Whittlesey v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 34 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] subsequent indictment on a second offense, otherwise barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is not barred if, at the time of prosecution for the earlier offense a reasonable prosecutor, having full knowledge of the facts which were known and in the exercise of due diligence should have been known to the police and prosecutor at that time, would not be satisfied that he or she would be able to establish the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Whittlesey v. Conroy · Spencer v. State

2. “It is ... well-established ... that a felony such as robbery, rape, or kidnapping, and a wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder (or any species of murder other than felony murder), both arising out of the same transaction, are not deemed the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., State v. Frye, 283 Md. [709,] 716, 393 A.2d [1372,] 1376 [(1978)] (‘‘if a first degree murder conviction is premised upon independent proof of wilfulness, premeditation and deliberation under Art. 27, § 407, then the murder, even though committed in the course of a felony, would not be deemed the same offense as the felony ..."). Consequently, under long-established double jeopardy principles, the double jeopardy prohibition does not bar the prosecution of a defendant for an intentional homicide, even though the defendant was earlier prosecuted and convicted for robbing, raping, or kidnapping the same victim. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 140-43 , 468 A.2d 101, 114-16 (1983) (earlier kidnapping prosecution and conviction did not preclude subsequent murder prosecution where the murder prosecution was based on proof of willfulness, premeditation and deliberation).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Whittlesey v. State

3. “We think, in the light of the facts which were known at the time of the robbery indictment, and considering that there were facts which were then unknown despite the exercise of due diligence, a reasonable prosecutor would not be satisfied that he or she would be able to establish Whittlesey’s guilt [of murder] beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the Diaz exception applies and serves to permit prosecution on the murder indictment. The Double Jeopardy Clause interposes no bar to prosecution under that indictment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 166 Md. App. 135 - Warne v. State