Nusbaum and Stone

                                358

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
       Argued and submitted January 7, affirmed August 10, 2022


                   In the Matter of the
            Registered Domestic Partnership of
                  Kimberly NUSBAUM,
                  Petitioner-Respondent,
                            and
                 Joseph Lee STONE, Jr.,
                  Respondent-Appellant.
             Deschutes County Circuit Court
                   19DR16144; A173641

  Alicia N. Sykora, Judge.
   Daniel S. Margolin argued the cause for appellant. Also
on the brief was Stephens Margolin PC.
  Kimberly Nusbaum waived appearance pro se.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
Powers, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2022)                                359

           ORTEGA, P. J.
         This is a proceeding involving a judgment of dissolution of domestic partnership following an Informal
Domestic Relations Trial. The trial court issued a judgment
on March 5, 2020, and a corrected judgment on February 8,
2021, accompanied by an extensive letter opinion explaining
the rationale for the division of real and personal property.
Appellant now claims the trial court erred (1) in dividing
real and personal property of common law domestic partners based on an incorrect “just and proper” analysis instead
of considering the express or implied intent of the parties;
and (2) in proceeding with an Informal Domestic Relations
Trial, which he claims should not have been utilized in the
dissolution of a common law domestic partnership.
        The first assignment of error is without basis.
The letter opinion accompanying the corrected judgment
stated the applicable legal standards for division of property between nonmarried partners and concluded that
the decision reflected the court’s best ability to “ascertain
the mutual intent of the parties in the overall partnership
and the mutual intent for each item or each item’s value.”
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s first assignment of error
without further discussion.
         Appellant concedes that his second assignment of
error is not preserved, but he urges us to review under the
plain error doctrine. ORAP 5.45(1). Even assuming, without
deciding, that the trial court erred in conducting an Informal
Domestic Relations Trial for the dissolution of a common
law domestic partnership, we would not exercise our discretion to correct the error. Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 

, 

 (1991).1 Appellant has not explained
the reasons that we should consider the error, apart from
his general assertion that the error resulted in the parties

    1
       In weighing whether to exercise discretion to correct plain error we may
consider
    “the competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of
    the error; the ends of justice in the particular case; how the error came to the
    court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring
    preservation of error have been served in the case in another way ….”
Ailes, 

 n 6.
360                                    Nusbaum and Stone

not being allowed to present their cases in accordance with
formal trial process. ORAP 5.45(7). However, the trial court
conducted a thorough hearing with testimony from both
domestic partners and numerous witnesses, who were subject to direct and cross-examination by the parties, and considered a variety of other documents as evidence. The trial
court ultimately offered an extensive explanation for the
distribution of the real and personal property at issue. In
the absence of a developed argument from appellant as to
what more he should have received through a formal trial
process, we see no basis on which to correct the claimed
error.
        Affirmed.