Hattison v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1996
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 18 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently May 2016
2 federal appellate · 18 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Jackson v. Indiana · Campbell v. State · State v. Steele · Schock v. Thomas
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“When the General Assembly uses the word “shall,” we hold the effect is mandatory unless an absurdity would result. Campbell v. State, 311 Ark. 641 , 846 S.W.2d 639 (1993). The 30-day requirement is thus mandatory in the literal sense. The question remains, however, whether the sanction for violation of it is, as Mr. Harrison argues, loss of jurisdiction in the probate Court to decide whether continuation of his commitment is justified. The statute does not address any sanction to be employed, and Mr. Hattison cites no case suggesting it was the General Assembly’s intent to deprive the Probate Court of jurisdiction should the report be untimely. Mr. Hattison . . . has been found lacking in mental capacity sufficient to have committed the crimes with which he was charged. According to § 5-2~314(e), Mr. Hattison now has the burden of proving to the Probate Court that “his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another due to a present mental disease or defect.” Jurisdiction of the Probate Court was established by the “automatic” order of commitment entered by the Circuit Court. While a commitment cannot be “indefinite,” Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493 , 625 S.W.2d 521 (1981), citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.715 (1972), we know of no reason to deprive the Probate Court of jurisdiction due to a late psychiatric report. Had that been the intention of the General Assembly, it could easily have so provided[.]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“On the basis of the report filed pursuant to § 5-2-305, the court may . . . enter judgment of acquittal on the ground of mental disease or defect if it is satisfied that, at the time of the conduct charged, the defendant lacked capacity, as a result of mental' disease or defect, to conform his conduct to the requirements of law or to appreciate the criminality'of his conduct. If-the defendant did not raise the issue of mental disease or dtfect pursuant to § 5-2-305(a)(1), then the court shall he required to make a factual determination that the defendant committed the offense and that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the commission of the offense.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Cleveland v. Frazier“The Director of the Department of Human Services shall file the psychiatric or psychological report with a probate court having venue within thirty (30) days following entry of order of acquittal. A hearing shall be conducted by the probate court and shall take place not later than ten (10) days following the filing of the report with the probate court.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Daniels v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.