53
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Submitted December 23, 2022, affirmed February 1, 2023
In the Matter of M. S.,
a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
M. S.,
Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
22CC00644; A178028
Jenna R. Plank, Judge.
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Leigh A. Salmon, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Egan, Presiding Judge, and Kamins, Judge, and
Hadlock, Judge pro tempore.
EGAN, P. J.
Affirmed.
54 State v. M. S.
EGAN, P. J.
In this involuntary commitment case, appellant
appeals a judgment committing her to the Oregon Health
Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, based on her
being unable to provide for her basic needs due to a mental disorder. See ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C); ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B).
She does not contest that she has a mental disorder, but she
argues that the state failed to establish that she was unable
to provide for her basic needs. As explained below, the record
supports the trial court’s determination that appellant suffered from a mental disorder such that she was unable to
meet her basic needs. Accordingly, we affirm.
The trial court may involuntarily commit a person if
it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a “person with a mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C).
A “person with a mental illness” is someone who suffers
from a “mental disorder” and, as a result of that disorder, is
“[u]nable to provide for basic personal needs that are necessary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future, and
is not receiving such care as necessary to avoid such harm.”
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B).
“Serious physical harm” is “bodily harm that is serious enough that a person who suffers that harm is unsafe
in the absence of commitment, treatment, or other amelioration of the physical condition.” State v. M. A. E., 299 Or App
231, 239,
448 P3d 656 (2019). The “serious physical harm”
does not need to be immediate to justify involuntary commitment; the evidence is sufficient to support commitment
if “the person’s mental disorder, and resulting lack of ability
to provide for basic needs, puts the person at risk of [serious
physical harm] in the near future.”
Id. at 240.
Appellant did not request that the court review her
case de novo, nor would we do so, as this is not an exceptional case justifying such review. See ORAP 5.40(8)(C) (providing that the court will exercise its discretion to review
de novo “only in exceptional cases”). Accordingly, “[w]e review
whether the state presented sufficient evidence to support
appellant’s civil commitment for legal error and are bound
by the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 324 Or App 53 (2023) 55
evidence in the record.” State v. C. M. C.,
301 Or App 206,
207,
454 P3d 30 (2019).
At the commitment hearing, the state presented
the following evidence: Appellant has been diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder and has a history of multiple hospitalizations. During the three days preceding the instant
hospitalization, appellant did not sleep, eat, or drink, because
she believed that her food and water were poisoned; ran
outside in the cold without shoes or a coat and hid in her
neighbor’s bushes throughout the night; urinated and defecated in the living room of her home, because she believed
there was acid on the toilet seat; and locked her partner in a
bedroom, because she believed her partner was dangerous.
Appellant’s partner called a crisis line several times during
those three days, and appellant’s mental health counselor
came to her home three times, observing appellant outside
in the cold in shorts and a t-shirt. On the last visit, the counselor found appellant inside her home with her pants around
her knees, exposing herself, looking very pale, sweating,
and disoriented.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found
that appellant was unable to care for her basic needs, and
it entered a judgment committing appellant to the Oregon
Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days.
On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support commitment, because it was too
speculative that her eating and drinking habits would lead
to serious physical harm in the near term. Appellant also
argues that she was not at risk of suffering physical harm
based on “dehydration, starvation, a lack of housing, or a
lack of adequate medical care,” because her lab results upon
admission to the hospital did not show signs of malnutrition.
We conclude that the state presented evidence from
which a rational factfinder could find that it was highly probable that appellant was unable to provide for her basic needs
and was at a nonspeculative risk of serious physical harm in
the near future. That included evidence that appellant was
not eating or drinking before her hospitalization and that,
due to her mental disorder, she believed her food and water
were poisoned. Appellant also testified at trial that she did
56 State v. M. S.
not have a mental disorder and would not take medications
for her mental disorder or diabetes. That evidence, paired
with the testimony that appellant does not eat or drink
because of her delusions, was sufficient to allow the trial
court to infer that appellant would be at risk of suffering
physical harm that would compromise her ability to safely
survive in the near future if she were released from hospitalization. See State v. M. A. E., 299 Or App 231, 242,
448
P3d 656 (2019) (when the evidence showed that an appellant
would be unable to make food arrangements due to a mental
disorder, “the trial court could infer, as a matter of common
knowledge, that a person who literally does not eat will soon
be at risk of suffering serious physical harm—of a sort that
compromises the person’s ability to safely survive—in the
near future”); see also State v. N. S.,
306 Or App 140, 148,
472 P3d 818 (2020) (“[W]hen an individual cannot function
without medications, refusal to take them is evidence of an
inability to provide for basic personal needs.”).
Additionally, appellant refused to articulate a plan
for finding shelter, and appellant’s partner indicated that
appellant could not return to their home, as it would be
unsafe for the partner. Houselessness, on its own, is not a
sufficient ground for commitment. State v. M. B., 300 Or App
522, 528,
452 P3d 1006 (2019). But shelter is a basic need,
N. S.,
306 Or App at 147, and that evidence, along with the
evidence discussed above, further supported the trial court’s
determination that, because of a mental disorder, appellant
could not meet her basic needs such that there was a nonspeculative risk of serious harm. Therefore, the trial court
did not err by committing appellant.
Affirmed.
