue, as well as the State’s response, before denying French’s Batson challenge. See Coleman, 301 Ga. at 723-724 (4) (trial court “implicitly engaged in the third step” of Batson by hearing arguments from the defense as to why each reason proffered by the prosecutor was inadequate and then making its own findings as to each juror). 7 may carry its burden of persuasion by showing that similarly-
¶112situated members of another race were seated on the jury.” (citation
¶113and punctuation omitted)). And under the circumstances of this
¶114case, whether to credit the prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral
¶115explanation, as the trial court did here, necessarily entailed an
¶116“evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and
¶117credibility”; that evaluation “lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s
¶118province” and will not be disturbed on appeal. Johnson, 302 Ga. at
¶119780 (3) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). In short, the trial
¶120court’s finding that the prosecutor’s peremptory strike was not
¶121racially motivated was not clearly erroneous, and this claim fails.
¶122 2. In his second claim of error, French argues that the trial
¶123court erred by denying his motion for funds to retain a defense
¶124expert. Again, we disagree.
¶125 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for an expert
¶126witness for abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. 474, 476
¶127(2) (813 SE2d 384) (2018). As we have explained, where an indigent
¶128defendant seeks to obtain funds for an expert witness, his motion
¶129 8 should disclose to the trial court, with a reasonable degree of precision, why certain evidence is critical, what type of scientific testimony is needed, what that expert proposes to do regarding the evidence, and the anticipated costs for services. Lacking this information, a trial court will find it difficult to assess the need for assistance.
¶130Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶131 Here, French’s motion for funds indicated that he sought to
¶132retain an otherwise unidentified “independent lab qualified in
¶133forensic DNA analysis and testing” to review the test results
¶134showing that a partial profile of French’s DNA was obtained from
¶135Mosley’s pants. But other than these general assertions, French’s
¶136motion failed to make any specific showing as to whom the expert
¶137witness might be or the anticipated costs for the expert’s services.
¶138See Finn v. State, 274 Ga. 675, 677 (2) (558 SE2d 717) (2002)
¶139(explaining that a motion for funds to retain an expert witness must
¶140provide “specific information necessary for the trial court to fully
¶141consider [the] request” because “[w]ithout detailed information,
¶142neither the trial court, nor an appellate court, can determine
¶143whether the funds are necessary to protect the defendant’s due
¶144 9 process rights”). And in light of French’s failure to provide
¶145sufficiently detailed information to allow the trial court to make an
¶146informed decision about his need for assistance, we cannot say that
¶147the court abused its discretion by denying the motion for funds. See
¶148Williams, 303 Ga. at 476-477 (2) (affirming denial of motion for
¶149funds for expert witness that did not indicate what the expert
¶150proposed to do regarding the evidence at issue or what the
¶151anticipated cost for the expert’s services would be); Finn, 274 Ga. at
¶152677 (2) (affirming denial of motion for funds that “did not identify
¶153the expert [appellant] proposed to use, how that expert would
¶154examine the evidence, whether [appellant’s] examination would
¶155differ in any material aspects from the State’s expert and the
¶156independent expert, or the cost of the expert”); Roseboro v. State, 258
¶157Ga. 39, 40-41 (3) (c) (365 SE2d 115) (1988) (affirming denial of
¶158motion for funds for expert witness where motion “made no effort to
¶159demonstrate to the trial court what type of expert was needed, nor
¶160the qualifications of this expert, nor what tests the expert would
¶161perform” and did not “identif[y] by name and qualifications a specific
¶162 10 expert” or “indicate[] the amount in fees that any expert likely would
¶163charge” (emphasis omitted)).
¶164 3. In his third and fourth enumerations of error, French
¶165challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for change of venue
¶166and motion for mistrial, respectively. Beyond vaguely recounting the
¶167procedural history underlying these claims, however, French
¶168neither engages in substantive argument nor cites any legal
¶169authority in support of these alleged errors. Supreme Court Rule 22
¶170(1) states that in all briefs filed in cases other than death-penalty
¶171matters, “[a]ny enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error
¶172not supported by argument, citations to authority, and citations to
¶173the record shall be deemed abandoned.” And as we recently
¶174explained, “litigants must do more than just make an argument or
¶175cite authority” to comply with Rule 22. Byrd v. State, ___ Ga. ___,
¶176___ (2) (913 SE2d 667) (2025). Rather, to avoid having an
¶177enumeration deemed abandoned, litigants must “ensure that
¶178argument, citation to authority, and citation to the record are all
¶179present” with respect to each and every error enumerated in their
¶180 11 briefs. Id. (emphasis supplied). By omitting any legal analysis or
¶181citation of authority in support of his third and fourth enumerations
¶182of error, French has failed to comply with Rule 22, and, accordingly,
¶183we conclude that he has abandoned those claims of error. See
¶184id.; Sauder v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816 (7) n.21 (901 SE2d 124)
¶185(2024) (“[appellant] makes no specific argument and cites no
¶186authority to support any of these claims, so we do not address
¶187them”).
¶188 Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
¶189 12