In re Michael’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

255 federal appellate · 31 district · 113 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 510 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore, it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial. It need not necessarily, however, obstruct or halt the judicial process. For the function of a trial is to sift the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence, and to do so the fact-finding tribunal must hear both truthful and false witnesses.”

   24 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Collins v. United States · United States v. Essex

2. “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.”

   13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Oliver · In re Brown

3. ““These unequivocal answers [given by Michael] were clear enough so that if they are shown to be false petitioner would clearly be guilty of perjury. But he could have been indicted for that offense, in which event a jury would have been the proper tribunal to say whether he or other witnesses told the truth. * * * “Not very long ago we had occasion to point out that the Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 487 , from which Sec. 268 of the Judicial Code [now 18 U.S.C. 401-2] derives, represented a deliberate Congressional purpose drastically to curtail the range of conduct which Courts could punish as contempt. * * * But the references to that Act’s history in the Nye case, supra, reveal a Congressional intent to safeguard constitutional procedures by limiting courts, as Congress is limited in contempt cases, to ‘the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.’ * * The exercise by federal courts of any broader contempt power than this would permit too great inroads on the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, since contempts are summary in their nature, and leave determination of guilt to a judge rather than a jury. * * * “Here there was, at best, no element except perjury ‘clearly shown.’ .*x * * jn thg ingtant case there was collateral inquiry; the testimony of other witnesses was invoked to convince the trial judge that petitioner was a perjurer. Only after determining from their testimony that petitioner had wilfully sworn falsely, did the Court conclude that petitioner ‘was”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Matusow v. United States · 55 Wash. 2d 576 - State v. Estill