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← 324 F.2d 795 - United States v. Garguilo

United States v. Garguilo’s Empirical Analysis

324 F.2d 795 · 1963

Citation profile

134
cited by 134 later decisions
10
states following
October 2005
most recently cited

85 federal appellate · 5 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 134 later decisions — most recently October 2005 · most notably 157 W. Va. 640 - State v. Thomas (1974), United States v. Bubar (1977)

85 federal appellate · 5 district · 14 state decisions — followed in 10 states

75019631970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 474 · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on United State v. Morgan · Parker v. Ellis · Costello v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · United States v. Wight · Dorsey v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 134 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““* * -* iphe proof of the efficiency of such assistance lies in the character of the resultant proceedings, and unless the purported representation by counsel was such as to make the trial a farce and a mockery of jus tice, mere allegations of ineompetency or inefficiency of counsel will not ordinarily suffice as grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus * * * [citations omitted]. “A lack of effective assistance of counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the Court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice [citations omitted]. * -X- -X- 9*”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““ * * * The decision whether to place a defendant on the stand in a criminal case is always a difficult one — indeed, probably the most difficult decision for a defendant and his counsel to make. Experienced trial counsel will often differ as to the wisdom of such a course in a particular case; varying answers are possible as the advantages of a defendant’s testimony are weighed against the potential hazards of a vigorous cross-examination. Similarly, the advisability of calling particular witnesses or the value of extensive cross-examination are matters open to honest differences of opinion — especially where, as here, the evidence to be elicited would not have directly rebutted the strong case against the appellant, [footnote omitted] Compare Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 , 83 S.Ct. 1110 , 10 L.Ed.2d 143 (1963). It may well be that another attorney would have resolved these problems differently and that Garguilo would have profited by sounder advice. Yet this in no way suggests that he has been denied a fair trial, or that the errors of counsel were so outrageously incompetent as to shock the conscience of the court. “[7] It thus seems clear that Garguilo is merely complaining of alleged tactical errors or mistakes in strategy, and for these we can grant no relief. United States v. Duhart, 269 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1959). Even assuming counsel to have erred in the respects alleged, the petition was properly denied. When reviewing c”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““We hardly consider such errors, if indeed they were errors at all, sufficient to warrant reversal. The decision whether to place a defendant on the stand in a criminal case is always a difficult one — indeed, probably the most difficult decision for a defendant and his counsel to make. Experienced trial counsel will often differ as to the wisdom of such a course in a particular case; varying answers are possible as the advantages of a defendant’s testimony are weighed against the potential hazards of a vigorous cross-examination. Similarly, the advisability of calling particular witnesses or the value of extensive cross-examination are matters open to honest differences of opinion — especially where, as here, the evidence to be elicited would not have directly rebutted the strong case against the appellant. Compare Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9 Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 , 83 S.Ct. 1110 , 10 L.Ed.2d 143 (1963). It may well be that another attorney would have resolved these problems differently and that Garguilo would have profited by sounder advice. Yet this is no way suggests that he has been denied a fair trial, or that the errors of counsel were so outrageously incompetent as to shock the conscience of the court.” 324 F.2d at 797 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.