¶1dissenting:
¶2I respectfully dissent. The trial judge initially granted appellant’s request to charge the jury in the penalty phase that appellant would not be eligible for parole for thirty years if the jury found an aggravating circumstance and recommended a life sentence. This initial ruling was made prior to jury voir dire, and profoundly influenced that process, the se*396lection of jurors, and the presentation of the guilt phase evidence. It was not until after the jury had returned the guilty verdicts that appellant’s attorneys learned the judge had changed his mind and decided not to give the charge. Whether or not the initial ruling was the proper one, it is fundamentally unfair to change the ground rules in mid-trial. Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E. (2d) 87 (1990). In my opinion, the circumstances of this case require that appellant be granted a new trial.
¶3Further, in my opinion, appellant’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the judge refused to charge the jury on appellant’s parole eligibility after the issue was explored on voir dire. See State v. Young, — S.C. —, 459 S.E. (2d) 84 (1995) (Finney, A.J., dissenting). This error alone mandates a new sentencing proceeding.
¶4For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.