State v. Davis

                                302

   This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
    pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
         except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
          Argued and submitted May 9, affirmed June 7, 2023.


                   STATE OF OREGON,
                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
                               v.
                    SETH ERIC DAVIS,
                  Defendant-Respondent.
              Washington County Circuit Court
                   20CR45338; A176881


  Eric Butterfield, Judge.
   Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
   David O. Ferry, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for respondent. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 

 (2023)            303

        TOOKEY, P. J.

         The state appeals a pretrial order suppressing statements defendant made during police questioning. The trial
court determined that defendant, who was not provided
Miranda warnings, was in compelling circumstances when
he made the statements and invoked his right to remain
silent. On appeal, the state contends that the trial court
erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress.

         “[W]e consider the factual findings that the trial
court made in support of its conclusions, and, to the extent
that the trial court did not make explicit findings with
regard to any pertinent fact, we presume that the trial court
decided the facts in a manner consistent with those conclusions.” State v. Powell, 

, 

 (2012).
Additionally, “we are bound by a trial court’s ‘finding’ that
a party’s evidence is not sufficiently persuasive.” State v.
Johnson, 

, 

 (2003). We review the
trial court’s legal conclusions for errors of law. Powell, 

. In the trial court, the state had the burden of
proving that “ ‘defendant’s unwarned statements were not
made while [he] was in compelling circumstances.’ ” State
v. Grimm, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2018) (emphasis in Grimm; quoting State v. Roble-Baker, 

, 

 (2006)).

         Having considered the record, as viewed in light of
our standard of review, we conclude that trial court did not
err. In reaching that conclusion, we note that although the
location of the encounter and the length of the encounter
militate toward a determination that defendant was not in
compelling circumstances, the evidence would have allowed
the trial court to determine that defendant was in compelling circumstances based on the amount of pressure exerted
on defendant and that a reasonable person in defendant’s
position would not have perceived that they were free to terminate the encounter. See Roble-Baker, 

(explaining that, to determine if circumstances are compelling, the court considers, among other factors, “(1) the location of the encounter; (2) the length of the encounter; (3) the
amount of pressure exerted on the defendant; and (4) the
304                                        State v. Davis

defendant’s ability to terminate the encounter” (internal
citation omitted)).
       Affirmed.