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← 323 F.2d 201 - Samuel Bailey v. Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi

Samuel Bailey v. Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi’s Empirical Analysis

323 F.2d 201 · 1963

Citation profile

97
cited by 97 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
April 2018
most recently cited

56 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 97 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2018 · most notably Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. (1970), Perez v. Ledesma (1971)

56 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions

470196319701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United States v. W. T. Grant Co. · Shelley v. Kraemer · Massachusetts v. Mellon · Hecht Co. v. Bowles · Poe v. Ullman

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 97 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he very nature of the rights [the plaintiffs] [sought] to vindicate require[d] that the decree run to the benefit not only of [the plaintiffs] but also for all persons similarly situated.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “[t]he purpose of an injunction is to prevent future violations.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. ““There is at least considerable doubt that relief confined to individual specified Negro children either could be granted or, if granted, could be so limited in its operative effect. By the very nature of the controversy, the attack is on the unconstitutional practice of racial discrimination. Once that is found to exist, the Court must order that it be discontinued. Such a decree, of course, might name the successful plaintiff as the party not to be discriminated against. But that decree may not — either expressly or impliedly — affirmatively authorize continued discrimination by reason of race against others. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 . Moreover, to require a school system to admit the specific successful plaintiff Negro child while others, having no such, protection, were required to attend schools in a racially segregated system, would be for the court to contribute actively to the class discrimination proscribed by Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 5 Cir., 1962, 308 F.2d 491, 499 , on rehearing 308 F.2d 503 ; see also Ross v. Dyer, 5 Cir., 1962, 312 F.2d 191 . The effect of this last consideration is to afford additional basis for affirmance. In this light, if it was an error to treat the case as a class suit and enter such a decree, such error, if any, was harmless since the decree for all practical purposes would have been the same had it been confined to the Teal or Flax children.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.