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← 325 F.3d 243 - Robertson v. Cockrell

Robertson v. Cockrell’s Empirical Analysis

325 F.3d 243 · 2003

Citation profile

47
cited by 47 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
March 2010
most recently cited

29 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey · Williams v. Taylor · Santosky v. Kramer · Teague v. Lane · Furman v. Georgia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “`You are instructed that when you deliberate on the questions posed in the special issues, you are to consider mitigating circumstances, if any, supported by the evidence presented in both phases of the trial, whether presented by the state or the defendant. A mitigating circumstance may include, but is not limited to, any aspect of the defendant's character and record or circumstances of the crime which you believe could make a death sentence inappropriate in this case. If you find that there are any mitigating circumstances in this case, you must decide how much weight they deserve, if any, and therefore, give effect and consideration to them in assessing the defendant's personal culpability at the time you answer the special issue. If you determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that a life sentence, as reflected by a negative finding to the issue under consideration, rather than a death sentence, is an appropriate response to the personal culpability of the defendant, a negative finding should be given to one of the special issues.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “For ten years, this court has [asked] ...: Was the criminal act “due to the uniquely severe permanent handicaps with which the defendant was burdened through no fault of his own”? Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009 , 1029 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc), aff'd, 506 U.S. 461 , 113 S.Ct. 892 , 122 L.Ed.2d 260 , (1993). This formulation encompasses four principles found in Penry I: voluntariness, permanence, severity, and attribution. Did the defendant acquire his disability voluntarily or involuntarily? Is the disability transient or permanent? Is the disability trivial or severe? Were the criminal acts a consequence of this disability?”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The mechanism created by the supplemental instruction thus inserted `an element of capriciousness' into the sentencing decision, `making the jurors' power to avoid the death penalty dependent on their willingness' to elevate the supplemental instruction over the verdict form instructions. There is, at the very least, `a reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevent[ed] the consideration' of Penry's mental retardation and childhood abuse. The supplemental instruction therefore provided an inadequate vehicle for the jury to make a reasoned moral response to Penry's mitigating evidence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.