State v. Bennett’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In State v. Whelan , supra, 200 Conn. at 753 , 513 A.2d 86 ... we adopted a hearsay exception allowing the substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements, signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. This rule has also been codified in § 8-5(1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which incorporates all of the developments and clarifications of the Whelan rule that have occurred since Whelan was decided.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 178 Conn. App. 16 - State v. Jackson · 174 Conn. App. 675 - State v. O'Donnell

2. “The legal principles guiding the exercise of the trial court's discretion regarding the admission of hearsay evidence under the residual exception are well established. An [out-of-court] statement is hearsay when it is offered to establish the truth of the matters contained therein.... As a general rule, hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it falls under one of several well established exceptions.... The purpose behind the hearsay rule is to effectuate the policy of requiring that testimony be given in open court, under oath, and subject to cross-examination.... The residual, or catch-all, exception to the hearsay rule allows a trial court to admit hearsay evidence not admissible under any of the established exceptions if: (1) there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the statement, and (2) the statement is supported by the equivalent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness essential to other evidence admitted under the traditional hearsay exceptions.... We have recognized that [t]he residual hearsay exceptions [should be] applied in the rarest of cases ....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 181 Conn. App. 215 - State v. Rivera

3. “[i]t is well settled that the prosecutor, as a public official seeking impartial justice on behalf of the people of this state, has a heightened duty to avoid argument [or questioning] that strays from the evidence or diverts the jury's attention from the facts of the case. ... Nonetheless, in evaluating claims of impropriety during summation, we recognize that the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed or unduly hampered .... Thus, as the state's advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state's case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. ... Moreover, [i]t does not follow ... that every use of rhetorical language or device [by the prosecutor] is improper. ... The occasional use of rhetorical devices is simply fair argument.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 175 Conn. App. 22 - State v. Franklin