Cobb v. Benjamin’s Empirical Analysis
1997
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 42 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently August 2014 · most notably Floyd v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance (2005), Trivelas v. South Carolina Department of Transportation (2001)
2 federal appellate · 42 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 223 N.J. Super. 174 - Longworth v. Van Houten · Schmidt v. Clothier · C.A.N. Enterprises, Inc. v. South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission · 107 Wash. 2d 721 - Hamilton v. Farmers Insurance Co. · Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Other jurisdictions hold that a Covenant Not To Execute is not a satisfaction or a release and that its legal effect is similar to that of a Covenant Not To Sue because it does not operate to release other joint tortfeasors. A Covenant Not To Execute is a promise not to enforce a right of action or execute a judgment when one had such a right at the time of entering into the agreement. A Covenant Not to Sue and a Covenant Not to Execute are so closely akin that a major distinguishing factor is that the latter is normally executed when a settlement occurs after the filing of a lawsuit, while the former is entered into before a lawsuit is filed. In South Carolina when a Covenant Not To Sue has been entered into, usually the covenanting tortfeasor is no longer a party to the litigation.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[T]his interpretation ... is consistent with traditional notions of judicial economy. There is no reason to require payment of full policy limits of available liability coverage as a precondition to UIM benefits. Such a requirement does not benefit the UIM carrier, as long as it is given a credit for the liability limits which were available. There may be many reasons settlement for less than limits is advantageous. As recognized by other courts which have analyzed this issue, they include: (a) the difficulty of ascertaining the exact amount of settlement in some structured agreements, such as those which include future medical benefits contingent upon surgery or other medical need; (b) the uncertainty of recovery, and the costs associated with continuing litigation; and (c) the health or other current necessities of the insured or the at-fault driver making immediate compromise propitious. These reasons nourish settlement, consistent with judicial economy.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“The insurer has the right to appear and defend in the name of the underinsured motorist in any action which may affect its liability and has thirty days after service of process on it in which to appear.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.