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← 325 F.2d 370 - Lyons v. United States

Lyons v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

325 F.2d 370 · 1963

Citation profile

114
cited by 114 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
5
states following
April 2001
most recently cited

74 federal appellate · 7 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 114 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2001 · most notably Liteky et al United States (1994), United States v. Haldeman (1976)

74 federal appellate · 7 district · 8 state decisions

55019631970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990) · 28 U.S.C. § 144

Relies on Lutwak v. United States · Crooker v. California · National Labor Relations Board v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc. · Black v. Amen · Cities Service Gas Producing Company v. Federal Power Commission

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 114 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ ‘The section [144] is directed to personal bias, which means an attitude of extrajudicial origin. A mere showing of prior judicial exposure to the present parties or questions will not invoke the section.’ ” (Citing Lyons v. United States (9 Cir. 1963), 325 F. 2d 370, 376 , cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969 , 84 S.Ct. 1650 , 12 L.Ed.2d 738 . Court held affidavits legally insufficient.)”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Thus, appellant, through his attorney, impliedly consented to the proposed instruction concerning his professional status. This implied consent, when considered together with his failure to object to, and apparent acquiescence in, the instruction, when it was actually given, shows that ultimately appellant’s status as a suspended attorney was an admitted and uncontroverted fact. “Although an instruction which assumes a fact which is in issue is prejudicially erroneous, Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961), Carothers v. United States, 161 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1947), an instruction, such as the one given here, which assumes an admitted or uncontroverted fact, is not reversible error. Malone v. United States, 238 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1956). United States v. Jonikas, 197 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 877 , 73 S.Ct. 171 , 97 L.Ed. 679 . Nordgren v. United States, 181 F.2d 718 [ 12 Alaska 671 ] (C.A.9 1950). “Moreover, in the course of its instructions, the trial court several times advised the jury that it is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Such an instruction would not cure a prejudicial error in a charge, United States v. Gollin, 166 F.2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1948), cert. denied 333 U.S. 875 , 68 S.Ct. 905 , 92 L.Ed. 1151 ; but in a case such as this, it lends support to the conclusion that there was no ‘miscarriage of justice.’ Herzog v. United States, supra, [ 235 F.2d 664 ] 667 (on rehearing) . “In view of t”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.