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2024 PA Super 202
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL ANTHONY CAHILL :
:
Appellant : No. 140 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 11, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-01-CR-0001412-2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2024
Michael Anthony Cahill appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
after he was convicted of obstructing administration of law, resisting arrest,
driving under the influence (DUI), possession of a small amount of marijuana,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with an obscured registration
plate.1 Police stopped him for driving with a license plate cover, after this
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 282 A.3d 796 (Pa. Super.
2022) (holding any partial license plate cover violates Section 1332 of the
Vehicle Code), and before the enactment of Act 112 of 2022 (amending
Section 1332 to permit some license plate frames). We hold the trial court
properly denied suppression because the police had probable cause to suspect
that Cahill violated the law as it existed at the time of the stop. Further, we
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101, 5104, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2), 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(31)(i), (a)(32), and 75 Pa.C.S. § 1332(b)(3).
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find the evidence sufficient to sustain Cahill’s convictions for DUI and resisting
arrest. Accordingly, we affirm.
This case arose from an incident on September 28, 2022, when Trooper
Bradley Fornwalt of the Pennsylvania State Police stopped Cahill in Adams
County, Pennsylvania. Trooper Fornwalt charged Cahill with the above
offenses and three moving violations. The charges were held for court.
Cahill moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop. The trial court
held a hearing and found that Trooper Fornwalt observed Cahill driving with a
license plate cover that prevented him from reading the license plate from
approximately 20 feet away. The court concluded that the ensuing traffic stop
was supported by probable cause that Cahill violated Section 1332(b) of the
Vehicle Code in effect at the time of the stop. The court denied suppression.
The case proceeded to a non-jury trial. Trooper Fornwalt was the only
witness. The trial court recounted the facts as follows:
On September 28, 2022, at approximately 10:24 AM, Trooper
Bradley Fornwalt . . . of the Pennsylvania State Police was in a
marked patrol vehicle in Straban Township, Adams County,
Pennsylvania. Trooper Fornwalt has approximately five years of
law enforcement experience. He has received Standard Field
Sobriety Test and ARIDE training. He has conducted
approximately 350 DUI investigations, of which 250–280 involved
marijuana.
Trooper Fornwalt observed a grey Honda Accord driving with tags
that he could not read because of a covering over the license plate.
Trooper Fornwalt then effectuated a traffic stop [based on the
obscured registration plate].
[Cahill] was driving the Honda Accord and lit a cigarette as
Trooper Fornwalt approached. Once the cigarette was put out,
Trooper Fornwalt could smell the odor of burnt marijuana.
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Trooper Fornwalt observed [Cahill] had red, bloodshot, and glassy
eyes. [Cahill] told Trooper Fornwalt that there was marijuana in
the car and that he was a medical marijuana user in Maryland, but
he did not have a Pennsylvania card. There were two containers
of labeled marijuana in the car, but they were not packaged
properly based on Pennsylvania regulations . . . . Based on these
observations, Trooper Fornwalt believed [Cahill] was under the
influence of a controlled substance and ordered [Cahill] to exit the
vehicle.
[Cahill] performed several Standard Field Sobriety Tests and
ARIDE tests. During the Walk and Turn Test, [Cahill] started the
test too soon, had an improper turn, and raised his arms on the
return walk. During the One-Leg Stand Test, [Cahill] was swaying
and put his foot down after 26 seconds. During the Modified
Romberg Test, [Cahill] had eyelid tremors and swayed in a circular
motion. During the Lack of Convergence Test, [Cahill’s] left eye
did not converge. Trooper Fornwalt testified that these were all
indicators that [Cahill] was under the influence of a controlled
substance. Additionally, [Cahill] gave consent for Trooper
Fornwalt to search his vehicle, and Trooper Fornwalt found a metal
grinder and a smoking device. Based on these observations, and
based on his training and experience, Trooper Fornwalt believed
[Cahill] was under the influence of a controlled substance to a
degree rendering him incapable of safe driving. Trooper Fornwalt
then placed [Cahill] under arrest for driving under the influence.
[Cahill] refused to consent to a blood draw, and he was taken to
the Pennsylvania State Police Gettysburg Station. Trooper
Fornwalt began the process of obtaining a search warrant, but
[Cahill] kept asking to see a lawyer or see a judge. Trooper
Fornwalt explained that he had to finish the search warrant first.
[Cahill] was seated on a bench, handcuffed. [Cahill] began
banging his head on the wall. [Cahill] hit his head hard enough
that the whole wall shook and a Lieutenant a few rooms over could
hear it. Several officers had to stop [Cahill] and restrain him to
keep him from injuring himself. After [Cahill] was given a chance
to calm down, [Cahill] refused, and it required six officers to
restrain him. The officers then decided to take [Cahill] to a patrol
vehicle to transport him to the prison. [Cahill] kicked his feet and
flailed around. Multiple officers had to hold his arms, midsection,
and feet while he was on the ground. Multiple troopers had to
assist with taking [Cahill] to the patrol vehicle. One trooper had
to sit in the back of the patrol vehicle with [Cahill] to hold his head
still, which Trooper Fornwalt testified was not usually required.
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[Cahill’s] actions prevented Trooper Fornwalt from completing the
process of obtaining a search warrant for a blood draw, and no
blood draw was taken.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/13/24, at 1–4 (footnotes omitted).
The trial court found Cahill guilty of obstructing administration of law,
resisting arrest, DUI, possession of a small amount of marijuana, possession
of drug paraphernalia, and driving with an obscured registration plate and not
guilty of the three moving violations. On January 11, 2024, the trial court
sentenced Cahill to an aggregate term of 3 to 6 months of confinement,
concurrent with 24 months of probation.
Cahill timely appealed on January 25, 2024. Cahill and the trial court
complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. Cahill presents
three issues for review:
Whether the trial court erred in denying [Cahill’s] Motion for
Suppression of Evidence, inasmuch as Trooper Fornwalt lacked
probable cause or reasonable suspicion required to initiate a traffic
stop?
Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Cahill] was guilty of driving under
the influence of a controlled substance to such an extent that he
was incapable of safe driving?
Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove
[Cahill’s] guilt of resisting arrest beyond a reasonable doubt?
Cahill’s Brief at 4 (format altered).
Cahill first challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He
argues that Trooper Fornwalt used the obstructed license plate as a pretext to
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stop him,2 but the stop was based on a mistake of law and thus lacked
probable cause. Specifically, Cahill claims this Court’s opinion in Ruffin “was
in error” based on subsequent legislation, so Trooper Fornwalt could not rely
on our interpretation of Section 1332 to initiate a traffic stop.
We apply the following standard:
Our review is limited to determining whether the record supports
the findings of fact of the suppression court and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those findings are correct. We are bound
by the factual findings of the suppression court, which are
supported by the record, but we are not bound by the suppression
court’s legal rulings, which we review de novo.
Commonwealth v. Mendoza, 287 A.3d 457, 462 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting
Commonwealth v. James,
69 A.3d 180, 186 (Pa. 2013)). Where the factual
findings are not in dispute, this Court applies the same legal standard as the
suppression court—here, to determine whether Trooper Fornwalt had a
constitutionally sufficient basis to stop Cahill. See
id. at 463 n.5.
A traffic stop is a “seizure” for constitutional purposes, entitling the
subject of the stop to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 147–48 (Pa. Super. 2021). The
quantum of cause needed to stop a vehicle turns on whether the stop can
“serve a stated investigatory purpose.”
Id. at 148 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Feczko,
10 A.3d 1285, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)). Where further
investigation is needed, e.g., a stop for suspected DUI, an officer needs
____________________________________________
2 Cahill’s premise alone affords him no relief.
Pretextual traffic stops, even for
“minor” offenses, are not unlawful. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
813–14 (1996); Commonwealth v. Chase,
960 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa. 2008).
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reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Commonwealth v. Walls, 206
A.3d 537, 541 (Pa. Super. 2019). Where further investigation would provide
no additional information, e.g., a stop for an obscured license plate, an officer
needs probable cause. Ruffin,
282 A.3d at 801.
Probable cause for a search or seizure is a “practical, non-technical
concept” that depends on the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth
v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 40 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted).
In order for a traffic stop to be justified, a police officer must have
probable cause to believe that a violation of the Vehicle Code or
regulations has taken place. The officer must be able to articulate
specific facts possessed by him at the time of the questioned stop,
which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or
the driver was in some violation of some provision of the Vehicle
Code. Probable cause does not require certainty, but rather exists
when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even
the most likely inference.
Commonwealth v. Lindblom, 854 A.2d 604, 607 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Mickley,
846 A.2d 686, 689 (Pa. Super. 2004)).
Under the United States Constitution, a traffic stop can be lawful if it is
based on an officer’s reasonable mistake of law. Heien v. North Carolina,
574 U.S. 54, 67 (2015); see
id. at 69–70 (Kagan, J., concurring) (elaborating
on which mistakes of law are “reasonable”). However, as Cahill notes,
Pennsylvania courts have held that a mistake of law, “reasonable or
otherwise,” cannot support a warrantless stop. Commonwealth v. Rachau,
670 A.2d 731, 735 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).3
____________________________________________
3 Based on the disposition of this case, we do not resolve the apparent tension
between Heien and Rachau.
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Analysis of Cahill’s argument depends on the history of the relevant
statute, case law, and legislation. At the time of the stop in this case, the
statute at issue provided:
(b) Obscuring plate.--It is unlawful to display on any vehicle a
registration plate which:
(1) is so dirty as to prevent the reading of the number or
letters thereon at a reasonable distance;
(2) is obscured in any manner which inhibits the proper
operation of an [automated enforcement or electronic toll
collection system];
(3) is otherwise illegible at a reasonable distance or is
obscured in any manner; or
(4) is obscured, covered or otherwise obstructed in a
manner which inhibits the visibility of the issuing jurisdiction
at a reasonable distance.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1332(b) (effective Aug. 4, 2017, through Nov. 2, 2022)
(emphasis added).4
On August 23, 2022, this Court held as a matter of first impression that
Section 1332(b)(3) “unambiguously prohibits the obstruction or concealment
of any portion of a registration plate, including the address to our
commonwealth’s tourism website.” Ruffin, 282 A.3d at 804. We explained
____________________________________________
4 Prior law also prohibited displaying an obscured registration plate. Act of
April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, No. 32, § 504. Notably, the 1959 Vehicle Code defined
an “Obscured Registration Plate” as one on which “the characters . . . are not
legible” from 50 feet away in daylight. Id. § 102. The 1976 Vehicle Code did
not retain this definition, providing instead: “It is unlawful to display on any
vehicle a registration plate which is so dirty as to prevent the reading of the
number or letters thereon at a reasonable distance or is otherwise illegible at
a reasonable distance or is obscured in any manner.” Act of June 17, 1976,
P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1332(b) (emphasis added).
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that the statute “unambiguously pertains to any partial covering of a
Pennsylvania license plate.” Id. Consequently, under this Act, a police officer
had probable cause to stop a vehicle that had a license plate frame obscuring
the tourism website information on the bottom of the registration plate. Id.
On November 3, 2022, the Governor approved Act 112, which amended
Section 1332(b) and added a rule of construction to allow for the use of frames
around registration plates.5 The statute now provides:
(b) Obscuring plate.--It is unlawful to display on any vehicle a
registration plate which:
(1) is so dirty as to prevent the reading of the number or
letters thereon at a reasonable distance;
(2) is illegible, obscured, covered or otherwise obstructed in
any manner which inhibits the proper operation of [an
automated enforcement or electronic toll collection system];
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5 The remarks of Senator Scott Martin signal the legislative intent:
Mr. President, this amendment also includes language from my
Senate Bill No. 1357, which protects Pennsylvania drivers from
the recent Commonwealth Court [sic] decision that effectively
made license plate frames illegal in Pennsylvania. That decision
not only put an incredible amount of Pennsylvanians at risk for
being pulled over for simply having a frame around their plates
from their local car dealer or favorite sports team, but it also put
an unreasonable expectation on law enforcement to consistently
apply the ruling. This legislation would clarify the statute to make
it clear: only the necessary identifiable information of the plate is
needed to be visible. It also outright bans the use of tinted covers
on license plates that have caused enforcement issues for
automated plate readers and law enforcement statewide.
2022 Pa. Legislative Journal—Senate 1129 (Oct. 25, 2022).
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(3) is illegible, obscured, covered or otherwise obstructed in
any manner at a reasonable distance;
(4) is illegible, obscured, covered, or otherwise obstructed
in any manner which inhibits the visibility of the issuing
jurisdiction at a reasonable distance; or
(5) has a tinted plate cover.
(b.1) Construction.--Nothing under subsection (b) shall be
construed to prohibit a vehicle from being affixed with a
registration plate frame that minimally outlines the registration
plate in such a manner that the registration plate’s number and
issuing jurisdiction is identifiable by an automated enforcement
system under subsection (b)(2) or by law enforcement.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1332(b), (b.1). Except for the addition of subsection (b)(5), the
legislature directed that the change “shall take effect immediately.” Act of
Nov. 3, 2022, P.L. 1734, No. 112, § 10.
We hold that a subsequent amendment to a law does not negate the
existence of probable cause under the law in effect at the time of a police
interaction. In determining whether to stop a suspect for violating a law, an
officer can and should rely on authoritative court rulings interpreting that law.
Doing so is not a mistake of law, even if the legislature later changes the law.
This flows from the function of the judiciary in our system of government.
Courts possess “the power, the duty and the responsibility of
interpreting . . . all legislation.” Stander v. Kelley, 250 A.2d 474, 482 (Pa.
1969); see Pa. Const. art. V, § 1 (vesting “judicial power” in the courts). “In
construing a statute, the court’s interpretation is considered to be a
declaration of the applicable law as enacted by the legislature.” Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd.,
437 A.2d 778, 780 (Pa.
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Cmwlth. 1981) (citation omitted). Such a decision becomes “the law of the
Commonwealth” until it is overruled or the statute is amended. Randt v.
Abex Corp., 671 A.2d 228, 232 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citing Baker v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co.,
454 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. 1982)); see In re Opperman’s
Estate,
179 A. 735, 736 (Pa. 1935) (holding that a court’s construction of a
statute “must stand, until the Legislature declares otherwise”).
True, subsequent legislation can show that the legislature intends for a
law to be applied differently. Courts interpreting statutes must “ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). A
prompt change to the text of a statute can rebut the presumption that a court’s
“interpretation was in accordance with the intent of the Legislature.”
Commonwealth v. Willson Prods., Inc., 194 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1963).
Nevertheless, legislation is generally prospective. See Rose Corp. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 238 A.3d 551, 559 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (en
banc) (“[S]tatutes must be given prospective effect only, unless the statute
includes clear language to the contrary.”). Our legislature has provided: “No
statute shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so
intended by the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1926. Notably, “new
provisions [of a statute] shall be construed as effective only from the date
when the amendment became effective.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1953. Therefore, if the
General Assembly has not indicated that a new section of a statute should be
applied retroactively, then prior decisions interpreting the statute remain valid
for cases arising prior to the new section’s enactment. See
Randt, supra.
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Here, our Ruffin decision interpreting Section 1332(b)(3) remained
effective on the day Trooper Fornwalt stopped Cahill. When the General
Assembly later added a provision to permit certain registration plate frames,
75 Pa.C.S. § 1332(b.1), it directed that the addition “shall take effect
immediately.” Act of Nov. 3, 2022, P.L. 1734, No. 112, § 10. The General
Assembly did not manifest an intent for the provision to be retroactive, i.e.,
to be applied prior to approval by the Governor. This Court’s interpretation of
the unambiguous statutory text thus remained binding, mandatory authority
across the Commonwealth until the additional provision went into effect.
Trooper Fornwalt made no mistake of law and properly relied on our holding
to find probable cause that Cahill violated the law by displaying a registration
plate with “any” covering.6 Consequently, the traffic stop was valid, and the
trial court did not err by denying suppression. Cahill’s first challenge fails.
In his remaining issues, Cahill challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain his convictions for DUI and resisting arrest. We apply the following
standard:
We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support
the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is
sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element
of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the
sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.
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6 The Commonwealth argues, independently of our holding in Ruffin, that
Cahill’s license plate cover violated Section 1332. Because Ruffin was the
law of Pennsylvania at the time of the stop, we need not analyze this further.
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The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the
province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden
may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt
about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 889–90 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Mollett,
5 A.3d 291, 313 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
As to DUI, Cahill alleges that the Commonwealth failed to prove his guilt
because there was no evidence of erratic driving, no chemical testing of his
blood or the purported marijuana in his car, and no expert testimony that he
was impaired as a result of drug use. Cahill argues that he was able to drive
safely, as he was acquitted of the three moving violations.
The statutory section charged here provides:
An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following
circumstances:
…
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or combination
of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability to safely
drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of
the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). This section “requires only proof that the driver was
under the influence of a drug or a combination of drugs to a degree that the
ability to [safely] drive is impaired.” Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d
342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012). It “does not require that any amount or specific
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quantity of the drug be proven.” Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302,
307 (Pa. Super. 2012).
We recently explained that “impairment evidence should be drawn from
the totality of the factual circumstances,” including direct and circumstantial
evidence. Commonwealth v. Nestor, 314 A.3d 863, 874 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(citing Commonwealth v. Spence,
290 A.3d 301, 309 (Pa. Super. 2023)).
A defendant’s erratic driving, demeanor, and performance on field tests can
support a finding of impairment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williamson,
962 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Pa. Super. 2008). Notably, this Court has found
evidence sufficient to prove impairment despite a defendant’s driving in a
controlled manner, where the defendant admitted to drinking, had bloodshot
eyes, answered questions inappropriately, and refused a blood test. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Gruff,
822 A.2d 773, 782 (Pa. Super. 2003);
id. at 795–
96 (Bender, J., dissenting in part).7
Section 3802(d)(2) does not require expert testimony to prove that a
driver’s impairment was caused by drugs, although our Supreme Court
acknowledged that such testimony “may be helpful, or perhaps even
necessary,” depending on the case. Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d
1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011). Expert testimony is necessary where there is no
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7 Gruff involved a provision of the Vehicle Code that prohibited driving “under
the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe
driving,” former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1), the predecessor to 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3802(a)(1). A fortiori, the quantum of evidence to prove that a defendant
was incapable of safe driving can also prove that his ability to safely drive
was impaired. Compare 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) with id. § 3802(d)(2).
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“other independent evidence of impairment.” Commonwealth v. Gause,
164 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc).
The facts in Gause established the need for expert proof that a driver
was impaired due to marijuana use. Because the driver promptly pulled over
for police lights, provided his documents without fumbling, did not have
bloodshot eyes, and did not admit to recent use of marijuana, expert
testimony was needed to prove impairment. Id. However, the only evidence
of marijuana impairment was an officer’s testimony based on eyelid tremors.
Id. at 536, 539. This Court held the testimony to be inadmissible as a lay
opinion, concluded that the error was not harmless, and found the remaining
evidence to be insufficient to sustain the driver’s conviction under Section
3802(d)(2).
Id. at 539–40.
Here, by contrast, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Cahill was
driving under the influence of marijuana to a degree that impaired his ability
to safely drive, without the need for expert testimony. Trooper Fornwalt
observed Cahill cross the white fog line while driving, smelled burnt marijuana,
and saw that Cahill had glassy, bloodshot eyes. Cahill said he was a Maryland
medical marijuana patient and that there was marijuana in the car. Cahill
showed signs of possible impairment during field tests by not following
directions, swaying while standing, and using his arms. Trooper Fornwalt
testified without objection that he believed Cahill was incapable of safe driving.
This is enough to prove guilt under Section 3802(d)(2). As the trial court
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reasoned, Cahill’s performance on the field tests showed that Cahill “did not
have the coordination needed to safely drive.”
Additionally, Cahill’s actions showed consciousness of guilt. When
Trooper Fornwalt approached him, Cahill had a freshly lit cigarette. While
Trooper Fornwalt prepared a search warrant for a blood draw, Cahill
repeatedly banged his head against the wall, causing such a disturbance that
the trooper never finished the warrant. The trial court could infer that Cahill
knew he was impaired by marijuana when he tried to mask the smell of
marijuana and prevent a blood draw that would show the presence of
marijuana.
Therefore, despite Cahill’s substantially controlled driving, the totality of
the evidence was sufficient to establish impairment. Cahill’s challenge to his
DUI conviction fails.
Finally, Cahill contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction for resisting arrest. He asserts that his arrest was unlawful and
that his actions at the barracks did not injure any of the troopers who tried to
control him.
The statute provides: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the second
degree if, with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful
arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying
or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
This offense requires proof that a public servant was effecting a lawful arrest
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or discharging a legal duty “other than arrest,” which the defendant intended
to prevent. See Commonwealth v. Karl, 476 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. Super.
1984).8 The Commonwealth does not need to establish actual injury.
Commonwealth v. Lyons,
555 A.2d 920, 925 (Pa. Super. 1989). Instead,
it may prove either that the defendant’s actions created a substantial risk of
serious bodily injury or that the defendant employed means justifying or
requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.
Id. For example,
evidence was sufficient where an arrestee tried to swim away in a creek,
requiring four deputy sheriffs to subdue him.
Id.
Here, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Cahill’s conviction for
resisting arrest. Trooper Fornwalt lawfully arrested Cahill on suspicion of DUI
and was preparing a search warrant for a blood draw. Cahill repeatedly
banged his head against the wall, ultimately requiring six officers to restrain
him from kicking and flailing. When Cahill was being driven to the prison, an
officer had to sit in the back of the patrol vehicle and restrain Cahill’s head.
The trial court could find that Cahill, who was under a lawful arrest, acted up
to prevent the officers from acquiring a search warrant and transporting him
to the prison. Cahill’s final challenge fails.
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8 Notably, the phrase “discharging any other duty” does not include police
investigation following an unlawful arrest. Commonwealth v. Karl, 476 A.2d
908, 911 (Pa. Super. 1984). Here, however, the police actions followed a
lawful arrest.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/10/2024
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