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← 322 F.3d 1229 - Hulen v. Yates

Hulen v. Yates’s Empirical Analysis

322 F.3d 1229 · 2003

Citation profile

67
cited by 67 later decisions
April 2024
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 17 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 67 later decisions — most recently April 2024 · most notably Schrier v. University of Colorado (2005), Riggins v. Goodman (2009)

27 federal appellate · 17 district ·

470200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · Anderson v. Creighton · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Ex Parte: Edward T Young

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims. Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “First, we must determine whether the employee’s speech involves a matter of public concern. If so, we then balance the employee’s interest in commenting upon matters of public concern against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Third, if the balance tips in favor of the employee, the employee then must show that the speech was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision. Fourth, if the plaintiff establishes that speech was such a factor, the employer may demonstrate that it would have taken the same action against the employee even in the absence of the protected speech.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[f]or the balance to be struck in favor of the governmental employer, there must be some evidence of actual disruption. Finn, 249 F.3d at 1249 . Although a governmental employer may sometimes rely upon predictions of disruption supported by evidence, that does not apply here because the challenged action came several months after the protected speech. See Kent v. Martin, 252 F.3d 1141 , 1145—46 (10th Cir.2001) {“That legal standard is inapplicable when an employer has allowed an employee to continue to work after the protected expression.”).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.