Schenley Distillers Corporation v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

100 federal appellate · 28 district · 50 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 298 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “While corporate entities may be disregarded where they are made the implement for avoiding a clear legislative purpose, they will not be disregarded where those in control have deliberately adopted the corporate form in order to secure its advantages and where no violence to the legislative purpose is done by treating the corporate entity as a separate legal person.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Shippers Cooperative, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission · CAO Holdings, Inc. v. Trost

2. ““Plaintiffs [interveners contesting a Commission determination that Lenoir Chair Company and Schen-ley Distillers Corporation, petitioners in the original proceedings before the Commission, were engaged in private carriage and therefore not required to secure a permit authorizing their operations] are here attributing to the term ‘compensation’ a mystical significance which the term does not possess. There are fallacies in this contention even if resort be had, as plaintiffs wish, to mere mechanical logic and a purely analytical interpretation of the terms used in the statutory definitions. Thus, the clause ‘when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise’ appears (a) in the definition of private carrier, but not (b) in the other two definitions, common carrier and contract carrier. Accordingly, by this same logic, the basic difference between (on the one hand) common carriers and contract carriers and (on the other hand) private carriers, is whether or not the ‘transportation is for the purpose of sales, lease, rent or bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.’ Possibly, this confused thinking of plaintiffs may be due somewhat to the fact that at common law, the common carrier of goods must carry for a compensation. See, Dobie, Bailments and Carriers, 296, 300, 304. “The history of the Act, we think, completely demolishes the validity of plaintiff’s compensation criterion and suppor”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 225 F. Supp. 973 - Studna v. United States

3. ““The district court rightly held that the parent corporation had no standing to sue. It did not ask that a permit be issued to it, and its sole interest in the permit sought for its co-appellant was that of a stockholder. * * * For the parent is adequately represented for purposes of suit by the subsidiary whose conduct of the litigation it controls. We conclude that the character of a stockholder’s interest in this regard is not so altered by the mere facts that it owns all the stock of the corporation against which the commission’s order is entered and that the parent manages and controls its subsidiary, as to give the stockholder standing to sue to set aside the commission’s order.” 326 U.S. at 435 , 66 S.Ct. at 248 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pepsico, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board