State v. McCallum’s Empirical Analysis
1991
Citation profile
8 district · 77 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 85 later decisions — most recently August 2021 · most notably Hoffman v. Stamper (2005), Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett (1996)
8 district · 77 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Mullaney v. Wilbur · Pelaes v. United States · United States v. United States Gypsum Co. · Lawrence v. United States · Duvall v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"exists where a person believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.””
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Deliberate ignorance should be established if McCallum believed it was probable that his license was suspended and if he deliberately avoided contact with the MVA to evade notice. For example, the trier of fact could find that: 1) based on his failure to pay district court fines and failure to appear in court, McCallum knew that it was probable that his license was suspended; 2) McCallum failed to fulfill his obligation to keep MVA apprised of his current address, [fn] or that he failed to contact MVA after learning that for several months his mail was destroyed, and 3) McCallum deliberately avoided contact with MVA to avoid receiving notice of the suspension of his driver’s license. These findings should justify a conclusion that McCallum’s intentional avoidance of notice of his suspension satisfied the mens rea requirement and was the equivalent of actual knowledge of his suspension. [fn] Md.Code (1984, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Transportation Article, § 16-116(a) requires a licensed driver to notify the MVA within thirty days of moving from the address shown on the license.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“It would be a sad state of affairs if a suspension of driving privileges could not be made effective until the State had given actual notice of the suspension to the defendant. Irresponsibility, failure to obey the law regarding notification of change of address, and a nomadic lifestyle would be rewarded. Only those who were conscientious in attending to their affairs would be affected by suspensions. The legislature has required that the MVA follow procedures which are reasonably calculated to give actual notice of suspension to licensees. It has specifically delayed the effective date of suspension in cases of this kind, to reasonably ensure that the licensee receives notice and has an opportunity to correct any oversight. This is a reasonable, and in my judgment, lawful compromise between the Utopian desire for actual notice in every case, and the practical realization that requiring such notice is unworkable.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.