294
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Argued and submitted on April 11, reversed and remanded October 5, 2022
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
COLLIN QUENTIN HOAG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lincoln County Circuit Court
19CR57456; A174321
Amanda R. Benjamin, Judge pro tempore.
Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Susan G. Howe, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Powers, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Hellman, Judge.
POWERS, P. J.
Reversed and remanded.
Cite as 322 Or App 294 (2022) 295
POWERS, P. J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction
for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS
813.010(4), and contends in two combined assignments
of error that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress physical evidence and his statements. Before
trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial
court denied. Subsequently, defendant entered a conditional
guilty plea pursuant to ORS 135.335(3), reserving for appeal
the trial court’s denial of his “motion to dismiss due to lack
of probable cause for stop & arrest of defendant.” For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant reserved his
right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress as it
related to his argument that he was arrested without probable cause. We further conclude that the trial court erred
in denying the motion to suppress, because defendant was
arrested when he was handcuffed, which requires probable
cause, and the trial court’s determination that the arresting
officer had reasonable suspicion was insufficient to justify
that arrest. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to allow
defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea and
for the court to reconsider defendant’s suppression motion
under the correct legal standard if defendant withdraws his
plea.
As an initial matter, we first consider whether
defendant reserved his right to appeal the adverse pretrial
ruling. Under ORS 135.335(3), a defendant “may enter a
conditional plea of guilty or no contest reserving, in writing, the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of
an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.”
As we have explained, to meet the requirements of ORS
135.335(3), the reservation must be in writing and the reservation must specify the pretrial motion for which appellate
review is sought, although that latter specification need not
be in writing. State v. Slight, 301 Or App 237, 241, 243,
456
P3d 366 (2019).
Here, defendant reserved in writing the “denial
of defense motion to dismiss due to lack of probable cause
for stop & arrest of defendant.” That readily satisfies
the requirement that the reservation be in writing. The
296 State v. Hoag
remaining question is whether defendant’s reservation specified the pretrial ruling for which he now seeks appellate
review.
We conclude that defendant’s reservation adequately
specified part of the pretrial ruling that he now challenges
on appeal, viz., the denial of the motion to suppress to the
extent that the denial related to defendant’s arguments
about an unlawful arrest. That reservation encompassed
his argument on appeal that the trial court should have
suppressed physical evidence (his keys) and his statements
because that evidence derived from the unlawful arrest.1 To
the extent that the state’s argument suggests that defendant’s reservation specified only the question of whether
probable cause justified his stop or arrest and did not
encompass the discovery of his car keys and admission to
driving, we are unpersuaded. In his conditional guilty plea,
defendant reserved for appeal the “denial of defense motion
to dismiss due to lack of probable cause,” although the trial
court’s pretrial ruling was a denial of his motion to suppress.
In spite of defendant’s reservation’s reference to the denial of
a “motion to dismiss” rather than the “motion to suppress,”
we understand defendant to have reserved the denial of the
motion to suppress to the extent that the denial related to
his argument that he was arrested without probable cause
and that evidence derived from that unlawful arrest should
have been suppressed. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of
that argument.
We review the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to suppress for legal error. State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 163, 165,
389 P3d 1121 (2017). In so doing,
we are bound by the court’s factual findings if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them.
State v. Ehly,
317 Or 66, 75,
854 P2d 421 (1993). Where the
court did not make express findings, and there is evidence
1
We reject defendant’s contention that he reserved the pretrial ruling as it
pertained to an invocation of his right to remain silent under Article I, section 12,
of the Oregon Constitution. The written reservation specifically focused on the
motion to suppress “due to lack of probable cause for stop & arrest of defendant”
and did not include any reference to the independent ground for suppression
under Article I, section 12. Accordingly, we do not address defendant’s argument
on that point.
Cite as 322 Or App 294 (2022) 297
from which the court could have found a fact in more than
one way, we presume that the court decided the facts consistently with its ultimate conclusion.
Id.
Applying that standard of review, we briefly recount
the facts. On a late August day around 2:00 a.m., a Lincoln
County Deputy Sheriff saw defendant near a car that was
unlawfully parked and blocking a lane of traffic on Highway
101 in downtown Newport. The car, which was parked on
the wrong side of the highway, was registered in defendant’s
name. While speaking with defendant, the deputy observed
signs of intoxication, including bloodshot and watery eyes
and slurred speech. When defendant began to walk away,
the deputy, who was alone, handcuffed defendant and
read him Miranda warnings. Defendant confirmed that he
understood his rights and continued to speak with the deputy and with a cover officer who had arrived. Among other
statements, defendant acknowledged that the car keys in
his pocket belonged to him and admitted that he had driven
the car. The deputy then told defendant that he was under
arrest.
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress. At
the suppression hearing, defendant asserted, among other
arguments, that he was arrested without probable cause
when he was handcuffed and that all evidence stemming
from the unlawful arrest should be suppressed, including
the keys and his statements. The trial court denied the
motion, concluding that defendant was “clearly seized at the
point or stopped at the point when he was … placed in
handcuffs by the officer” and that the deputy had reasonable
suspicion that the crime of DUII had been committed.
On appeal, defendant contends, and the state concedes, that defendant was arrested when he was handcuffed,
and that the trial court’s ruling that the deputy had reasonable suspicion of DUII was insufficient to justify defendant’s
arrest. We agree that, under the circumstances of this case,
defendant was arrested when he was handcuffed and that
the trial court’s determination of reasonable suspicion was
insufficient to justify that arrest. See, e.g., State v. Phillips,
312 Or App 239, 247 n 4,
491 P3d 99 (2021) (explaining that
“the restriction imposed by handcuffing defendant typically
298 State v. Hoag
converts a stop into an arrest, requiring the officer to possess
probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, of the commission
of a crime”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and we
also decline to affirm under the alternative basis advanced
by the state. See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of
Oregon,
331 Or 634, 659-60,
20 P3d 180 (2001) (outlining
the requirements for affirming based on the “right for the
wrong reason” doctrine).
As previously discussed, defendant’s conviction in
this case was the result of a conditional guilty plea under
ORS 135.335(3), which provides:
“With the consent of the court and the state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or no contest
reserving, in writing, the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who finally prevails on
appeal may withdraw the plea.”
Because defendant has prevailed on appeal, we reverse and
remand to allow defendant the opportunity to withdraw his
guilty plea. If defendant withdraws his guilty plea, the trial
court will have the opportunity to reconsider defendant’s
suppression motion under the correct legal standard. See,
e.g., State v. Smith, 295 Or App 135, 136,
430 P3d 228 (2018)
(explaining that, when we reverse a judgment of conviction
based on a conditional guilty plea under ORS 135.335(3)
because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard
in denying the suppression motion, the correct disposition
is to direct the trial court to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and “for the court to reconsider defendant’s suppression motion under the correct legal standard
if defendant withdraws [the] plea”).
Reversed and remanded.
