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← 323 F.3d 445 - Moss v. United States

Moss v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

323 F.3d 445 · 2003

Citation profile

121
cited by 121 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
7
states following
November 2025
most recently cited

48 federal appellate · 21 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 121 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2025 · most notably United States v. Infante (2005), McFarland v. Yukins (2004)

48 federal appellate · 21 state decisions

760200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 952 · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Apprendi v. New Jersey · Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · Gideon v. Wainwright · Hill v. Lockhart

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 121 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “First a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was ‘deficient,’ involving'‘errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’ .... Second, even if counsel’s performance is deemed deficient, a defendant must show that those deficiencies were prejudicial to the defense. To make this showing, the defendant must demonstrate that there ‘is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing ... the evil — it bears repeating — -is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotia tions and in the sentencing process.... The mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate’s conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “occurs where a single attorney represents two or more co-defendants in the same proceeding.” Id. at 455 . Here, Appellant and Eapmon were not jointly represented by Delaney, as Delaney represented them at different stages — Eapmon through his guilty plea prior to trial and Appellant during his second sentencing phase. Thus, Delaney engaged in successive representation of Eapmon and Appellant. . If Appellant’s counsel”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.