166
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Submitted May 11, affirmed August 3, 2022
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HANS COLTON WILKINSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lincoln County Circuit Court
19CR73908; A175025
Thomas O. Branford, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and John Evans, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Joanna Hershey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 321 Or App 166 (2022) 167
TOOKEY, P. J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
unlawful possession of methamphetamine ORS 475.894(2)(b)
(2019) (Count 1),1 and felon in possession of a restricted
weapon ORS 166.270(2) (Count 2). Defendant was convicted
of those offenses based on evidence obtained after defendant was initially stopped based on reasonable suspicion of
second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025, and probable cause that he had committed a traffic violation under
ORS 814.070 by walking in the roadway. Defendant assigns
error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress,
arguing that the arresting officer unlawfully exceeded the
subject-matter and durational limitations of the stop. We
affirm.
We review “a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for legal error,” and “we are bound by the
court’s finding of fact if they are supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record.” State v. Rodriguez,
320 Or App 1, 2,
511 P3d 424 (2022).
Defendant was walking along U.S. Highway 20,
near Toledo, Oregon. A police officer stopped him based on
reasonable suspicion of second-degree disorderly conduct,
ORS 166.025, and probable cause that defendant had violated ORS 814.070 by walking in the roadway. On appeal,
defendant does not challenge either of the bases for the stop.
About seven minutes into the stop, the officer explained that
he wanted “to try and educate [defendant] not to walk in
the middle of the road” but needed to identify defendant.
Defendant repeatedly declined to identify himself, and
the officer repeatedly told defendant that he must identify
himself or he would be arrested. About 17 minutes after
defendant was initially stopped, a back-up officer recalled
defendant’s name from a prior interaction, and determined
that defendant had an active warrant. The officers arrested
defendant and performed a consensual post-arrest search.
The officers discovered methamphetamine and a weapon
that was unlawful for defendant to possess, and defendant
was later charged for possession of both items.
1
ORS 475.894 was amended in 2021 in ways that do not bear on our analysis.
See Or Laws 2021, ch 591, § 39.
168 State v. Wilkinson
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress
“all evidence obtained from defendant” on the night of his
arrest, arguing that that evidence was obtained as a result
of an unlawful stop and search. The trial court denied the
motion to suppress, reasoning that the officer’s investigatory stop of defendant was lawful because the officer had
probable cause to believe that defendant had violated ORS
814.070 and reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed disorderly conduct in the second degree. In doing so,
the trial court also noted that “[t]he fact that the officers
told the Defendant that they just intended to ‘educate him’
does not detract from the existence of probable cause for the
stop.” Defendant was subsequently convicted of unlawful
possession of methamphetamine and felon in possession of a
restricted weapon.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained
after his arrest. Specifically, defendant argues that the officers violated defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights, because
prolonging the stop to repeatedly demand that defendant
identify himself exceeded the subject-matter and durational
limits of the stop.2
Under Article I, section 9, “all investigative activities, including investigative inquiries, conducted during a
traffic stop are part of an ongoing seizure and are subject
to both subject-matter and durational limitations.” State v.
Arreola-Botello, 365 Or 695, 712,
451 P3d 939 (2019).
Regarding subject-matter limitations, “an officer is
limited to investigatory inquiries that are reasonably related
to the purpose of the traffic stop or that have an independent
constitutional justification.” Id. Here, the officers’ attempt to
ascertain the identity of defendant during the traffic stop
was reasonably related to the stop. See State v. Watson,
353
Or 768, 782,
305 P3d 94 (2013) (“[A]n officer’s determination
2
Although the record shows that the officer’s stated basis for effectuating the
stop in this case was twofold—reasonable suspicion of second-degree disorderly
conduct, ORS 166.025, and probable cause that he had violated ORS 814.070 by
walking in the roadway—our analysis is focused, as is the parties’ briefing, on
the lawfulness of the stop and subsequent investigatory activities of defendant
based on probable cause that he had violated ORS 814.070.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 321 Or App 166 (2022) 169
of a person’s identity generally is reasonably related to the
officer’s investigation of a traffic infraction.”); State v. Mock,
310 Or App 454, 462,
485 P3d 295 (2021) (“Determining a
person’s identity … [is] reasonably related to the purpose
of a traffic stop, so long as those activities are not unreasonably lengthy.”); see also ORS 810.410(3)(b) (“A police officer
… [m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for
the purposes of investigation …, identification and issuance of citation.” (Emphasis added.)). Therefore, we conclude
that the officers did not violate the subject-matter limitation
imposed by Article I, section 9.
Regarding durational limitations, police authority
to detain a person “dissipates when the investigation reasonably related to that traffic infraction, the identification
of persons, and the issuance of a citation (if any) is complete
or reasonably should be completed.” State v. Krieger, 318 Or
App 441, 446,
508 P3d 62 (2022) (emphasis added). Here,
considering the circumstances of this case, the 17 minutes it
took to identify defendant was not “unreasonably lengthy,”
nor could it have been reasonably completed any sooner. The
officers could not reasonably have completed that identification any sooner, due to defendant’s repeated refusal to
identify himself; the time it took to identify defendant was
attributable to defendant’s own refusal to identify himself,
not the officers’ lack of diligence or unreasonable delay in
investigating, identifying, or citing defendant. Therefore, we
conclude that the officer did not violate the durational limitation imposed by Article I, section 9.
Defendant contends that, because the officer here
said his purpose was to educate defendant, the officer’s
efforts to identify defendant were not reasonably related
to the purpose of the stop. See Arreola-Botello, 365 Or at
712 (An officer’s investigatory inquiries during a traffic stop
must be “reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic
stop.” (Emphasis added.)). But that argument is unpersuasive, as we explain below.
As defendant notes, during the stop in this case,
the officers indicated that they wanted to educate defendant
about walking in the roadway. But defendant is incorrect
that that was the “purpose” of the stop. In the context of
170 State v. Wilkinson
investigative activities pursuant to a traffic stop, the relevant sense of “purpose” is “the purpose that permits the officer to stop an individual in the first place.” Id. at 711 (emphasis added). Here, as articulated by the officer, the relevant
purpose of the stop was to investigate defendant for a violation of ORS 814.070, and defendant does not challenge the
lawfulness of the stop for that purpose. The officer’s statements during the course of the investigatory stop that he
wanted to educate defendant about walking in the roadway
did not change the purpose of the stop. And, as noted above,
ORS 810.410(3)(b) authorized the officer to ascertain defendant’s identity as part of that investigation.
Affirmed.
