State v. S. P. M.

                               768

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
          Submitted October 26, affirmed November 23, 2022


                In the Matter of S. P. M.,
         a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                             v.
                         S. P. M.,
                        Appellant.
             Deschutes County Circuit Court
                  21CC06846; A177592


  Owyhee Weikel-Magden, Judge pro tempore.
   Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc. filed
the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  EGAN, J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2022)                                   769

            EGAN, J.
         In this involuntary commitment case, appellant
seeks reversal of a judgment committing her to the custody
of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed
180 days and an order prohibiting the purchase or possession of firearms. On appeal, appellant contends that the
record lacks clear and convincing evidence that, due to a
mental disorder, appellant was a danger to others. ORS
426.005(1)(f)(A). As we explain below, the record supports
the court’s determination that appellant was a danger to
others. Accordingly, we affirm.
         The trial court may involuntarily commit someone if
it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a “person with a mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C).
A “person with a mental illness” is someone who suffers
from a “mental disorder,” and is “dangerous to self or others”
as a result of that disorder. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A). A person is
“dangerous to others” if the person’s “mental disorder makes
[her] highly likely to engage in future violence toward others, absent commitment.” State v. E. J. J., 

, 

 (2021) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).1 Threatening statements can justify a finding that a person is dangerous to others, but in that case,
the court “require[s] that evidence of threats be accompanied by evidence of an overt act directed toward fulfilling
the threats, or evidence that those threats are made under
circumstances making future harmful acts highly likely.”
State v. K. L., 

, 

 (2008); see
also State v. C. J., 

, 

 (2022).
        With regard to our standard of review, “[u]nless we
exercise our discretion to review an order of civil commitment de novo (which we do not here), we view the evidence,
as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative

    1
      Appellant argues on appeal that we should redefine “dangerous to others” to
match its definition for “dangerous to self.” A finding of “dangerous to self” requires
evidence of a “particularized and highly probable threat to appellant’s safe survival, including a risk of substantial harm, in the near future.” State v. B. B.,

, 

 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). However, we have defined “dangerous to others” for the purposes of ORS
426.005(1)(f)(A), and appellant does not provide any persuasive argument as to
why we should disregard our previous case law.
770                                                         State v. S. P. M.

inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was
legally sufficient to permit that outcome.” State v. M. J. F.,

, 

 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, in view of the clear-andconvincing-evidence standard of proof that applies in civil
commitment proceedings, the question for … the reviewing court is whether a rational factfinder could have found
that it was highly probable that appellant was a danger
to herself or others because of a mental disorder.” State v.
S. A. R., 

, 

 (2021) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
         In summary, at the commitment hearing in this
case, the state presented evidence that: (1) appellant was
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and, at the time of her commitment, she was having a manic episode with psychotic
features; (2) appellant burglarized her neighbor due to her
mental disorder, ripping the door off its hinges in the process;
(3) appellant’s condition worsened in the hospital such that
she was placed in seclusion for most of the time to prevent
her from harming staff or other patients; (4) while in seclusion she continuously threatened staff and other patients;
and (5) on the date of the hearing, she expressed that other
people would not be safe if she was let out of seclusion, and
she continued to make threats about harming staff.
        At the end of the commitment hearing, the trial
court ordered appellant committed, because it determined
that she was a “danger to others”;2 entered a judgment
committing appellant to the Oregon Health Authority for a
period not to exceed 180 days; and entered an order prohibiting purchase or possession of firearms.
        As noted above, appellant argues that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that she suffered from a mental disorder that makes her dangerous to others. Appellant argues
that burglary is not a violent act on its own to support a
    2
      Appellant argues that this court should only consider the testimony from
the commitment hearing—and no other evidence in the record—because the trial
court said, “after considering the testimony here today, I am going to have [appellant] committed for 180 days.” We reject that argument because, among other
reasons, the trial court’s order of commitment says that the court considered “the
findings of the examiner and all other evidence presented[.]”
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2022)                                771

determination she was a danger to others, and she did not
take any “overt acts” to follow through on the threats that
she made while hospitalized.
          We disagree with appellant. The state presented
evidence from which a rational factfinder could have found
that it was highly probable that appellant was a danger to
others because of a mental disorder. That evidence included
her own statements to the healthcare providers and examiners, the facts that led to her initial hospitalization, her worsened condition while hospitalized, her threats both during
and outside of seclusion that persisted even to the day of the
commitment hearing, and her aggressive behaviors toward
staff and other patients when released from seclusion. Both
her psychiatrist and the mental health examiners testified
that appellant was bipolar and having a manic episode and
that, because of her disorder, and based on her actions while
being hospitalized, she would likely be a danger to others.
         Although appellant did not physically harm anyone
before or during her hospitalization, physical harm is not
required for a trial court to determine someone is a “danger to others.” State v. K. S., 

, 

 (2008). When appellant was released from seclusion at
the hospital, she engaged in “overt acts” that signaled she
would fulfill her threats to harm hospital staff or patients.
The only reason someone was not “actually harmed” during
her hospital stay was because a hospital staff member
intervened in time to prevent physical contact. As such, a
rational factfinder could have found that it was highly probable that appellant was a danger to others because of her
mental disorder.3
        In sum, the evidentiary record is legally sufficient
to support the court’s determination that appellant was a
     3
       Appellant also argues that “the trial court did not find there was sufficient
evidence appellant had a qualifying mental disorder or that there was a nexus
between the mental disorder and danger to others.” This is incorrect, however,
as the trial court’s order committing appellant found that appellant is mentally
ill. Furthermore, the order prohibiting purchase or possession of firearms states,
“the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that [appellant] would constitute a danger to self or others or the community at large as a result of [her]
mental or psychological state as demonstrated by past behavior or participation
in incidents involving unlawful violence or threats of unlawful violence, or by
reason of a single incident of extreme, violent, unlawful conduct.”
772                                        State v. S. P. M.

danger to others because of her mental disorder. Therefore,
the trial court did not err by committing appellant, nor did
the trial court err by prohibiting appellant from the purchase or possession of a firearm.
        Affirmed.