526
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Submitted September 27, 2021, affirmed August 31, 2022
In the Matter of T. S. C.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
T. S. C.,
Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
20CC05261; A174738
Todd L. Van Rysselberghe, Judge.
Alexander C. Cambier and Multnomah Defenders, Inc.,
filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Daniel Norris, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
Powers, Judge.
POWERS, J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 321 Or App 526 (2022) 527
POWERS, J.
Appellant seeks reversal of an order involuntarily
committing her to the custody of the Mental Health Division
for a period not to exceed 180 days, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a determination that she
suffered from a mental disorder that made her unable to
provide for her basic personal needs. Because the record is
legally sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion, we
affirm.
Neither party has requested that we review the
record de novo, and we conclude that this is not an “exceptional” case that warrants de novo review. See ORAP 5.40(8)(c)
(providing that the court will exercise its discretion to
review de novo “only in exceptional cases”). Thus, we view
the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed,
the record is legally sufficient to permit that outcome. State
v. T. W. W., 289 Or App 724, 726,
410 P3d 1032 (2018).
ORS 426.130 outlines the framework for the civil
commitment of a “person with mental illness.” That statutory framework defines a “person with mental illness”
to include a person who, because of a mental disorder, is
“[u]nable to provide for basic personal needs that are necessary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future, and is
not receiving such care as is necessary to avoid such harm.”
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B). To meet that standard, the state must
prove that the person is unable to provide for his, her, or
their “basic personal needs in a way that leaves the person
at nonspeculative risk of ‘serious physical harm’—meaning
that the person’s safe survival will be compromised—in the
near future, even though that risk is not imminent.” State v.
M. A. E., 299 Or App 231, 240,
448 P3d 656 (2019).
On appeal, appellant’s challenge is narrow. There
is no dispute that appellant, who has been diagnosed with
bipolar I disorder with psychotic features, has a mental
disorder and that there is a causal connection between the
mental disorder and the alleged inability to meet her basic
needs. Appellant’s challenge focuses on whether there was
sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that she
528 State v. T. S. C.
would sustain serious physical harm in the near future due
to lack of food, water, shelter, or medical care. We conclude
that there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court
could have found that appellant was unable to provide for
her basic personal needs necessary to avoid serious physical
harm in the near future.
The record contains evidence that appellant had
lost nine percent of her body weight over a six-month period
before the commitment hearing, had been hardly eating
before her commitment despite being provided with meals,
looked weak and unhealthy, and was barely at a healthy
weight at the time of the hearing. Due to poor fluid intake,
she had elevated creatinine levels that could damage her
kidneys. Although appellant was generally healthy otherwise, there was evidence that, because of appellant’s mental disorder, appellant would continue to lose weight and
would “continue to not take in what she needs in order for
her body to work as far as food and drink.” See, e.g., State v.
N. S., 306 Or App 140, 148-49,
472 P3d 818 (2020) (explaining that, among other evidence, the appellant’s inability or
refusal to obtain and consume adequate food supported her
basic needs commitment and concluding that “[i]t is common knowledge that a serious risk of harm can result from
the inadequate intake of food and, here, appellant had lost
weight and was not eating the food she was offered in the
hospital”).
There was also sufficient evidence for the trial court
to conclude that the risk of serious physical harm would
occur in the near future. Two witnesses testified that it
was likely that appellant would continue to lose weight and
further decompensate if she was in an unsupported environment. Moreover, although some of the identified risks of
injury due to appellant’s poor intake—such as kidney failure and the need for dialysis or a kidney transplant—were
“pretty far down the line” and thus may not satisfy the “near
future” requirement, there was also evidence that appellant
was at risk of “imminent death” due to her poor intake. The
mental health investigator testified that, due to her mental
disorder, appellant had been unable “to provide intake necessary to sustain her life” even in “a very controlled setting
where she’s literally being handed food” and it was unlikely
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 321 Or App 526 (2022) 529
that appellant would be able to meet her intake needs in
the future, “indicating a very substantial risk of imminent
death due to her poor intake and care for herself[.]” That
evidence, when viewed together with the other evidence in
the record including her nine percent weight loss in the six
months leading up to the commitment hearing and evidence
that she would continue to decompensate if released, leads
us to conclude that the record is legally sufficient to support
the trial court’s determination that there is a nonspeculative risk of serious physical harm in the near future due to
appellant’s inability to care for her basic needs.
Affirmed.
